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From 2013 to 2018, Brazil was encapsulated in a multisited crisis that unsettled its political order. 
Unlike other turmoil in the country’s history, this one was strongly influenced by ordinary Brazilians 
who found a space to express themselves politically on digital platforms. This thesis aims to 
understand how the datafied government of users’ visibility by Facebook (Brazil’s most popular 
platform) can be understood to have structured these everyday experiences and, in so doing, to have 
prompted these individuals to (re)constitute the ways they act and comprehend themselves as 
citizens. 
 
To investigate these processes of civic becoming, the thesis develops a conceptual framework that 
uses elements of social practices theory to bridge critical notions of citizenship, recognition, 
datafication, and visibility. It is proposed that one of Facebook’s primary power techniques is the 
attempt to direct how the algorithmic visibility regime that supports its business model is imagined by 
users so as to try to prefigure these users’ actions. 
 
A thematic analysis of interviews with 47 users suggests that the ambiguous knowability of the 
platform’s machine learning algorithms gives rise to three sociomaterial imaginaries of its algorithmic 
visibility regime. Combined with assumptions about Brazil’s troubled democracy, these imaginaries 
(and the imagined others that populate them) are found to generate a paradoxical understanding of 
how civic worth is granted on Facebook, according to which being heard often depends on silencing 
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The image in my memory seems intact. It is a night in June 2013. I am in Brasília, leaning 
against the ramp of the Congresso Nacional. I examine the construction – two narrow rectangles of 
glass and concrete framed within two enormous plates, playful semi-spherical representations of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives. The construction appears, as ever, oddly opulent; however, 
its surroundings are occupied by strangers. Large groups of teenagers are sitting on the lawn, giggling 
as they look at their phones. The small pond has been occupied by young Black men, who, shirtless, 
are throwing water at each other. A man runs – screaming for some unfathomable reason. A small 
crowd starts to occupy the roof of the building. Onlookers hold up their phones, filming non-stop, 
maybe as amazed as I am. I remember thinking about the surrealism of what I was witnessing. Perhaps 
strangest of all was that, for some time, there were no authority figures – police officers, men in suits, 
the military – to be seen. It was as if the usual occupants of that bureaucratic palace, designed in the 
1950s to mark Brazil’s then (seemingly) irresistible democratization, had been expelled by the 
uninvited guests. Suddenly, someone began to chant: "Oooh, o gigante acordou, o gigante acordou” 
[the giant has woken up, the giant has woken up]. In a state of seeming bewilderment, others joined 
in. By "giant" they meant “we”: we have woken up, we, the Brazilian people will not accept that a tiny 
elite keeps pretending that we do not exist. I felt a shiver and an urge to join in the singing, but this 
would have been weird behaviour. I was a journalist, wearing an obvious badge. It had been a busy 
reporting day: several other government buildings in the same area had been occupied, some of them 
violently. Similar events were happening not just in Brasilia alone, nor just on that one day. 
Throughout June 2013, Brazil lived a democratic oneiric scenario – sometimes dreamlike, sometimes 
nightmarish. Street demonstrations of a size never before seen in the country broke out in most of 
the main cities, often followed by bloody responses from the police. Those protests seemed conjured 
by some sort of magic: there was no single reason for the turmoil, no one had ordered those people 
to be there – or so I thought. I remember interviewing a teenager. Why are you here?, I asked. He 
replied, slightly perplexed by my question: “Everyone was coming, what do you mean?”. In fact there 
were people who were telling “everyone” to be there. Not in the mainstream media of the kind I was 
working for, but on the Internet and, most likely, Facebook, whose number of Brazilian users were 
mushrooming at the time. In my memory, the protesters continued to chant about a giant that wakes 
up, until they were suddenly interrupted by a boom and a cloud of white smoke. I looked and could 
see officers approaching, wearing black helmets and holding tear gas guns. At first, the people 
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returned to their song, but the burning smell soon became unbearable. People were coughing, 
running, someone slipped among the shards of glass covering the ground; I also ran. It would not be 
long before the building was returned to its traditional occupants. 
 
During the time this thesis was produced, it had become commonplace in Brazil’s public 
commentary to say that June 2013 and its sudden and angry multitudes were not over (Sakamoto, 
2015; Ortellado, 2019). There is some truth in this. Recalling that night in Brasilia, it contained 
elements of what would come to define the Brazilian crisis, which in this thesis I describe as the 
multisited turbulence that, between 2013 and 2018, disrupted the Brazilian political landscape. 
Already occurring were the rebirth of a dormant nationalism, the vanishing of a decaying political elite, 
a sense of regression and – perhaps primarily – the prominence of a certain political actor and of a 
certain political space. The actor is the “ordinary people”,1 whose unimportance had so far been a 
defining trait of Brazilian democracy. The space is datafied platforms, in particular Facebook, the most 
popular of its kind in Brazil. The demonstrations that mesmerized the country since 2013, the 
impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 and the far-right landslide victory in the 2018 
elections – all these collective occurrences which, in Brazil’s public discourse, have become known as 
“the crisis” would be unthinkable without the actions of such individuals in these (and other) online 
spaces, as Chapter 2 argues. 
 
However, this study is concerned with not how these ordinary people created “the crisis”, but 
whether and how the everyday experience of creating the “critical events” (Das, 1995) of the crisis, as 
lived by them on platforms, (re)constituted these individuals as citizens. Certainly, the unfolding of 
such processes does not depend on crises. But they seem to be accelerated by turmoil, which renders 
more vivid the urgency to act, “and [makes] their contrast with ‘passive citizenship’… more 
conspicuous” (Balibar, 2015, p. 128). Comparable processes of civic becoming have been extensively 
investigated in relation to legal frameworks – that is, how individuals begin to be political by 
performing and claiming their rights (e.g. Isin, 2008; Zivi, 2012). While rights might be underlying the 
processes this study analyses, my main interest is in a relatively new form of structure – that enacted 
by the datafication operations developed by platforms to govern the visibility of their end users. How 
did Facebook’s engineered patterns of seeing and reading (which I theorize as an algorithmic visibility 
regime) shape the way those Brazilians ordinary end users acted and understood themselves as 
 
1 In this study, “ordinary people” refers to individuals whose political participation happens outside of political 
organizations and do not identify as “activists”. They are referred to, also, as “ordinary end users”, or, for stylistic 
reasons, as simply “end users” and “users” – although I realize that not all end users are “ordinary”. See Sections 
3.2 and 4.4.2. 
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citizens (what I theorize as their civic voices) during the crisis? This is the question that this thesis 
addresses. 
 
The significance of the constitution of citizens might appear self-evident. After all, citizens are 
often seen as the typical subjects of democracy. They are the ones who are expected to vote, discuss, 
protest and hold their rulers accountable. As critical legal scholar Julie Cohen (2013, p. 1912) 
summarizes, a “democratic society cannot sustain itself without citizens who possess the capacity for 
democratic self-government”. At the same time, political theorists have long pointed out that the 
relationship between citizenship and democracy is paradoxical (Mouffe, 2000). As a system of 
government, democracy has come to be associated with the establishment and enforcement of equal 
and universal individual rights, an endeavour which, in order supposedly to guarantee some basic level 
of freedom to all, partially curtails the sovereignty of citizens (cf. Balibar, 2015; Young, 2000). Solutions 
to this paradox are necessarily contingent, Mouffe argues (see also Wolin, 2016), and their stability 
depends on whether they are realized, accepted and resisted by these citizens. Therefore, by looking 
into the constitution of citizens one can observe a crucial terrain where the normative nature of 
democratic culture is disputed and defined. Mouffe and others are keen to stress the “democratic 
deficit” of post-Cold War Western democracies, that is, how a particular interpretation of what count 
as “individual rights”, centred on free enterprise, was eroding the rule of the demos (cf. Crouch, 2004; 
Ranciére, 2006; Brown, 2015; Norris, 2011; Mair, 2013). In this view, the ideal of “liberal democracy” 
is often a mirage. This certainly applies to the case of Brazil – but for historically different reasons. 
 
1.2. The Contradictions of Democracy in Brazil 
The very attempt to create a democratic society is relatively new for Brazil (Avritzer, 2018; 
Carvalho, 2002). Anthropologist James Holston (2008) points out that the country’s political history is 
characterized by an “inclusively inegalitarian citizenship”. That is, social differences originate not in 
decisions regarding membership of a national community (which from early on was granted 
universally), but through an unequal “distribution of rights, meanings, institutions and practices that 
membership entails to those deemed citizens” (Holston, 2008, p. 7; cf. Carvalho, 2002). This is not to 
say that Brazil is a “deviant” democracy – after all, as I have just noted, supposedly “correct” models 
also fall short of their promises. Nevertheless, its particular development has engendered what was 
described, at least until some years ago, as a “low intensity democracy” (Arantes, 2014, p. 718). The 
electorate usually vote without direct interference and the three branches of the government are 
more or less functional, but, despite localized attempts to implement radical participatory policies 
(Avritzer, 2006), democracy is “still very undemocratic” (Nobre, 2013, p. 7). Certainly, subalterns have 
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always fought, in one way or another, against inequalities, state authoritarianism and the acute elitism 
of Brazil’s society (Holston, 2008, pp. 18-19; cf. Alonso, 2018). However, their efforts were either 
violently repressed, ignored or co-opted into ambivalent institutional arrangements such as those 
created after the end of the military dictatorship in 1985. 
 
Since then, non-electoral participation expanded – but tended to be led by a few organized 
groups (unions, social movements, parties), which often were subordinated to the state, and seldom 
impactful (Avritzer, 2012).2 Even the celebrated rise, in 2002, of the centre-left PT, or Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (hereafter the Workers’ Party), did not alter the essence of Brazil’s forced solution to 
its democratic paradox: in the name of some rights, people had to relinquish most of their sovereignty 
and accept a profoundly corrupt, inefficient and unjust state (Nobre, 2013; Singer, 2018). Whilst living 
in an electoral democracy, and under the rule of the so-called “Citizen Constitution” promulgated in 
1988, ordinary Brazilians remained “neutralized”, largely impotent observers of the rulers their vote 
put in power (Nobre, 2013a). 
 
This backdrop helps to clarify the historical significance of what erupted in 2013. In essence, 
the crisis suggested that, perhaps, Brazil was not necessarily a “low intensity democracy”. The highly 
mobilized citizens behind the turmoil appeared radically different from the inert “Brazilians” which 
we Brazilians had come to expect. Even without the support of established organizations, their 
protests were far larger and more consequential than those organized by generations of social 
movements. The disruptive emergence of these citizens seemed (at least initially) to signal the sudden 
deepening of a long and convoluted process of assimilation of “the people” into Brazilian society 
(Carvalho, 2017). Unsurprisingly, the events of June 2013 were deemed a “democratic shock”, in which 
a “majority” had decided to “take on the system” (Nobre, 2013a, p. 15). From early on, datafied 
platforms were seen as decisive to the crisis. It was argued that the alleged “radical pluralism” of these 
spaces robbed the “traditional media” of “the monopoly of the formation of the public opinion” and 
generated independent “channels” to organize the “fight against the system, taking the revolt to the 
streets” (Nobre, 2013a, pp. 13-14). 
 
Yet, in the literature on the turmoil, this initial amazement at the disruptive novelty of these 
newly politicized citizens (and at the novel spaces of participation in which they emerged) was not 
followed up by substantive debate. As the turmoil gelled into institutional processes and decisions, 
 
2 There are significant exceptions: e.g. the “Painted Faces” movement, which contributed to the impeachment 
of the then president, Fernando Collor de Mello, in 1991; and the “March of the 100,000”, demonstrating against 
the then president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 1999. 
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more attention was given to traditional actors and organizations (politicians, parties, the Judiciary) 
and the role of mainstream media (see e.g. Singer, 2018; Anderson, 2019; Avritzer, 2018; Bueno, 
Burigo, Pinheiro-Machado, & Solano, 2018). The ordinary people whose everyday online actions on 
datafied platforms had been instrumental to sustain and nurture the crisis began to be taken-for-
granted. Likewise, despite a continuous acknowledgment of the importance of these platforms (and, 
later on, of messaging apps such as WhatsApp), the particular role of these spaces in enabling those 
actions – and those citizens – remain understudied. 
 
This gap is important, for, as it has become glaringly clear, platforms are not only “spaces of 
autonomy” (Castells, 2015, p. 2). They are themselves involved in politically consequential new forms 
of control. 
 
1.3. Rise of Datafication, Demise of Democracy? 
Over the last 30 years, scholars from various disciplines have investigated how the Internet 
implicated in the way people organize and discuss about political issues. The result is a vast literature, 
which has oscillated between optimistic and sceptical positions (for summaries, see e.g. Ess, 2018; 
Feenberg, 2017; Stromer-Galley, 2014; Loader & Mercea, 2011; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; DiMaggio, 
Hargittai, Newman, & Robinson, 2001; Street, 1997; see Mansell, 2012 for a broader overview). At the 
time of writing (July 2019), the pendulum was strongly swinging towards scepticism. The widespread 
view amongst critical academics was that digital networks, once thought of as bearing the promise of 
revitalization (Benkler, 2006; Jenkins, 2006; Castells, 2009) of an allegedly declining democracy 
(Putnam, 2000), have become a threat to democracy. The current pessimism in the literature may 
have been initially catalysed by the revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 about global surveillance 
(Greenwald, 2014). However, it also seems to stem chiefly from an earlier fundamental change to the 
configuration of the main online spaces of participation, I suggest. 
 
In the last 10 years, a small number of these spaces have risen to positions of market and 
cultural dominance (Moore & Tambini, 2018). Unlike their predecessors, these platforms are fully 
datafied, a neologism indicating that they are underpinned by datafication – the “transformation of 
social action into online quantified data” enacted by “real-time tracking” that allows for “predictive 
analysis” executed by machine learning algorithmic systems (van Dijck, 2014, p. 198, critiquing Mayer-
Schonberger & Cukier, 2013). As a consequence, long-lasting concerns about how online political 
participation may be hindered by offline inequalities, such as those related to education, income, 
gender and race (Blank, 2013; Hargittai, 2008; Brady, Schlozman, & Verba, 1999; Harp & Tremayne, 
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2006; Baek, Wojcieszak, & Delli Carpini, 2012; Graham, Straumann & Hogan, 2015), have been 
compounded or overtaken by worries about digital surveillance, ideological polarization and micro-
targeting (for a summary, see Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018, p. 21). Related problems have been 
studied for a long time (Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 1994; McChesney, 1996; Poster, 1997; Noam, 2001; 
Deibert, 2003; Howard, 2005; Dahlberg, 2005; Cammaerts, 2008). However, these were usually 
considered extrinsic to or rare in the online social experience of end users (e.g. Castells, 2009, pp. 
2010-16; Benkler, 2006, p. 261). Now, they are understood as positioned at the core of these 
platforms’ business model. 
 
Journalistic and academic works have come to associate datafied platforms3 with the alleged 
end of “the hegemony of liberal democracy” (Mounk, 2017, p. 16). Even when not focused on media 
per se, many of these writings give substantial weight to datafied platforms. As the title of one article 
asked, “Can democracy survive the Internet”? (Persily, 2017). The turning point seems to have 
occurred in 2016, with the result of the Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of Donald Trump 
in the US. Since then, liberal political theorists have denounced the apparent re-emergence of 
“populism” (e.g. Mounk 2018; Runciman, 2018; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; see also Lührmann & 
Lindberg, 2019). Others seem more concerned with the possible renascence of “fascism” (Albright, 
2018; Stanley, 2018) and the forms it might take today (Traverso, 2019; cf. Riley, 2018), or with how 
to use this moment of instability to (finally) democratize democracy from the left (Mouffe, 2018). The 
widespread usage in these works of terms like “echo chambers”, “algorithms” and “bots”, and 
discussions of the relationship between these terms and “fake news”, signal the greater emphasis 
now given to the inner workings of datafied platforms. 
 
This thesis dialogues with the broad object of these concerns – the shifting character of 
democracy in an increasingly datafied social world. However, it does so from a distinct angle, less 
concerned with macro dynamics than with individuals’ micro transformations. 
 
1.4. Conceptual and Methodological Directions 
The investigation of how ordinary end users may (re)constitute themselves as citizens through 
their political expressions on Facebook invokes problems in which much of the literature on the 
relationship between datafied platforms and politics is not typically interested. Usually, the notion of 
citizen is seen from a naturalist perspective, where it appears as an already present actor who must 
 
3 Datafied platforms (or simply “platforms”) is how this thesis refers to what is often named “social media” and 
“social media platforms”. See Section 3.5 for a discussion about the term. 
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be engaged, cajoled, coerced, incited, invited, and encouraged (Isin & Ruppert, 2015, p. 15). In this 
view, very little is said about how these people come into being not only as receivers of the actions of 
more powerful or better organized actors (technologists, politicians, political parties, consultants, 
bureaucrats, professional activists) but also as agents endowed with the socially situated capacity to 
produce meaning and act upon it. 
 
Therefore, the processes of civic becoming in which I am interested can be studied most 
realistically from a non-naturalist4 perspective (Bevir & Blakely, 2016) on citizenship, as I suggest in 
Chapter 3. The central assumption of this standpoint is that citizenship might be seen as a reflective 
practice whereby individuals construct their subjective sense of being political agents vis-à-vis multiple 
structures. This non-naturalist view provides a starting point for this study, but it does not offer the 
conceptual framework that I judge ideal to answer my research question. In order to develop this 
framework, this thesis builds a largely novel conceptual vocabulary. 
 
 The first step is the confection of an analytical foundation. To do so, I resort to elements of 
social practices theory. My approach is eclectic. I arrive at a definition of structure from Sewell’s (1992) 
theory of resources and schemas and Taylor’s (2004) conceptualization of social imaginaries. Based 
on the phenomenological take of Emirbayer and Mische (1998), I then describe agency as a form of 
reflexivity through which individuals engage in schematizations of the world and concoct projects on 
how to act upon this world. Lastly, Schatzki’s (2002) reading of Foucault’s late work informs my 
definition of power as the ordering of actions’ meanings – i.e. their prefiguration. 
 
These definitions of structure, agency and power are then rearticulated to develop this thesis’ 
two main concepts. The first one is civic voice, which results from a partial overhaul of the notion of 
citizenship as practice. As media sociologist Nick Couldry (2010) argues, at the core of the idea of voice 
is the idea of recognition – something that is implied, but rarely detailed in many non-naturalist 
accounts of citizenship. The need to be heard by others prompts individuals to express themselves; in 
having these expressions heard (or not), they might (re)constitute how they understand themselves 
as citizens. Being heard is also a pre-condition for civic autonomy, becoming therefore a requirement 
for a “democratic ethical life”, as argued by social philosopher Axel Honneth (2014). Therefore, more 
than helping to clarify how citizens come into being, the concept of civic voice offers a normative 
parameter which allows for the consideration of whether certain civic voices are democratic or 
 
4 Against naturalist views, this term designates broadly the philosophical assumption that “human beliefs and 
actions are expressive of meanings” (Bevir & Blakely, 2016, p. 31). See Section 3.2. 
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authoritarian. As a self-representational political project, this kind of voice is structured by implicit 
and contextual assumptions of how civic recognition is granted – what I term civic imaginary. 
Furthermore, whether and how a civic voice expression can be recognized (or not) depends on 
whether and how such expression can be made visible. This is a primary reason why datafied platforms 
are crucial for the development of civic voices: their main object of control is precisely the visibility of 
end users. 
 
My second main concept, algorithmic visibility regime, is an attempt to theorize how this kind 
of datafication power appears to be exerted by Facebook. Building on critical data studies and 
sociological accounts of visibility, this regime is described as a form of structure that entangles two 
vectors of visibility: how end users see and are seen on platforms (a definition usually made by 
“intelligent” algorithmic decision-making), and how they are read by platforms (often through 
pervasive dataveillance). I suggest that one of Facebook’s central techniques to control end users’ 
actions is the attempt to materialize these datafication operations in a way that influences how the 
same operations are understood by these users. Facebook’s business model seems to be importantly 
based on the expectation that, in materializing dataveillance as “invisible” and algorithmic decisions 
as “personalized”, end users might understand the news feed as somehow “relevant”. In turn, I 
propose that this understanding could then lead end users to qualify (i.e. prefigure) actions toward 
the interface as “enticing” and all actions toward its infrastructure as “impossible”.  
 
If this is the case, one could propose that the datafication operations of Facebook’s 
algorithmic regime shape end users’ civic voice indirectly. Such conceptualization might begin with 
considerations that are not necessarily civic: (1) how users make sense of such particularly 
materialized visibility regime, and (2) which social imaginaries arise from these schematizations. These 
imaginaries might then be associated with end users’ likely attempts to (3) expand and (4) reduce the 
visibility of their civic voice expressions so as to be heard on the platform. I am particularly interested 
in which ways these projects of visibility control, as I name them, entail adjustments to how civic voice 
itself is expressed and (mis)recognized on Facebook, influencing thus the (re)constitution of civic self-
understandings – i.e. end users’ civic becoming. The four aspects mentioned in this paragraph 
correspond to the thesis’ four empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, respectively – see last section 
of this chapter). 
 
These conceptual choices and constructs create methodological possibilities, as explained in 
Chapter 4. Since civic voice is deeply rooted in reflexivity, and datafication might be susceptible to 
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being imagined by individuals who are not necessarily tech-savvy, those ordinary people who largely 
drove the Brazilian crisis might be asked about the ways in which they constructed ideas of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime. They may also be asked how these ideas, if consolidated into social 
imaginaries, influenced (or not) the way they might express themselves politically on this platform 
during the crisis. In my fieldwork, undertaken mostly in São Paulo in early 2017, I posed questions 
about these aspects in interviews with 47 of these individuals. I recruited end users who self-identified 
as having become politically engaged after 2013 – mostly on Facebook – but who did not see 
themselves as activists nor members of formal political organizations. 
 
1.5. Aims 
This study hopes to contribute, first and foremost, to discussions on the civic ramifications of 
the commercial use of datafication to govern end users’ visibility. While an extensive literature has 
already emerged to describe, explain and critique some of these ramifications (usually focussed on 
privacy), not much has been written from the interpretive conceptual perspective adopted in this 
thesis, and even less so on ordinary end users (as opposed to social movements and activists). 
Secondly, this thesis aims to contribute to broader debates on the nature and dynamics of platforms’ 
datafication power, whose consequences are not limited to the civic sphere. In this regard, there is no 
shortage of studies, as Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 demonstrate. But few works have explicitly theorized 
on how to bridge concerns with datafication operations and people’s agential relationship to these 
operations, as my conceptual framework does. 
 
Throughout the production of this thesis, I considered whether my conclusions could also 
shed light on the transformation of democracy in post-2013 Brazil. Ultimately, I realized that my 
research was too limited, and Brazil’s transformation too complex, for any substantive contribution 
to be made. Thus, while the Brazilian troubled polity played a crucial role in my fieldwork and analysis 
(see in particular Section 9.5.1), it was treated as only the background to the thesis. (This is not to say 
that tentative ideas were not raised – see Section 10.3.) 
 
The main conclusion from this research indicates that the combination of interviewees’ 
assumptions about citizenship in Brazil’s ambiguous democracy and their imaginaries of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime end up engendering a paradoxical understanding of how to be heard on 
Facebook – a civic imaginary that seems peculiar to the platform. According to this understanding, 
having one’s civic voice heard on Facebook often depends on controlling one’s visibility through the 
silencing of others and oneself. I describe this structural misrecognition dynamic as bottom-up 
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authoritarianism. This insight will be shown to reveal a distinct relationship between civic autonomy 
and datafication, in which the former is structurally undermined not (only) by authoritarians and 
ruthless private conglomerates, but by ordinary end users themselves. The notion of bottom-up 
authoritarianism emerges in this thesis inductively, and should be understood as the culmination of 
the indirect shaping of civic voice by Facebook’s datafication operations mentioned in the previous 
section. Chapter 9 conceptualizes in detail the multiple aspects of this shaping process and explains 
how they are related. 
 
The last section of this chapter provides an overview of the thesis.  
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 sets the empirical context. First, I examine the problematic history of Brazil’s 
political organization and then the 2013-2018 crisis, pointing to the centrality in it of ordinary end 
users of datafied platforms.  
 
In Chapter 3, I develop the conceptual framework which underpins my empirical investigation. 
After defining the notions of civic voice and algorithmic visibility regime, the framework indicates how 
this regime may be theorized as shaping ordinary end users’ civic voices on Facebook. Sub research 
questions are stated. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the methodological basis of this study. It suggests that my interest in 
people’s sensemaking experiences, social imaginaries and practices justifies the use of a constructivist 
epistemology and a qualitative method. The chapter defends the choice of an in-depth interview 
method, explains the procedures followed during my fieldwork in Brazil, and discusses how data 
analysis was carried out. Considerations on research ethics are also debated.  
 
Chapter 5 begins the analysis of the interviews. Based on the concept of schematization, it 
examines how interviewees make sense of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses which social imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime emerge 
from the schematizations examined in Chapter 5. My investigation suggests that there are three, non-
mutually exclusive imaginaries that all interviewees appeared to hold. 
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Chapter 7 addresses whether and how participants5 of this study reported trying to expand 
the visibility of their civic voice on Facebook with the aim of having their voice heard. It discusses how 
the social imaginaries revealed in Chapter 6 were invoked during these actions and in what ways these 
invocations relate to the participants’ civic self-understandings. 
 
The last empirical chapter is Chapter 8. It has a similar structure and analytical approach to 
Chapter 7, but analyses projects that interviewees reported as constructed to reduce the visibility of 
their civic voice expressions. 
 
The empirical findings of Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are re-examined in Chapter 9. This is the main 
analytical chapter of the thesis. It sets out this study’s conceptual insights in regard to each of the sub 
research questions, culminating with the notion of bottom-up authoritarianism.  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 recaps the empirical and conceptual findings to highlight the contributions 
of this thesis to the debates on the civic ramifications of datafication and on the datafication power 
of platforms. It also discusses some limitations of this research and suggests directions for future work. 
 
Next, in Chapter 2, I discuss in more detail the real-life circumstances described at the 















5 The terms “interviewees” and “participants” are used interchangeably to refer to the subjects I interviewed 
during my fieldwork. 
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Chapter 2 
Brazil in Turmoil 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter situates the reader in the broader empirical context which informs this thesis, 
the Brazilian crisis. It highlights some of the momentous events usually associated with the turmoil 
and provides an indication based on available sources of the extent to which this crisis implicated 
ordinary people – mostly through their everyday political expressions on online spaces such as 
Facebook. This is discussed in the third section of this chapter. To understand the significance of and 
conditions surrounding the emergence of these citizens, it is essential to understand the basic 
characteristics of Brazil’s democracy (the first section of this chapter) and to provide some factual 
background to the crisis that engulfed the country from 2013 to 2018 (the second section of this 
chapter). 
 
2.2. A ‘Low Intensity’ Democracy 
This section identifies three main characteristics of Brazil’s political organization throughout 
its history: inequality, state authoritarianism and acute elitism. These traits help to explain why Brazil’s 
democracy can be described as underdeveloped. 
 
The country’s inequalities can be understood in the context of three inherently linked 
categories: race, gender and income.6 Beginning in the 19th century (Schwarcz, 2018), academic, state 
and media discourses largely denied these asymmetries, peddling the founding myths of Brazilian 
national identity being underpinned by an alleged harmonious “racial democracy” and a supposed 
predisposition of the Brazilian people to be “cordial” (see Freyre, 1933; cf. Buarque de Holanda, 
1995/1936; DaMatta, 1979; Guimarães, 1995; Souza, 2003). This interpretation has been challenged 
in more recent decades. In particular, amongst Marxist and post-Marxist scholars, it has become 
widely accepted that racism, sexism and socioeconomic inequalities, while nearly universal, are 
particularly intense and harmful in Brazil (although see e.g. Magnoli, 2009). This is not to say that the 
country is not racially hybrid (mestiço), that such hybridity cannot be beneficial to racially marginalized 
groups, or that Brazilians do not pride themselves on being welcoming and generous. However, many 
 
6 Other forms of inequalities, such as geographical (see Silva, 2017) and educational (see Menezes Filho & 
Kirschbaum, 2018) influence the functioning of Brazil’s democracy. I do not consider the former because as 
Chapter 4 shows, this study focuses on a single area (São Paulo, Brazil’s richest city); in the context of my 
research, the latter can be subsumed within the other divides. 
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argue that these ideas have perpetuated the inequalities they allegedly sought to erase (Starling & 
Schwarcz, 2017). 
 
Brazilian racism originates, mainly, in the country’s Portuguese colonial past, when slavery 
was a central feature of society. Not only were Blacks and indigenous people obliged to wait until 1934 
to be granted formal voting rights, but a deeply ingrained prejudice against them has continued to be 
a defining element of Brazilian society (Fernandes, 1964), as multiple empirical studies confirm (e.g. 
Venturi & Bokani, 2005; Schwarcz, 1996). Although composing more than half of the population, 
Negros (non-Whites) remain a tiny minority in institutional politics (e.g. only 3% of the elected 
politicians in 2014, at all levels – Sardinha, 2014). Another important form of inequality relates to 
gender. While women make up the majority of the population, they represent only 15% of the 
Congress, for instance (Montesanti, 2018). Sexism is associated to world-leading levels of domestic 
violence (Artigo 19, 2018) and pervasive prejudice and physical violence against LGBT people (Cowie, 
2018; Transgender Europe, 2016). Lastly, there is a profound income divide. Wealth concentration in 
Brazil is the third highest in the world (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). Such an 
economic divide helps to explain why, despite Brazil achieving average global GDP per capita, more 
than one quarter of its population is poor or extremely poor (IBGE, 2018). Income indicators are 
strongly correlated to race and gender (Ipea, 2017). 
 
In addition to these deep, multiple and chronic inequalities, Brazil has a long tradition of state 
authoritarianism. While some kind of voting rights date back to 1824 (Schwarcz, 2018), for more than 
110 years these rights applied to only a small proportion of the population, and even these people 
rarely voted freely (Carvalho, 2002, p. 32; Nicolau, 2012, p. 133). The first experience resembling a 
democracy began in 1945 and ended in 1964, in the context of the Cold War, with an anti-communist 
military coup (Avritzer, 2018, p. 284). After murdering, torturing and persecuting dozens of thousands 
of people and producing a profound economic crisis, the autocratic regime began a so-called “slow, 
gradual and safe” opening process, which formally ended the dictatorship in 1985 (Gaspari, 2003). 
Since the succeeding 30 years have not witnessed military coups or armed insurrections, democracy, 
in its electoral form, is considered by some to be consolidated. However, state authoritarianism 
remained very much alive in the routine “accidental” killings, extrajudicial executions and torturing of 
both criminal and innocent citizens by police forces, which are considered “the world’s most violent” 
(Muggah, 2016, para. 1). Racial inequality is related, closely, to this police violence (Cerqueira & 
Moura, 2013). Generally, Brazil has been ranked consistently amongst the top ten most violent 
countries in the world (UNODC, 2019).  
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Inequalities and state authoritarianism are linked strongly to an acute elitism. Pereira (2016) 
observes that dominant theorizations of this elitism coalesce around the Weberian notion of neo-
patrimonialism (Faoro, 1958; Schwartzman, 1975/2007; Oliveira, 2003; Chauí, 2000; cf. Souza, 2003). 
In this perspective, a “heavy administrative bureaucracy”, unchallenged by a “weak and poorly 
articulated” civil society, appropriates “functions, organizations and public resources” in favour of 
certain “private sectors” (Schwartzman, 1975/2007, pp. 10-11). While constrained by various 
transformations during the 20th century, this patrimonialist elitism remains an important 
interpretative frame to make sense of Brazil’s central traits such as the epidemic forms of corruption 
(Domingues, 2012, p. 162) and the powerlessness of social minorities. It helps, also, to explain why all 
regime transitions have been characterized as intra-elite agreements executed regardless of or against 
the people (Carvalho, 2002; 2017). It would be a gross simplification to say that the population was 
completely isolated from these transformations. From the colonial period to the military dictatorship 
and after, Brazilian governments have faced continuous resistance (Gomes, 2015; Fausto, 2008, pp. 
164, 295; Gorender, 1987; Holston, 2008). However, these movements were repressed, pushed back 
and rendered unable to advance their long-term demands. 
 
As both a legal regime and a pattern of practices, the democracy that emerged from the 
military dictatorship has been described as profoundly ambiguous. In his ethnography on how 
working-class people became citizens by struggling for urban spaces in Brazil’s large cities, James 
Holston (2008, p. 2) locates this ambivalence in what he terms an “inegalitarian citizenship”. According 
to him, throughout its history, Brazilian elites have given “the people” the legal status of citizens 
without guaranteeing realization of their basic rights, hence, legalizing injustice. Even the disruption 
of these conditions often led to the development of new forms of violence, impunity and corruption 
(Holston, 2008, p. 271). “Neither democracy nor its counters prevail… rooted yet rotted, they remain 
entangled, unexpectedly surviving each other” (Holston, 2008, p. 273). In similar vein, Marcos Nobre 
coined the term “immobilism in movement” to explain Brazil’s post-dictatorship political 
arrangement. From his viewpoint, the agreed and relatively pacific transition from dictatorship to 
democracy in the 1980s forged a political caste that developed different “shielding mechanisms”: 
pacts between high-level politicians, bureaucrats and capitalists, aimed at defending itself from 
“society” without, however, openly denying “society” its rights (Nobre, 2013, p. 14; Vilhena & Barbosa, 
2018). This arrangement was created by centre-right presidents and then adapted by centre-left 
leaders, such as Lula da Silva (who governed from 2003 to 2010) and his successor and mentee, Dilma 
Rousseff (2011-2016), both from the Workers’ Party (Anderson, 2016; Singer, 2012). 
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The condition and consequence of this “immobilism in movement” was arguably a form of 
“low intensity democracy” (Arantes, 2014). Despite the existence of free elections, of a general 
respect for political freedoms and of usually functional state bodies, everyday life rarely felt like fully 
democratic in Brazil (Nobre, 2013, p. 7). And it was not only about injustice and insecurity. Non-
electoral democratic participation remained a rare occurrence. Political parties functioned mostly as 
tiny elite clubs, social movements were localized, accountability institutions often failed and news 
media were ideologically homogenous (Schwarz, 2018; Azevedo, 2006). This tense but more or less 
stable coexistence of inequalities, authoritarianism and elitism with formal democratic rule imploded 
in 2013, initiating what this thesis refers to as the Brazilian crisis, the topic of the next section. 
 
2.3. ‘The Crisis’ 
Crises can be defined as “transitional phases, during which the normal ways of operating no 
longer work”, that is, periods when the “core values… of a community come under threat”, inducing 
“a sense of urgency” and a “high degree of uncertainty [original emphasis]” (Boin, Hart, Stern, & 
Sundelius, 2005, pp. 2-3; cf. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, pp. 4-10). This section provides a description of 
the main collective events of the Brazilian crisis to describe how the “normal ways of operating” of 
Brazil’s contradictory democracy have come to a grinding halt. 
 
The crisis can be considered as constituted of three phases. Its triggering event was a series 
of street demonstrations in 2013, led initially by a small autonomist social movement demanding 
revocation of a bus fares increase. In June 2013, a fourth protest was violently repressed by the police 
in São Paulo, producing a strong backlash from the population. In the succeeding weeks, the country 
saw protests in dozens of cities. The invasion of palaces in Brasília, described at the beginning of this 
thesis, was one such. On 20 June alone, more than a million people took to the streets. Since there 
was no identifiable central movement driving these demonstrations, the acts seemed spontaneous 
events, abrupt materializations of a shared, but, thus far, diffuse anti-establishment sentiment. 
Protesters demanded better and fairer state services and an end to the corruption (Singer, 2014). 
People’s personal Facebook accounts were the main sources of information on where and when the 
marches would take place and acted, also, as fora where people discussed what the protest should be 
about (Costa, 2013). Early analyses of this moment underscored the extent to which these events 
represented a break with Brazil’s tradition of civic apathy and highlighted the importance of datafied 
platforms in their unfolding (Nobre, 2013a; see Section 1.2). When what became known as the 
Marches of June7 finally ended, they had disrupted the political landscape. It had become clear that 
 
7 See UOL (2013) for a partial chronology. 
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mass demonstrations were possible and effective, even in the absence of any discrete unifying reason 
or powerful organizers. In 2014, a new wave of demonstrations emerged – focused on the overpriced 
stadia being constructed for the FIFA World Cup (Watts, 2014). The unstable political climate, in 2014, 
resulted in the Workers’ Party facing its toughest elections since 1998. President Dilma Rousseff was 
re-elected with the smallest margin in the history of Brazil’s presidential elections (Kingstone & Power, 
2017). 
 
The second phase of the crisis covers the short second term of office of Dilma Rousseff. It was 
defined by two factors. First, in this period Brazil experienced the worst recession in its history. A 
combination of deep cuts to public investments, a fall in the price of commodities and poorly designed 
tax cuts resulted in higher unemployment, inflation and base interest rates, declining wages and 
reduced private investment (de Carvalho, 2018). GDP shrank almost 8% over 2015 and 2016 (BBC, 
2017). Second, there was the Car Wash Operation (Operação Lava Jato), the largest corruption scandal 
in a country used to major corruption scandals (Watts, 2017). The operation, led by a local federal 
judge (Sérgio Moro), attacked the directors of Brazil’s state-owned oil company, the proprietors of 
large private construction companies and their godfathers and partners in the state and political 
parties, revealing billionaire kickback schemes (Winter, 2018). Initially lauded as a non-partisan 
technocratic revolution against Brazil’s neopatrimonialism (Netto, 2016), the operation galvanized 
national dissatisfaction with the entire political elite. 
 
Combined with the economic recession, the scandal inspired the creation of dozens of new 
social movements. They had a strong conservative agenda and a clear focus – the impeachment of 
Rousseff. Supported by international conservative organizations and by enthusiastic coverage from 
traditional media outlets, these groups mainly used datafied platforms such as Facebook to convene 
seven nationwide protests, which mobilised dozens of millions of people and resulted in the largest 
demonstrations in Brazil to date (Amaral, 2015; Gohn, 2017; Pinto, 2017; Tatagiba & Galvão, 2019; 
G1, 2016). As support for the impeachment of Rousseff rapidly increased, investigators and Judge 
Sérgio Moro started to engage in blatantly political actions. A taped conversation between Rousseff 
and Lula was leaked illegally by Moro; Lula was forced into being interviewed by the federal police; 
and the Workers’ Party became a discursive obsession of the prosecutors (Cuadros, 2018). 
 
The third and last phase began with the impeachment of Rousseff. Since there was no direct 
evidence of her involvement in the corruption scheme, the legislators took a shortcut and focused on 
some “creative accounting” techniques. At the same time, they were meticulous in adhering to the 
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protocols required for a trial. The combination of political opportunism and legal formalism left the 
impeachment process in an interpretive limbo, open to different narrative frames. Rousseff’s 
defenders called it a soft coup (Jinkings, Doria, & Cleto, 2016). Her opponents described it as a 
legitimate process that reflected the wishes of the population (see The Economist, 2016). In 2016, 
Michel Temer, the centre-right vice-president, was sworn in. Also involved in the Car Wash Operation 
and presiding over a radical austerity programme (Aleem, 2016; Safatle, 2017), he became deeply 
unpopular (DataFolha, 2018). A despised political establishment, a paralyzed economy and the 
contestable imprisonment of former president Lula da Silva (when he was the leading presidential 
candidate) created a scorched-earth scenario for the far-right landslide which put in power Jair 
Bolsonaro in the 2018 elections (Anderson, 2019; Nicolau, 2018). Bolsonaro had been a representative 
in the Lower House for almost 30 years, where he was famous for his anti-LGBT views and unwavering 
support for the military dictatorship, torture and political violence (The Guardian, 2018). 
 
The shocking 2018 electoral results ended the crisis as it existed so far, I suggest. Since 2013, 
the turbulence was driven by a strong anti-establishment disposition. By dethroning the political elite 
and putting in power an insider who had always behaved like an outsider, the election rendered 
meaningless the defining feature of the turmoil. This is not to say that Brazil returned to its pre-2013 
relative steadiness. However, the nature of the turbulence seemed to have changed. Once in power, 
Bolsonaro started to try to undermine Brazil’s already frail democratic institutions from within 
(Phillips, 2019). How the participatory burst of 2013 morphed into overt support for (or silent consent 
to) a candidate who talked openly about purging, arresting and killing rivals (Phillips, 2018; Hunter & 
Power, 2019) is a question that this thesis does not fully address. Nevertheless, Section 10.3 
establishes some speculative connections between my conclusions and these macro changes. 
 
 The story told in this section echoes what most of the academic and journalistic literatures 
say about “the crisis” — as the turmoil is commonly referred to in the Brazilian public debate. In these 
works, the initial fascination with the supposedly spontaneous masses of 2013 and their typical online 
spaces (datafied platforms) gradually disappeared from view, and interest in politicians, public 
officials, new social movements and traditional media took centre stage (see e.g. Singer, 2018; 
Anderson, 2019; Avritzer, 2018; Bueno et al., 2018). Without denying the importance of these agents 
in the development of the crisis, the next section returns the focus to the kind of actor that this thesis 
is concerned with – ordinary end users. 
 
2.4. The Dynamic Relationship Between “the Crisis” and Ordinary End Users 
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An important factor that rendered this turmoil a distinct juncture in the history of Brazil is that 
it cannot easily be summarized as a quarrel between segments of the elites – as previous crises largely 
were, I suggest. There was a dynamic association between “the crisis” and the everyday actions of (at 
least some) ordinary end users of datafied platforms such as Facebook, I point out in this section. 
 
In general terms, some analysts have pointed out that, from 2013 to 2018, Brazil underwent 
an massive process of political mobilization, a “rebirth of politics” (Arantes, 2018, para. 8) which was 
inherently linked to arenas that did not exist in previous crises – online spaces, in particular, datafied 
platforms. The historical novelty of this phenomenon is well summarized by Nobre (2019, p. 9), who 
wrote that online participation by ordinary individuals who “have never had access to environments 
of political decision” may provoke “an ecstasy that has never been seen in the history of this country”. 
This “hyper” mobilization (Ortellado, 2019, para. 6) appears to have opened “the gates for the 
absolute ungovernability of the country” (Arantes, 2018, para. 1). By this, the philosopher Paulo 
Arantes seems to mean not a complete institutional meltdown, but the difficulty experienced by the 
Brazilian elites to control the processes of change unleashed since 2013. 
 
A 2018 survey on “political engagement” indicated the weight of online political expressions 
by ordinary end users during the crisis. Amongst 14 countries from Asia, Latin America, Europe and 
the Middle East, the survey found that Brazil had the highest proportion of people who posted their 
“own thoughts or comments on political or social issues online” in the “past year”: 19% of its total 
population, or roughly 40 million people (Pew Research Centre, 2018). Given that 60% of the Brazilian 
population is connected to the Internet (CETIC.br, 2018), these numbers suggest that around one third 
of those who could express themselves about “political or social issues” online, did so. According to 
the same survey, Brazil saw the largest increase in this proportion since 2014 (the last time the same 
question was posed by Pew): 13 percentage points.8  
 
It seems likely that many of these expressions occurred on Facebook. In fact, the accelerated 
growth of this platform in Brazil coincided with the development of the crisis. In 2012, immediately 
before the eruption of the turmoil, Facebook had 36 million users, for the first time overtaking 
Google’s Orkut to become the most visited network by Brazilians (Comscore, 2012). In 2018, the 
number of users had increased by 250% and reached 127 million, or 65% of the country’s non-infant 
population (Oliveira, 2018). While any data from Facebook regarding users should be taken with a 
 
8 These data should be read in the light of the fact that Brazil is ranked second in the world in terms of time 
spent on platforms such as Facebook (We are Social, 2019). 
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grain of salt (Stewart, 2018), there is little question that it is the largest datafied platform in Brazil (We 
are Social, 2019; StatCounter, 2019). This popularity justifies my focus on Facebook – which from now 
on will be alternatively referred to as “the platform”. 
 
On the one hand, this extraordinary online mobilization informed the creation of the events 
described in the previous section. Indeed, the three phases of the turmoil would be barely imaginable 
without these ordinary end users. The 2013 Marches of June and the anti-World Cup protests in 2014 
were made possible by the usage of datafied platforms by masses of formerly demobilized people and 
not by social movements or political parties (Castells, 2015, pp. 230-237; Bennet & Segerberg, 2012; 
see Section 1.3). If the idea of truly horizontal organizations enabled by datafied platforms is simplistic 
(Poell, Abdulla, Rieder, Woltering, & Zack, 2016), it seems undeniable that the accelerated take up of 
these new media in the past decade presented a new “mediated opportunity structure” (Cammaerts, 
2012) for contentious demonstrations in Brazil. In the second phase of the crisis, the 2015 and 2016 
demonstrations were coordinated, in part, by the aforementioned platform-based new social 
movements. Yet, as it is obvious, these new activists could only play an important role in the 
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff because the ordinary individuals who took to the streets were 
massively present on platforms. Lastly, these end users were largely behind the rise of Bolsonaro, as 
his own campaign acknowledged on numerous occasions (Uribe, 2019). Ignored by most of the 
traditional news media and supported by a tiny party with almost no TV exposure, Bolsonaro existed 
as a public figure, essentially, on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube – and also WhatsApp. In 2018, he had, 
for a long time, been the most popular Brazilian politician on these platforms, where his overtly 
bigoted and violent views were often portrayed as courageous acts against a hypocritical political elite 
(Gortàzar & Becker, 2018; Utsch, 2018). 
 
If the role of ordinary end users in the development of “the crisis” has been widely recognized, 
how these individuals’ involvement in such a crisis appeared to have transformed themselves has been 
much less studied. There is abundant journalistic evidence on the disruptive manner in which politics 
infiltrated these people’s private relationships, leading, commonly, to the collapse of affective and 
family ties (e.g. Gragnani, 2016; Rossi & Mori, 2018; Valle & Biller, 2016). At the peak of the pro-
impeachment movement, this infiltration seemed to have become a topic of national concern. In 
2016, the then Minister of Justice thought it important to declare that “families are suffering from a 
‘collective psychosis’ because of political differences” and that “social media instil the most primitive 
instincts in people" (Amora, 2016, para. 4). Some few academics have begun to consider these 
personal transformations. Rosana Pinheiro-Machado and Lucia Scalzo (2018, para. 4), for instance, 
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point out that “national events affect not only the material conditions of existence” but also the 
shaping of individuals’ “political subjectivity”. In her study of supporters of Bolsonaro, Esther Solano 
(2018, para. 10) found what she calls the “bolsonarization of life”, which goes “far beyond the electoral 
process” and encompasses the modification of these individuals’ world view. They seemed to have 
developed a staunch anti-leftism and hatred of human rights (Solano, 2018, para. 8). 
 
Despite these interesting suggestions, the association between ordinary end users’ processes 
of civic becoming – as I describe the transformations of previously disengaged people into politically 
mobilized citizens – and their quotidian political expressions on Facebook during the Brazilian crisis 
remain largely unexplored. This association is the empirical phenomenon that thesis investigates. In 
this sense, I approach the Brazilian turmoil less as “the crisis”, as described in the previous section, 
than as a set of “critical events” (Das, 1995, p. 6), after which new modes of action and being can 
emerge in a variety of spheres – not only state and bureaucracies but, perhaps primarily, everyday 
life. In the light of the narrative of Brazil as a “low intensity” democracy, one can see the historical 
relevance of these personal transformations and the resulting emergence of newly politicized citizens. 
The overall hope was that the country was undergoing a form of confusing but genuine 
democratization, lato sensu: the will of “the people” was finally becoming sovereign. But which 
“people” were in fact being mobilized? Most newly mobilized ordinary end users did not represent 
the racial, economic and social minorities who, for centuries, have been violently supressed in Brazil. 
Survey data indicated that these newly mobilized people were, in fact, part of the so-called “new“ 
(protests of 2013-2014) and older (protests of 2015-2016) middle classes (Singer, 2014). Indeed, most 
of the poor people have no access to the Internet (CETIC.br, 2018). I return to the debates about the 
notion of “ordinary” in Sections 3.2 and 4.4.2. At any rate, that even this relative expansion of political 
participation has proved so disruptive is evidence of Brazil's historical difficulty in creating a citizenry, 
as José Murilo de Carvalho (2017), a leading historian of citizenship in Brazil, argues. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the Brazilian crisis and how it informs this study. 
After demonstrating the inequalities, state authoritarianism and elitism that have crippled the 
possibility of democracy in Brazil, I described the three main phases of “the crisis”: the 2013-2014 
revolts, the 2015-2017 anti-Workers’ Party protests that ended with the impeachment of former 
President Dilma Rousseff, and the unpopular Michel Temer government, which paved the way to the 
election of radical conservative neophytes. In the third section, I showed how it is possible to 
understand the crisis not only as a series of collective events but also as “critical events” (Das, 1995), 
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linked to a myriad of ordinary actions, mostly in online spaces, and in particular on Facebook (the 
datafied platform my work focusses on). How this space shaped the emergence of certain politically 
mobilized citizens (i.e. their processes of civic becoming) is the empirical phenomenon this thesis 
tackles. 
 









































Civic Voice Under Algorithmic Visibility Conditions 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 described the broad context in which this thesis is located, exploring the dynamic 
relationship between the crisis that upended Brazil’s political order from 2013 to 2018 and the 
proliferation of ordinary individuals expressing themselves politically, usually through datafied 
platforms. Whether and how one of these spaces (Facebook) influenced these individuals’ expressions 
and, in so doing, (re)constituted them as citizens, is the real-life process at the centre of this thesis 
research. The main research question couches this process in theoretical terms: How does Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime shape the civic voice of ordinary end users on the platform? 
 
This chapter discusses relevant theories as a basis for constructing a conceptual framework 
that can underpin the empirical and analytical parts of this study. It begins by discussing and locating 
the thesis in a tradition of thinking about citizenship, which, as noted in Chapter 1, might be described 
as non-naturalist. To further develop this view, the Chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it builds the 
analytical foundation of the conceptual framework by revisiting key elements of social practices 
theory (structure, agency, power). Then, to lay the groundwork for a partial reconceptualization of 
citizenship as a practice, it engages critically with recognition theory. Thirdly, the chapter discusses 
critical approaches to datafication and visibility, establishing conceptual pieces that are instrumental 
in my definition of datafication power. These three parts operate more or less independently, and 
their interrelations are detailed in the conceptual framework. There, I define citizenship as the social 
practice of political self-representation (civic voice), Facebook’s datafication power as being exerted 
through a form of structure (algorithmic visibility regime) and theorize how the latter concept is 
implicated in the shaping of the former. I propose that the datafication operations of this regime do 
not bear upon civic voices directly. Rather, they influence the construction (or schematization) of 
understandings (or social imaginaries) about themselves. In turn, these imaginaries work as the 
immediate structural elements informing whether and how end users try to control the visibility – and 
likely change the nature – of their civic voice expressions on Facebook, potentially leading to 
transformations in how they understand themselves as citizens, I suggest. 
 
3.2. A Non-naturalist View of Citizenship 
This first part of the chapter positions this thesis in relation to the broad field of studies of 
citizenship. The theoretical tradition upon which I draw to understand ordinary Brazilians’ processes 
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of civic becoming encompasses approaches that have been described as “interpretive political 
science” (Bevir & Rhodes, 2016), “culturalist” (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 5; Couldry, Livingstone, & Markham, 
2007, p. 11) and “critical citizenship studies” (Isin, 2008). While these labels suggest different 
disciplinary emphases (hermeneutics/phenomenology, cultural studies and strands of post-
structuralism, respectively), this thesis follows Bevir and Blakely (2016, 2019) and uses the umbrella 
term non-naturalist to characterize their common assumptions. In what follows, I explore these 
assumptions, highlighting their usefulness and limitations in the context of the present research. 
 
The non-naturalist tradition, as the name suggests, is defined in opposition to “naturalist” 
views. Thus, non-naturalists do not see citizenship as a phenomenon that is “ahistorical and invariant 
like those often found in the natural sciences” (Bevir & Blakely, 2016, p. 31), something that may be 
broken down into discrete pieces and analysed to find correlative or causal laws. This is because non-
naturalists arguably depart from two naturalist models of the civic subject (the citizen): one, derived 
from “homo economicus”, assumes these subjects are free beings who reason about themselves and 
their condition in a decontextualized and rational manner; the other, derived from “homo 
sociologicus”, tends to see these subjects as subject, ultimately, to self-interpreting social rules 
(Reckwitz, 2002, p. 245). In contrast, non-naturalist views seem to operate on the premise that 
subjects are in tension between two opposing, but complementary forces: their meaning-making 
reflexivity and their social embeddedness, which render citizenship unstable, contextual and 
processual. 
 
It is possible to discuss this tradition drawing on three core concepts. First, instead of 
emphasising membership, status and the legal institution of rights and obligations, as in the 
Marshallian mode of citizenship,9 this tradition assigns a central role to actions (see Arendt, 1969, for 
a modern precursor). These actions have been described variously as “performances” (Zivi, 2012; Isin 
& Turner, 2002; Banaji, 2013), “acts” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008) or “civic practices” (Dahlgren, 2009; 
Highfield, 2016; Cammaerts, 2018; Matonni & Treré, 2014; Penney, 2017; Bakardjieva & Gaden, 2012; 
Chouliaraki, 2010).10 These practices are deemed not to be limited to the institutional administration 
of a community (e.g. voting or policymaking), but to encompass verbal and non-verbal communication 
(e.g. talking, discussion, protest, organizing, deliberating) and knowledge acquisition (e.g. reading, 
 
9 See Isin and Turner (2007) for a discussion of why Marshall (1950) fails to explain current forms of multiple and 
globalized citizenships. This is not to say that citizenship does not encompasses national rights and legal 
membership. 
10 Isin (2008) differentiates between “acts” and “practices” on the assumption that the latter do not capture 
disruptive and unexpected actions. Practices, in this thesis, are not understood, necessarily, as a self-
perpetuating “habitus” (see Section 3.3, and Schatzki, 2002). 
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watching, searching). Likewise, rather than being restricted to special moments of public life, they are 
seen as enmeshed in the everyday, “private quarters and daily dealings of individual persons” 
(Bakardjieva, 2009, p. 92, Mouffe, 2005; Eliasoph, 1998). In this view, an action can be defined as civic 
not only “when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens – or… 
as those to whom the right to have rights is due” (Isin, 2008, p. 18) but also when this self-constitution 
involves the ineradicable possibility of dispute and conflict, that is, “the political” (Mouffe, 1992; 
2005). The typical subjects of these practices are “citizens”.11 
 
These citizens might be seen as members of social movements and activists, whose political 
involvement takes place in the context of more or less stable political organizations, or simply as 
“ordinary people” – the sort of actor in which this thesis is interested. Carpentier (2011, pp. 181-183; 
see also Calhoun, 1992) argues that, despite a long tradition of seeing, in this expression, a form of 
discursive othering (Hartley, 1992; Williams, 1981; Hall, 1981), the idea of “ordinary” remains 
productively fluid. I suggest that there is no fixed or single definition of “ordinary” because there is no 
fixed or typical definition of “extraordinary”. Even the most “ordinary” person potentially remains 
capable of “extraordinary” acts; likewise, it is hard to conceive of an “extraordinary” individual who 
does not experience much of her life “ordinarily”. In dramatically lowering the costs of engaging in 
civic practices, digital technologies have rendered this difference even more unstable. Thanks to 
datafied platforms, actions that once were exclusive to “activists” are now easily accessible to ordinary 
people (Bennet & Segerberg, 2012). Nevertheless, some differentiation can be achieved. Section 4.4.2 
shows that this study was inspired by the work of media and communication scholars, who tend to 
define “ordinary” individuals/end users as opposed to organized, professional, highly skilled and 
powerful individuals/end users (Couldry, 2002; Ytreberg, 2004; Syvertsen, 2001; Livingstone & Lunt, 
1994, as cited by Carpentier, 2011, p. 182). 
 
A second general concept that seems common to non-naturalist approaches is cognitive-
symbolic elements.12 A central feature of these elements is civic identity. In dialogue with theories 
about late modern selfhood (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000) and self-performativity (Butler, 1990), 
non-naturalist accounts frequently define civic identity, not as a fixed pre-existing element, but as the 
unstable outcome of the meaning-making processes engendered by civic practices (Bakardjieva, 2009, 
p. 93). That is, engaging in civic practices is expected to prompt individuals to ponder not only on their 
rights and obligations as citizens, but who they are as citizens (Isin, 2017, p. 501). This reflexivity is 
 
11 Interestingly, the notion of “citizen” began to be associated with ordinary people only after the emergence of 
nation states (Bruce & Yearley, 2006, p. 32). 
12 I borrow this term from Reckwitz’s (2002, p. 546) discussion of social practices. 
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said to culminate in two basic meanings that “operate in tandem”: the sense of being an “empowered 
political citizen” and the “feeling of a 'we' group, clearly defined in relation to a ‘they'” (Dahlgren, 
2009, pp. 120-121). 
 
Another cognitive-symbolic element said to be essential to the practice of citizenship is ethical 
values. Overall, the normative background to non-naturalist views of citizenship is located within what 
democratic theory usually terms “republicanism” (Dryzek, Honig, & Phillips, 2006, p. 20) and, in 
particular, “participatory democracy” (Della Porta, 2013, p. 38). A “participatory” understanding of 
answers (at least normatively) the “democratic paradox” (Mouffe, 2000) mentioned in Section 1.1, by 
positing that participation, “at all levels, institutional or not”, is normatively desirable to the extent 
that it can be “oriented to rebalancing power inequalities [emphasis added]” (Della Porta, 2013, p. 
38). This concern with participation triggers concern about civic disengagement, which is associated 
to the erosion “of engagement at the subjective level”, a sentiment suggesting that citizens’ practices 
“are losing political impact” (Dahlgren, 2014, p. 3). However, beyond the idea that participation is 
normatively desirable, it is not always clear which ethical values should guide citizenship. For some, 
these values can be summarized as “universal liberty and equality” (Mouffe, 1992, p. 30); others divide 
them into “substantive” (equality, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance) and “procedural” (openness, 
reciprocity, discussion and responsibility) (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 111). 
 
A third cognitive-symbolic element considered necessary for the practice of citizenship is 
accurate knowledge about public matters – and citizens’ abilities to acquire such knowledge, which 
involves discussion of literacy (e.g. Agre, 2004; Dahlgren, 2009, p. 109). Non-naturalists tend to 
assume that reflexivity turns the consumption of information into a relatively open meaning-making 
process, shaped by individual identity, values and emotions, this last also a key cognitive-symbolic 
element of citizenship.13 Against most deliberative models of participation, non-naturalists often 
understand that disentangling emotion from reason is artificial and detrimental to an understanding 
of democracy (Di Gregorio & Merolli, 2016; Mihai, 2014; see Scarantino & de Sousa, 2018, for a 
definition of emotions). 
 
A specific understanding of power is the third main concept in non-naturalist conceptions of 
citizenship. The individual who becomes a citizen by “doing” citizenship is commonly seen as both a 
subject to power, since she must obey some rules to have any rights, and a subject of power, once 
 
13 Sometimes termed “passions”, “sentiments”, “affects”. In this thesis, I use “emotion” to refer to all these 
feelings. 
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these rights allow her to subvert the obligations to which she initially submitted (Isin & Ruppert, 2015, 
p. 31, based on Foucault, 1984; cf. Brown, 2015). In addition to rights/obligations and economic 
rationality, space, also, is considered a crucial site of power. If no attention is given to understanding 
how power relations constitute these spaces by including/excluding certain civic practices, it is argued, 
theorizations of a democracy risk perpetuating the inequalities they may seek to combat – as 
contended by critics of the early Habermasian public sphere theory (for a summary, see Dahlberg, 
2013). Debates on power and digital spaces are important junctures where non-naturalist authors 
tend to approach online media. Before the emergence of datafied platforms, these spaces, generally, 
were seen as relatively decentralized, enabling individuals to more easily acquire civic knowledge, 
engage in civic practices and, thus, challenge and circumvent top-down control (Dahlgren, 2009). 
 
More recently, there has been a turn towards consideration of datafied platforms – usually 
focussed on social movements. Some argue that they enable generative computational openings and 
closures in relation to which citizens are constituted (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). Others suggest that their 
material affordances might be decoded by activists and, in this way, shape their self-mediation 
practices and collective identities (Cammaerts, 2018). There has been renewed interest, also, in how 
tech-savvy actors, such as “hackers”, “data activists” and “civic tech entrepreneurs”, employ their 
computational skills for political ends, sometimes “hacking in the public interest”, as Alison Powell 
(2016) puts it (see also Kennedy, 2018; Pybus, Coté, & Blanke, 2015; Baack, 2015; Milan & Gutiérrez, 
2015). 
 
Writing about “political agency”, Stephania Milan (2018) argues that datafied platforms are 
associated to an “unprecedented… quest for visibility” amongst “activists”, creating “subjectivities 
that orient themselves toward the algorithm — in other words, end users are trained to think of 
themselves with (what they believe is) the logic of the subtending algorithms [emphasis added]” 
(Milan, 2018, p. 514; see also Tufecki, 2013; Bigo, Isin, & Ruppert, 2017). Milan suggests that this 
orientation may limit citizens’ practices to the “ability to reveal oneself to the most marketable’ and 
likeable elements, an “optimal” self that is manufactured to increase popularity and “self-esteem” but 
that also often produces misleading perceptions of a social movement’s strength (Milan, 2018, p. 513). 
This “politics of visibility”, she argues, exacerbates “the centrality of the subjective and private 
experience of the individual” and undermines “fundamental group dynamics such as internal 
solidarity, commitment and responsibility towards fellow activists” (Milan, 2015, p. 896). On the other 
hand, the possibility of state surveillance has been found to produce “chilling effects” or resignation 
in activists, who have often naturalized the idea that their communications are monitored (Dencik & 
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Cable, 2017; Hintz & Milan, 2018; Stoycheff, 2016). Others have collected quantitative evidence of 
how end users’ incapacity to control one’s privacy seems to engender “spirals of silence” (Kwon, 
Moon, & Stefanone, 2014; Fox & Holt, 2018). In his study of current social movements, Emiliano Treré 
(2019, p. 198; see also Barassi, 2015; Lehtiniemi & Ruckenstein, 2019) suggests that many of these 
actions and inactions are informed by certain “technopolitical imaginaries” about how platform’s 
“algorithms” work. His fieldwork revealed that these activists tend to actualize these understandings 
as forms of control (including a sense of “paranoia”) and “political power” (“hacking” the system in 
their favour).14 
 
This thesis takes the empirical findings and conceptual insights of this tradition as its point of 
departure. In taking a holistic view of the interconnectedness between subjective and societal 
processes, non-naturalist accounts offer a complex, but realistic view of how ordinary people become 
citizens by doing citizenship. Furthermore, the suggestions about the consequences of datafication 
offer inspiration and intriguing points of comparison for my own research. 
 
Yet, further conceptual clarifications are necessary. First, there is a need for a better 
understanding of the very concept of citizenship as a practice. Normatively, it is not necessarily clear 
from the works examined above, what qualifies as ethical citizenship, that is, what democratic 
citizenship ought to be beyond the mere prescription of participation. Many non-naturalist authors 
say, or seem to presume, that ethical values should suffice to achieve this differentiation. However, it 
is not clear which ethical value is that. Similarly, it is not entirely clear how citizens come into being. 
What is the relation of this civic becoming to civic practices? The processes that allow them to 
reconfigure how they understand themselves as citizens are not usually detailed in this literature. To 
address these issues, the present chapter foregrounds a concept that is strongly implied, but 
essentially backgrounded in much of the non-naturalist writings: recognition. Arguments about the 
importance of actualizing and claiming rights, of “empowering” citizens and constructing collective 
affinities, can be traced back to older debates over whether and how citizens’ voices are or are not 
heard. On the one hand, since recognition theory is linked, inherently, to modern ideals of democracy 
(as I will show), it offers a particularly suitable normative backbone for conceptualizing citizenship – 
and a standpoint from which to consider authoritarianism. On the other, the proposal that citizens are 
formed through intersubjective relationships helps to offer a more sophisticated definition of how, 
ultimately, processes of civic becoming unfold. My discussion of recognition theory, in Section 3.4, 
 
14 Citizenship is not the only perspective from which the relationship between datafication and democracy has 
been analysed. I return to this issue in Section 3.5.1. 
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informs, in the conceptual framework, the conceptualization of civic voice – which is how this thesis 
defines citizenship as a practice.  
 
Second, despite the recent works on datafied platforms and social movements, and their 
original insights, there is a need for a theoretical systematization of the ways in which datafied spaces 
engender power relations – and, as such, shape processes of civic becoming. This applies particularly 
to the civic practices of ordinary individuals (the actors this thesis is interested in), who are likely to 
be less organized than activists and do not necessarily involve an explicit articulation of a collective 
identity. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the aforementioned findings and insights regarding 
attempts by activists to become more or less visible can explain similar experiences and practices of 
these ordinary individuals. My conceptualization of datafication power begins in Section 3.5, where I 
discuss critical data studies, and is finalized in the conceptual framework (3.6), where I define 
Facebook’s datafication power as exerted through an algorithmic visibility regime. 
 
These conceptualizations require, first, the construction of an analytical foundation, I suggest. 
I resorted to a body of work that is rather familiar to non-naturalists. When scholars in this tradition 
invoke a holistic vision of actions, cognitive-symbolic elements and power, their theoretical basis tends 
to be located in social practices theory and, in particular, in its critical variations (see Isin & Nielsen, 
2008). The next part of the chapter revisits some of the fundamentals of this scholarship. 
 
3.3. Overview of Social Practices Theory 
The following sections discuss three concepts that are crucial for this thesis: structure (Section 
3.3.1), agency (Section 3.3.2) and power (Section 3.3.3). Instead of choosing one major theorist, I 
explore multiple perspectives and demonstrate how they complement each other. This approach 
provides me with a rather detailed analytical tool kit which, in the conceptual framework (Section 3.6), 
is combined with other notions to develop the ideas of civic voice and algorithmic visibility regime, 
and to theorize their relationship. 
 
The emergence, in the second half of the 20th century, of social practice as one of the linchpins 
of social theory, was largely a response to the Wittgensteinian challenge to the assumption that rules 
determine actions. The concept was developed to investigate the locus of the “background 
understanding… that makes it possible to follow rules, obey norms, and articulate and grasp 
meanings” (Rouse, 2007, p. 503 ; Ortner, 1984; Schatzki, 1996). From a social practices theory 
perspective, actions do not merely follow rules – they also constitute them. This insight inspired 
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theorists to question the conventional agency versus structure dichotomy and opened new avenues 
to study power generally, (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Foucault, 1984). Various disciplines 
took up this challenge, including media and communications (e.g. Steele & Brown, 1995; Couldry, 
2004; Postill, 2010). 
 
If it is accepted that practices are processes involving both bundles of bodily actions and 
cognitive-symbolic elements – and, therefore, cannot be reduced only to either (Schatzki, 1996) – 
there is a fundamental bifurcation with regard to how practices are reproduced. This bifurcation is 
reminiscent of two different responses to the Wittgensteinian challenge. According to the first 
tradition, “the connections that form our background [are] just de facto links, not susceptible of any 
justification… simply imposed by our society”, and are thus highly stable, reproduced automatically 
and impervious to resistance. In contrast, a second tradition, “takes the background as incorporating 
understanding … a grasp on things which although quite inarticulate may allow us to formulate reasons 
and explanations when challenged [emphasis added]” (Taylor, 1995, pp. 167-68). The second tradition 
suggests that the rules embodied in practices have “to be applied”, an exercise that “may involve 
difficult and finely tuned judgments” (Taylor, 1995, p. 177). This renders the adherence to rules open 
to creative reconstructions by “self-interpreting” individuals (Taylor, 1985, pp. 26-27), who are, thus, 
less stable than assumed in the first definition (Schatzki, 2002). 
 
Given my adoption of a non-naturalist perspective, which assumes that individuals are 
inherently marked by reflexivity, the theoretical framing developed here accords with the second 
tradition. This initial choice substantively reduces the number of approaches on which the thesis can 
draw. These approaches tend to focus on three main concepts to explain the constitution of social 
practices: structure (including the aforementioned “background understanding” and materiality), 
agency (to specify how interpretation informs action) and power (to account for the unequal disputes 
that shape the nexus of structure and agency). I unpack these concepts in what follows. 
 
3.3.1. Structure: Resources, Schemas and Social Imaginaries  
In this thesis, I adopt Sewell’s (1992) synoptic formulation of structure. He examines critical 
theories of practices, identifies their difficulties and proposes a definition that is unusual in two 
respects: it exhibits striking terminological clarity and expounds, in sufficient detail for my purposes, 
the role of materiality. 
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Sewell’s starting point is to argue that, while social practices theorists (in particular Giddens 
and Bourdieu) are correct in not assigning deterministic capacities to “structures”, they are unable to 
explain, ultimately, what “structure” means beyond being a metaphor for other equally vague terms, 
such as “patterning” and “stability”. Sewell sets out to provide a formulation, which, in addition to 
recognizing the agency of actors and “the possibility of change”, is able to bridge two visions of 
structure: the semiotic (which tends to define structure as related to meaning and meaning 
production) and the material (which tends to define structure as related to non-human materials) 
(Sewell, 1992, p. 4). 
 
Using the springboard of Gidden’s structuration theory, Sewell begins by discussing the first 
vision, according to which structures are virtual rules, that is, generalizable procedures that pattern 
actions. This semiotic conceptualization is promising, but must be made more specific in Sewell’s view. 
In place of “rules”, he prefers schema, the normative “conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles of 
action, and habits” (Sewell, 1992, p. 8). Sewell contends that schemas have varied “depths”. Some are 
“deep”, that is, pervasive and “relatively unconscious”, the “taken-for-granted mental assumptions or 
modes of procedure that actors normally apply without being aware that they are applying them”. A 
“deep” schema “lies beneath and generates a certain range” of “surface’ schemas (Sewell, 1992, p. 
22). 
 
Aside from schemas, structures can be conceptualized, also, as resources. Resources might be 
divided between human (e.g. one’s actions, skills, knowledge and dispositions) and nonhuman (e.g. 
“objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured”) (Sewell, 1992, p. 9). Sewell 
differs from Giddens in proposing that resources are not “virtual”, but actual. This is so, he argues, 
because they are either physical things (in the case of non-human resources) or “observable 
characteristics of real people”, in the case of human resources (Sewell, 1992, p. 10). Some structures 
are understood to “mobilize” more or fewer resources and to create varying concentrations of 
different kinds (persuasion or coercion) of “power” for certain actors to advance their interests. 
 
Sewell posits that structures could be seen as emerging out of constitutive relations between 
these two elements: “schemas are the effects of resources, just as resources are the effects of 
schemas… ” (Sewell, 1992, p. 13). On the one hand, schemas effectuate human resources inasmuch 
as they engender understandings about what is possible for particular social actors. However, they 
also effectuate non-human resources – both by assigning to things the very meaning of “resources” 
and by orienting their usage, that is, how they should be exploited, manipulated, etc. On the other 
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hand, resources effectuate schemas when they “incorporate and actualize”, “teach and validate” 
schemas, which then can “be inferred” from “material form” (in the case of non-human resources) or 
from their observable enactment by people (in the case of human resources) (Sewell, 1992, p. 13). 
How schemas can be “inferred” from non-human resources is an important, but underdeveloped 
point, to which I return when discussing agency in the next section. 
 
While Sewell (1992, p. 22) suggests that typologies of structures are difficult to define a priori, 
there is, arguably, at least one kind of schema that is necessarily present in social life – namely, 
imaginaries. The term has been conceptualized variously as relating to e.g. psychoanalysis (Lacan, 
2006), communities (Anderson, 1991), “arational” concepts of the social (Castoriadis, 1987/1997) and 
“global flows” (Appadurai, 1996). However, the theory that, perhaps, is best aligned to the general 
notion of social practices that underpins this chapter, is Charles Taylor’s (2004). Taylor’s approach is 
chiefly historical. He is interested, principally, in the emergence of a modern, secular imaginary in the 
Western world – but his understanding of imaginaries is helpful beyond this context, as suggested by 
e.g. Mansell (2012), Jasanoff (2015), Barassi (2015), and Treré (2019) (see also McNeil, Arribas-Ayllon, 
Haran, Mackenzie, & Tutton, 2017). By social imaginary Taylor means, “the taken-for-granted shape 
of things, too obvious to mention” (Taylor, 2004, p. 29), that is, how people “imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the 
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations” (Taylor, 2004, p. 23).  
 
Given their pervasiveness and implicitness, social imaginaries, are arguably akin to the 
prototypical “deep schema” to which Sewell refers. As such, they are neither illusory (as the ordinary 
understanding of the term would have it) nor are they fabrications that perpetuate domination (as in 
Marxist understanding of “ideology” – see Thompson, 1982). Rather, social imaginaries are depicted 
as constitutive of and constituted by the social practices they apparently represent in dematerialized 
form, and are carried in the “images, stories, and legends” of a society (Taylor, 2004, p. 23). Like 
Sewell, Taylor assumes that any attempt to pit “idealism” against “materialism” is based on a “false 
dichotomy” (2004, p. 31). By materialism he appears to mean less concrete things than human 
resources, the “material practices carried out by human beings in space and time” which are 
“inseparable” from the imaginary “modes of understanding” (or schemas) that enable those practices 
(Taylor, 2004, p. 31). Social imaginaries derive their constitutive capacity as much from their 
pervasiveness and implicitness as from their dual nature. On the one hand, they imply an 
understanding of existing practices as if they were natural, providing us with a sense of coherence 
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(Taylor, 2004, p. 31). On the other, this descriptive dimension has profound normative ramifications. 
Because, in accepting that this is the natural, “too obvious to mention” way of ‘how things go’, it can 
be assumed that this is “how they ought to go [emphasis added]” (Taylor, 2004, p. 31). Therefore, 
while not an ideology, social imaginaries are imbricated with power: the social practices to which 
these schemas give coherence are, themselves, dynamically associated with an unequal material 
reality. 
 
There is a second aspect which clarifies the constitutive properties of social imaginaries in 
relation to practices. As a “deep structure”, these imaginaries, also, are associated to the constitution 
of other, more superficial and localized schemas – arguably the “surface schemas” Sewell theorizes. 
Taylor seems to point precisely to this when he says that social imaginaries are not a mere “grasp on 
the norms underlying our social practice”, but a broader moral order that “makes these norms 
realizable” (Taylor, 2004, p. 40; 1995, p. 170). These “norms” do not exist as detached theory. They 
are materialized in people’s everyday lives through their comprehension of their own position in that 
broader normative order, which Taylor terms the “self-understanding” that “build[s] upon implicit 
understandings that underlie and make possible common practices” (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 4).15 Such 
sense of the self is subjective – produced by cognitive processes that can only be felt and reported by 
the individuals themselves. Furthermore, inasmuch as the social imaginary is associated with “how 
one should live” (Williams, 1985/2006, p. 1), this sense is necessarily ethical. As suggested by Taylor’s 
(1989, p. 64) earlier work on the origins of modern identity, one comes to understand who one is by 
making decisions about how to act, vis-à-vis what Taylor describes as “hypergoods”, and then 
questioning and interpreting these decisions. He suggests that, to know “who you are is to be oriented 
in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and 
what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary” (Taylor, 1989, 
p. 28). Again, individual normative orientations are seen as anchored in a sense of naturalness about 
one’s social life – “whom to speak to and when and how… what kinds of people we can associate with 
in what ways and in what circumstances” (Taylor, 2004, p. 26). Lastly, this sense is also social. Self-
understandings can only be constructed by our positioning ourselves “in a certain way among other 





15 While the concept of social imaginary may be studied in relation to collective processes, I focus here, mostly, 
on the experiences of individuals. 
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3.3.2. Agency: Three Meaning-Making Processes 
The formulation of agency adopted here is based on Emirbayer and Mische (1998). Similarly 
to Sewell, they review existing theories to offer a clear and synthetic formulation. But they 
complement his view by breaking down agency into multiple meaning-making processes (see 
Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1005) and characterizing it as the “[t]he temporally constructed 
engagement by actors of different structural environments… which, through the interplay of habit, 
imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures” (Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998, p. 970). My use of their theory is selective. I focus on the three macro-elements of agency to 
which their definition points and on some of their main sub-elements.16  
 
The first macro-element (iterational) refers to the “schematization of social experience 
[emphasis added]” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 975). Their formulation seems to be designed, 
primarily, to explain routinized actions. However, I suggest it is useful for this study inasmuch as it 
helps to explain how people construct schemas – such as social imaginaries. Schutz’s social 
phenomenology (1964, p. 283), on which Emirbayer and Mische draw heavily, posits that schemas are 
“constituted in and by previous experiencing activities of our consciousness”. That is, they involve 
everyday experiences, reflected upon by individuals both socially and personally. Schematization 
occurs when individuals pay "selective attention” to certain “areas” of reality (Schutz, 1964, p. 283; 
Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 979). Which areas of reality actors pay attention to in order to 
construct schemas about the world is rarely self-evident – they may encompass social experiences, 
artefacts, people’s own thoughts. In general, individuals are oriented by “systems of relevancies”, 
which are formed “over the course of biographical histories” and through social experience (Emirbayer 
& Mische, 1998, p. 979). These systems influence “not only what is problematic and what can remain 
unquestioned but also what has to be known and with what degree of clarity and precision it has to 
be known in order to solve the emergent problem” (Schutz, 1964, pp. 283-284).  
 
If selective attention seems common to all forms of schematization, more specific processes 
also can occur. One of these is “type recognition”(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 979). “Types” are 
“simplifying models” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 979) which are formed either when an “emerging 
experience” is understood as “familiar” or when such “experience” is comprehended as “strange” 
(Schutz, 1964, p. 284). Therefore, the processes of recognizing “types” (or “patterns”) depend on 
comparisons between “an emerging experience with those of the past, either within the actor's direct 
 
16 I leave aside the elements of their theory which, in my view, are not helpful to explain processes of civic 
becoming on Facebook. Moreover, I do not engage in this study with their formulation of temporality. 
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memory or within a social memory as objectified in various media of communication [emphasis 
added]” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 979). Importantly, schematizations are framed by the 
“ontological structures” of the “objective world” (Schutz, 1964, p. 288; see also Couldry & Hepp, 
2017). 
 
The second macro element of agency is projectivity. It “encompasses the imaginative 
generation of possible future trajectories of action” in which schemas “may be creatively 
reconfigured” in relation to individuals’ teleological emotions, their “hopes, fears, and desires” 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 984). Emirbayer and Mische propose that the generation of a plan 
begins with anticipatory identification, where the individual considers the schemas already held “to 
clarify motives, goals, and intentions” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 989). In a second moment 
(symbolic recomposition), individuals “insert themselves into a variety of possible trajectories and spin 
out alternative means-ends sequences”, likely taking into account the expected reactions of others 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 990). After such exploration, the individual is said to entertain 
“hypothetical resolutions” to the likely competing or contradictory future scenarios, resolutions that 
might have to resolve “several conflicts simultaneously” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 990). This 
other sub-element alludes to the justification of a possible course of action. 
 
Yet, projectivity does not determine actions. Individuals might identify ambiguities in their 
plans, triggering yet another layer of reflection on “emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of 
presently evolving situations”, prompting adaptations to people’s goals and plans (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998, p. 971). Emirbayer and Mische name this third macro-element of agency practical 
evaluation. A sub-element of this third macro element of agency is problematization, the recognition 
that the reality is, “in some degree resistant” to the “immediate and effortless realization” of a plan 
and that something must be done to render the situation “unproblematic” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, 
p. 998). Deciding how to adapt a plan to these difficulties might entail some form of deliberation. That 
is, after problematizing and characterizing a given situation, people commonly engage in “a conscious 
searching consideration of how best to respond to situational contingencies” in light of plans 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 999). Deliberation might be intersubjective and public or monologic 
and private, a dialogue with oneself. In engaging in this sort of thinking, people might reconsider their 
own habits and plans, their fairness and usefulness, leading to a decision about what to do. Quoting 
Nussbaum (1986, p. 307-8), Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 999) argue that these judgments stand 
“on the borderline between the intellectual and the passional, partaking of both natures: it can be 
described as either desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire”. Finally, there is the execution of 
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the decision, which might demand certain abilities and entail sacrifices and unintentional 
consequences that nuance even carefully considered plans (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1000). 
 
 While projectivity and practical evaluation refer to different moments of agency, the level of 
detail needed in this thesis allows me to adopt the general term project to encompass these two 
dimensions. 
 
3.3.3. Power: Prefiguration and Its Ordering 
Defined in this way, agency and structure do not have a priori normative characteristics nor 
are they opposed in a zero-sum game. Their relationship is one of co-constitution, patterned by 
disputes between unequal actors, who, frequently, try to influence the unfurling of this process to the 
benefit of their own projects, social imaginaries and self-understandings. This asymmetric patterning 
has been discussed through the notion of power. 
 
This thesis adopts a qualified version of the conceptualization developed by the late Michel 
Foucault, as hinted at in Section 3.2. While Foucault’s approaches to power varied over time (see 
Foucault, 2002, p. 331; Oksala, 2013), in the last part of his life he turned away from the earlier focus 
on top-down disciplinary institutions and became concerned with the self-interpretive processes 
whereby individuals turn themselves into “subjects” endowed with a self-understanding (Laidlaw, 
2014; Ortner, 2016). In his view, these processes of subjectivation occur through social practices of 
self-government that respond (transform, resist, comply) to a normative “field of possibilities” 
engendered by structures of government, such as scientific classification (Foucault, 2002, p. 341; 
Foucault, 1988). He suggested that self-formation of the subject is inherently indeterminate, 
susceptible to myriad “ways to conduct oneself” (Foucault, 1984, p. 26; Foucault, 2002, p. 331). In 
sum, contemporary techniques of power (which he sometimes labelled “governmentality”) are 
defined as not ontologically opposed to freedom, largely independent of discrete and observable 
controllers and often producing unintended consequences (Brown, 2006, p. 73). 
 
The political thinking of the late Foucault (which is philosophically coherent with my 
discussion of structure and agency) has inspired multiple applications. Building on the vocabulary 
developed in the previous two sections and on an insight from social practices theorist Theodore 
Schatzki (2002), I propose that the notion of prefiguration is helpful to understand which angle of 
Foucault’s formulation of power is of interest here. My starting point is one of the ambiguities in his 
theory. For Foucault, as indicated above, power occurs through government of the said “field” of 
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possible actions. At the same time, he says, also, that this field only “in the extreme… constrains or 
forbids absolutely”; more often it “incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it 
releases or contrives, makes more probable or less” (Foucault, 2002, p. 341). Thus, rendering some 
actions possible or impossible (the absolute constraints he refers to) rarely impacts on how people act 
to change themselves; usually, control is exerted by assigning other particular meanings to particular 
courses of action, making them look like, for example, inciting, seductive, easier or harder, probable 
or unlikely, etc. This indicates a contradiction that Foucault left underdeveloped, as Schatzki (2002) 
points out. It suggests that government and self-government interact in terms that are much more 
precise than the notion of “field of possibilities” entails. Schatzki (2002, pp. 227-28) proposes the 
concept of “relations of prefiguration” to understand this interaction. He defines these relations as 
the means whereby “social life bears on forthcoming activity by qualifying paths of action as easier or 
harder, longer or shorter, obligatory or proscribed” (Schatzki, 2002, p. 227).  
 
In this formulation, prefiguration is unavoidable: all actions depend on being endowed with 
some form of meaning – as fleeting or inarticulate as this meaning might be. However, prefiguration 
is also influenced pervasively by attempts at ordering, Schatzki (2002) says. That is, some actors 
constantly try to lead other actors to qualify certain “paths of actions” in particular ways so as to 
prompt these people to carry out/do not carry out certain actions. In Sewell’s (1992) terms, these 
power exertions are realized through human resources (e.g. discourse, actions) and non-human 
resources (e.g. physical and digital artefacts, such as the datafication operations of Facebook I am 
concerned with in this thesis). I shall focus on the latter. 
 
Under this perspective, no artefact directly produces meanings about actions. In order to lead 
certain people to qualify certain paths of action in certain ways, these resources, first, must try to 
shape how they are themselves understood by those they are designed to influence. Or, to use the 
vocabulary of Emirbayer and Mische (1998) described in the previous section, they must try to 
influence how they are schematized. This attempt is realized, importantly, through the material 
shaping of these resources, i.e. their materialization (for similar propositions, see e.g. Verbeek, 2011; 
Bijker & Law, 1992, p. 300).17 By materiality, I mean the matter and the forms “that do not change, by 
 
17 The idea that artefacts influence on actions resembles the notion of affordances, developed chiefly by Gibson 
(1966) and frequently used or referred to by authors interested in the relation between media and civic practices 
(e.g. Cammaerts, 2018; Milan, 2018). Affordances can be defined as “’multifaceted relational structure’… 
between an object/technology and the end user that enables or constrains potential behavioural outcomes in a 
particular context” (Evans, Pearce, Vitak, & Treem, 2017). I contend that prefiguration and affordances differ, to 
the extent that the latter involve actions that are enabled/constrained by things, thus, resembling the 
possible/impossible dichotomy of the “field of possibilities”. The former refers to the meanings that designers 
may try to assign to certain actions through the characteristics of the artefacts they construct. 
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themselves, across differences in time and context [emphasis added]” (Leonardi, 2012, p. 31). This 
entails that the materialization of an artefact might be interpreted differently by different actors.  
 
As defined here, the notion of prefiguration hones the constitutive relationship between 
artefacts and schemas that Sewell conceptualizes (see Section 3.3.1 above) by making clear its political 
dimension. However, even if non-human resources are schematized as their designers expect and lead 
to the intended assignment of certain meanings to certain actions (both of which are far from sure), 
actors might decide not to realize such actions. As Schatzki (2002, p. 256) puts it, “all the prefiguration 
in the world cannot sew up” action before action occurs. From a late-Foucauldian perspective, the 
process remains uncertain – and thus productive. 
 
As form of power, prefiguration may be defined as the (1) materialization of certain non-
human resources (artefacts) with the goal of influencing their schematization, so as to (2) engender 
particular understandings about these artefacts in order to (3) lead individuals to qualify certain 
actions (likely toward the artefact itself) in certain ways. This insight is what allows me to theorize, in 
the conceptual framework, Facebook’s power as working indirectly (see Section 3.6.2 below). 
 
3.4. Overview of Recognition Theory 
The previous sections defined the three core components of social practices theory that serve 
as the analytical bedrock upon which the remainder of this chapter builds. As described in Section 3.2, 
however, a reconceptualization of citizenship demands, also, a theory able to explain how democratic 
citizens come (and ought to come) into being. This is done in the next set of sections through a 
consideration of recognition theory. 
 
The re-emergence in the post-Cold War period of “recognition”, as a prominent concept to 
address social justice, has been linked to the increased awareness of non-economic forms of injustice, 
the rapid intensification of globalization and the spread of the liberal democratic ideal (Markell, 2003, 
p. 19). It is possible to trace theories about recognition back to Plato’s “Republic” (Fukuyama, 2018, 
pp. 47-60). However, usually, Hegel is the most important source of inspiration of current 
theorizations. Hegel’s “big idea” of recognition is supported by “two features”: one, that self-
understandings are “essentially… a social achievement”, dependent on one’s intersubjective 
engagement with others, but realized by individual’s own conscience; two, that “recognition is a 
normative attitude”, for “to recognize someone is to take her to be the subject of normative statuses, 
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that is, of commitments and entitlements, as capable of undertaking responsibilities and exercising 
authority [original emphasis]” – i.e. be autonomous (Brandom, 2007, p. 136). 
 
Building on these points, contemporary authors have reconstructed the notion of recognition. 
While many others have also worked on the theme (e.g. Taylor, 1994; Fraser, 2003; Ricoeur, 2005; 
Markell, 2003; Young, 1990), the work of Axel Honneth offers a particularly helpful way, albeit in 
modified form, of considering the dimensions of recognition which are important in this study.18 
 
3.4.1. Social Recognition, Voice and Social Freedom 
Reading Hegel through a neo-Aristotelian lenses, Honneth identifies three different 
“patterns” of recognition and misrecognition, or ways that different, but interdependent sorts of 
relations between persons can give rise to three practical “relations-to-self”. Since these relations 
come to define who one is and who one might possibly wish to be and want to do, they are the 
processes that fundamentally are responsible for autonomy. That is, Honneth does not define what 
constitutes an autonomous action, but rather what ought to be in place for an autonomous individual 
to flourish. 
 
The term “interdependent” suggests a developmental way of understanding the proper 
constitution of the self, in which one step makes the next more likely. The first pattern involves the 
affective relationship between an infant and its main carer and, over time, between the individual and 
other family members, friends and romantic partners. Through love, individuals are expected to 
develop a relation-to-self that allows for “the development of all further attitudes of self-respect” 
(Honneth, 1992, p. 107). The “most fundamental” form of misrecognition at this level is “violation of 
the body”, such as torture and rape (Honneth, 1992, p. 132). The second pattern echoes the 
Marshallian view of citizenship (Honneth, 1992, pp. 115-117). Honneth posits that recognition is 
produced through a legal relationship with the state (rights), which is made possible by general 
acceptance of an equalitarian moral status of all individuals in the condition of social beings. Being 
subject to rights and obligations infuses the individual with a basic sense of “self-respect” – a second 
kind of “relation-to-self”. Misrecognition, in this case, means denial of rights. 
 
However, legal rights in themselves do not explain how they are fought for, claimed, realized, 
contested, changed, imposed or invented; nor do they clarify the practices, which, while entirely about 
 
18 For critical assessments of the importance of Honneth’s theory, see McQueen, 2014; McBride, 2013; Zurn, 
2015. 
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governing the polity, do not explicitly address the existence, institution or content of rights. These 
practices – the focus in this thesis – are explained primarily by the third pattern, social recognition. 
Social recognition is mediated by a shared set of norms, which orient the appraisal of “achievements” 
and the “social worth” of “particular personality features” by calculating “the degree to which these 
[features] appear able to contribute to the realization of societal goals” (Honneth, 1992, p. 122). 
Different traits and abilities allow individuals to contribute differently to a polity’s “shared praxis” 
(Honneth, 1992, p. 129). This sort of recognition instils in the individual a third form of “relation-to-
self” that Honneth terms “self-esteem”. The shared norms on which it is based are understood as 
historically specific. If, in traditional societies, esteem stemmed from the individual’s social origins, in 
modern societies, achievement has become individualized, oriented “towards the capacities 
developed by the individual in the course of his or her life”, which inject “value pluralism”, “albeit one 
defined in class-specific and gender-specific terms”, into the framework within which social worth is 
formulated (Honneth, 1992, p. 125). The tension between the need to establish general “societal 
goals” and the expectation of value plurality renders the granting of social esteem a permanent source 
of dispute. Social misrecognition or denigration occur within a recognition framework in which the 
individual’s contributions to a community “is so constituted as to downgrade individual forms of life 
and manners of belief as inferior or deficient”, robbing “the subjects in question of every opportunity 
to attribute social value to their own abilities [emphasis added]” (Honneth, 1992, p. 134). 
 
As a consequence, individuals or groups might see themselves as unable, effectively, to 
contribute to the social world of which they are a part and this could trigger a “struggle for 
recognition”, in which social actors try not only to be recognized but also to alter the very norms that 
underpin the granting of social recognition (Honneth, 1992, p. 143). This triggering mechanism 
comprises, first, “[n]egative emotional reactions, such as being ashamed or enraged, feeling hurt or 
indignant”, which arise from the frustrated expectation of being respected (Honneth, 1992, p. 136), 
and, second, the articulation of these “symptoms” “within an intersubjective framework of 
interpretation such that they can be shown to be typical of an entire group” (Honneth, 1992, p. 163). 
However, this articulation remains only a possibility. For Honneth, relations of power both include or 
exclude some individuals from achieving autonomy and imply an understanding of whether 
psychological suffering is or is not “social” and, thus, is justification to resist and seek social change – 
“struggle”. Defined in this way, social recognition occupies a significant position in the constitution of 
/citizens and polities. The former are emotionally driven19 to try to have their individuality recognized 
 
19 Recognition is not an emotion, but its granting and denial are associated to an array of emotional states – 
pride, outrage, happiness, shame, etc. (see Zurn, 2015, p. 15). 
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by peers and avoid misrecognition; the latter are formed, crucially, by struggles over its symbolic 
hierarchies, Honneth says. 
 
I suggest that the action through which social recognition is sought and struggled for is well 
captured by the metaphor of voice which seeks (and, under certain conditions, ought) to be heard. 
While the voice terminology is typical of multiple theoretical strands (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 
1995; Sen, 1999; Hirschman, 1970; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), and appears, also, in Honneth’s work (e.g. 
Honneth, 2014, p. 15), my approach is inspired by Nick Couldry’s (2010, p. vi) extensive work on it (cf. 
Butler, 2005). For Couldry, voice is akin to a social practice, the “socially grounded” process of “giving 
an account of oneself and what affects one’s life” (Couldry, 2010, p. vi). This does not mean that one’s 
voice is explicitly about oneself. More often, it is what a social actor thinks best represents her 
understanding about a given aspect – an expression of self-representation, I suggest. Of course, when 
expressing “voice”, the individual might consider this voice “authentic” – the “real self”. However, by 
exerting voice, we do not simply disclose our “inner” selves, Couldry reminds us. Rather, we reflect on 
such disclosure in order to assess who we are and who we want to be. There is an “internal plurality”, 
made apparent through “the processes whereby we think about what one strand of our lives means 
for other strands” (Couldry, 2010, p. 46).20 In this view, voice entails a relative uniqueness, but does 
not assume a unified, pre-existing and fixed self-understanding. 
 
Let me return to Honneth. The normative kernel of his conceptualization rests in the notion 
of mutual recognition. Honneth (2014) argues that only institutionalized relations of mutual 
recognition can create the sustained conditions required for what he terms “democratic ethical life” 
(Honneth, 2014, p. 63). The first key idea of this proposition is that, in contrast to negative and 
reflexive conceptions, freedom is conceived as social freedom, created by the capacity of “being 'with 
oneself in the other'” and to “grasp each other as the other of their own selves” (Honneth, 2014, p. 
44). If an individual needs some other person to be able to understand herself as an autonomous 
being, this other must be conceived of by her as worthy of respect, that is, as striving for the same 
thing – otherwise, recognition of the other is not itself worthy of respect and, thus, not sufficient to 
instil in her the confidence, respect and esteem to allow her to conceive herself as autonomous. The 
second idea is that “institutions of recognition” (Honneth, 2014, p. 46) must be designed to foster the 
universalization of the fundamental sense of reciprocity that underpins mutual recognition, chiefly 
 
20 I suggest that the means whereby self-representation is conveyed might include non-narrative actions, such 
as voting, marching, etc. 
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through “practices, customs and social roles” – and not, as Hegel assumed, only laws (Honneth, 2014, 
p. 66). 
 
Honneth points out that democratic ethical life can be fulfilled only “where the principles of 
freedom institutionalized in the various spheres of action have been realized and embodied in 
corresponding practices and habits” (Honneth, 2014, p. 330). Put another way, as long as mutual 
recognition is not systematically ensured in personal and market relationships, democratic will 
formation can hardly function properly or, on its own, bring about the ethical life Honneth idealizes. I 
suggest, therefore, that “democratic ethical life” is not an institutional ideal of what democracy should 
be – it is a normative formulation of what democratic culture should be. Indeed, Honneth (2014, p. 
329-335) uses the term “political culture” without defining it. Yet, if, for him, “democracy” is 
materialized in the dynamic, fragmented and mundane intersection of various institutions and 
ordinary practices, it might be understood as a form of culture (for a similar formulation, see Sewell, 
2005, p. 169). 
 
3.4.2. Power, Misrecognition and Authoritarianism 
While understanding the struggle for social recognition as “agonistic” and its necessity as 
“permanent” (1992, p. 127), Honneth has been criticized for underestimating the role of power 
relations in recognition processes. This section presents three facets of these critiques and contends 
that, in contrast to what his most stringent critics say,21 these problems do not necessarily undermine 
his theory. Instead, they help to improve it by rendering more sophisticated the understanding of 
what counts as misrecognition, and one of its key instantiations – authoritarianism.22 
 
Firstly, an important criticism is that misrecognition may masquerade as social recognition. In 
this case, apparent acts of recognition might endow misrecognized citizens with a sense of belonging 
to an unjust order, so as to constitute subjects who willingly participate in the reproduction of their 
own unfreedom (McQueen, 2015; McNay, 2008; see also Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1988; Fanon, 1952, 
for previous articulations of this point). Over time, Honneth came to acknowledge that recognition 
could, indeed, function as a form of ideology, and that a more critical view of power was needed 
(Honneth, 2007, p. 339). I suggest that his recent elaboration of how social justice depends on 
“institutions” does just that, by implying that certain structures should be constructed so as to develop 
 
21 For an extended treatment of these critiques, see McNay (2008, p. 118-147). 
22 While the works of Honneth and of the early Foucault would be largely incompatible, the thought of the late 
Foucault upon which this thesis draws is much closer to the philosophical underpinnings of Honneth’s theory. 
For a similar interpretation, see Sinnerbrink (2011).  
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subjects who partake in mutual recognition practices. That is, as much as power presupposes the 
possibility of freedom (the late-Foucauldian point discussed in Section 3.3.3), social freedom cannot 
exist outside power structures, broadly understood – it must be designed into them. This reading 
deflates much of the post-structuralist critique which insists that Honneth still works within an overly 
idealist register (e.g. McQueen, 2015). Of course, it does not mean that recognition rules might not 
engender distortion of voice, which is how I describe situations where individuals see themselves 
forced, against their legitimate will, to transform themselves into socially recognizable subjects. Faced 
by the need of distortion, individuals might react in multiple ways: change completely, supress 
themselves, seek a compromise or, as Butler (2004, p. 3) puts it, decide to not be recognizable at all – 
“there are advantages to remaining less than intelligible”. It is important to differentiate this kind of 
misrecognition from the kind described in the previous section, which Honneth (1992) originally 
defined as denigration, where no change to the subject is enough to render the individual recognizable 
and even the possibility of voice may be denied (e.g. racism). 
 
A similarly complicated second aspect is linked to Honneth’s implicit suggestion that all voices 
are entitled to the same level of social recognition. This expectation is “untenable”: different 
individuals will always have different capacity and, thus, will be differently recognized – the very 
notion of esteem depends on this (Fraser, 2003, p. 32; see also McBride, 2009). This question raises 
problems about the limits to social recognition: are voices that are hostile to mutual recognition, such 
as authoritarian and “racist identities”, entitled to individual recognition (Fraser, 2003, p. 38; 
Thompson, 2018, p. 570), a common liberal criticism of the so-called “identity politics” (Fukuyama, 
2018)? After all, “how should recognition claims be judged?” (Fraser, 2003, p. 38). There is no all-
encompassing, single fixed answer to this problem. For, as Honneth points out, the norms of social 
recognition are contextual, constantly changed and fought over. Nevertheless, it could be said that 
this judgment ought to have as its ethical lodestar, the mutual recognition value. This does not mean 
that all voices must be heard at all times equally, but that everyone must be able “to pursue social 
esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity”, in Fraser’s (2003, p. 32) proposition of a similar 
point. That actors will disagree about how to interpret what counts as mutual recognition, and that 
these disagreements are themselves influenced by power relations, are unavoidable. This second 
criticism indicates that an individual whose voice is founded on the illegitimate misrecognition of other 
voices has no grounds to demand recognition or to complain about misrecognition if such recognition 
is denied to them. It does not follow, however, that, in practice, misrecognition-based voices are not 
socially recognized or that such recognition does not play a role in the constitution of one’s self-
esteem. It does play a role, an aspect that Honneth’s theory tends to disregard due to its normative 
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focus. So, for instance, studies of why individuals join and continue to belong to neo-Nazi groups point 
to the sense of social worth these groups provide, although they may not use the term “recognition” 
(e.g. Blee, 2002; Koster & Houtman, 2008). Yet, in the perspective adopted here, such recognition is 
not a proper normative recognition, that is, it will not create the conditions for the development of an 
autonomous self, according to Honneth’s parameters to what is “autonomy” (see Section 3.4.1). 
 
Thirdly, in discussing institutions of recognition, Honneth refers repeatedly to their mediating 
role: they are “media of reflexive freedom” (Honneth, 2014, p. 43) or “mediating institutions that 
inform subjects in advance about the interdependence of their aims” (Honneth, 2014, p. 65). He seems 
to suggest that institutions mediate inasmuch as they enable the interaction of citizens, socializing 
them into practices which are respectful of mutual recognition. However, the mention of “media” 
suggests two shortcomings to his theory: the lack of an appreciation of how media spaces mediate 
recognition, and in what ways this mediated recognition is affected by the materiality of these spaces 
(Campanella, 2018). Deranty (2006) indicates that Honneth puts strong emphasis on “virtual” social 
structures (schemas, in the vocabulary developed in Section 3.3.2), but suggests that he largely 
neglects the fact that relations of recognition are themselves imbricated with “interactions between 
human and nonhuman beings… personal objects,… tools, machines” (Deranty, 2006, p. 128). Deranty’s 
point is suggestive of all sorts of roles that non-human resources might play in how recognition 
happens. Particularly relevant for this thesis, is how media materiality can potentially change the 
visibility conditions that define the possibility of recognition. That some sort of visibility precedes 
recognition is acknowledged by Honneth (2001). By entering into one’s visual field, individuals may be 
cognized. However, one might “look through” the acknowledged other, a form of “social invisibility” 
typical of interactions tinged, for example, by racism, which is a form of denigration (Honneth, 2001, 
p. 115). That is, the process of visibilizing does not in itself guarantee recognition: the former 
maintains with the latter, a necessary but insufficient relationship. In fact, it might lead to 
misrecognition. 
 
The unresolved tension between mediated visibility and recognition is of central interest in 
this thesis. However, Honneth rarely extend his insights beyond face-to-face interactions. This 
precludes him from contemplating the relations of power that are embedded in spaces – such as 
datafied platforms. Even when he discusses media, such as newspapers and “the Internet” (see e.g. 
Honneth, 2014, p. 300-304), the role of mediated visibility is not addressed, and that of materiality in 
this relation is completely overlooked. That the configuration of spaces influences the exertion of 
voice by structuring “the visibility of subjects”, is not a new observation (e.g. Noval, 2007, p. 102). This 
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is, arguably, the underlying theme of many criticisms of how spaces of civic participation function 
(Dahlberg, 2018; see also Fraser, 2007, pp. 76-77). Typically, when media and communications 
scholars examine this debate, notions of visibility/invisibility and recognition/misrecognition tend to 
be conflated such that it is assumed that the “very… visibility of an individual or group”, in particular 
that of social minorities, “may be a valuable recognition” (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 150; Maia, 2014). While 
others have noticed the ambiguities of achieving mediated visibility to recognition (Dayan, 2013; 
Barnhurst, 2007), and explored in-depth the ethical complexities of granting recognition to distant 
others (Chouliariaki, 2013; Silverstone, 2006), there is an emerging concern over how datafied 
platforms have replaced a politics of visibility for an “economy of visibility”, where being seen is 
stripped of its subversive character and becomes “an end in itself” (Banet-Weiser, 2019, p. 22; Gray, 
2013). These are thought-provoking points, to which I return in Section 9.5.1. For now, it is important 
to notice that this third criticism points to another misrecognition, invisibilization of voice. It refers to 
how some voices, even when expressed and not necessarily deemed abnormal or inferior, may be 
prevented from being even acknowledged by certain others – usually due to spatial configurations. 
 
In sum, albeit detrimental to the development of autonomy, the three forms of 
misrecognition explained in this section (denigration, distortion and invisibilization)23 likely have 
productive consequences for the formation of self-understandings of both those who misrecognize 
and those who are misrecognized. 
 
I suggest that this might be associated with authoritarianism. One consequence of Honneth’s 
somewhat limited discussion of power is that he barely conceptualizes the structural impediments to 
recognition. I want to bring to the foreground an idea that is latent in much of his theory: 
authoritarianism. In both academic and popular discourse, authoritarianism is most often associated 
with a top down regime of unfreedom imposed on a given population by, often, charismatic and brutal 
strongmen and parties (see e.g. Linz, 1975/1995; O’Donnell, 1973). Studies tend to focus on policies, 
laws, institutional decisions and opinion polls to characterize governments and societies as 
“authoritarian” or “democratic”, or, more often, somewhere in between (see e.g. Bermeo, 2016). 
Another matrix focuses on psychological traits, and their relation to wider social and economic 
conditions. This approach originates chiefly in the critical work of the Frankfurt School, conducted 
during or in the wake of Nazi-fascism. Empirically, the School’s perhaps most important line of 
research regarding authoritarianism per se refers to the study of the typical social-psychological 
 
23 This index does not consider “anterior recognition” and its correspondent form of misrecognition, reification, 
i.e. to strip people of their human condition (Honneth, 2008), since this concept is not applicable given the aims 
of this thesis. 
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characteristics of authoritarian personalities such as the alleged propensity to submit to authorities 
and anti-intellectualism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; see also Horkheimer, 
1950). Theoretically, Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1944/2002) conceptualization of the role of cultural 
industries in the constitution of subjects disinterested in their own freedom received enormous 
attention. In similar vein and context, Arendt (1951, p. 474) proposed that authoritarianism depends 
on social isolation, “insofar as… isolated men are powerless by definition” – loneliness would be thus 
a pre-condition for “the terror”. Recently, noticing the lack of holistic definitions of the authoritarian 
phenomenon, Glasius (2018) proposed another way of looking at it – by paying attention to the social 
practices of (mainly) politicians and policymakers. 
 
Understanding authoritarianism through recognition theory provides a relatively straight-
forward philosophical basis that bridges these different views. Building on the last three sections, I 
suggest that, if authoritarianism represents, in abstract terms at least, the opposite of democracy, it 
can be defined as the inverted image of “democratic ethical life”, the term used by Honneth to 
describe his ideal of democratic culture (see previous section). That is, it can be defined as the 
structural patterns of misrecognition that systematically constitute disrespected individuals, whose 
abilities to act autonomously and resist authority figures are likely damaged. These patterns might 
involve the establishment of state policies (in which case they would relate mostly to the denial of 
legal rights and obligations, the second parameter of recognition – see Section 3.4.1). However, they 
might be associated, also, with the everyday social practices of ordinary people, thereby undermining 
different facets of social recognition. This endows the idea of authoritarianism with a great deal of 
granularity. Instead of trying to ascertain whether/to what extent someone or a community is 
“democratic” or “authoritarian”, the emphasis is on the ways in which one’s reflective relationship 
with certain structures engenders certain practices of denigration, distortion and invisibilization. This 
brief discussion neither claims to advance Honneth’s work nor exhausts the relationship between 
recognition theory and authoritarianism. My goal was to simply highlight this relationship, which I 
suggest is largely implied in Honneth’s theory. Whereas my definition of authoritarianism is not a fully 
developed theory, it is developed enough to provide the basis for my discussion of bottom-up 
authoritarianism (Section 9.5). In the conceptual framework (Section 3.6.1), recognition theory, as 
discussed in this section, is combined with aspects of social practices theory to redefine the practice 





3.5. Thinking Critically about Datafication 
So far, this chapter has taken two steps toward the formulation of this study’s conceptual 
framework. After developing a general analytical foundation with elements of social practices theory 
(Section 3.3), it resorted to recognition theory to explain how democratic citizens come (and ought to 
come) into being (Sections 3.4). In this part, the chapter addresses a third, rather different problem: 
how to conceptualize Facebook’s datafication power. This step is essential to understand in which 
ways Facebook, as a datafied platform, shapes the processes of civic becoming this thesis is interested 
in. 
 
My argument evolves inductively. I begin with an overview of two key concepts – datafication 
and platform. Then, I review contrasting literatures within critical data studies which, explicitly or not, 
address how the datafication operations of platforms engender power relations. I observe that, in the 
light of this study’s conceptual foundations and empirical interests, two aspects of these literatures 
can be foregrounded: the constitutive relations between datafication operations and individuals’ 
understandings about these operations, and how these relations seem to govern end users’ visibility. 
A theorization of datafication power that accounts for these two aspects might be framed by the 
notion of visibility regime – which I then introduce. These elements pave the way for the definition of 
Facebook’s datafication power as exerted through an algorithmic visibility regime, which is formulated 
in the conceptual framework (the last part of the chapter, Section 3.5.2). 
 
It is worth returning to the broad formulation offered in the introduction to Chapter 1. 
Datafication, Jose van Dijck (2014, p. 198) says, is the “transformation of social action into online 
quantified data” enacted by “real-time tracking” that allows for “predictive analysis”. Her formulation 
does not fully capture the complex and increasingly diverse practices that multiple fields of activity 
are pressed to adopt in order to supposedly reap the benefits of “big data”, in particular, those 
analysed by “Artificial Intelligence” (AI). However, it does indicate the two basic datafication 
operations that are the concern of this thesis. First, the rapid development of “enabling technologies, 
infrastructures [and] techniques” has driven the continuous production of unprecedentedly 
variegated and large amounts of digitalized data (Kitchin, 2014, p. 286). Embedded “into everyday 
business and social practices and spaces” (Kitchin, 2014, p. 286), these “enabling technologies” are 
supported significantly by hypertrophied variances of “dataveillance”; the “systematic use of personal 
data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more 
persons” (Clarke, 1988, section 7; Raley, 2013). Second, these data undergo automated analysis, 
executed increasingly by machine learning algorithmic systems (Seaver, 2013), a form of artificial 
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intelligence directed at “transforming, constructing or imposing some kind of shape” on datasets in 
order to “discover, decide, classify, rank, cluster, recommend, label or predict what is happening or 
what will happen” (Mackenzie, 2015, p. 432; 2017). While large scale social quantification has been 
one of the defining features of Western modern states (Hacking, 1982; Starr, 1987), these datasets, 
techniques and services now often are controlled by – and are the property of – a handful of 
conglomerates, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, 
whose main products are datafied platforms. 
 
To say that a datafied platform is a platform that is underpinned by dataveillance and 
algorithmic decision-making, as hinted at in Section 1.3, is an intuitive point – but it does not 
completely answer the question of what a “platform” is. Tarleton Gillespie (2010, 2017, 2018; cf. Carl 
& Hayes, 2015) demonstrates that the image of “platform” originates from a kind of software 
framework able to support other software. Over time, this computational definition has come to 
evoke “older meanings”: “an architecture from which to speak or act, like a train platform or a political 
stage” (Gillespie, 2017, para. 2). He notes that this shift has political connotations. It has “lent social 
media services” the aura of being “flat, open, sturdy”, naturalizing the assumption that these spaces 
are neutral and conducive to (negative) freedom. Crucially, the metaphor may obscure the designers’ 
responsibilities for the services of organizing, structuring and channelling information (Gillespie, 2017, 
para. 7). Therefore, it is paramount to consider the sprawling infrastructure of the stuff (data centres, 
cables) and the code (including machine learning algorithmic systems) that support instantiations of 
the platform’s end user interface (Plantin, Lagoze, Edwards, & Sandvig, 2016). Nevertheless, platforms 
are spaces of sociality among multiple actors – intermediaries of sorts, even if never neutral (Srnicek, 
2019; Moore & Tambini, 2018). Despite some of these problems, I suggest that the term platform 
remains interesting precisely because it blends the promise of self-expression and social interaction 
with the material and economic nature of datafication operations. In so doing, it foregrounds the 
tensions between these two aspects and, hence, the essentially political character of these spaces. 
 
Optimistic proponents of datafication in the first decade of the 21st century, seemed, at times, 
amazed by these platforms and the companies that built and controlled them. They predicted a 
datafied future in which reality somehow would speak for itself, unmediated, rendering previous 
explanatory human models “obsolete” (Anderson, 2008, para. 10) and ensuring “stability and fairness” 
(Pentland, 2014, p. 25). As it became increasingly clear that this new version of what Mosco (2004) 
had earlier called “digital sublime”, had not materialized, datafication received a huge backlash. 
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Echoes of this backlash can be identified in the fast-growing area of critical data studies 
(Seaver & Gillespie, 2017; Dalton, Craig, & Thatcher, 2016; boyd & Crawford, 2012). Much of this field 
concerns more or less explicit critiques of the ways in which datafication operations enable power 
relations (hereafter, datafication power24). As Beer (2017) notes, there appear to be two main 
approaches to this sort of power: (1) the power given to (usually) elite actors by the datafication 
operations themselves, which I refer to as a top-down approach; and (2) the power of the notions of 
datafication operations, particularly in relation to those individuals who, allegedly, are controlled by 
these operations, which I refer to as a bottom-up approach. I unpack these views in the following 
sections. 
 
3.5.1. Datafication as Top-Down Power 
This line of thought focuses strongly on the nexus between platform’s business model, politics 
and technology, as Zuboff’s (2019, 2015) work exemplifies. Zuboff (2019, p. 9) argues that datafication 
has given rise to “surveillance capitalism”, a “new economic order that claims human experience as 
free raw material for hidden commercial practices [emphases added]” and aim at modifying the 
behaviour of individuals so as to best serve companies economic interests. In this view, datafication 
is not a disinterested exercise of scientific curiosity, as suggested by Anderson (2008). Rather, it is a 
scientific, for-profit system of practices that relies on an acute visibility inequality to datafy social life 
itself and, through algorithmic analysis, produce predictive models that can “anticipate” what each 
individual will “do now, soon and later” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 25; see Fogg’s, 2003, conceptualization of 
computers as “persuasive technologies”; Yeung, 2017; cf. Couldry & Mejías, 2019). This technology 
maximizes companies’ abilities to offer information that people will, indeed, consume – click, buy, 
see. Personalization – the process of offering end users what their previous datafied actions 
demonstrated they want to interact with (Turow, 2011) – is a crucial instantiation of “the utopia of 
certainty” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 980). 
 
“Surveillance capitalism” is said to be underpinned by “instrumentarian power”, a new 
authoritarianism that Zuboff compares with 20th century fascist states. Although totalitarian and 
instrumentarian powers are both defined by their disregard for freedom, historical novelty and radical 
dreams of total domination, they are, she suggests, in many ways, the opposite. Zuboff points out that 
instrumentarian power has no political ideology, no interest in bodily violence or ethnic 
extermination. Looking at people from the same disinterested perspective as “radical behaviourists”, 
 
24 I employ this term as synonymous with what is sometimes called “algorithmic power”. Given the proposition 
that datafication encompasses both dataveillance and algorithmic data analysis, I consider this terminology 
clearer. 
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this power “only cares that whatever we do is accessible to its ever-evolving operations of rendition, 
calculation, modification, monetization, and control [original emphasis]” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 686). Its 
means are not “hierarchical administration of terror”, but the “ownership of the means of behaviour 
modification”. While not using the term authoritarianism, Cohen (2013, p. 1917; see also Cohen, 
2011,) argues that unchecked dataveillance on an industrial scale, erodes democracy by undermining 
the conditions for the flourishing of the ideal democratic self. She states that, instead of citizens, 
platforms aim to constitute “tractable, predictable” consumers, unwilling to accept uncomfortable 
diversity and uncapable fully governing themselves. 
 
Other authors, partly in reaction to the resurgence of authoritarian governments, politicians 
and activists (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), tend to argue that datafied technologies are not 
necessarily authoritarian themselves – they enable authoritarian actors. In this case, the argument, 
typically, is that ordinary citizens may fall prey to those who aim “to sow confusion, ignorance, 
prejudice, and chaos in order to undermine public accountability” (Deibert, 2019, p. 31; Marwick & 
Lewis, 2017; Turner, 2019; Bradshaw & Howard, 2017; Siva, 2018; MacKinnon, 2011; cf. Fuchs, 2018). 
From this perspective, the maliciously engineered “cacophony of opinions and the flood of 
information” on platforms degrade public discourse by creating “the perfect environment” for the 
(often automated) spread of falsehoods, conspiracy theories, rumours, and leaks, in addition to 
guiding end users “into online ‘filter bubbles’ in which they feel comfortable and ideologically aligned” 
(Deibert, 2019, p. 32; Woolley, 2016; but, see Borgesius et al., 2016; Tucker et al., 2018, for summaries 
of the empirical inconsistencies in the notion of “filter bubble”; cf. Pariser, 2011). Others see platforms 
as enabling “hyperleaders” – which might or not become authoritarian figures (Gerbaudo, 2018, p. 
150). Furthermore, it has been argued that the Internet has proven to be a “tool” that “authoritarians” 
employ to identify and persecute “activists, dissidents and journalists” (Deibert, 2019, p. 34) and to 
produce social conformity through the datafied classification of its citizens, as exemplified by the 
experiments surrounding the so-called Chinese social credit system (Creemers, 2017). 
 
Both those who see datafication operations as themselves being authoritarian and as enabling 
authoritarians, are often concerned with opacity. They argue that a key reason for the rise of 
companies, such as Google and Facebook, is that, in addition to their economic, technical and political 
assets, their datafication operations are technically, legally and administratively designed to be 
seamless and unknowable (Zuboff, 2019; Pasquale, 2015; Chalmers & MacColl, 2003; Araújo, 2016). 
The central argument in this context is that, once end users (and regulators also, in general) are 
impeded from seeing, accessing and, thus, judging dataveillance and algorithmic decision-making, 
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social and legal accountability are severely hampered. Actualizing the Marxist view of the cultural 
order that sustained the brutalities of the early industrial revolution, Zuboff (2019, p. 722) claims that 
“false consciousness is no longer produced by the hidden facts of class and their relation to production 
but rather by the hidden facts of instrumentarian power”, which usurps “the rights to answer the 
essential questions: Who knows? Who decides? Who decides who decides?” (see also Cheney-Lippold, 
2011; Lash, 2007). Along these lines, privacy is not so much eroded, but “redistributed”: “instead of 
people having the rights to decide how and what they will disclose, these rights are concentrated in 
the domain of surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 226). In addition to companies’ efforts to 
conceal platforms’ inner workings and objectives, are the intricacies of datafication operations and 
end users’ low level of technical literacy (Burrell, 2016). 
 
Thus, at the heart of how datafication enables control, there is a fundamental visibility 
inequality between “sorters” and “sortees”: the former pervasively monitor the latter, who have very 
little insight into how this monitoring is employed to control them (Andrejevic, 2014; boyd & 
Crawford, 2012). Even when the authoritarian actors are ordinary end users (e.g. “trolls” and 
“gamegaters” – Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Nagle, 2017), the assumption is that these actors act upon 
others who are seen as susceptible to this external action. 
 
3.5.2. Datafication as Bottom-up Power 
A second critical view changes the focus – from the political and economic usage by powerful 
actors of datafication to its instantiation “as culture”, that is, the “manifold consequences of a variety 
of human practices” (Seaver, 2017, p. 4; Devendorf & Goodman, 2014; see also Mol, 2002; cf. Striphas, 
2015). A growing literature has highlighted the importance of investigating these practices (Beer, 
2009; Ziewitz, 2016; Roberge & Melancon, 2017, p. 318; Bucher, 2018; Beer, 2017; Milan & Treré, 
2019; van Dijck, 2013; see also Ananny & Crawford, 2016; Neyland, 2016). This other literature asks: 
“What does it mean for ordinary people that their personal data” (and therefore themselves) “are 
increasingly tracked, sorted, and monetized?” (Livingstone, 2018, p. 2). Datafied systems are 
described as material elements with which “social actors develop more or less reflexive relationships”, 
even if the actual parts of these system remain invisible to the naked eye (Bucher, 2018, pp. 61-62; 
Gillespie, 2017a; 2016). After all, “whatever its appearance of complexity, even of opacity, the social 
world remains something accessible to interpretation and understanding” (Couldry & Hepp, 2016, p. 
25). From this perspective, datafication, like previous forms of social quantification (e.g. Espeland & 
Stevens, 2008), is neither a process of “data extraction”, as Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier (2013) 
would contend, nor a unidirectional process of almost unescapable control, as Zuboff (2019) 
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sometimes implies. Instead, precisely because it works as a “computational rendition of reality” 
(Kallinikos, 2009, p. 186), it becomes a socially “productive force” (Milan, 2018, p. 508). This suggests 
that, in not only quantifying discrete events, actions or opinions but also attempting to map out social 
life itself, algorithmic decisions are fed “back to end users”, helping them to “orient themselves in the 
world” (Kennedy, Poell, & van Dijck, 2015, p. 1). Thus, instead of revealing concealed realities or 
producing effects on end users, datafication, in this view, is entangled in a “recursive loop between 
the calculations of the algorithm and the ‘calculations’ of people” (Gillespie, 2013, p. 17). 
 
A central insight of this second critical view is that a significant number of end users construct 
some form of “notion” (Beer, 2017) about the two main operations of datafication – even if this 
understanding amounts to ambiguous “known unknowns” (Bucher, 2018). This has been 
demonstrated empirically to apply to dataveillance – even without awareness of its technical 
intricacies (Barnes, 2006; Hargittai & Marwick, 2016; Lupton & Michael, 2017; Turow, Henessy, 
Draper, & Virgilio, 2018; Knapp, 2016). Lately, several works have tried to explain how people make 
sense of algorithmic decision-making operations. Echoing what audience studies have demonstrated 
for decades (Livingstone, 2018), they suggest that end users do not stare passively at screens. 
 
Observation of their feeds reveals patterns of (in)visibility, that the individual can compare to 
what they thought should be shown to them, allowing them to infer a “mismatch” between these 
patterns and their “expectations about how the News Feed should work” (Rader & Gray, 2015, p. 179; 
Eslami et al., 2015). It might be that posts/ “friends” that participants are missing from their feeds or 
are appearing at a different frequency or in a different order to what they prefer (Rader & Gray, 2015, 
p. 179). Based on these findings, end users appear to achieve an awareness of algorithmic decisions 
through their perception of a “mistake” – that is, algorithms become perceptible if their visible 
decisions contrast with the end users’ preferences. This sensation has been termed variously as “faulty 
predictions” (Bucher, 2017, p. 35), “user surprises” (Rader, 2017) and “algorithmic disappointment” 
(Eslami, Karahalios, & Hamilton, 2017; see DeVito, Birnholtz, & Hancock 2017; Vaccaro et al., 2017).  
 
Sometimes, making sense of these connections apparently involves amazement. This happens 
when end users realize the extent of dataveillance – what Bucher (2017, p. 35) calls a “whoa moment” 
and Knapp (2016) describes as “unfolding”. Less often, end users intentionally introduce an input into 
an algorithmic system in order to probe it (Eslami et al., 2017, p. 6; Knapp, 2016, p. 168; Bucher, 2017, 
p. 36). In these examples, people seem to make sense of datafication operations by making 
connections between what they see on their screens and their past actions. These findings are usually 
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understood as exemplifying the assumption that, as infrastructures, algorithmic systems become 
visible when they break down (Starr, 1999). End users may also identify forms of unsolicited feedback 
from the system. Rader and Gray (2015, p. 179; see also DeVito et. al, 2018) describe how people 
speculate about algorithms by sensing that “an entity—usually either “Facebook” or an “algorithm”— 
[is] making inferences about their preferences”. Visible interactions, such as “likes”, have been 
described as the most important information users employ to understand how Facebook manages 
their visibility (Bernstein, Bakshy, Burke, & Karrer, 2013). 
 
Another, less well explored way that people appear to make sense of algorithmic decision-
making is through information, such as that found in the press and/or communicated by friends, family 
and partners (DeVito, Birnholtz, Hancock, French, & Liu, 2018; Eslami et al. 2015) and “replicated, 
queried, questioned or confirmed” in their everyday lives (Knapp, 2016, p. 203; see also Bucher, 2017, 
p. 38; Bishop, 2019; Lomborg & Kapsch, 2019). Furthermore, Instagram professional “influencers” 
have been described as seeking information and using data analytics to learn the “rules” of the 
“algorithmic game” (Cottler, 2019). 
 
It has been suggested that the understandings end users develop about platforms’ 
datafication operations give rise to more or less formalized mental representations. Adopting a 
concept from cognitive science (Gelman & Legare, 2011), some have proposed that end users hold 
“folk theories” of ubiquitous computing (Poole, Dantec, Eagan & Edwards, 2008) and, in particular, of 
algorithmic systems. Algorithm folk theories would include the “non-authoritative conceptions” that 
“circulate informally” among ordinary end users (“non-professionals”) about how these systems work 
(Eslami et. al, 2016, p. 2). Some of the “theories” found during previous empirical research describe 
algorithms as driven by “personal engagement” and “global popularity” (Eslami et. al, 2016, p. 5-6), or 
assume these systems to be a kind of “rational assistant”, “unwanted observer”, “transparent 
platform” and “corporate black box” (French & Hancock, 2017; see also DeVito et al., 2018; West, 
2018). Others point out that datafication may also be deployed as a form of ideology to promote “the 
virtues of calculation, competition, efficiency, objectivity and the need to be strategic” (Beer, 2017, p. 
9) and the “widespread belief in the objective quantification” (van Dijck, 2014, p. 198). Closer to the 
theoretical positioning of this thesis, the notion of “imaginary” has also been used to conceptualize 
these representations. In Bucher’s words, Facebook end users hold “algorithmic imaginaries”, which, 
rather than “a false belief or fetish of sorts” (Bucher, 2017, p. 31), are “ways of thinking about what 
algorithms are, what they should be, how they function and what these imaginaries in turn make 
possible” (Bucher, 2017, p. 39; see also Mukherjee, 2019; Smith, 2018). 
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This literature proposes that mental representations of datafication operations (“folk 
theories”, “ideologies”, “imaginaries”) prompt “adjustments” by end users (Couldry, Fotopoulou, & 
Dickens, 2016, p. 123). Part of the research on these adjustments is influenced by dramaturgical 
sociology, particularly neo-Goffmanian writings on how online identity is strategically performed. 
Before the rise of datafication as a major critical paradigm, these performances (or “self-
presentations”) were analysed in relation to what has been termed “networked privacy”, according 
to which the design of platforms collapses different “social contexts” and obscures what other users 
can or cannot see of one’s platform performances (e.g. Marwick & boyd, 2014). These conditions 
would lead individuals to construct certain “imagined audiences”, which have been found to be either 
abstract or targeted and, often, changing depending on the characteristics of the performance (e.g. 
Litt & Hargittai, 2016; Litt, 2016). Unable to not be seen, end users then tailor these practices through, 
for example, “self-censorship” and encoded messages (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Marwick & boyd, 2014; 
Das & Kramer, 2013). Studies of datafication that draw on this tradition suggest that understandings 
about algorithmic decision-making operations “guide self-presentation behaviours” by “mediating the 
relationship between self and audience” on platforms (DeVito et al., 2018, pp. 7, 9; DeVito et al., 2017; 
West, 2018). It has also been proposed that understandings about surveillants lead people to change 
who can see their actions (through “Privacy Settings” functionalities) even who the users are through 
use of pseudonyms (Duffy & Chan, 2018; Hargittai & Marwick, 2016). Some actors seem to format 
their “self-presentations” to increase their visibility. Instagram professional “influencers”, for 
instance, have been shown to try to “game” algorithmic decision-making by building “authentic” 
relationships with their audiences or inflating metrics (Cottler, 2019; see Dayan, 2013, for an earlier 
articulation of a similar point). 
 
Another, emerging strand of work is more closely aligned to the late-Foucauldian theoretical 
matrix that informs this thesis (see Section 3.3.3 above), but not necessarily interested in citizenship. 
In this view, performance is less a strategic projection of an identity than a means through which 
individuals form themselves. In relation to datafication, it has been argued that platforms incite the 
“algorithmic self-optimization” of its users by unequally “rewarding with visibility” those whose 
performances comply with the platform’s business model (Bishop, 2018, p. 81; Introna, 2016). These 
works have an important predecessor, namely, the notion of self-branding. This refers to normative 
and entrepreneurial “technologies of the self”, such as “self-promotion and advertising techniques”, 
through which people strive not only to act as, but to become their “authentic” self – in particular, on 
spaces such as Facebook (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p. 55, 80-85; Hearn, 2008; Marwick, 2013). 
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Taking stock of the views discussed in this and in the previous sections, datafication in the 
context of platforms might be defined as the set of processes through which increasing aspects of 
human existence become digitalized and are fed into AI algorithmic systems so as to be returned to 
end users in the form of automated decisions, triggering reflection and action. 
 
This definition highlights the link between what datafication operations do and what end 
users do with datafication operations. While both approaches recognize this link, they do not 
necessarily specify how it might inform a definition of datafication power. Top-down approaches are 
concerned with the ways in which the opaque nature of dataveillance and algorithmic decision-making 
affect end users engagement with platforms – but are less interested in the possibility that this 
engagement might engender some autonomous understanding about these operations. Bottom-up 
approaches unpack these sensemaking experiences – but tend to downplay how they are shaped by 
the materiality of those datafication operations, or at least by the political nature of this materiality. 
 
Sewell (1992 – see Section 3.3.1) helps us to reconsider this link. Indeed, datafication 
operations, as defined by scholars like Zuboff, resemble his definition of resources, and more 
specifically, non-human resources, which controllers of platforms employ to exert power over end 
users for economic, political and social gains. Likewise, works that look at datafication from the 
bottom-up appear to be largely interested in what Sewell defines as schemas – how ideas about 
platforms’ operating rules come into being, which ideas are these, and how they are associated with 
end users’ actions. Therefore, if Sewell is correct, datafied platforms might be understood as a 
structure, one in which there is an enormously concentrated distribution of resources – which 
effectuate and is effectuated, to use his terminology, by schemas. 
 
Before unpacking how such structure might be understood as engendering power relations in 
their attempt to order the prefiguration of end users’ actions (what is done in the conceptual 
framework), a second question might be raised. If datafied platforms like Facebook are structures, 
what do they structure? Platforms are remarkably complex spaces, populated by a plethora of 
elements that might be defined as governing a plethora of phenomena. Yet, I suggest that we can 
answer this question by foregrounding another topic of the literatures discussed in this and in the 
previous sections. It can be said that datafied platforms govern, primarily, end users’ visibility (this is 
made particularly clear by Gillespie, 2017a; Flyverbom, 2016; Plantin, 2018, p. 4; Milan, 2015). This 
term means different things to different authors. Under the top-down perspective examined above, 
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the emphasis is given to the erosion of privacy25 by dataveillance procedures, and to the creation of 
news feeds in which end users’ are exposed to personalized content. Works that investigate 
datafication from the bottom up expand this scope, and tend to be interested in both how end users 
negotiate their lack of privacy and in their eventual “quest” to be seen by others. Given my focus on 
end users’ practices, this expanded focus was deemed more fruitful. Furthermore, as explained in 
Section 3.4.2, visibility is the necessary but insufficient condition for social recognition – an aspect 
that, while hardly explored by Honneth, is of immense importance for the possibility of the practice 
of citizenship, as it becomes clear in Section 3.6.3. 
 
 Visibility entails thus more than just the condition of being visually perceivable to others – it 
is also about seeing and becoming legible to institutions. If we are to conceptualize the government 
of visibility by Facebook in a way that encompasses these multiple dimensions (and their productive 
nature), it is useful to resort to the notion of media visibility regimes, I suggest. 
 
3.5.3. Media Visibility Regimes 
As approached here, the notion of visibility regime originates from critical theorizations about 
how spaces26 are designed so as to control visibility patterns and engender not only domination, as 
Foucault (1977) originally proposed about the Panopticon, but also processes of self-formation 
(Manokha, 2018; see also Lyon, 2017). This study is not the first to use the term in relation to datafied 
platforms. Bucher (2012, p. 1164) argues that Facebook turns the Panopticon inside out, imposing not 
the “threat of an all-seeing vision machine, but the constant possibility of disappearing and becoming 
obsolete”. Many authors have dealt directly or indirectly with the idea of a visibility regime, in 
particular, surveillance scholars (for a summary, see Bruno, 2013).27 Brighenti (2010) provides a more 
comprehensive assessment – in particular regarding the relationship between visibility and media. 
 
For him, a “regime of visibility” suggests that visibility is not only the exercise of physical vision 
(what one sees or fails to see), but a social category, that is, a “phenomenon that is inherently 
ambiguous, highly dependent upon contexts and complex social, technical and political 
 
25 Throughout this thesis, the expression “privacy” rarely surfaces. For, although privacy may be helpful to 
think critically about dataveillance, and in particular of its legal dimensions, it is not very helpful for clarifying 
the need to be visible. Visibility, on the other hand, might be employed to consider both – attempts to be and 
not to be visibilized. For a work on privacy that touches on the preoccupations of this thesis, see Cohen (2013). 
26 Surveillance scholars are keen on stressing that electronic surveillance is not limited to one particular space, 
as the Panopticon metaphor implies; indeed, Facebook may be said to exemplify this point (see a summary in 
Lyon, 2017). Given my interest in end users’ actions and perceptions, this fragmentation is important inasmuch 
as it is articulated by interviewees – as it indeed is (see e.g. Section 6.3.1). 
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arrangements” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 3). Visibility regimes, he says, are the “systematic and routinary 
(i.e. invisible) set-up of visibilities in contemporary social-technological complexes” (Brighenti, 2010, 
p. 39). Unpacking this formulation, it is possible to differentiate between three components. First, 
there is the very notion of regime, “a repeated, agreed upon and more or less settled pattern of 
interactions” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 45). Second, the blueprint of these patterns of interactions might be 
called visibility diagrams. Diagrams assign specific positions to certain social actors, which, in turn, 
allows these actors to see and be seen through distinct “vectors” of visibility. Third, both the diagram 
and the interactions it patterns, end up settling “a series of normative questions”: (i) “what is worth 
paying attention to”; (ii) what we have a right to observe”; and (iii) what can be seen safely, taking 
pleasure from it” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 45). The answers to these questions establish “the set of 
conditions that must be met” in order to become visible and invisible, what defines “the reciprocal 
constitutions of subjects” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 45). 
 
Media technologies have given rise to new and highly consequential forms of visibility 
regimes, “freed from the spatial and temporal properties of the here and now” (Thompson, 2005, p. 
35). Two of those discussed by Brighenti are helpful to make sense of the visibility regime of datafied 
platforms. First, the broadcast, which relates to mass media. Its diagram may be visually represented 
as a cone with a very wide base (the audiences/readership) and a very narrow tip (media professionals 
and their messages). Building on Brighenti, it might be said that this diagram is comprised of two basic 
vectors. First, what audiences see, a central area of study in the media and communications field. 
Theories such as gatekeeping (see Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, for a critical review) and framing (see 
Vreese, 2005, for a critical review) tackle how media organizations answer the “normative questions” 
mentioned above, when deciding what audiences could and should see (see also Thompson, 1995). 
Since this vector refers to what becomes physically visible, I hereafter refer to it as sight vector. The 
other vector refers to how mass media organizations seek to make their audiences visible to them, in 
ways that, usually, are informational and rarely physical. This I call the readability vector, that is, how 
the controllers of a mediated regime of visibility make the participants of such regime legible (cf. Scott, 
1998). The long history of attempts to measure TV audiences’ viewing habits so as to construct these 
individuals is described by Ang (1991, p. 3) “as an objectified category of others to be controlled” 
which could, or could not, influence how the first vector is operationalized (see Webster, 2014, for an 
assessment of contemporary practices of audience measurement). 
 
A second regime of mediated visibility described by Brighenti is typical of the pre-datafication 
spaces of online participation (e.g. blogs, forums and early platforms). This regime has in the network 
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its ideal diagram: a collection of similar nodes linked by straight lines with dialogical flows of visibility 
through which all nodes are, in principle, capable of seeing one another – what Castells (2007, p. 246) 
seems to characterize as mass self-communication. This supposedly horizontal and dialogical 
architecture is said to turn participants into active nodes, creating a profound instability in the sight 
vector. The network visibility regime has made it “much more difficult for those in power to ensure” 
that the contents shown to “individuals are those they would wish to see circulated” (Thompson, 
2005, p. 35). However, it has created the possibility for skilful powerful actors to manipulate their 
visibility, gaming or circumventing media professionals (Thompson, 2005, p. 35). Similarly, the 
network has also increased the complexity of the readability vector, since it allows for the proliferation 
of decentralized dataveillance. Advertisers developed invisible computational techniques to track end 
users as they browsed the Internet, with the goal of using this behavioural data to construct profiles 
and visibilize personalized ads (see Turow, 2011, for a history of these developments). While this sort 
of operation affected only a small proportion of what end users could see on the Internet (mostly, 
ads), this relation between seeing and being read was to become an essential part of the visibility 
regime of datafied platforms – a sort of media that Brighenti does not discuss. 
 
Similar to other kinds of media technologies, datafied platforms seem to be composed of the 
two kinds of visibility vectors described above: end users see content on the platform’s news feed 
(sight vector) and are read by platforms’ controllers (readability vector). However, these two vectors 
are materialized differently from previous media visibility regimes, since they embody the two main 
datafication operations. The framework developed below explains what an algorithmic visibility 
regime might be and how it might engender power relations. 
 
3.6. Conceptual Framework 
The chapter’s last part further develops and positions the main concepts which inform the 
conceptual framework in this thesis and describes how they are integrated in this study. It begins with 
civic voice. 
 
3.6.1. Citizenship as Civic Voice 
Drawing on non-naturalist assumptions of citizenship (Section 3.2), on social practices theory 
(Section 3.3) and on the discussion of social recognition (Section 3.4), citizenship is defined in this 
thesis as civic voice, the social practice of civic self-representation through which individuals constitute 
themselves as citizens. By civic self-representation, I mean what a social actor, at any given moment, 
thinks best represents its wish to contribute to a polity – that is, any community that addresses 
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antagonisms typical of “the political” (Section 3.2). Formulated in this way, civic voice can be 
conceived as the normative intersection of civic voice expressions (the actions whereby individuals 
represent themselves politically) and civic self-understandings (how individuals comprehend 
themselves qua citizens). 
 
Three general characteristics of civic voice can be underlined. Firstly, civic voice is a self-
evaluative project, which, once enacted (or intentionally not enacted), generates processes of 
(mis)recognition, whereby one’s expressions are (mis)recognized, and informs the self-constitution of 
oneself as a citizen. Drawing on Emirbayer and Mische (1998), by project, I mean the cognitive-
emotional process whereby individuals identify their intentions and decide on a plan to realize them, 
before evaluating this plan in the face of concrete conditions and, finally, executing it (see Section 
3.3.2 for details of these sub-elements). These stages are not necessarily linear. The emotional need 
to have one’s civic self-understanding recognized by others is a primordial reason why individuals 
express their civic voice. It is not the case that individuals necessarily intend to receive personal praise, 
but that they tend to talk on the assumption that their voice will generate some form of social 
contribution. Two basic objects are understood to inform this project: those regarding any subject 
matter that is not civic recognition per se and those that do regard civic recognition. The latter might 
be termed the struggle for civic voice, which aims at unveiling and changing the conditions of civic 
recognition: what counts as civic worth and how such worth is granted – to whom and under which 
logics. 
 
Secondly, processes of civic becoming unfold through a dynamic relationship between civic 
self-understanding, (mis)recognitions and civic voice expressions. In having an expression of one’s self-
understanding recognized by others (heard), individuals may come to understand that they possess 
civic worth, generating civic esteem, that is, the feeling of being a citizen whose actions bear upon the 
definition of social condition. Being heard is, in this view, the condition to be an autonomous citizen. 
While, in this framing, individuals ought to respect mutual recognition, no-one must be obliged to 
recognize anyone in any concrete instance. Rather, individuals ought to regard themselves and others 
as, in principle, entitled to be heard.28 In this view, civic voices ought to be – but are not necessarily – 
democratic. Whether a civic voice can be considered democratic depends upon whether or not it is 
supported by and aims at mutual recognition. Civic misrecognition occurs when civic voice, while 
embracing mutual recognition, is explicitly denigrated, distorted or invisibilised; if reproduced by 
 
28 Therefore, this thesis rejects the suggestion that hate speech might be conducive to democracy. However, see 
Heinze (2016). 
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structures, civic misrecognitions may be characterized as engendering authoritarianism (Section 
3.4.2). Civic misrecognition is likely to lead individuals to feel an incapable, and thus unfree citizen. In 
both cases, these feelings are expected to influence one’s civic self-understanding, what can change 
civic voice expressions, and so on. It is, thus, improbable that an individual will crystalize into an 
immutable citizen. Civic voices, both as expressions and as self-understandings, are malleable. 
 
Thirdly, the constitution of civic voice (the processes of civic becoming) is inherently 
influenced by various structures, two of which are the focus in this study. The ways individuals create 
the project of how they want to represent themselves as citizens and reflect upon/adapt/ execute this 
project, are prefigured by civic imaginaries.29 Building on Taylor’s (2004) notion of social imaginary as 
the “too obvious to mention” normative assumptions about social life and Honneth’s norms of social 
worth, civic imaginary is understood here as a set of implicit assumptions about what civic worth is 
and to whom it is granted. This prefiguration is essentially normative. The qualification of what is the 
good, right, appropriate, possible, necessary or dangerous courses of action to represent oneself, is 
linked to the individual subjective understanding of location in this broader moral framework. It is also 
relational. While Honneth writes of fixed sets or norms used to define social recognition, it seems fair 
to assume that individuals in unequal social positions imagine these norms asymmetrically. For, as in 
the case of social imaginaries, these are informed by the social “materiality” of life (as described by 
Taylor): e.g. income, gender and race, to which the unequal distribution of resources is central. Thus, 
asymmetric societies are likely to engender civic-self understandings that are assumed by their holders 
to be “inferior” or “unrecognizable”, or “superior” and “recognizable” in relation to others. In addition, 
since becoming visible (cognizable) is an indispensable and insufficient condition for (mis)recognition, 
civic voices are influenced, also, by structures that govern visibility. That is, while the absence of 
visibility engenders a particular kind of misrecognition (invisibilization), its availability does not 
guarantee that mis/recognition will happen. In making a civic voice (in)visible in certain ways, these 
structures might lead the individual to qualify certain civic voice expressions in certain ways. The same 
voice expression might be considered beneficial with certain interlocutor, but dangerous with 
another. The next section conceptualizes which sort of structure might characterize Facebook – and, 
thus, order the prefiguration of civic voice expressions on the platform. 
 
 
29 While not using recognition theory or Taylor’s notion of social imaginary, Isin and Ruppert (2015, p. 30) also 
talk about an “imaginary of citizenship produced through thought, symbols, images, ideas, and ideals of the 
democratic citizen”. 
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3.6.2. Facebook’s Datafication Power Through the Algorithmic Visibility Regime30 
 Based on my definition of datafication (Section 3.5.2), on the concept of media visibility 
regime (Section 3.5.3), and on social practices theory (Section 3.3), Facebook’s datafication power in 
this thesis is defined as based on an algorithmic visibility regime, a kind of structure (Section 3.3.1). 
Through this regime, the platform defines who can visibilize whom and attempts to control the 
prefiguration of end users’ actions (Section 3.3.3) in ways that are beneficial to its business model.31 
 
First, let me explain in which ways Facebook’s datafication operations seems to enact a 
visibility regime. The platforms’ readability vector is comprised of advanced forms of dataveillance, 
supported by sprawling infrastructural resources. In the case of Facebook, in addition to datafying all 
actions and content related to end users within the platform, this infrastructure also produces or 
receives different kinds of data from devices, Internet browsers and plugins, as the company itself 
acknowledges (Facebook, 2019). The second vector (sight vector) uses machine learning algorithms to 
define what end users are exposed to on their news feeds and interface – crucial resource more 
generally. Although some have found them to be guided by a mix of six factors (popularity; similarity 
between end users, ties between end users, paid sponsorship of content, subscription to content and 
newness – Ochigame & Holston, 2016), how precisely these factors are coded and balanced against 
each other is ultimately unknown. For this study’s purposes, solving this puzzle (if a solution is 
possible) is a marginal issue. What matters is that, to employ Mackenzie’s (2015) language, algorithms 
are constantly inventing relational “shapes” on the datasets produced by end users previous datafied 
actions, so as continuously to update what counts as “relevant” to a specific end user. Based on this 
analysis, these algorithms determine probabilistically which existing content an end user will deem 
more or less relevant and then make this content visible to the end user before she can decide 
whether or not to see it. 
 
On datafied platforms, the sight and readability vectors are, by default, entangled, I suggest. 
The regime echoes an algorithmic logic: how end users are made readable (input) necessarily informs 
the definition by the regime of what they can see (output); this, in turn, delimits what users can act 
upon, hence, defining how they can be made readable – and so on. Certainly, end users constantly 
 
30 Many of my ideas about algorithmic visibility regime emerged during my conversations and co-authored work 
with Jun Yu (see Magalhães & Yu, 2017). 
31 Throughout this thesis, I use “Facebook” and “platform” to refer not to particular human actors but to either 
the datafied platform that is controlled by a private company called Facebook or to the organization itself. 
Thus, when I discuss or imply the “intentions” of “Facebook”, I refer to the presumed objectives of this private 
company to further its business model, according to what is publicly known or theorized. What are the “real” 
intentions of its individual controllers and coders is not of interest here. 
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make their own decisions about what to see on the platform; companies acquire external data to 
understand users that are not produced by how they act on the platform; and there is an increasing 
number of one-sided actions by platforms to moderate content and ban profiles (e.g. Gillespie, 2018). 
Therefore, this entanglement should not be taken as determining the entirety of the visibility 
phenomena on Facebook. However, it does portray the typical visibility regime of datafied platforms. 
 
This regime, as noted in Section 3.6.2, is defined in this thesis as a structure, in Sewell’s (1992) 
sense: the operation of these vectors (Facebook’s non-human resources) are associated with the 
construction of schemas (in this study, end users’ understanding of the rules guiding these 
operations). This structure, I propose based on the literature discussed in Section 3.5.1, is crucial to 
the platform’s business model. This model is widely believed to be concerned, predominantly, with 
increasing the number of end users so as to benefit from “network effects”, enhancing the profiling 
of these users so as to optimize the placement of advertisements, and avoiding any form of 
transparency32 and tampering (see also, Taplin, 2017, p. 131; Galloway, 2017, p. 238; Vogelstein, 2012; 
Martínez, 2016). Therefore, Facebook might be said to want its end users to (1) interact as often as 
possible with what the platform offers, but also to (2) remain ignorant of its inner workings. 
 
In order to accomplish these two goals, I suggest that the platform attempts to lead end users 
to endow certain actions towards the regime with certain meanings. Or, as explained in Section 3.3.3, 
Facebook might be said to try to order the prefiguration of these users’ actions towards itself. Table 
3.1 below provides a summary of how this form of power is theorized in this thesis. According to my 
definition of prefiguration, this form of control involves particular materializations of the resources of 
the two visibility vectors. In relation to the sight vector, it might be said that Facebook attempts to 
materialize its end user news feed as personalized, in the hope that it will be understood by end users 
as relevant. This is expected to lead users to qualify (i.e. prefigure) any datafied action in relation to 
the content offered on the news feed or elsewhere in the interface, as “enticing”.33 The more 
Facebook datafies an end user’s actions, the more it is able to enhance the profile of that user and 
offer ads (or other services) on which she will, indeed, click and engage with. In using “enticing”, I 
signal that this qualification need not be positive, good or socially acceptable. Hating, harming or 
mocking others, for instance, might well be enticing actions – although there is no evidence that the 
platform intends individuals to act in these ways. In relation to the readability vector: in its seeming 
bid to avoid external forms of control over its visibility regime, Facebook seems intent on ensuring 
 
32 At least this seemed to be the case at the time of my fieldwork; see Section 10.4. 
33 See also the notion of recommendation systems as “traps” (Seaver, 2018). 
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that its infrastructural resources (which datafy and read end user’s actions) are materialized as 
inscrutable to these users (see again Section 3.5.1). The aim appears to be to produce not an action, 
but an inaction. More than avoiding external accountability, this second prefiguration might also 
preserve the platform from attempts to “game” the regime.34 Furthermore, as the visibility vectors 
are inherently entangled, these attempts to control end users’ actions might aim to effectively prevent 
end users’ from even realizing that the algorithmic visibility regime, at least as a way to exert power 
over users, even exists. In this view, ideally, Facebook users’ would understand the rules defining who 
can visibilize whom on the platform as seamless and natural extensions of their wishes, and not the 
result of intricate and contestable logics. 
 
In both cases, following my discussion of schematization (Section 3.3.2), these 
materializations might be said to be an attempt to direct end users’ “systems of relevancies” when 
using the platform. Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime appears to be materialized to lead end 
users to pay attention to some “areas of reality” (its news feed) and ignore others (its infrastructure), 
possibly leading users to identity one particular pattern – the enticing “relevance” of the interface and 
of the platform, more generally. Whether these attempts are successful, however, is unclear. Aligned 





Schema Prefiguration Ordering  
Sight Vector 
Personalized 
Interface (news feed) 
Relevant 
All actions toward news feed 





All actions toward the 
infrastructure are impossible 
Table 3.1. Summary of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime. Source: Author. 
 
3.6.3. Civic Voice Under Algorithmic Visibility Conditions 
Based on the foregoing definitions, this last section of the conceptual framework indicates 
how I conceptualize the shaping of civic voice by Facebook’s algorithmic visibility. It can be argued 
that the platform’s datafication operations do not shape end users’ actions directly. The primary site 
of this sort of datafication power is whether and how the regime’s visibility vectors directs how they 
are made sense of by end users. The schemas that stem from this first moment then become the 
immediate structural element that may influence users’ actions in relation to the algorithmic visibility 
 
34 This is common to various platforms. See, e.g. Ziewitz (2019) for a description of how search engines try to 
stifle the work of SEO consultants. 
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regime – including those related to their civic voice expressions and, potentially, to their civic self-
understandings. Below, I break this process down into three components and propose corresponding 
sub research questions (SRQs) to investigate them. 
 
1. The Schematization of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regime. If Facebook’s double 
attempt to order the prefiguration of end users’ actions is indeterminate, as the previous 
section proposed, it might be formulated as giving rise to certain schematizations that are not 
necessarily those the platform expects to produce. The empirical literature discussed in 
Section 3.5.2, provides such evidence: end users have been shown to discover the 
infrastructure of platforms by becoming surprised by the patterns they observe in their news 
feeds, reading and talking about platforms’ functioning and, less often, by trying to test 
algorithmic systems. This thesis’s conceptual grounding enables an investigation of how the 
very materiality of the regime bears upon end users’ schematizations, that is, how a 
“personalized” news feed and a “inscrutable” infrastructure direct the attention of end users 
to certain areas of reality, and in which ways end users can identity, in these areas, patterns 
that, in their view, elucidate the rules behind who can visibilize whom on Facebook. This 
component is analysed in Chapter 5, where I present findings addressing SRQ 1: How do 
ordinary end users schematize datafied platforms’ algorithmic visibility regime? 
 
2. The Social Imaginaries of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regimes. The second component 
of this shaping process refers to which schemas are (or not) formed through the processes 
examined in the first component. But which schemas are these? An algorithmic regime of 
visibility is not, I suggest, a mere set of functionalities/datafication operations or stand-alone 
technologies. It is also a collection of processes and decisions designed to enable certain 
interactions and a certain sociality. Schemas about these regimes are likely, then, to be social 
imaginaries (Section 3.3.1). I propose that considering what kind of social imaginaries end 
users hold about Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime means probing the taken-for-
granted premises about the different aspects of the algorithmic visibility regime: the 
readability vector, the sight vector, the relations between these two vectors and, lastly, the 
normative dimension of this imaginary – what Brighenti (2010, p. 45) calls the “normative 
questions” of visibility regimes. Given my concern with ordinary citizens and power relations, 
these normative questions can be summarized as: do end users assume to be able to define 
how they are visibilized on Facebook? This second component is addressed empirically in 
Chapter 6, and refers to SRQ 2: Which social imaginaries do end users hold of Facebook’s 
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algorithmic visibility regime? 
 
3. The Visibility Control Projects of Civic Voice Expressions. Since being visibilized by others is a 
necessary, but insufficient condition for end users to have their civic voice (mis)recognized 
(Section 3.6.1), and since Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime changes the terms of this 
condition by rendering it uncertain (Section 3.6.2), end users might decide to engage in 
projects whose aim is to control the visibility of their civic voice expressions so as to have them 
heard: both recognized and not denigrated, invisibilised and distorted. (Whether “visibility” 
in this context means being seen/seeing or being read (or even reading) is an empirical 
problem, I suggest.) In this thesis, I am interested in the extent to which these visibility control 
projects (structured by the aforementioned social imaginaries of the visibility regime) are 
associated with the prefiguration and adjustments to end users’ civic voice expressions 
(initially, structured by users’ civic imaginaries). For these adjustments (or lack thereof) may 
give rise to specific relations of (mis)recognition, leading to transformations in end users’ civic 
self-understandings – the processes of civic becoming the thesis intends to illuminate. This 
research investigates the nature of this potential association by looking into two kinds of 
projects to control the visibility of civic voice. 
 
a. Visibility Expansion Projects. End users might decide to increase the visibility of their 
civic voices on Facebook so as to have their voice heard as they intend it to be heard. 
The literature analysed in Section 3.2 provides evidence that, at least, activists have 
engaged in visibility quests, “optimizing” their voices “towards the algorithm” (Milan, 
2018, p. 516). However, reflections on these “quests” by ordinary citizens regarding 
politics has been less well studied. Chapter 7 considers this possibility by addressing 
SRQ 3.1: Do ordinary end users’ attempt to expand the visibility of their civic voice 
expressions on Facebook? If so, is this attempt associated with how they articulate 
these expressions? 
 
b. Visibility Reduction Projects. Alternatively, end users might attempt to decrease the 
visibility of their civic voices to avoid suffering misrecognitions from other actors. The 
research reviewed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.5.2 shows that end users often employ 
interface functionalities (e.g. “Privacy Settings”), coded expressions and “self-
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censorship”,35 to realize this sort of visibility control. It is unclear whether these same 
findings apply to civic voice expressions of ordinary citizens acting on datafied 
platforms. Chapter 8 probes this by addressing SRQ 3.2: Do ordinary end users’ 
attempt to reduce the visibility of their civic voice expressions on Facebook? If so, is 
this attempt associated with how they articulate these expressions? 
 
The answers to these two questions inform my discussion of how these attempts to control 
one’s visibility on Facebook are associated with the prefiguration of end users’ processes of civic 
becoming. The analysis of how visibility control projects are related to the prefiguration of civic voice 
per se is undertaken in Chapter 9, when my empirical findings are re-examined with the objective of 
advancing conceptual insights. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
  This chapter tackled the challenge of formulating the conceptual framework that guides the 
remainder of this thesis. The lexicon emerges out of a discussion about what citizenship is and ought 
to be, and which structural elements shape the practice of civic self-representation that constitutes 
the citizen. After positioning the thesis within non-naturalist approaches to citizenship, the chapter 
developed a conceptual foundation (social practices) which, combined with elements from other 
theoretical traditions (recognition theory, critical studies of datafication and visibility), suggests two 
central concepts: civic voice and algorithmic visibility regime, to account for the practice of citizenship 
and the exertion of datafication power by Facebook, respectively. In considering how the latter 
modifies the conditions for the expression of the former, the conceptual framework delimits three 
components that guide the analysis in this thesis: the schematization of Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility regime; the social imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime; and the visibility 
control projects of civic voice expressions (what encompasses both visibility expansion projects and 
visibility reduction projects).  
 
Before exploring the sub research questions proposed to examine these components, I 
explain the methodological choices employed to investigate these issues empirically, in the context of 





35 Since civic voices are inherently prefigured, I avoid such terms as “self-censorship”, which tend to assume 






An important idea, discussed Section 3.6.3, is that the relative opacity of platforms’ 
datafication operations may play a generative – rather than restrictive – role in end users’ abilities to 
imagine these processes and act upon these imaginings. In casting new light on end users’ potential 
agency, in this thesis, this possibility works as an epistemological stepping stone. Assuming it is 
possible for individuals, somehow, to reflect on dataveillance and algorithmic decision-making, this 
chapter suggests means of accessing those reflections and their potential consequences for people’s 
civic voices by examining their descriptions of those reflections and the potential consequences for 
these civic voices. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss what a constructivist epistemology for the 
analysis of end users’ understandings of/reactions to datafication operations might entail, followed 
by my choice of a qualitative method (in this study, in-depth semi-structured interviews) to address 
my research questions. I then justify and explain the data collection and analysis procedures. Third, I 
discuss some ethical issues that emerged during the planning and execution of this study, with a view 
to considering how my responses to these issues informed my methodological decisions.  
 
4.2. Epistemological Position 
This section explains the constructivist epistemological position from which the thesis 
addresses the research questions presented in Section 3.6.3. 
 
It is useful to recall that, as argued in Section 3.6.1, datafication operations are based on 
computational methods to generate, analyse and act upon digital data. In the past 20 years, many of 
these methods have been adapted by social scientists and there is a robust body of academic and 
critical work on the techniques, efficacy and ethics related to the collection and analysis of data 
produced on and through the Internet. Some dub these “digital methods” (see Venturini, Bounegru, 
Gray, & Rogers, 2018 for a critical assessment). The realization of datafication’s dubious social 
consequences has inspired multiple approaches that develop and apply similar methods to uncover 
the negative consequences of datafication (see FATML, 2019). 
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The non-naturalist assumptions underpinning my conceptual framework, suggest an 
approach that may be framed, broadly, as constructivist, and the use of a qualitative method (next 
section).36 In this approach, the emphasis is on how “the dynamic contours” of mundane social reality 
are “put together and assigned meaning" by individuals, able to reflect on and narrate this contextual 
generative process (Gubrium, Holstein, Marvasti, & McKinney, 2008, p. 3; Flick, 2009, p. 15; 
Hammersley, 1992, p. 165). The employment of this approach in this thesis is made conceptually 
possible by the definition of datafication as involving both computational and reflective processes 
(Section 3.5.2). 
 
One way of translating this ontology into an epistemological concept is to argue that, from 
the end user’s standpoint, datafication operations are not something that “might be knowable” by 
opening a metaphorical “black box” (Bucher, 2018, p. 44; Ananny & Crawford, 2016). Rather, they are 
“known unknowns [emphasis added]”, which end users “encounter” through practical, contextual and 
reflective engagements (Bucher, 2018, p. 62; Couldry et al., 2016). People, then, may develop 
understandings about datafication operations “despite not knowing exactly what they are or how they 
work” (Bucher, 2018, p. 64), which, likely, will play a part in the structuring of their social practices – 
including civic voice. I understand this perspective as both phenomenological and material (Couldry & 
Hepp, 2017, pp. 33-34). That is, these “reflexive relationships” are themselves shaped by the fixed 
forms and means whereby datafication becomes perceivable. In particular, as suggested in Section 
3.6.3, the various forms of opacity that surround dataveillance and algorithmic decision-making may 
be understood not as an obstacle to carrying out empirical research on people’s reflective 
relationships to them, but as a key element to be investigated empirically. 
 
4.3. Method: The Choice of In-Depth Interviews 
In this perspective, it becomes possible to employ “well-known methods” to research the new 
methods employed by datafication (Kubitschko & Kaun, 2016, p. 315). Inspired by previous research 
on similar topics (e.g. Rader & Gray, 2015; Bucher, 2017; Eslami et al., 2015; Eslami et al., 2016; DeVito 
et al., 2018), I opt for what Kvale (2007, pp. 7-8) describes as the in-depth, “semi-structured, life world 
interview”, whose purpose is “obtaining descriptions of the life word of the interviewees with respect 
to interpreting the described phenomena”. Through constructivist lenses, this kinds of interview is a 
“contextual, improvised and performative” practice that “reconstructs” the world (Denzin, 2001, p. 
26) by making certain elements of it visible and, thus, analysable (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 3; cf. 
Silverman, 2001). Rather than being considered a “miner”, as the naturalistic traditions would put it, 
 
36 This is not to say that all non-naturalist research is qualitative (Bevir & Blakely, 2019, p. 95). 
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the interviewer is likened to a “traveller”, venturing into participants’ stories, with a world view and 
experience that shape which journey should be embarked upon and how such an allegorical trip 
should be reported (Kvale, 2007, pp. 10-20). 
 
Also, I follow Flick’s (2008, pp. 27-32) proposal that a practical step towards enhancing the 
quality of research is recognition of the notion of “diversity”, which can be applied to different project 
stages such as development of the interview guide and sampling. Here, validity is understood as 
related to the researcher’s capacity to make accurate claims about the world “on the basis of the 
adequacy of the evidence offered in support of them” (Hammersley, 1992, p. 69). An analysis of in-
depth interview data does not yield broadly generalizable insights, but it can enable the researcher to 
discuss their potential generalizability, especially as a guide to future research (Flyvbjerg, 2001). My 
methodological choice implies other limitations. Common to any self-reporting method, the 
information derived from interviews is limited by the interviewees’ likely need to be regarded 
favourably by the interviewer. Thus, their personal and contextual inhibitions and, necessarily, flawed 
memory can result in responses that are exaggerated, selective and incomplete. I made every attempt 
to minimize some of these aspects in my research design, but they are factors which must be 
considered. 
 
Despite these limitations, from four alternative methods considered, in-depth individual 
interviews were deemed ideal to answer my research questions. Although asking participants to write 
personal diaries could have generated the kind of data I needed, even proponents of this method 
accept that the difficulties related to persuading participants to make regular diary entries are costly 
and make this method better suited to research, such as qualitative longitudinal studies, where other 
methods are even less feasible (Alaszewski, 2006). I discarded focus groups because some of the topics 
of interest for this research might be perceived by participants as too private or as socially undesirable 
to be shared collectively. Participant observation might have helped to circumvent participant filters 
and allowed observation of their Facebook practices. However, while all forms of ethnography entail 
some level of concealment by informants, ultimately, Facebook’s visibility control functionalities could 
have rendered completely unobservable the issues in which I was interested. However, I conducted 
an initial observation in order to customize my interview protocol (see next section). Last, at the time 
of the fieldwork, I considered there was little existing information on how people imagine and act in 
relation to Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime, allowing the design of a survey – although it is 
hoped that the findings from this thesis research may be informative in this regard (see Section 10.4). 
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4.4. Research Design 
 The Brazilian crisis both inspired me to investigate how Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime structured everyday civic voices and presented a peculiarly relevant empirical background for 
such an investigation. Given the discussion of the Brazilian context in Chapter 2, here, I do not provide 
further detail on the rationale for my decision to focus on Brazil and on Facebook. In this section, I 
describe the research design including the decisions involved in operationalizing the conceptual 
framework to formulate the interview questions, and the data collection and analysis 
 
4.4.1. Operationalizing the Research Questions 
Operationalization of the main research question (How does Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime shape the civic voice of ordinary end users on the platform?) involved the construction of an 
interview protocol. This stage was influenced by the premise that, since the thesis concerns the 
phenomenon of in/visibility and its civic ramifications, the possibility that participants might be 
unaware of Facebook’s algorithmic systems should not procedurally be avoided. Rather, I remained 
open to any explanation participants might propose concerning how in/visibility works on Facebook. 
This departs from some previous interview-based works on end users and datafication, which 
assumed that prior methodological interventions were needed to ensure participants knew about or, 
at least, were sensitized to algorithmic systems.37 Thus, the interview protocol does not use technical 
terms such as “algorithm” and “data”, which could have confused participants and resulted in their 
withholding information because of a lack of awareness that some of their imaginaries and practices 
are related to “algorithms” and/or “data”. 
 
 These terms, also, risked being understood by interviewees as signals of what I, an alleged 
media expert living in an affluent city (London), was expecting to hear (my positionality is detailed in 
Section 4.5.1 below). In this case, participants could become self-conscious and fail to disclose relevant 
information and/or become eager to please me, increasing the possibility of artificial descriptions. 
Thus, the protocol adopted an in/visibility vocabulary.38 Another terminology choice was the use of 
the phrase “political participation” rather than “civic voice”; I deemed the former more easily 
understood than the latter. I did not anticipate that participants’ potentially distinct understandings 
of “participation” and the “political” would be problematic since this study is not concerned with 
investigating differences between distinct forms of “participation” or particular meanings of 
“political”. In addition, I used the terms “social media” or “Facebook”, which are more typically used 
 
37 Examples: Bucher (2017) selected people who, previously, had talked publicly about algorithms; Eslami et al. 
(2016, 2017) used a code device to de-algorithmize participant’s Facebook newsfeeds. 
38 Rader and Gray (2015) inspired the wording of some of my interview questions. 
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in Brazil than “platform”. Lastly, all the questions in the interview guide included the word “politics”. 
Not because I believed that Facebook uses a particular visibility logic with regard to politics, but 
because I expected that participants’ reflections on the existence or not of this logic would be a 
potentially interesting aspect. 
 
There were two versions of the interview protocol (see Appendices 1 and 2). The first was 
produced in September 2016 and contained 16 questions. In addition to the questions, it also asked 
participants to access their Facebook profiles to give me examples of the practices they described. To 
refine this protocol, I conducted pilot interviews in London, between October and November 2016. 
From among acquaintances and friends, I recruited three Brazilian individuals who self-described as 
politically engaged on Facebook. I explained that these were pilot interviews, assured them of the 
confidentiality of our conversation and that they could call a halt to the interview at any time. Based 
on a review of the transcripts obtained, I concluded that: (1) the interviews would benefit from an 
initial narrative question, which would encourage them to talk freely about how they exert their civic 
voice on Facebook; (2) the protocol contained too many questions and that this hindered my ability 
to probe important points further; (3) there was some wording that, at some moments, was inducing 
certain answers and precluding others (e.g. “What do you do to hide?”, which implied a negative 
practice and, possibly, would stop the interviewee describing forms of invisibilization not necessarily 
negative); (4), the sequence of questions began and ended abruptly and elicited some repetitive 
responses (e.g. there was a question about respect and another about listening, although both 
questions, essentially, were about civic recognition). However, confirming my expectations, my 
interviewees seemed not to need to be prodded to talk about algorithmic visibility; they had 
developed a vocabulary of their own to describe datafication operations, as Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 will 
demonstrate. 
 
I then revamped the interview protocol. The second (and final) version began with an 
explanation by me about the project and the forthcoming interview, and the distribution to the 
interviewee of a consent form (see Section 4.4.4 below). The first main question (“Could you explain 
how you participate politically on social media?”) was not linked directly to a specific research 
problem. Rather, it was aimed at building trust and making the interviewee feel comfortable in the 
interview setting. I expected, also, that this first question would help me to elicit more information 
about the participant – such as occupation, age and political ideology. The number of questions was 
reduced to 11 and the wording of the questions was refined to be more neutral and open. For reasons 
that will become clear in Section 4.5.2, I abandoned the request for the interviewees to access their 
 81 
Facebook accounts. I included a final question (“How have your political activities on social media 
changed your offline life?”) which, although not related directly to one of the thesis research 
questions, was intended to elicit a final, further reflection that would enhance the value of the 
interview experience for participants and prepare them for the debriefing. 
 
I also changed the organization of the interview protocol. Rather than breaking down each of 
the research questions into discrete series of interview questions (as in the first version of the 
protocol), the concept of algorithmic visibility regime was used to guide the operationalization of the 
conceptual framework (in particular, Section 3.6.3) into interview questions. This was because the two 
vectors of visibility regime – sight and readability – give rise to at least three potential real-life event 
types about which end users could be asked: (1) seeing the news feed and, in particular, the news 
feed; (2) being seen by others in the news feed and having actions read by other actors, in particular 
the platform; and (3) being recognized/misrecognized (or, simply, being heard), which originates in 
the second event kind (being seen/read). Appendix 3 presents a cross-tabulation of the components 
of the conceptual framework, the research questions and the interview questions. This appendix 
demonstrates that some interview questions provided data related to more than one sub research 
question, thus, operating as a form of in-method triangulation through enhancement of diversity in 
data production (Flick, 2008, p. 55). The way each sub research question was translated into the 
interview questions is described below. 
 
• SRQ 1: How do ordinary end users schematize Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime? 
The data were elicited through three interview questions, all focused on the notion of 
schematization (thus the wording: “How did you discover…”). These sought to push participants to 
reflect on the experiences informing their conclusions about what defines how they see what they see 
in terms of politics (event 1), who can see/read their posts/comments about politics (event 2) and 
why certain posts/comments about politics are more visible than others (event 3). If their answers did 
not explain which areas of reality underpinned their schematization, probing questions were posed. 
 
• SRQ 2: Which social imaginaries do ordinary end users hold of Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility regime? 
In Section 3.6.3, I posited that the notion of social imaginary can be captured by analysing 
narratives and practices. I approached this through two kinds of interview questions. The first 
comprises attempts to elicit some form of personal explanation about the criteria that define who can 
visibilize whom on Facebook (events 1,2 and 3). I anticipated that some individuals could find it 
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difficult to verbalize what they imagine, even when asked directly about this. Thus, I triangulated the 
responses to the first kind of questions with the responses to a second kind – related to participants’ 
practical attempts to become more or less (event 3) visible on the platform. 
 
• SRQ 3.1: Do ordinary end users’ attempt to expand the visibility of their civic voice 
expressions on Facebook? If so, is this attempt associated with how they articulate these 
expressions? 
This sub-question was addressed through four interview questions. I asked participants about 
what, if anything, they do to allow their political activity to be seen by more people on the platform 
(event 2). As the language indicates, I was seeking accounts of their actions. At the same time, these 
attempts are linked to expectations of civic (mis)recognition (event 3), which was probed through two 
questions: one aiming to elicit general reflections about being heard on Facebook (which might or 
might not be related to visibility expansion projects); and a second, which sought to prompt reflections 
about the specific relationship between being seen and being recognized. Because Facebook’s 
functionalities, which allow users to define partially what they see or not, might also affect how they 
are seen (e.g. the “Block” button), I included a question on these actions. 
 
• SRQ 3.2: Do ordinary end users’ attempt to reduce the visibility of their civic voice 
expressions on Facebook? If so, is this attempt associated with how they articulate these 
expressions? 
The last sub-question was treated similarly to SRQ 3.1 and was investigated by four interview 
questions. The language of the first question was modified intentionally to include the possibility of 
inaction. Thus, instead of asking what they did to become less visible, I asked: “Have you ever changed 
your political activities on social media because these activities might be visible to others?”. 
 
The protocol combined traits from different interview approaches, as indicated by Kvale 
(2007, pp. 72-76). The first question was “narrative related”, that is, was focused on the interviewees’ 
own understanding of their stories of expressing civic voice on Facebook; questions about practices 
were “factual”, inasmuch as they allowed me to elicit descriptions of what participants do; questions 
on social imaginaries could be described as typical of “conceptual interviews”, in which participants 
are expected to reflect on and explain their understanding of certain phenomena. 
 
Finally, while all participants were asked the same set of core questions, I used initial 
observation of participants’ public Facebook profiles to include specific questions for some 
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interviewees (e.g. why the participant wore a hood in his profile picture, or why the participant had 
included incorrect city information in her profile). 
 
4.4.2. Data Collection: Sampling and Recruitment 
Having designed the interview protocol, I constructed my interviewee sample. The first step 
was operationalization of the notion of “ordinary people”. Building on the discussion in Section 3.2, 
an “ordinary citizen” was defined as an individual who: (1) had never participated in a political 
organization, including a social movement or a political party; (2) did not identify him or herself as an 
activist39; and (3) before the onset of the Brazilian crisis had little or no previous experience expressing 
herself politically in a sustained manner. Also, participants were also expected to self-identify as 
participating intensively in political activities on Facebook. All these criteria were used in the 
recruitment ads, made explicit when I asked participants to indicate other participants, and repeated 
at the first contact/meeting. 
 
The second step was deciding how to construct the participants sample. In line with the 
qualitative nature of this study, I used a nonprobability sampling procedure, which included decisions 
about sampling frame and sampling technique. One issue related to the sampling frame was the 
generic nature of the idea of “ordinary citizen”. I adopted the “maximum variation” principle, aimed 
at “obtain[ing] information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and 
outcome” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 79). Given the characteristics of Brazil’s political organization and the 
nature of the country’s crisis (Chapter 2), I sought a sample that would provide as much variation as 
possible in relation to four individual “circumstances”: income, race, gender, and political ideology. 
Since I judged that certain professional circumstances would allow some individuals to have 
disproportionately more powerful voices, I filtered out mainstream media journalists and “digital 
influencers”.40 I assumed, also, that not all interviewees would be equally “ordinary” in terms of 
Facebook. Some were likely to have hundreds of followers while others might have thousands. Also, 
my fieldwork was mainly conducted in the city of São Paulo, since it is both my hometown (an 
important practical advantage) and was the epicentre of the Brazilian crisis. 
 
In relation to my sampling technique, I decided to combine snowballing and purposive 
sampling. Recruitment began in November 2016, in London, with a Facebook ad (see Figure 4.1). I 
created a Facebook page on the research project and used Facebook’s services to “boost” a post, 
 
39 Interestingly, this procedure did not stop some individuals from referring to their political activities online as 
“activism”, which I suggest attests to the inherent fluidity of the term. 
40 By “digital influencer” I mean individuals who profit from their activity on datafied platforms. 
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targeting adults (over 20 years old), living in São Paulo who demonstrated some “interest” in certain 
politicians (see example in Figure 4.2 below).41 In addition, I joined multiple Facebook groups related 
to Brazilian politics and posted 47 recruiting messages (see example in Figure 4.3 below). Although 
the ad, presumably, was seen by thousands of users (how many saw the posts within the groups was 
unclear), only five individuals said they were interested in participating. Based on successive 
recommendations from these initial five participants, I recruited 14 interviewees. The remaining 
participants were recruited through six initial acquaintances who suggested interviewees. 
 
By the end of January 2017, I had interviewed 19 people; however, the sample was too 
homogenous, composed mainly of people similar to myself: White, male, progressive, upper middle-
class. I changed my tactic and, in place of snowballing, I employed purposive sampling to add variation 
to the participants in my sample. I tried to recruit participants who self-identified as non-White, not 
male nor cisgender, conservative, and from a poor background. The fieldwork concluded in March 
2017 when I sensed that data collection had reached “theoretical saturation”, that is, the point when 
“no new insights are likely to result from continued [efforts]” (Low, 2008, p. 779). I ultimately achieved 
a sample of 47 individuals (see Appendix 4), whom I interviewed in São Paulo and two neighbouring 
cities, Campinas and Jundiaí. 
 
It is important to highlight some general ways in which the sample appears to have been 
skewed. First, geographically, by focusing on the region of São Paulo, the sample did not capture other 
views on the crisis which likely exist in poorer areas of Brazil. Also, people identifying as politically 
engaged might be more likely to take extreme political positions (Pew Research Centre, 2014). This 
sampling limitations imposes restrictions on the generalizability of my results (Section 10.4). 
 
 
41 This strategy was justified by my interest in Facebook end users and its relative inexpensiveness (see Forgasz, 
Tan, Leder, & Mcleod, 2017). While micro-targeting has questionable societal consequences, my usage of it did 
not engender perceivable ethical concerns. 
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Figure 4.1: Print screen of Facebook recruiting post, November 2016. Source: Author.42 
 
 




42 See Appendix 6 for a translation of the basic text enclosed in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
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               Figure 4.3.: Print screen of a recruitment ad, posted in a Facebook group. Source: Author. 
 
 
4.4.3. Data collection: Conducting the Interviews 
The interviews were recorded. They began with a briefing, lasted between 45 and 130 minutes 
(75 minutes on average) and ended with a debriefing and a thank you to interviewees for their 
participation. I also asked some what they thought of the experience and discussed, informally, some 
aspects of the Brazilian crisis. My interview questions were intended to promote a fluid conversation. 
After listening to participants’ answers to the first question, which, commonly, resulted in lengthy 
descriptions of their political involvement on Facebook, I tended to take a more active stance, asking 
probing questions (such as “what do you mean by this?” or “can you give me an example?”). 
 
4.4.4. Informed Consent 
To allow participants to assess the possible risks and benefits entailed by this study, and to 
ensure their consent to participation, participants were informed repeatedly about “the overall 
purpose” and “the main features of the design” of the research (Kvale, 2007, p. 27). They were briefed 
about this: (1) during the recruitment process; (2) before the interviews began; and (3) on the consent 
form. During the debriefing, participants were again told that the project was about political 
participation on Facebook during the crisis, that their descriptions would be completely anonymized 
and that they could withdraw from the research at any time without providing a reason. Aware of the 
suspicions around research, heightened by the then current climate of distrust, I gave participants the 
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online address of my profile in LSE’s Media and Communications Department, which contained more 
information about me. In the interview briefing, interviewees were given two hard-copies of the 
consent form (see Appendix 5) and were asked to read it carefully before deciding to sign. They kept 
a copy and I filed a copy. Before these face to face meetings, I asked participants, in writing (via email 
or WhatsApp messages), if, before our conversation, I could find them and add them on Facebook as 
“friends” to allow me to observe their posts and profile information and customize my interview 
protocol. All of them agreed to my doing this. 
 
4.4.5. Data Analysis 
After transcribing the interviews,43 I embarked on the analysis. I discarded narrative analysis 
and discourse analysis (since my interest was in participants’ actions and ideas, not their personal 
stories44 or discourses as such), and chose to employ thematic analysis. This technique is understood 
here as a method of “pattern recognition within the data, where emerging themes become the 
categories for analysis” (Fereday & Cochrane, 2006, p. 82) through the “careful reading and re-reading 
of the data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258). 
 
It took some time to understand how to make sense of the narratives I had listened to during 
the fieldwork. Initially, I tried to implement theory-driven analysis, but found that the concepts I was 
using were too vague to establish specific categorizations. After working for some weeks, I abandoned 
this strategy and adopted a mixed approach: partially deductive (general themes originating from my 
theory-driven research questions) and partially inductive (categories and sub-categories developed 
from the ground up). This work was neither step-by-step nor formulaic. Over time, I learnt to embrace 
the process’s unavoidably messiness and iterativeness. Despite this non-linearity, the analysis 
included some general stages, inspired largely by Braun and Clarke (2006): 
 
1. Habituation to the data. Before engaging in systematic analysis, I familiarized myself with the 
data by reading the hard copies of the transcriptions and making some initial notes. This led 
to the decision to use the sub research questions as the main themes. 
 
2. Developing and applying the codebook. Using NVivo software and my initial notes, I 
developed a basic set of categories and sub-categories (i.e. a thematic codebook) from a 
 
43 Interviews were transcribed in full, either by myself and a Brazilian company; those transcribed by the 
company were checked by me for accuracy. 
44 This is not to say that, during the interviews, personal stories did not arise. However, my focus on actions 
and understandings led me to not privilege the narrative nature of these stories. 
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subsample of 15 interviews. I applied this codebook to the remaining 32 transcriptions, 
making necessary adjustments and additions as necessary. Each theme involved certain 
interpretative logics: 
 
a. Schematization of the algorithmic visibility regime (SRQ 1): the categories described 
broader processes/sources of information (e.g. “Newsfeed Experiences”); 
subcategories referred to specific examples of these processes/sources (e.g. “I 
inferred dataveillance from Facebook’s ‘Memory’ posts”). I coded, essentially, the 
explicit explanations given by interviewees in response to my questions about how 
they had developed certain understandings about the definition of who can visibilize 
whom on Facebook. 
 
b. Social Imaginaries of the algorithmic visibility regime (SRQ 2). Categories described 
what I initially termed imagined “principles” of the regime (e.g. “principle of 
uncertainty”), which, over time, would become simply “social imaginaries”; mid-level 
subcategories described to which vector of the visibility regime the coded text alluded 
(e.g. “Surveillance”); lower-level subcategories detailed the assumption which could 
be inferred or was made explicit by the coded text (e.g. “Facebook practices of 
dataveillance”). Based on my theoretical definition of social imaginaries, my 
interpretative strategies involved making sense of which assumptions about the 
visibility regime seemed to underpin my interviewees’ explanations, guesses and 
theories about how Facebook works, and their practical attempts to become less or 
more visible. In relation to the latter, my work, to some extent, was that of a reverse 
engineer, querying the coded texts with: what which assumption about Facebook 
algorithmic visibility regime needed to be in place to make that action at least 
possible? See Figure 4.4 below for a graphic illustration of this theme’s categories and 
subcategories. 
 
c. Visibility control projects of civic voice expressions (SRQ 3.1 and SRQ 3.2). In addition 
to coding each visibility control-oriented action in relation to its alleged goal, that is 
“expand” (SRQ 3.1) or “reduce” (SRQ 3.2) the visibility of one’s civic voice, I engaged 
in a reverse engineering interpretation as well. I attempted to derive not only which 
assumption about Facebook’s visibility regime the coded action seemed to depend 
upon but also which understanding of the recognition/misrecognition of the civic 
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voice the narrated action was linked to (e.g. “I want to draw attention to my political 
project”). This led to a cascade of hundreds of subcategories which were substantially 
simplified in the next phase of the analysis. Due to the format of my questions, I 
focused on descriptions of their visibility control projects, which, arguably, entailed 
the core element of these projects’ creation. 
 
3. Refining the coding, planning the chapters. Based on this initial full coding of all the interview 
transcripts, the themes and their respective coded excerpts were translated into Word files. 
While reviewing the texts within these files, some codes were abandoned, merged or had 
their names changed. Also, I decided not to use some of the material that was coded in the 
second stage, since I realized it was neither helpful for answering the sub-questions, nor did 
it contradict any of the observations and arguments based on the material that is included in 
the analysis which follows. These exclusions related to themes concerning the “non-political 
consequences of Facebook voice exertion” and “offline consequences of Facebook voice 
exertion”. This material may provide a resource for future work. 
 
4. Reporting the data, producing an analytical narrative. My strategy in the four empirical 
chapters is in line with Braun and Clark’s (2006, p. 22) suggestion to choose “particularly vivid 
examples” to produce “a concise, coherent, logical, nonrepetitive, and interesting account of 
the story” based on my data. The data presentation followed some guidelines. First, 
interviewees were assigned not codes (e.g. “participant 36”), but rather personal descriptors 
(e.g. name and profession). This was not because their jobs were necessarily relevant to my 
interpretation of their narrative – although if they were, I made this explicit. This choice was 
intended to humanize participants and to enhance the fluidity of the text. Second, if they were 
of analytical significance, other elements of individuals’ personal contexts, such as ideological 
positioning, race, gender, income, political experiences, for example, were provided. Third, I 
used terms such as “some” and “many” to refer to the prevalence of certain patterns in my 
interviews. However, given the qualitative nature of my research and my relatively small 
sample in this context, this prevalence is intended only to signal relatively how often a 
narrative occurred. For the same reason, I usually avoided providing the number of 
participants who answered some questions in certain ways. Fourth, while in Chapters 7 and 
8, I refer to participants’ visibility control projects, my analysis in these Chapter is limited to 




        Figure 4.4: Illustration of Theme 1 categories and subcategories. Sources: NVivo software, Author. 
 
 
    Figure 4.5: Depiction of an attempt to graphically systematize findings. Source: Author. 
 
Lastly, I used new terms to designate my empirical findings, that is, the patterns I found in the 
interviewees’ descriptions in relation to my sub research questions (e.g. “accurate responses”, 
“readability as eavesdropping”, “tactical aggressions”, “profile disguise” – see Appendix 7, which 
summarizes these themes/empirical findings, locate them in thesis and indicate on which concept 
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they are based and which conceptual insight they inspired). These thematic labels play an important 
role in the thesis, as I employed them to organize the empirical Chapters 5 to 8. Yet, they should not 
be understood as conceptual insights, which are developed only in Chapter 9. In this analytical 
chapter, my procedure involved the re-reading of the interview excerpts (hereafter, simply “excerpts”) 
used in the empirical chapters, the literature discussed in Chapter 3 and various hand-written 
attempts to systematize my findings (see example in Figure 4.5. above). 
 
4.5. Ethics 
The bellicose political climate in Brazil proved not only to be a central concern of the thesis 
but also a frame that shaped the ethical conditions for its realization. These conditions are discussed 
below from two perspectives: positionality and reflexivity, and individual harm (Allmark et al., 2009; 
Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005; Kvale, 2007, pp. 24-30). 
 
4.5.1. Positionality and Reflexivity 
A continuous effort was made to reflect on ways that my personal context could shape how I 
designed and executed this research. This aspect was particularly important in my relationship with 
interviewees. I was aware that my position as a White, male and cisgender PhD student, living in an 
affluent foreign city, could increase the power asymmetries that naturally permeate the interview 
process. Furthermore, I assumed that some of the questions in my protocol were about actions that 
could be understood as being morally charged and socially undesirable – particularly in the context of 
the Brazilian crisis. For instance, some people could be ashamed of admitting to be afraid of not saying 
what they wanted to say on Facebook; conversely, participants could be reluctant to admit that they 
intentionally shaped their voices to become more visible. In view of these possibilities, I told 
participants that the interview was a conversation, not a test of what they knew about Facebook or 
about what kinds of citizens they were; there were no “right” or “wrong” answers, I assured them. 
While interviewees would necessarily have to deal with some sort of pressure to “perform” for me, 
being open about this pressure was expected to incentivize them to be as frank as possible. Put 
another way, by highlighting my interviewees’ autonomy, I hoped to enhance the quality of the 
interview as well. 
 
My own politically progressive views were another persistent reason for reflection. Due to the 
contentious climate in Brazil, I feared that, if conservative interviewees saw my positionings on 
Facebook, they would lose trust in me, question the intentions of my research, imagine an explicit 
ideological bias in my work or give up on the interview. My concerns were heightened because of my 
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institutional ties to the LSE. I knew that many conservative people in Brazil had bought into the fanciful 
notion that the world is “dominated” by Fabian socialism, the strand of non-revolutionary socialism 
fostered by some of LSE’s founders (see Morgenstern, 2017). Moreover, progressive participants 
could develop erroneous expectations – for example, that my research was aimed at criticizing 
conservative users, which was not the case. Therefore, I took the decision to delete or hide all political 
posts from my Facebook profile – an action that, I was to learn from my interviewees’ descriptions, 
was fairly common amongst those who feared professional repercussions from expressing their civic 
voices on the platform. Nevertheless, at the end of the interviews, many participants asked: “Which 
side are you on?”. To these participants, I answered truthfully about my progressive views and 
explained that the thesis research was not designed to prove “my side” right or wrong. Ultimately, 
even those participants on the right of the ideological spectrum appeared to react sympathetically to 
my answers to their questions. I was careful, also, to ensure that my political views would not affect 
the rigour of my analysis. This meant being wary of any apparent emerging pattern related to the 
ideology of an interviewee. 
 
4.4.2. Personal Harm 
My efforts to avoid any personal harm to the participants involved, first, a preoccupation with 
confidentiality – especially, again, in the context of the crisis. In order to guarantee their privacy, digital 
records of the interviews were stored in password-protected digital environments; hard-copies of the 
transcriptions were kept safely in my house; the transcriptions do not mention participants’ full 
names; the company that transcribed some of the interviews gave me the written assurance that all 
files would be destroyed immediately after I approved their work. When reporting the interviews, I 
use pseudonyms and, on some occasions, change biographical details (e.g. jobs) of some participants 
so as to make it very difficult for readers to identify them. I also took steps to minimize the chances of 
the actual interview being harmful, for example, by leading interviewees to relive distressing 
experiences. Before starting the conversation, interviewees were informed that they could stop at any 
point and should not feel obliged to answer any question; during the conversation, I was attentive to 
any signal that our interaction might be having a stressful impact. Lastly, I designed the interview 
protocol and conducted the conversations, in part, to provide participants with an enriching 
experience that allowed them to reflect critically on their own autonomy as citizens to express their 
voices on Facebook and about the Brazilian crisis. In the debriefing, I thanked and reminded them of 
how important it was to me that they accepted my invitation to share their views. 
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While the research entailed no significant risks to me, the interview protocol was adapted in 
response to a security risk common to anyone in Brazil. Since I do not have an office in São Paulo, I 
asked participants to suggest the place of the interview. Most chose public spaces. In the very first 
interview, as soon as I took my laptop out of my backpack, the interviewee said: “Are you sure you 
want to open this here [a shopping centre’s food court]”? Although the environment was safe, a 
criminal could have observed our interaction and then followed me and stolen my computer. I deemed 
this unlikely, but just in case decided not to ask participants to log on to their profiles. However, many 
participants spontaneously showed me, on their mobile phones, examples of their practices. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter described my methodological decisions and procedures. After framing this study 
as a constructivist inquiry, I argued that in-depth interviews was the most suitable method to probe 
how Facebook end users make sense of, imagine and express their civic voice in relation to the 
platform’s algorithmic visibility regime. I described the theoretical premises informing the 
operationalization of the conceptual framework into interview questions, the process employed to 
construct a sample of ordinary Brazilian end users to be interviewed, and the ways in which thematic 
analysis was adapted to examine the data produced during my fieldwork. Finally, I described how 
critical self-reflection on my own personal context and on my interviewees’ well-being, vis-à-vis the 
Brazilian crisis, shaped some of the decisions discussed in the first sections of the chapter. 
 
The succeeding empirical chapters discuss the results of the thematic analysis. Following the 
sequencing of the components of Section 3.6.3, the next Chapter (5) examines interviewees’ 



















The Schematization of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regime 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 described and justified the epistemology and empirical methods applied in this 
thesis research. The present chapter begins the discussion of the empirical findings produced by the 
thematic analysis of my in-depth interviews with ordinary Brazilian end users of Facebook. 
 
It examines, in particular, interviewees’ descriptions of how they made sense of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime. Based on the phenomenological conceptualization of Emirbayer and 
Mische (1998), these sensemaking experiences were described in Section 3.3.2. as “schematizations”. 
Schematizations depend on two basic processes, I suggested: paying attention to certain areas of 
reality, which allow for the identification of patterns (“types”). The primary site of Facebook’s 
datafication power is precisely the end users’ schematizations of the platform’s algorithmic visibility 
regime, I proposed in Section 3.6.2. In materializing the interface as “personalized” and its 
infrastructure as “inscrutable”, Facebook was said to attempt to orient end users’ attention (their 
“systems of relevancies”) to certain areas of reality so as to make them observe certain patterns. These 
directed schematizations were expected to lead end users to understand Facebook only as a naturally 
“relevant” interface, obscuring the very existence of the algorithmic visibility regime and possibly 
prompting them to act in ways that are conducive to the platform’s business model, I suggested. At 
the same time, this attempt to direct the schematization of the regime is inherently indeterminate. If 
we are to understand how Facebook’s visibility regime shapes civic voice, we should begin by this 
process – which is political but not necessarily civic. To do so, this chapter answers SRQ 1: How do 
ordinary end users schematize Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime? 
 
My analysis of interviewees’ answers to my questions on how they had arrived at some 
conclusions about their experiences on Facebook (see Section 4.4.5) suggests that all participants  
identified that there is an order defining who can visibilize whom on Facebook. My findings are 
presented according to the macro areas of reality to which participants apparently paid attention to 
in order to make sense of the platform’s government of visibility, and the ways in which they come to 
identify patterns in these macro areas. The first part of the chapter examines a macro area of reality I 
named as responses; the second considers information; the third explores descriptions of a less 
common macro area – probing actions. In explaining my findings, I also mention the micro areas of 
reality that made their schematizations possible (for a list of them, see Table 9.1). It is important to 
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note that these schematizations are not conflicting. While all interviewees reported the ability to, 




Interviewees reported that observing the way in which their news feeds and other end users 
responded to their actions, on and off the platform, allowed them to observe patterns that helped 
them to realize that something was making visibility definitions on Facebook. These patterns were 
noticed through two kinds of responses: those participants suggested to be accurate and those they 
suggested to be inaccurate. 
 
5.2.1. ‘Facebook Does It Very Well’: Schematization Through Accurate Responses 
To understand what I mean by accurate responses, consider first what I was told by Helena, a 
politically conservative law student, when I asked how she had discovered the rules governing the 
definition of visibility on Facebook: 
 
[5.1] I think it's my preference, what I see more often. I believe Facebook’s filter does it 
very well, you know? My feed is mostly about politics, because it [the “filter”] knows 
that what I most look at now is politics. I love Carnival, and could be posting Carnival 
stuff, but it’s been a couple of years that I stopped parading during Carnival. It’s just 
logics, logics, I’ve never read anything about it to be honest.  
When I asked her to detail what she meant by “logics”, she took out her phone, opened the 
Facebook app, started browsing her news feed and said: 
[5.2] Here’s an example. [Shows me her news feed; all posts are about politics]. You see, 
whenever I open my feed, [it’s about] politics. So the logic is: what I see more often, 
[Facebook will show her more often]. When I used to parade in the Carnival, I did talk 
about politics, but not so openly. I knew it would be controversial [to talk about 
politics], that I would have to fight. So, until the moment I said, ‘fuck off, this is my 
opinion and I will say it’, it took a while. And at the time it was only Carnival in my 
feed. So, it's just a logical association, that's it, nothing else. 
Helena’s description of expressing her civic voice exemplifies a trajectory common to other 
interviewees. Before the Brazilian crisis, she commented about politics, “but not so openly”. Having 
been “born and raised” in a samba school community,45 as she had told me at another moment of our 
conversation, her interests were mostly related to the annual Carnival parade. However, since 2013, 
 
45 In Brazil, samba schools are community-based associations that compete in Carnival parades. 
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she had become increasingly political, which is reflected in how she expressed herself on Facebook 
(“this is my opinion and I will say it”). Then, something happened: her news feed, which had been 
“only [about] Carnival”, became essentially about “politics”. Facebook’s “filter” (she did not use the 
term “algorithm”) captured this change of “preference” “very well”. It seems that Helena needed no 
formal information on computational systems in order to comprehend what was going on (“I’ve never 
read anything about it to be honest”); to her, the analogy between her actions and what she started 
seeing on her Facebook feed appeared self-evident (“just logics”). 
Olivia, a progressive editor, told me that she had sensed something similar: 
[5.3] [Before the crisis,] my circle of friends on Facebook didn’t have so many feminists, 
and now it does, because we get to know each other, it widens the network. 
Sometimes I read it [her newsfeed] and, it’s just women, only feminism here. Because 
we end up interacting more with ourselves and forming what we call a bubble. 
Like Helena, Olivia seems to believe that Facebook is able to notice the change in her civic 
voice during the crisis. Up to a few years ago, she told me, most of what she saw on the platform was 
from friends made in high school, college or work. However, especially after 2013, Olivia started to 
post about feminism and to interact, on Facebook, with people with similar interests. She told me that 
this changed who she sees and who sees her on the platform. Her “network” had both expanded 
beyond its previous confines and became specified as a feminist “bubble”. The notion of “bubble” was 
a prominent trope in the conversations with many of my participants and appears frequently in the 
succeeding chapters. (Section 9.3 conceptualizes the meaning of this term in the context of this study.) 
Helena’s and Olivia’s accounts are illustrative of schematizations that involved comparing 
changes on their news feeds to broader transformations of their civic voice. Other interviewees 
described having noticed a similar connection, but in relation to more precise and not necessarily 
political aspects. Take the example of Lorena, a funk dancer, who mocked the naiveté of my question 
about whether something decides what she sees on Facebook: 
[5.4] No, it’s the holy spirit who’s doing it [laughter]. Of course not. There is some command 
there that I don’t know how to explain, which is automatic. If I wrote on the Internet, 
it's there. No matter how privately, no matter where I am, this information is written 
somewhere, and it will reverberate in some way that I have no idea which way is. So, 
for example. I went to Rio in the past Carnival and I met a lot of dancers. Then I started 
adding many of these dancers on Facebook. I didn’t ‘like’ any page or anything, but 
because I started to ‘add’ many dancers, several things related to the dance scene of 
Rio de Janeiro began to pop up [in her feed], and this led me to get to know a very 
nice project [in Rio], which I participated in. And it was the network that gave it to me. 
No one spoke about it, no one introduced it to me, I didn’t know anyone who had 
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talked about this project. I started to search [about it], I started to follow [dancers], 
and I went back to Rio de Janeiro to participate in it and it was incredible. 
Lorena talked about how Facebook’s definition of what she sees in her feed (a “command” 
that is “automatic”) is informed by some sort of all-seeing monitoring capacity (“No matter how 
privately, no matter where I am”). Whereas she does not seem to fully understand how it works (“I 
have no idea which way [it will reverberate]”), she does seem to believe that it works well. In her 
example, the “command” started to show her “things” about the “dance scene” of Rio de Janeiro (she 
is from São Paulo). Not because she “liked” certain posts, but simply because she added individuals 
from this “scene” to her network of Facebook “friends”. One of these “things” was an “incredible” 
“project” in which she would not have participated if it were not for “the network”, i.e. Facebook. It 
seems that although the platform might intrusively read her datafied actions, it also automatically 
generates connections that she appears to be happy about. 
In the examples above, interviewees described observing how their news feeds responded to 
actions realized within the platform. Yet, these responses were often linked to other online spaces. 
Patricia, a nurse, told me that she “feels” that Facebook offers what she had already clicked on another 
website: 
[5.5] It's very clear. I want to buy a, say, bread maker. Then I clicked there [an online 
shopping website], [and] then a lot of related advertising started to appear. I think 
Facebook is similar. Things about cooking – this also I see all the time [in her news 
feed]. So, it does not really change – cooking, feminism, things about Black culture 
[she is Black]. For instance, I’m a nurse but I don’t ‘like’ things about [nursing] so I 
never see anything about it [on her feed]. 
Vicente, a theatre teacher, offered a very similar explanation for how he came to understand 
that he is monitored by Facebook. 
 
[5.6] If I search something on the Internet then, later on, something appears [on Facebook] 
for me to buy, and it keeps showing up all the time. And everything is more and more 
intertwined. Google, which is interconnected to Facebook, which is interconnected to 
who knows what – everything can connect. 
 
Theo, a lawyer, summarized well this sentiment: 
 
[5.7] We can’t think that everything works by chance or that everything is a mere 
coincidence. If you visit Magazine Luiza’s [webpage, a popular online retailer in 
Brazil], looking for a phone, it will appear on Face[book some] news about Magazine 
Luiza. There’s a cause and consequence thing. 
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In these excerpts, Patricia, Vicente and Theo appear to be describing how they noticed that 
their actions outside Facebook (clicks, searches, browsing) provoked a response on Facebook (in the 
form of ads, or “news”, in Theo’s vocabulary). The association between algorithmic decision-making 
and dataveillance were described by them not as a shocking or unusual, but as an evident (“very 
clear”), logical (“cause and consequence”) and quotidian (“it keeps showing all the time”) fact of life. 
The association helps them to dismiss the unlikely possibility that the sameness of the content offered 
on other websites and in their news feeds is “mere coincidence”, as Theo said. Indeed, as Patricia 
described, it is possible that these “causes and consequences” relationships between off Facebook 
actions and news feed become “very clear” precisely because (as Vicente described) they are shown 
“all the time”. 
 
These responses were depicted by other interviewees as too accurate. The following excerpt 
from my conversation with Amanda, who freelances as a video-maker, is illustrative of these accounts: 
 
[5.8] It’s the most common thing [original emphasis], you search for a plane ticket and then 
you open your Facebook and you see [an ad]: ‘Tickets to Chile’. It’s quite creepy. I 
don’t know, sometimes I think that someone is listening to my Facebook inbox 
messages. I don’t know, I think they have this… I think they monitor [me], not sure. I 
don’t know how [it works], man. It has to involve an algorithm. I don’t know, I don’t 
know. Conspiracy theory, maybe? It should involve that thing, the algorithm, that you 
click on [something on] Google, then the YouTube is also connected, everything is 
networked. You see suggestions on Facebook and YouTube. 
 
            Consider, too, what I was told by Artur, a documentarist:  
 
[5.9] Another day a very surreal thing happened on Facebook, I was absurdly scared. I was 
talking to my dad over Skype, in a private chat, and I told my dad I was, ‘Dad’, I told 
him, ‘I want to use solar energy in my house, what you think?’ and such. Five minutes 
later, I log on Facebook and see a solar energy [panel] advertisement. I said, damn... 
If I had googled, in Google, I don’t know, it would be more [explainable]. But I hadn’t 
searched. I had thought, talked to my dad in a private chat and it popped up. I said, 
fuck, it is too much of a coincidence. 
 
Could it be only “coincidence” that, after searching for a plane ticket on Google, Facebook 
displayed to Amanda ads for tickets to the same destination? That the platform showed in Artur’s 
news feed an ad for the solar panel he had been discussing with his father on Skype? Similar to Theo, 
accepting the coincidence hypothesis seemed illogical to them. Amanda and Artur appeared to believe 
that something must be guessing – in a worryingly accurate manner – what they were interested in. 
However, they were uncertain what this element was and how exactly it worked. Maybe it is “that 
thing, the algorithm”, which operates in an environment where “everything is networked”, pondered 
Amanda. Another possibility was that someone might be “listening” to her chats – or would this be a 
 99 
“conspiracy theory”? Artur’s quote demonstrates a similar concern. He even wonders if Facebook 
planted some sort of audio recording device in his phone.46 
 
A comparable self-doubt was reported by Lucia, an actress. She explained that she came to 
realize that Facebook was secretly recording her actions within the platform through a Facebook 
Memory47 video that celebrated her Facebook “friendship” with her partner: 
 
[5.10] And [the video message] is like, ‘hey, you two had a great time’, and it showed photos 
and stuff, [and it says]: ‘you ‘liked’ each other thousands of times’. Then you say: A-
ha! So, they are there, there is something there that calculates how many ‘likes’ you 
give to that person, or that person [gives] to you [original emphasis]. I don’t think it's 
a person who observes, I'm not good at technology, but it's a Facebook system, a 
program scheduled to do that. It must be [laughter]. I sound like a psychotic person, 
like, ‘oh, they're chasing me’. [laughter] 
In Lucia’s reported experience, dataveillance appears not as an intricate technical 
arrangement of devices, software and statistical techniques, but as a poorly hidden set-up. If an 
apparently automated video “knows” how many “likes” she has given to her partner over the years, 
it means that “they” are “there”, covertly recording her actions on Facebook. Her reasoning seems 
compelling. But, as Amanda (Excerpt 5.8 above), Lucia questions: is she a bit “psychotic” for thinking 
about these things? It might be that that the interview setting, and her possible wish not to appear 
self-centred (“like, ‘oh, they're chasing me’”), led her to express self-doubt as an ironic defence 
mechanism. However, it is reasonable to conclude that this sense is linked as strongly to her 
assumptions about Facebook as to her need to perform for the interviewer. Noticing the conspiratorial 
tone of her answer, but not finding an alternative explanation for it, she likely found herself in a 
position to both trust and doubt her own conclusions. 
So far, I have examined descriptions of Facebook accurate responses to participants’ online 
actions. However, Octavio, a cultural producer, reported noticing responses to a different kind of 
element: 
[5.11] I had noticed these questions of ... these responses, these indications of places, which 
are quite peculiar. They can see that I'm here in the library [where the interview took 
place], that I came yesterday here and I'm here again. So, what do they understand? 
That I often attend to this area. And they advertise things from this area. And it's so 
clear ... You have, like, an advertising of a car repair shop, or of a furniture store. [But] 
why are they going to send me things from both Campinas [a city near São Paulo] and 
São Paulo, if these cities are not even stuck together, if there is a road linking them? 
 
46 This suspicion would become a global rumour (Martínez, 2017).  
47 Messages created by Facebook to commemorate alleged milestones in end users’ connections (Facebook, 
2018).  
 100 
They're reading the things I do. I don’t always ‘check in’ on Facebook, but I still see 
myself read, that I go to São Paulo quite often ... And why? Thus, there is a reading. 
The “responses” Octavio talks about were not given to his clicks, searches, or any online 
actions. Rather, they were responses to his geolocation. In his news feed, he started to see ads from 
shops in two cities (São Paulo and Campinas). He does not “check in” to physical spaces using Facebook 
– so, what other explanation could there be for these sudden appearances except that he travels 
frequently to these locations? The reasonable conclusion is very “clear”, he said: “they are reading the 
things” he does – even if these “things” happen offline. 
Not all the responses narrated by these interviewees were performed by the platform. In 
particular, when asked to explain how they had developed understandings about who could see the 
expressions of their civic voices on the platform, interviewees often pointed to other end users. 
Antonio, a real estate agent, offered a typical explanation: 
 
[5.12] If the person did not give his opinion, it is not possible to know who saw [the post]. If 
the person only visualized, [but] didn’t ‘like’ it, did nothing, I can’t find out. Now if you 
do anything, give it a thumb up, then I already know [who saw the post]. 
 
Since Facebook offers no data about “views” for personal profiles (only for pages), in the 
absence of some kind of reaction (an “opinion” such as a “like”, in Antonio’s words), it is almost 
impossible for anyone to be sure about whether someone saw or not their post. However, participants 
not only noticed the reactions. They also reported finding patterns in these reactions, patterns that, 
commonly, coalesced around some sort of continuity. Those who interacted with their posts were 
depicted as those who had interacted with them before, as Adão, a high-school teacher, told me: 
 
[5.13] I think that there is a device of Facebook itself that shows what I want to see, it’s 
always the same 20 people. The people that I ‘like’ more often, the people that I talk 
to more often, with whom I interact the most, because Facebook maybe thinks I’m 
interested in these persons. So, it’s like 20 people, I once even counted them up. It’s 
always the same bunch of 20. 
 
For Adão, the formation of a Facebook “bubble” (a term he used frequently in our interview) 
was so evident that he could even enumerate its members (“it’s like 20 people”, the “same bunch” 
who commonly interacted with him). He sensed a pattern of appearances in his news feed which, in 
Adão’s description, is not produced by these 20 people alone, but also by the “device” that Facebook 
uses to show what he wants to see, as he put it. That is to say, he can only know who is seeing his 
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posts because others are reacting, but these others are only reacting because his posts were offered 
to them in the first place by “Facebook itself”. 
 
Sometimes, responses appeared to be noticed by interviewees through other means. Vicente, 
the theatre teacher, told me that he thinks that more people see his posts than actually react to them. 
I asked him to explain: 
 
[5.14] I imagine this because some people, when you meet in-person, they comment [on his 
Facebook activity]: ‘You’re always posting, um?’. A friend of mine who usually doesn’t 
‘like’… it’s not that she disagrees, but she doesn’t ‘like’. There was a protest that was 
bit rough and then she sent me an inbox message: ‘Where are you? I'm worried’. That 
is, she was following the things I was posting [about the protest]. 
 
As Vicente’s description exemplifies, there are also responses which, while happening through 
Facebook, are not public. In Vicente’s example, a friend sent him a private chat message to ask if he 
was alright, which Vicente interpreted as meaning that the friend had seen his posts about a “protest 
that was a bit rough” and was “worried” about him. 
 
However, not everyone observed patterns of accurate responses by drawing “cause and 
consequence” inferences between their actions and what appears on their news feeds. Several 
reported understanding the governing of visibility via different sorts of comparisons. Consider four 
examples. 
Fabricio, a telemarketer: 
[5.15] There is the normal news feed and the "see latest" news feed. In my "normal" [feed], 
what appears most often [is] what I "like" more often. When I go in the “latest”, 
everything appears. It's different. 
Julia, who works as a freelance journalist: 
 
[5.16] When [João] Dória won [the elections and became mayor of São Paulo in 2016], within 
my bubble, he wouldn’t win. I was inserted [in a “bubble”], most people were talking 
about other candidates. Suddenly Dória wins in the first round. This means I didn’t 
perceive the diversity of opinion, of choice. 
 
Lucia, the actress: 
 
[5.17] We speculate: ‘Why do these people appear? Are they the people you like the most, 
or are they the people who most visit your page?, Why don’t I appear in my friend’s 
[news feed] if we are such good friends [outside of Facebook]?’. [She concluded] it 
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has something to do with access [to one’s profile], with going to that space [the 
profile] several times. It stays in your history. 
 
And, lastly, the video-maker Amanda: 
 
[5.18] I sometimes visit [the Facebook page of] MBL [Movimento Brasil Livre, Free Brazil 
Movement].48 I have gotten terrified. I got scared because you realize that those 
guys... I don’t have, like, a deep knowledge about politics, [but she realized] that a lot 
of people out there [in the MBL page] are just a front, and that there is a much bigger 
force behind [MBL]. 
In these four examples, participants’ exposure to diversity reveals the sameness of their news 
feeds. Fabricio depicts a sort of intra-news feed comparison: he switched an interface button allowing 
the news feed to be ordered either chronologically or according to what he “likes” “more often”. Then, 
he noticed that what he “likes” “more often” was not there (“It’s different”). He seems to be talking 
about the possibility of choosing between “Most recent” and “Top Stories” configurations of the feed 
(Facebook, 2019a). Julia’s example entails a comparison not to other formats of the feed, but to reality 
itself. She said that when she failed to “perceive” what was really going on in the São Paulo’s mayoral 
2016 election, it became apparent to her that she was “inserted” in a “bubble”. The winning 
candidate, the conservative João Dória, won in the first round – but in her news feed, full of 
progressives, he was mostly absent, Julia said. Lucia’s example indicates that what happens on 
Facebook does not necessarily stay on Facebook. Posts are a topic of in-person talks and, as other 
participants told me, the reason for quarrels, jokes and discussions. Lucia described how, often, she 
compared and talked about the patterns of her news feed with those of her friends to try to 
understand why certain “people appear” or do not appear on their news feeds. Lastly, Amanda was 
one of the participants who described being concerned, explicitly, with trying to “burst her bubble” 
on Facebook, as she put it. She is politically progressive and, eventually, visited Facebook spaces 
dominated by conservatives, as she told me. She had seen the Facebook page of a right-wing social 
movement (MBL) and had been “scared” to learn that there is a “much bigger” force behind this 
organization – although what she meant by this was unclear from her explanation. In contrast, her 
surprise indicates how her own news feed seemed to be impervious to the sort of content she 
observed in the MBL page. 
The interview excerpts analysed in this section indicate that, by observing certain patterns of 
likeness, participants developed the understanding that their past actions are read and might inform 
 
48 MBL is one of the right-wing new social movements that emerged during the Brazilian crisis (Section 2.2.). 
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accurate responses by Facebook (or “filter”, “the algorithm”, “system”, “device”) in the future. In the 
next section, I consider some examples in which this perceived accuracy seems missing. 
5.2.2. ‘Some People I Talk to Never Show Up’: Schematization Through Inaccurate Responses 
Joaquim, a script writer, explained to me that he had noticed a sort of glitch in how 
Facebook decides what will show up in his news feed: 
[5.19] Automatically, when I interact, read, spend more time in a post, even if you do not 
‘share’ [it], Facebook understood that it generated some interest. Sometimes you 
read a long text that you actually didn’t like but the person [author of the text] starts 
to appear more often because you spent some time reading it [the text]. 
I suggest that the difference between his description and those I discussed in the previous 
section lies in the term “automatically”. Joaquim appears to think that Facebook’s “algorithm”, as he 
described it many times in our conversation, is not so smart. It does not really know what he or anyone 
else wants to see; it just makes automated decisions based on what end users “interact” with and 
“read”. The more time spent on a post, the more that post will be judged by the algorithm as of 
“interest” to that person – regardless of what the user really thinks, he seems to think. Thus, in his 
example, he might more often see someone who he does not find particularly relevant simply because 
he spent a long time reading a “long text” from that person. For him, this sort of misguided visibility 
definition seems to reveal the disparity between the logic of the algorithm, which he depicts as 
conflating interactions with relevance, and his logics of relevance, in which interaction could mean 
many different things – including disapproval. There is a response, but this response presents a 
subjective strangeness: in working well objectively, the algorithm failed to offer Joaquim what he 
personally wanted to see. 
The perceived inaccuracy of some definitions made by Facebook helped participants to arrive 
at different conclusions from the one Joaquim reported. For instance: Vigo, an accountant, told me 
how a subjective glitch made him suspicious about the platform’s “algorithm”: 
[5.20] I thought it [the ‘algorithm’] was about interaction. Then I saw that there were some 
people who I talked to a lot, but they never showed up. These people who won’t 
appear [in his newsfeed] think rather differently from me. There is this friend, I 
consider him as a brother, but we sometimes go a few rounds in the Messenger 
[Facebook private chat] and he’s never there [in his news feed]. That's when I got it, I 
said, ‘gosh these guys [Facebook] are smart’. 
 
Usually, Vigo appears to believe, the “algorithm” works “by interaction”. Yet, he came to 
realize that, at least in relation to some end users, this logic did not seem to work. Why is it that he 
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rarely sees those who think “differently” from him in political terms, even though he interacts quite 
frequently with them?, Vigo apparently wondered. He told me that he concluded that Facebook 
surreptitiously and intentionally divides right and left (“’these guys are smart’”). Vigo offered no 
further explanation for why Facebook would do that, but this impression of a mistaken definition by 
Facebook’s “algorithm” is a different sort than that reported by Joaquim. It is not that Facebook tried, 
but failed to divine what Vigo wished to see – the platform apparently does not care about what he 
wishes or not; its motivations are themselves political, Vigo seemed to have concluded. 
 
For Fernanda, an engineer, inaccurate responses could indicate alterations in Facebook’s 
inner workings. 
 
[5.21] Once, I realized that it [the algorithm] had changed. For two days in a row, it kept 
appearing folks’ profile pictures. I said, ‘wow, this is a lot of profile photos, would 
everyone be changing their profile at the same time?’. Then I realized: they are 
changing the algorithm. Because it’s not always that people change their profile 
picture. Then, after two days, it [the algorithm] returned [to normal]. 
 
Fernanda heard of “algorithms” in a postgraduate marketing course, she told me. In this 
excerpt, she describes them as a typical infrastructural element, which usually goes unnoticed until it 
breaks down. Like a broken water pipe whose eventual repair may temporarily disrupt the everyday 
flow of life, she said that that “the algorithm” would go on the blink when it was tweaked. Profile 
pictures, which appeared only if they were altered (i.e. interacted with), started to show up 
continuously (“’wow, this is a lot of profile photos’”). Likewise, when the inaccurate responses 
stopped, this seemingly meant that the “change” to “the algorithm” had been finalized. The sort of 
glitch she describes differs from those examined in this section so far. “Algorithms” fail for reasons 
that, in her description, seems to be technical – rather than subjective or political. To my knowledge, 
there are no evidences that modifications to Facebook’s algorithms would indeed create the sort of 
inaccurate responses Fernanda describes. From the perspective of this study, this is largely irrelevant; 
what matters is that this perceived “change”, real or not, apparently helped Fernanda to further her 
understanding of how the platform governs the visibility of her news feed. 
 
In the same way that other end users’ familiar responses helped interviewees to make sense 
of Facebook’s visibility regime (see previous section), interviewees also noticed when their posts 
received unexpected reactions. For instance, Lorenzo, a retail clerk, said that: 
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[5.22] You are not invisible on social media. I had posts that were liked or commented by 
people who I haven’t seen in 20 years. So if that person, who I had completely 
forgotten, commented, surely, folks will see [original emphasis]. 
 
This comment emerged when Lorenzo was explaining why he thought that “everything” one 
does on Facebook might end up being seen by other end users, and the risks this poses for ordinary 
people like him when talking politics in this space. His reasoning was associative: if his posts were seen 
(thus, “liked”, “commented”) by people he no longer remembered, how could he be sure that other 
end users, complete strangers even, would not see his posts? It is not that Facebook’s government of 
visibility is random – Lorenzo demonstrated in our conversation an awareness of the interactional bias 
of the platform’s algorithms (see Section 3.6.2). However, there is a persistent possibility that, due to 
some unknown decision, he might be exposed to people with whom he rarely interacts, Lorenzo 
appears to think. 
 
In the previous section, I referred to comparisons helping interviewees to notice the sameness 
created by Facebook’s accurate responses. Other comparisons helped people to realize the absence 
of a particular response. For instance, Nicolas, who is employed in a call centre, told me that: 
 
[5.23] I don’t block anyone. But folks block me, many have blocked me. 
  
  [JCM]49 How do you know? 
 
Because, suddenly, you can’t find [their posts] in the [news] feed. Then, I searched 
[for the] the person, and [the person] had disappeared. 
 
As he said in the interview, Nicolas sensed that his quasi-socialist political positions made him 
a pariah amongst his friends, relatives and work colleagues. When he observed that posts from some 
of his Facebook connections stopped appearing in his news feed and their profiles could not be found 
through searches, even though he had not stopped interacting with these people, he concluded that 
they had “blocked” him. Like other participants quoted in this section, he started to make sense of 
what was going on by noticing a break in the familiar pattern of his news feed. 
 
So far, this chapter has examined how interviewees described noticing different sorts of 
recurrences and interruptions in different areas of reality (visual representations on the interface, 
such as “likes”, images, texts, and offline interactions, events, and places). These recurrences and 
interruptions, they told me, led them to conclude that these areas were either connected in a logical, 
 
49 Acronym for author’s name. 
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cause-consequence relationship (what I termed accurate responses), or that this connection was 
missing (what I termed inaccurate responses). It seems, however, that these two forms of responses 
are related. As the excerpts of my interviews with Fernanda (Excerpt 5.21), Lorenzo (Excerpt 5.22) and 
Nicolas (Excerpt 5.23) suggest, participants were only able to sense a break due to their expectation 
of sameness. Put another way, inaccurate responses could be understood as such due to an apparent 
default expectation of accuracy. I return to this point in Section 9.2. 
 
In the next section, I turn to a rather different form of schematization of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime. 
 
5.3. Information 
This second part examines how interviewees described making sense of Facebook’s 
algorithmic regime of visibility through information.50 Their descriptions denote three sources of 
information: traditional media; platforms; and social interactions. In the cases analysed in the next 
three section, participants appear to have compared the information they were exposed with their 
own experiences on Facebook, or with other information about the platform. In this way, they 
illustrate Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998, p. 979) point on how patterns often are perceived through 
comparisons between one’s “emerging experience” with those of the past, “either within the actor’s 
direct memory or within a social memory as objectified in various media of communication”. 
5.3.1. ‘I Have a Notion of What’s an Algorithm’: Schematization Through Traditional Media 
Information 
Consider the following interview excerpts about how participants had discovered what they 
told me they knew about Facebook: 
[5.24] Well, I watched the Snowden movie51 recently and this [points to his phone] is a 
portable spy machine. [Artur, documentarist] 
[5.25] Oh, [I became aware of algorithms] through readings. I don’t remember the [media] 
outlet now. But there has been a lot of comments on this question of Facebook. [Julia, 
freelancer journalist] 
[5.26] There is an episode of [the TV series] ‘The Good Wife’ that is very interesting. One 
woman was complaining that the algorithm [of a website] put her restaurant location 
in a dangerous area, and it was not a dangerous area. It was only in a more distant 
 
50 I realise that “information” is a disputed term. My approach to it is essentially empirical: what interviewees 
told me that they had read, heard and saw, and which helped them to schematize Facebook’s algorithm visibility 
regime. 
51 “Citizenfour” (Poitras, 2014). 
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neighbourhood, but with that she was losing customers. [The discussion was]: Does 
the website have this right? [Ireni, lawyer] 
At the time of my fieldwork (January to March 2017), Brazil’s (and the world’s) mainstream 
media were abuzz with pieces on the, then recent, victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 US elections, 
which compounded the global surprise at the results of the Brexit referendum held in the UK. A key 
question addressed by these pieces was how these events had come to pass and a frequent answer 
was Facebook. This context – and the then still lingering debate about the 2013/2014 Snowden 
scandal – perhaps helps to explain why many interviewees told me that some of what they knew about 
Facebook’s visibility regime had been acquired from traditional media. Some of these media were 
fictional (the TV series Ireni talks about), others were journalistic (the reports mentioned by Julia, the 
documentary movie watched by Artur). Importantly, the information they talk about are not full 
explanations of the platform’s algorithmic visibility regime, but fragments: the idea of pervasive 
surveillance (Artur), the deployment of an “algorithm” (Julia), the possibility of automated injustice 
(Ireni). Interviewees appeared to have used these bits of information to reflect on their own 
experience on Facebook – and then articulated this during our conversation.52 
The role of information could exhibit yet another facet. Consider the following excerpt on 
how some participants concluded that state agents could visibilize their civic voice expressions on 
Facebook. 
 
[5.27] I am, in fact, inferring from all I have read about activism and intelligence agencies. 
[Telma, musician] 
 
[5.28] [I learned these things by] reading things and watching a lot of conspiracy movies. 
These days I watched that one from [Noam] Chomsky, ‘Requiem for an American 
Dream’, he talks about this connection between the big multinationals and the 
governmental political system. [Vicente, theatre teacher] 
 
[5.29] For example, when something closer [to her] happened, ‘oh, they revealed that thing 
about [former President] Lula’, or ‘[Judge Sergio] Moro managed to reveal that other 
thing’… these events made me think: ‘Okay, we put our lives on a social network – but 
to what extent I want people to have access to it [her life]?’ [Rosa, nurse] 
 
In the descriptions of Telma, Vicente and Rosa, books, documentary movies and journalistic 
pieces are essential for them to make sense of how Facebook governs their visibility. Yet these media 
are neither about Facebook’s visibility regime nor about any specific element of the platform 
 
52 The possibility that their explanations emerged only during the interview cannot be discarded (see Section 
4.2 on this study’s constructivist approach) . 
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(algorithms, “bubbles”). They refer to “activism and intelligence agencies” (Telma), the “connection” 
between state and businesses (Vicente) and the surveillance operations realized against authorities 
by the Car Wash Operation in Brazil (Rosa). While they apparently never saw any concrete information 
about state agents monitoring people like them on Facebook, they seem to associate Facebook with 
a wider matrix of uncertainty and power asymmetries. If a judge can reveal the secrets of a former 
president, as Rosa concluded from reading the news on Brazil’s massive corruption scandal; if, as 
Vicente described, there is abundant evidence of “conspiracies” between powerful companies and 
states; and if, as Telma seemed to believe, these conspiracies may target “activism” – if all these ideas 
as true, it is logical to think that Brazilian state agents may be able to monitor their civic voice 
expressions on Facebook in ways that are not entirely clear to them. They seem to have transformed 
generic narratives of power into interpretative frameworks for what happens in Facebook. 
Yet, traditional media were only one of the sources of information about the platform that 
participants mentioned, as the next two sections indicate. 
5.3.2. ‘According to Analytics…’: Schematization Through Platform Information 
 Many interviewees, when asked about how they had developed certain understandings of 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime, replied with explanations not about the platform but about 
other end users – their actions and motivations, which affected what participants saw and how they 
were seen on the interface. 
 
Consider for instance what I was told by Luis, a pensioner. Until 2015, he had been able to 
boost his retirement pension with freelance consulting jobs. With the onset of the economic recession 
in Brazil, this additional source of income dried up. When we met, in early 2017, he was wondering 
whether his newly discovered passion for conservative politics could solve some of his financial 
troubles. He described to me the possibility of monetizing the videos in which he articulated strident 
attacks upon the left. For this to be financially rewarding, the videos needed to be seen by more 
people and, to achieve this, Luis calculated that the platform analytics were essential: 
 
[5.30] According to YouTube analytics, my audience is between 24-34 years old. So, I have 
two tracks, being 40% from 24 to 34 and the rest from 34 to 54. And there are about 
10% that is diffuse, a minority. I'm going to find out where the error is, because 90% 
of the view is still male. On Facebook is the opposite. Most of it is feminine, my posts. 
I have to understand what is happening there. 
 
At the time of our conversation, making money out of his own civic voice expressions on 
platforms seemed a distant reality for Luis. However, in this excerpt, he appears to talk as a marketer 
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of himself, reciting information on his viewers’ as a businessman would arguably describe his target 
audiences. These numbers allowed him to construct certain ideas about the end users who compose 
his Facebook “audience” (mostly over 34 year-old, mostly female). For Luis, knowing to whom he was 
talking was essential to understand what he had to say to expand the number of people who watched 
his political videos (the topic of Chapter 8). 
 
Yet, not all interviewees appeared to trust in information produced by Facebook itself. Gael, 
a graphic artist, was at the time of our interview helping to administer a Facebook page about 
environmental issues. In this capacity, he said that what really affected the reach of civic voice on 
Facebook was the “Share” button – which counts as both an interaction and a direct propagation of 
the post. Therefore, understanding why other end users would “share” something was fairly relevant 
to his goal of increasing the reach of the page’s posts. But “Facebook metrics” did not mean much to 
him, he said: 
[5.31] When people ‘share’ [his posts], they write their own little subtitle. I take a look at it. 
If my text isn’t that good, people will write their own text when sharing. If the text is 
good, people share and don’t add anything. What they think is missing [in the post], 
they write. [I also see] what their ‘friends’ answered [in the ‘shares’], and sometimes 
I go to people's profiles to see what’s the ideological profile of the person. To me this 
is much more insightful than looking at that control panel of Facebook [page], which 
speaks of clicks. I think I can understand better when you see these ‘shares’, than 
[with] these [Facebook] metrics, which I think are a mega bullshit. 
Gael appears to think that the best way to understand whether the posts of the page he 
administers were appreciated was not “metrics” (a “mega bullshit”, in his words) but a sort of 
qualitative profiling. He described reading the texts his readers wrote when “sharing” his posts, the 
comments strangers left in the “shared” post and, “sometimes” visiting the profiles of these people 
to check their “ideological” leaning. He is interested in making sense not only of how many people 
have clicked on his posts but also why they did (or not): did they like or dislike, what was missing?, he 
appears to ponder, in this excerpt. In linking various information (text, profile, comments), Gael can 
get some intuitive understanding of his typical reader, with the likely goal of honing his messages to 
better please this audience. 
5.3.3. ‘I Talked a Lot to My Teachers”: Schematization Through Social Interaction 
 So far, I have examined descriptions on how interviewees paid attention (and were thus being 
exposed) to different forms of recorded information. This section discusses information on who can 
visibilize whom on Facebook that were communicated through social interaction. 
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Let me begin with a rumour I heard repeatedly from conservative participants regarding 
something called “MAVs”. When asked them what or who was a “MAV”, I was told that: 
[5.32] [MAVs] are [leftist] parties that pay for human beings to manage a series of profiles. 
[Helena, law student] 
[5.33] Today, there are MAVs, which stands for… malware… something like that. Automatic 
MAVs are created by hackers. [Fabricio, telemarketer] 
[5.34] What is a MAV? I understand it to stand for ‘activist in a virtual environment’ 
[Militante em Ambiente Virtual]. They come around and take your page down, fuck 
your Facebook up, send you death threats. [Davi, English teacher] 
 [5.35] They swarm your page with reports. [Maria, event organizer] 
According to these participants, the idea of “MAV” circulated in conservative Facebook and 
WhatsApp groups. Despite these similar sources, no-one was able to define a MAV precisely. 
Explanations involved pauses and expressions of doubt. I was told variously that MAV was an acronym 
referring to “activists” in the “virtual” space, i.e. fake Facebook profiles used by leftists to wage 
visibility wars against the right (Davi, Excerpt 5.34; Maria, Excerpt 5.35). Some seemed to believe that 
MAVs were controlled by leftist political parties (Helena, Excerpt 5.32), others thought they were 
automated (Fabricio, Excerpt 5.33). Whereas no-one was certain of what a MAV was, all participants 
who mentioned this mysterious figure appeared to fear its ability to game Facebook’s content 
moderation system against them. These rumours apparently helped the interviewees to make sense 
of why so many pages of conservative groups (sometimes their own pages) went offline and, more 
broadly, of the ways in which the government of visibility on Facebook could be exploited for political 
reasons. 
Information about Facebook or related topics circulated widely in various other spheres which 
are not overtly political, I was told by multiple interviewees. Rafael, a conservative law student, told 
me that his former job was instrumental to his understanding of how Facebook works: 
[5.36] I worked as a DBA [Database Administrator], not specifically with social media, but 
databases basically work in the same way. You can pull any kind of information about 
anything that is happening inside the database. So, for instance, if Facebook’s people 
have a situation where the word ‘multiculturalism’ suddenly pops on someone's 
profile, they might start to check this person’s profile, if it’s far-right or far-left. Like, 
‘we will start to monitor this guy, if the person posts ‘multiculturalism’, or a curse, we 
have to receive an alert because this guy is beginning to be a problem for Facebook, 
or for a political ideology’, I don’t know. 
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As a DBA, Rafael was exposed to the information that digital databases allow their controllers 
to monitor key words. By comparing this (another) fragment of information to what he knows about 
Facebook’s ideological leaning, he appeared to identify a pattern that helps him to explain how the 
platform’s content moderation works. If Facebook is a massive database, which is what Rafael seemed 
to assume, what stops the platform from creating an “alert” for uses of ideologically-charged 
expressions such as “multiculturalism”? A simple command could probably carry out this kind of 
monitoring, he appeared to imply.  
Others told me that they had been exposed to some basic information on computation and 
the functioning of the Facebook platform through pedagogic experiences. For example: 
[5.37] I did a very short course in programming, two months. I didn’t learn anything, to be 
honest. But I have a notion of what’s an algorithm, programming, programming 
language, Java Script.[Nicolas, telemarketer] 
[5.38] I talked a lot to my [college] teachers, I had all kinds of talk. We were talking, 
informally, then my teacher said, ‘I think Facebook always had this [interactional 
bias]’, he said, and ‘these reactions of ‘love’, ‘wow’," are related to that too’. 
[Bernardo, public employee] 
The experiences depicted in these excerpts suggest that topics such as “algorithm” and 
“bubbles” are discussed in pedagogic but not necessarily technical specialist circles. These include a 
short course for people without a university degree, such as the one taken by Nicolas, or a corridor 
talk with a college teacher in Bernardo’s case. In these informal and transitory spaces, they acquired 
some information that helped them to cast light on how the platform works. This information was 
sometimes about Facebook directly (in the case of Bernardo) or was appeared in the form of an 
underlying concept which was applied to the immediate reality of the platform (“algorithm”, in the 
case of Nicolas). 
Since algorithms, “bubbles” and cognate terms related to Facebook’s visibility regime 
circulated widely in interviewees’ media diet and, sometimes, were utilized in the everyday work and 
learning environments, it is hardly surprising that information about the platform also infiltrated their 
domestic lives. For instance, Artur, the documentarist, told me how important talking to his wife was 
in his learning about visibility on Facebook: 
[5.39] [After he began to talk about politics on Facebook] I started to fight with a friend, then 
I fought with another, and then another, you start to fight with everyone. Then, my 
partner said: ‘Dude, stop fighting with your friends, just hide what they post’. Then I 




It might that Artur was already aware that there was a way of not seeing the political posts of 
some of his friends – especially those with whom, as a result of the deepening of crisis, he had started 
to “fight” all the time. However, it was his wife who provided him with the information about “Hide 
Post”, which did not involve “blocking” or “unfollowing” the person. 
Some few participants described having invented their own area of reality to make sense of 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime, as described next. 
5.4. Probing Actions 
The excerpts examined so far in this chapter described schematizations that depended on 
areas of reality, so to speak, which existed regardless of the participants’ explicit desire to understand 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime. These macro areas were populated by concrete micro areas, 
so to speak: their own actions, posts and visual representations of reactions on their news feeds (e.g. 
“likes”), actions from other end users, texts, images and movies in traditional media products, 
numbers in their screens (analytics), rumours, professional and pedagogic experiences, domestic 
conversations, etc. However, interviewees’ reported attempts to make sense of this visibility regime 
also involved intentionally creating a macro area so as to produce concrete micro areas from which 
patterns about Facebook could be identified. I call these probing actions, of which two kinds surfaced 
in my fieldwork: improvised surveys and improvised algorithm audits. In the descriptions analysed 
below, there seems to exist a dynamic conjunction of the two “areas” analysed above. After being 
exposed to some information about the algorithmic visibility regime, the participants provoked a 
response so as to produce a different sort of information. While Emirbayer and Mische (1998) do not 
contemplate this form of schematization, its dynamics involve familiar elements: allocation of 
attention and identification of patterns. 
 
5.4.1. ‘I Have to Fix My Own Tools’: Schematization Through Improvised Survey 
Above, I analysed descriptions of how participants used Facebook’s analytics or news feed 
visual elements to identify patterns about other end users. Daniel, a businessman, told me that he 
had to find other means to understand his readers. 
 
Over the course of the Brazilian crisis, he developed a relatively large readership on Facebook. 
The natural next step, he said, would be to create a Facebook page, what would give him access to a 
panel of analytics about visitors – as Luis had, for instance (Excerpt 5.30). However, this could be a 
trap, he said. The platform would “hide” posts of his eventual page to force him to pay for more reach 
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– something that he learned in his work. He decided then to stick with the personal profile. And, in 
order to have some kind of information about who his readers were, he fixed his own “tools”: 
 
[5.40] Since I do not have the [embedded] tools to measure [his readers], I have to fix my 
own tools. One of the things I used to do was a survey, every Friday. There is this 
Survey Monkey tool that you can create a survey. So I did the survey [by posting the 
Survey Monkey link]. Most of the questions were stupid, but what I was really 
interested in was the demographics. I’d always ask things like, ‘are you a man or a 
woman’, so I could have ... demographic data about who was responding. It's not 
much, and in no way scientific. You write and get the responses, [and realize] what is 
working. 
 
By eliciting responses to his post – even though these responses were provided outside of 
Facebook and with the aid of a software foreign to the platform’s visibility regime – Daniel managed 
to collect information (“demographics”) about his readers. His “not scientific” endeavour did not 
illuminate any aspect of Facebook itself. However, in Daniel’s view, it would make him well placed to 
understand why his posts were more or less interacted with and thus seen by more people – if they 
were “working”, as he said. That is, by using third-party software to manually profile those end users, 
Daniel assumed he could make partial sense of the environment where he articulated his civic voice 
expressions.  
As the following section indicates, the relations between information and responses may be 
distinct. 
 
5.4.2. ‘I Like to See Where the Hole Is’: Schematization Through Improvised Algorithm Audits 
An early adopter of various online services, Fabio, who manages a tattoo shop, told me that 
he has a long history of “experimenting” with “social networks”. At the time of our conversation, he 
appeared to have developed a love-hate relationship with Facebook: he described himself as a heavy 
user who deeply despised the platform. Among other reasons, because he thinks Facebook is “super 
racist”: 
[5.41] I like to see how social networks function, to see where the hole is. [For instance], I 
like to see what we can publish in terms of nudity. I found out that, if it’s a picture of 
Kate Moss [the White female model], then you can post a picture of her breasts. But 
not the breasts of a Black woman. If you post the breasts of a Black woman, Facebook 
will find it. It could be that someone reports it, but I saw that Facebook also has an 
automatic [system]. I posted Rihanna [the Black female singer] naked, and he [the 
system] said: ‘No, this image you can’t [post]’. It has a filter that already identifies 
pubic hair, or the nipple, and takes it away [the picture]. But it's funny. I saw that, with 
Katie Moss... I posted several pictures. The only one [Moss’ picture] that Facebook 
said ‘no’ was one which showed her pubic hair. Then Facebook said, ‘no, hold on’.. I 
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remember that Karina Burh [a Brazilian singer] posted a photo of a Black woman, big 
breasts, fat, and the Facebook didn’t like it. I think it was too much [laughs]. I don’t 
know if it's Facebook or someone [who reported the picture], because she [the singer] 
has many followers, maybe someone complained. But I think the app [Facebook] is 
super retrograde, super racist. 
Fabio’s depiction resembles a form of improvised algorithm audit (see Sandvig, Hamilton, 
Karahalios, & Langbort, 2014): he intentionally inputs certain content (naked posts of the Black 
singer/model, Rihanna, and of the White model, Kate Moss) and, from observation of the outputs 
(Rihanna’s picture got taken down; Moss’s usually did not), saw a pattern and constructed an 
understanding of Facebook’s algorithmic decision-making process (“the app” is itself “super racist”, 
regardless of any complaint from other users). 
 
From a scientific perspective, it can be argued that the experiment is hugely flawed. But Fabio 
is no scientist; he was interested, only, in testing information obtained from a public figure (the 
Brazilian singer Karina Burh). Of course, the very idea of testing assumes that he knew that Facebook’s 
“automatic” content moderation system could respond to his actions. Somewhat similar to the 
descriptions analysed in the first part of this chapter, Fabio appears to assume a cause-consequence 
dynamic. Facebook allows a picture to be posted (cause) and if it decides to take the picture down 
(consequence), it will visibly communicate this decision with a message (“he said: no”) and with the 
absence of the picture in his timeline. That is, instead of collecting information through responses (as 
Daniel), he uses responses from the platform to test information communicated by another user. 
 
A second variety of improvised algorithm audit I identified during my field work involved more 
actors. As implied in Excerpt 5.36 above, Rafael, the conservative law student, suspected that 
Facebook has a covert political agenda. This idea, he told me, came from information he acquired 
from reading and listening to Infowars, the far-right conspiratorial North-American multi-media 
website. The idea that Facebook might discriminate against conservative material gained personal 
traction with Rafael when his own expression of civic voice began to trigger fewer reactions. He talked 
to a fellow conservative friend, who reported the same “limitation of reach”, and decided to 
investigate: 
 
[5.42] It happened to me, this limitation of reach. I can’t tell you what’s behind it. Usually, 
when people feel this issue of reach, we [conservatives] publish a message on our 
Facebook page, [saying]: ‘If you saw this post, please ‘like’ it, I need to check the reach 
of my network’, to test it, really. It was incredible how this [test] post in which I did 
not mention nor linked anything about politics, had a very good reach. But all the 
other posts [with political content], that I posted two or three days after this [test] 
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post had almost no reach. I have a clear conscience of what is really relevant, among 
the things I post, and what is bullshit. And among these posts [that had no reach] 
there were things that were very significant. Most of my [Facebook] ‘friends’ are 
involved with politics. They would have ‘liked’ them [the supposedly hidden 
messages], they would have commented something. You end up noticing, because… 
I keep thinking – I posted something silly and it was shared, I posted something 
interesting and it was shared, and now I posted something super interesting, a 
shocking revelation and folks didn’t feel anything, didn’t share, didn’t speak? It’s 
intriguing. There’s an unknown: why is this happening? Why does it happen in a 
certain moment, and in another moment it doesn’t happen? 
Rafael’s probing actions configured a form of improvised algorithmic audit that is different 
from the one examined in the previous section. While Fabio’s test involved what appeared to him to 
be a direct response from the platform to his action, Rafael’s was indirect. He seemed to assume that, 
unlike content moderation algorithms, news feed algorithms cannot be tested directly. Thus, other 
end users’ reactions could be used as a proxy. Similar to someone who tries to measure the depth of 
a well by dropping a pebble and waiting to hear how long it will take for the water to splash, Rafael 
sent a post to his network and waited for the elicited echoes. As in Fabio’s case, it is easy to spot the 
flaws in his experiment: what if his “friends” could see, but simply did not want to “like” his political 
posts? But he appeared to trust in people’s willingness to react to some of his political posts (“I have 
a clear conscience of what is really relevant”) and assume that this variable is a constant. The problem, 
he apparently concluded by exclusion, is Facebook. Therefore, his test endorsed the information he 
heard on Infowars. Rafael said: “it was incredible how” the posts with “shocking revelations” against 
the left received fewer reactions. Even an ordinary end user could be “shadowbanned” automatically 
(see West, 2018), he seems to believe. 
The probing actions analysed in the previous sections did not emerge from a vacuum; they 
depended on paying attention to areas of reality that were not created by Daniel, Fabio or Rafael: 
visual elements of their news feeds, survey software, a public declaration from a singer, Facebook’s 
content moderation system, Infowars’ texts and videos. What their descriptions suggest, though, is 
that these participants consciously combined these elements to engineer novel areas of reality, to 
which they then paid attention: private survey responses, automated decisions from the moderation 
system, and reactions to probing messages. 
5.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter examines how my interviewees made sense of (schematized) Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime – the topic of SRQ 1. My interpretation of their accounts indicates three 
broad forms of schematization. For many of them, the regime becomes perceivable by paying 
attention to what I call responses. The first part of the chapter analyses two ways in which patterns 
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may be identified in these responses: accurate if they noticed that Facebook’s news feed changed or 
other end users reacted in ways understood as congruent with the meaning or nature of their 
online/offline actions (Section 5.2.1); and inaccurate if such changes/reactions were seen as not 
fulfilling the participants’ expectations in relation to their correlate actions (Section 5.2.2). Many 
interviewees also described making sense of the visibility regime by attending to another macro area 
– information. As I show in the second part of the chapter, this information might come from 
traditional media (Section 5.3.1), platforms (Section 5.3.2), and social interactions (Section 5.3.3). 
Thirdly, I analyse probing actions, a form of macro area of reality that hybridizes the first two to create 
micro areas of reality, which, arguably, would not be available without their interventions. These 
actions can be categorized as improvised surveys (where the participant asked other participants to 
complete a private survey – Section 5.4.1) and improvised algorithm audits, which involved the input 
of different content to check how the regime would react, or assessment of other end users’ reactions 
as proxies for the decisions of the visibility regime (Section 5.4.2). The data discussed in this chapter 
underscores what the literature on similar processes suggests: Facebook’s attempt to orient how its 
algorithmic visibility regime is made sense of (see Section 3.6.2) largely fails. In Section 9.2, I argue 
that this failure is associated with an internal contradiction of the platform’s datafication power: in 
successfully producing a personalized news feed, Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime exposes its 
infrastructure, and ends up being materialized as conspicuously invisible. 
  
Chapter 6 examines which schemas appear to have been produced by the schematizations 
















Three Social Imaginaries of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regime 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 examined participants’ explanations about how Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime becomes imaginable to them. By noticing patterns and shifts in the interface, being exposed 
to different sorts of information or, less often, engaging in improvised surveys and algorithm audits, 
all interviewees reported being aware that something operates from behind the screen to govern who 
can visibilize whom on Facebook. 
 
The present chapter discusses what this something might be. In so doing, it addresses SRQ 2: 
Which social imaginaries do ordinary end users hold of the Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime? 
Consistent with the findings in Chapter 5, my analysis of the interviews suggests that all participants 
share three contrasting social imaginaries about the regime, which are described in three separate 
parts. Each part is organized according to Section 3.6.3, where I proposed that, by projecting the 
notion of social imaginary (Taylor, 2004) onto my formulation of algorithmic visibility regime, it is 
possible to highlight the main different aspects of this regime, which can be investigated as imagined 
by end users. These are: the readability vector (the ways in which dataveillance operations read end 
users’ actions), the sight vector (the definition by machine learning algorithms of how end users see 
and are seen on the platform news feed), the way these two vectors become entangled and the 
normative dimension underpinning these imaginations53 (which is relative to the presumed ability of 
end users to influence the functioning of the regime). Following the data analysis strategy described 
in Section 4.4.5, the descriptions I selected on which to ground my claims involve both interviewees’ 
explicit articulations of their taken-for-granted understandings about the regime, and their narrated 
actions. Importantly, this chapter is aimed at formulating the central tenets of these three imaginaries. 
By providing more examples of how they were articulated by interviewees in concrete visibility control 
projects, Chapters 7 and 8 flesh out the findings analysed here. 
 
6.2.1. ‘We Generate the Behaviour of Algorithms’: The Readability Vector as End Users’ Tool of Control 
 While the dataveillance processes I theorized as contributing to the readability vector have 
been described by critical scholars of datafication as mostly detrimental to end users (Section 3.5.1), 
participants seemed to assume that these processes might, in fact, be beneficial to them. Consider 
 
53 “Imagination” is used to refer to specific elements of a social imaginary. 
 118 
first what Joaquim, the script writer who experienced an episode of sudden visibility on Facebook, 
told me when I asked him what defines what he sees on his news feed. 
 
[6.1] Everyone blames the algorithms. But the algorithm, it’s... we are the ones who 
generate their behaviour, as well. Today, I have some control over what will appear 
[on his news feed]. I put I do ‘Not Want to See This Anymore’, ‘Stop Seeing 
Information from this Page’, done, I’m excluding. There is more. People and pages 
that you put to ‘See First’. The problem is – this requires time, and acting, you have 
to be active. It requires a certain maturity to understand your presence in the 
network, or how the network affects your life. I think most people are not so 
concerned with this. 
 
Joaquim appears to be keenly and critically aware of how Facebook’s algorithms work. 
Perhaps this familiarity explains his dissatisfaction with the idea that “the algorithm” is to “blame” for 
the configuration of the news feed – which “everyone” else seems to believe in. His explanation does 
not deny that algorithms are involved in decisions about what can or not be seen, but it adds an 
additional actor: Joaquim. End users like him (“we”, as Joaquim says), also play a role in this decision: 
“we are the ones who generate their behaviour [of algorithms]. Today, I have some control over what 
will appear [on news feed]”. This control over the “behaviour” of the “algorithms” is exerted through 
built-in buttons he termed “I do Not Want to See This Anymore”, “Stop Seeing Information from this 
Page”, “See First”. Thanks to these interface buttons his “acting” towards the regime can be 
“algorithm ready” (Gillespie, 2013, p. 168). However, not everyone is “concerned” with exerting 
control over the algorithm in Joaquim’s view. In order to have their demands met, they need to “be 
active”, have a “certain maturity” and self-reflexivity to “understand your presence in the network”. 
The understanding that the possibility of using these buttons depends on acting in certain ways was 
displayed, also, by Cristian, a geography student, who told me: 
 
[6.2] It’s funny because, when I started using it [Facebook], I didn’t dominate the tool very 
much. It has many things, right? I didn’t know what it was to follow something, or see 
first. There has been like an appropriation of the tool. I started to filter what I would 
like to see. Sometimes you go like… [Cristian stops talking, picks up his phone and 
pretends to scroll down the news feed absentmindedly], right? For me, you have to 
see it from another angle, from another perspective. 
 
Cristian’s narrative underlines what is suggested in Joaquim’s. In using interface buttons, he 
appears to feel he is simply not going to accept what is presented to him. Instead, he will take 
command, “see it from another angle”, his angle, presumably. A more prevalent facet of the same 
imaginary involves the implicit understanding that interface buttons allow end users to avoid 
problems. Take what the left-leaning real estate agent Emilia said: 
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[6.3] So, my [Facebook] is quite restrict, only my ‘friends’ [can see what she posts]. Two 
weeks ago, they [Facebook] changed again the privacy configurations, so I’ll have to 
change everything again. Because they [the configurations] are not the same in the 
laptop, mobile, iPad. So, if I want to wall off these people, [she will have to change 
each one of these devices’ configurations]. 
 
“These people” she mentions are members of her family. Due to the Brazilian crisis, she told 
me, her relationship with her father and mother, who are politically conservative, disintegrated. As a 
consequence, she unfriended both of them on Facebook and became wary that they were able to see 
what she posted in her account. To avoid new conflicts, Emilia started using Facebook’s “Privacy 
Settings”, which allow her to decide which kind of user may or not see her posts and “wall [her 
parents] off”. Her account nuances Joaquim’s and Cristian’s descriptions of control. For, while the 
settings gave her command over how her posts were seen, the functioning of these interface buttons 
were not controlled by her. Emilia demonstrated some irritation with how these “configurations” 
change abruptly, forcing her to engage in a form of unwanted labour. 
 
Gael, the graphic artist, provides an example of another ambiguity regarding interface 
buttons. 
 
[6.4] [Blocking is] mostly when I don’t know [the blocked other user], when I have no 
reason why I want to keep talking to this person. Depends more on me than the 
person. If I’m cool, I just ignore. If I’m in a bad day, and the guy starts talking about, 
like, death penalty, fascists in general, I block. The Unfollow [button] has to do with 
the phase of the person. The cool thing about the Unfollow is that, if I want to follow 
that person again, I won’t have to ask him, you know? It’s transparent. The Block ends 
your friendship with that person, it’s forever. I’d would have to Unblock and add the 
person again as my friend… The big problem is that the only tool that you have is to 
block or stop following. And it's a very blunt tool, a sledgehammer, yes or no. That's 
why I wanted to have a finer control, I wanted to see what this person writes, but not 
the links that they post, for example. 
 
Gael appears to think, as do Joaquim and Cristian, that interface buttons are essentially 
designed to serve his wishes. They might help him not to deal with “fascist” strangers when he is on a 
“bad day” or friends who are in a bad “phase”. Also, like Emilia, he does not appear fully satisfied with 
how these settings work – he wanted a “finer” control, not the “sledgehammer” of the “Block” 
“Unfollow” buttons. Interestingly, he also associates the buttons with social costs. The “Unfollow” is 
described as “transparent”: it can be done and undone without the awareness of the unfollowed user. 
As a result, the potential social cost of unfollowing is taken by him as low, and its usage as a banal and 
unproblematic decision. The “Block” button, on the other hand, is pictured as a drastic measure (“it’s 
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forever”) – potentially perceptible by the blocked users and, thus, costly. Not because the blocked 
user would be directly informed about the blocking action, but because any attempt to reconnect 
would entail the unspoken confession of disconnection – or so Gael seems to think. 
 
These accounts exemplify an implicit understanding common to all my interviewees that how 
Facebook reads their actions may have less to do with spying than with handing them tools of control, 
which are not free of potential costs. Of course, these interface buttons not only datafy end users’ 
wishes. They also provide the platform with “general feedback mechanism to increase user 
engagement” (Vaccaro et al., 2018, p. 1). Yet, at least in this social imaginary, dataveillance seems 
problematic to interviewees only to the extent that it does not work exactly as they want, as indicated 
by Emilia’s and Gael’s descriptions. Next, I analyse a correlate imagination of the sight vector. 
 
6.2.2. ‘I’ll Construct my Own Bubble’: The Sight Vector as Visual Boundary-Making 
In assuming that the platform gives them some control over how they are read, participants 
appear to presume that they might also exert a certain directing over the sight vector. To understand 
what this imagination is, it is useful to return to the accounts provided in the previous section. Emilia’s 
language (“[If] I want to wall off these people” [emphasis added]) and Gael’s image of interface 
buttons as a “sledgehammer” which can only include or exclude (“yes or no” ) suggests that the sight 
vector might be guided according to a visual-spatial binary: there are contents and profiles that are 
“in” and there are those that are “out” of one’s news feed. However, another metaphor was far more 
common – that of “bubble”. Take, first, what I was told by Lucia, who works in an NGO. 
 
[6.5] [JCM] You talked about the bubble. How do you think this bubble is formed? 
 
I don’t know, I'll construct my own [laughs]. There must be people who stop following 
me as well. As I do [unfollow some of her ‘friends’]. I say [to herself], ‘oh, you're 
posting a lot of fascist stuff, I'll stop following you, otherwise I will not able to greet 
you on the street’. 
 
Another useful example was provided by Humberto, the copywriter: 
 
[6.6.] I recently did a… Facebook asked if I would like to say about the things that I wanted 
to see, don’t want to see. I said, ‘sure‘. 
 
[JCM] Like a survey? 
 
Yes. Like, ‘improve your content in the news feed’, it was an option [in the interface], 
something like that. Then, I selected some things but… very bubble, but a bubble 
that... Specific contents for me to follow, specific activists, specific pages. 
 121 
 
The idea of “bubble” has become common amongst critical scholars of datafied platforms and, 
as suggested in Section 5.3.1, appeared to have infiltrated journalistic accounts in Brazil on how 
Facebook works. These depictions further exemplify how the term has been appropriated by ordinary 
people. In Lucia’s and Humberto’s descriptions, the “bubble” is described not as a construct of the 
platform itself, but as a consequence of their own actions, through the “Unfollow” button. In Lucia’s 
case, similar to Gael’s, the “bubble” functions as a protective environment, preventing personal 
relationships from breaking down. As Lucia said, if she does not exclude some Facebook “friends” who 
post “fascist stuff”, she might be unable to engage with these people in real-life situations (“greet” 
them “on the street”, for instance). The “bubble” could be understood, also, as important to include 
certain things that the platform does not show, as Humberto’s quote indicates. For him, “bubble” has 
become a pejorative term to describe some content that is too personalized (“very bubble”). At the 
same time, he insisted that the “bubble” to which he was referring to? was not necessarily negative: 
it included serious content – of “activists”, “pages”. 
 
Another perspective on why people manually form “bubbles” on Facebook was presented to 
me by Alvaro, a private tutor. 
 
[6.7]  [It’s not only the algorithm, it is also], the people I know, who introduce me to people 
they know, and almost everyone knows people from the same places. Sometimes the 
person will introduce me to a new person who is someone I've known before. There 
is an algorithm but I think this algorithm is in some way a reproduction of how we live. 
We live in enclaves, looking for similar people. 
 
Olivia, the editor, said something similar: 
 
[6.8] This [São Paulo] is a big, huge city, but people who have studied in certain schools, 
who have more or less the same level of education, they are somehow connected. It's 
very common for someone to add me [as Facebook ‘friend’] and I'll check and the 
person has 30 ‘friends’ in common with me. They are people who, in addition to 
common interests, had a more or less similar formation, attended more or less the 
same type of school, more or less the same kind of university, so we end up being 
paired. We live in a bubble outside of Facebook too. Bubble of people who, in my 
case, always lived in upper-middle-class neighbourhoods, studied in private schools, 
studied at the University of São Paulo, then lived with people from upper-middle class. 
 
These accounts seem to suggest that people might form “enclaves”, in Alvaro’s words, not 
only because they specifically want to see or not see some content/profiles, but because their 
Facebook actions largely reflect “bubbles” that exist outside Facebook. It is not uncommon, Alvaro 
said, to be introduced to new people on the platform that he actually already knew or, in Olivia’s case, 
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with whom she has “30 ‘friends’ in common”. The acting of “friending” others is, thus, permeated by 
non-Facebook ties, which Olivia links, explicitly, to socioeconomic inequalities (see Section 2.2): the 
“kind” of schools and universities people attended, which in Brazil reflects wider income and 
geographical differences (“upper-middle-class neighbourhoods”). This does not mean that these 
“bubbles” are built against their will – as Alvaro says, people “look for similar” others. They are still 
making decisions on who is “in” and who is “out” of their news feed. 
 
The metaphor of the “bubble” points to attempts, primarily, to delimit participants’ own vision 
fields and, secondarily, the vision fields of users they are connected to. Consider, however, what 
Maria, a politically conservative event organizer, said: 
 
[6.9] Block, unfollow? Oh yeah. The people I know in real life [she won’t block], but these 
people I met [online] because of politics, oh, I made a cleansing. My block list has a 
scroll bar [laughs]. A dick comes up talking shit? Blocked. You have this information 
war: just as they want to limit our range, we want to cut theirs [range short as well]. 
 
Maria told me that she spends much of her time involved in political disputes with both 
“lefties” and conservative fellows on Facebook and other platforms. Her description reflects this sort 
of conflictual engagement. She does not appear to have second thoughts about blocking end users 
with whom she disagrees. On the contrary – she talked proudly about how long her list of blocked 
profiles was (it even has “has a scroll bar”, Maria laughed). What sets her account apart from the 
others analysed in this section is the suggestion that, by blocking other end users, she will not only 
insulate herself from this other end user, but also “limit” the “range” of this other user, more 
generally. Her understanding, as I interpret it, is that, if a user is constantly blocked, this user will have 
her overall seeability decreased by Facebook. This would be important because different ideological 
factions, she says, are involved in an “information war” whose victory appears to involve high 
seeability. To put it another way, blocking someone serves not only to preserve relationships, increase 
the quality of the content in one’s news feed and reinforce socioeconomic sameness but also to attack 
perceived opponents. 
 
 The actions described in this section seem to depend on the taken-for-granted understanding 
that end users might decide on what may or not appear on their news feeds by engaging in visual 
boundary-making, motivated by multiple reasons. These digital boundaries seem to be understood as 
affecting the possibility of seeing, helping the definition of what is in/out, but not as determining what 
will indeed appear in people’s news feeds. Hence, Joaquim’s statement at the beginning of this chapter 
that he has “some” control. These boundaries are imagined, also, as involving pros and cons, costs 
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and gains. All of these calculations can be of huge importance insofar as they encompass relationships 
with not only distant others (complete strangers, acquaintances) but also intimate relations (family, 
co-workers, real-life friends). As such, these boundaries might reaffirm other and deeper non-
Facebook boundaries, such as socioeconomic boundaries. 
 
6.2.3. Entanglement of Visibility Vectors as Compliance 
In the previous two sections, I proposed that the readability and sight vectors of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime might be assumed to be under the relative control of end users. Building 
on the accounts analysed above, I suggest that the entanglement of these particularly imagined 
vectors appears to be imagined as a form of compliance. That is, by providing certain control tools, 
whereby users decide, in part, about how they see and are seen, the algorithmic visibility regime is 
assumed as obeying their visual boundary-making. If they click the “Unfollow” button, they will not 
see more content on that profile/page in their news feed; if they decide to “See First” a page, they will 
see that page first. The assumption seems to be that there is no space for interpretations by 
algorithms. 
 
Such compliance looks to be conceived as certain, but not as unmediated. The descriptions 
on which I commented, arguably imply assumptions about various other elements. Firstly, the very 
configuration of the interface buttons. It appears to go without saying for interviewees that this 
configuration allows for only some (and not other) kinds of control, which are limited to the sort of 
“blunt” visual boundary-making about which Gael complained. Secondly, there are user’s personal 
resources and self-understandings. Important evidence of who in Joaquim’s view can be listened to 
by the regime is his use of the expression “acting” to refer to the human action that affects algorithms’ 
“behaviours”. In Portuguese, even more than in English, “acting” is synonymous with performance. As 
such, it necessarily entails users’ intentions and skills. Thirdly, this process involves particular 
assumptions about who and what are the recipients of one’s boundary-making actions and whether 
these recipients can be aware of such actions. The presumption that different individuals combine 
differently with different buttons pervades all descriptions, but is particularly clear in Gael’s 
description of who is “blockable” and who is merely “unfollowable”. Bearing upon these qualifications 
is not only what other people do on Facebook, but also non-Facebook ties such as social class, as 
exemplified in Alvaro’s and Olivia’s stories. Put another way, some sort of broader understanding 




6.2.4. Controllable Visibility Imaginary: A User-Centred Normative Order 
In sum, the imaginations discussed in this first part of the chapter comprise what I would term 
controllable visibility imaginary. In line with this, Facebook’s visibility regime is designed to allow end 
users to exert some control over itself through interface buttons which comply with their wishes about 
which visual boundaries should be instantiated in the platform. The descriptions examined above 
suggest an underlying sense of normative order centred on users’ abilities to decide about how the 
regime works. The interviewees seem to indicate that they assume to have the ability to decide 
unilaterally about how they will make others visible and make themselves visible to others (including 
to the interface buttons, which are conceived of as needing to be actively clicked to generate the data 
that may be created by Facebook). However, this control is conceived as relative; as indicated just 
above, interviewees also take for granted that that their wishes can only be expressed according to 
formats pre-determined by the platform. That only rarely was this channelling made explicit by 
interviewees (e.g. Gael) seems an indication of how naturalized datafication operations appear to 
have become. 
 
6.3.1. ‘That Thing that Monitors Us’: The Readability Vector as Eavesdropping 
Following the order in the first part of this chapter, I begin this second part by analysing 
another way that participants seem to imagine the readability vector. In this next social imaginary that 
emerged in my analysis, Facebook is again conceived as underpinned by “the algorithm” (or its 
variegated cognate terms), and again understood as central to understanding how visibility is 
governed on the platform. However, this invocation differs significantly from the controllable visibility 
imaginary. Julia, the freelance journalist, described this difference: 
 
[6.10]  I believe that what determines [what appears on her news feed] is... what is the name 
of that stuff? That thing that monitor us... the algorithm. I believe it is like a tool to 
know how the interactions of the user are, it’s possible to know what he clicks on, 
what he accesses, what his interests are. Then, it [the algorithm] controls what will 
appear in our page [news feed], as well as what it [the algorithm] puts in [the news 
feed] in terms of ads. 
 
Consider, also, what Octavio, the cultural producer, told me: 
 
[6.11] It is a digital reading, I mean, is not about what you are really seeing. It is a reading 
that they do of your behaviours. 
 
In Julia’s statement, the notion that the behaviour of Facebook’s algorithmic system can be 
controlled directly by end users, central to the controllable visibility imaginary, largely vanishes. For 
Julia, algorithms are a “thing that monitor us”, a “tool to know” people like her. “The algorithm” is 
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pictured as not controlling Julia’s actions, but as monitoring actions performed by her. Also, her 
monitored actions are not necessarily linked to her direct wishes about what should be in or out of 
her news feed. Instead of clicks on buttons such as “Block” and “Unfollow”, the algorithm is described 
as computing their “interactions”, “clicks” and “access”. As Octavio said, this “digital reading” is not 
necessarily interested in what one explicitly demonstrates interest (“what you are really seeing”), but 
in all sorts of other “behaviours”. 
 
Indeed, in this second imaginary, computational reading processes were often depicted as 
pervasive, touching everything that happens on the interface and, sometimes, reaching beyond the 
confines of the interface – as if Facebook had tentacles. More frequently, this sense of constant 
vigilance was implied in descriptions about how advertisements users believed were generated 
outside of the platform, kept appearing on their Facebook’s news feeds (see examples in Section 
5.2.1.). Nevertheless, some participants were able to articulate this apparent feeling in more explicit 
terms. The private tutor Alvaro provided an instance of the latter when explaining what he thinks “the 
algorithm” is: 
 
[6.12] I believe it is about… the kinds of posts I ‘like’, probably some keywords of the texts I 
write. It’s also about the interaction between Facebook and the other things I use, like 
Google, other websites I access, it [the algorithm] might have access to the cookies 
[in his computer], so... It’s also probably related with the groups I participate [in 
Facebook], I believe it [the algorithm] has a kind of complex dataset. It [the algorithm] 
is like an interaction between a lot of information they collect about me. What I click 
on, what I write, other websites I go to, the groups I’m part of, my ‘friends’, the posts 
I comment on, I think that... Not sure if it [the algorithm] is as apprehensible to me in 
a very specific way. 
 
Alvaro’s account points to an aspect that was mentioned by other participants: “the 
algorithm”, or similar terms, are described as instantiating the various imagined linkages that 
Facebook is thought of as having with other spaces or functionalities of the Internet (“Google, other 
websites… cookies”). In effect, “the algorithm” is so much defined by this relatedness that it is even 
described by him as “an interaction” of “a lot of information collected” by a number of dataveillance 
operations (“they”) which cannot be easily turned off. It is about what he clicks on, writes about, 
accesses, his Facebook groups – but also his “friends”, what he comments on in which posts and… 
what else?, Alvaro seems to wonder. Consequently, the functioning of “the algorithms” is imagined 




My interpretation of these excerpts suggests what appears to be a second social 
understanding of the readability sector, in which Facebook seems to be conceived of as secretly spying 
on them – a form of eavesdropping. In contrast to the first imaginary, in which control over the 
readability vector is made possible by interface buttons, which are voluntarily clicked on by users 
themselves, this computational reading is assumed as not limited by these buttons, much less directed 
by end users’ wishes. At the same time, the controller-controlled relationship is not fully inverted. 
While no clear sense of control over the regime is noticeable in the statements examined in this 
section, there did not seem to be any assumption about a complete lack of control either. Next, I 
consider how the sight vector seems to be assumed to work vis-à-vis this differently imagined 
readability vector. 
 
6.3.2. ‘It Becomes a Snowball’: The Sight Vector as Automated Placement 
 This section offers an examination of interviewees’ descriptions which point to an 
understanding of the sight vector as controlled by the platform itself – but still based on end users’ 
datafied actions. The kind of definition of the feed executed by Facebook’s algorithms seems to be 
understood by participants as rather different from how they understand what in Section 6.2.2 I 
termed visual boundary-making. If, in the controllable visibility imaginary, interviewees described 
their decisions about how to configure their feed as based on emotional (avoiding conflict, maintaining 
relationships), informational (being exposed to quality content) and political (downgrading the 
“reach” of rivals) reasons, in this second social imaginary the platform is portrayed as informed by end 
users’ prior interactions. This is noticeable in Julia’s description, presented in the last section, in which 
“the algorithm” is described as guided by “what” end users do. However, on many occasions, 
participants described that the quantity of interactions was as important as their quality. The video-
maker Amanda was talking about “the algorithm” when she said: 
 
[6.13] Like, when a lot of people share the same things, I think it appears [in her news feed]. 
[The algorithm] might be like a formula […], it measures, like, the number of the words 
that you say or the number of times you Interact with someone. That is what I 
imagine. 
 
In Amanda’s quote, the algorithm is a “formula” (itself a mathematical term) that defines what 
is going to appear in the news feed through the counting of actions (“the number of words” and 
“number of times you interact”, which algorithms’ “measure”). This might mean that the number of 
times she interacts with a content will make this content more likely to appear in her news feed; but 
it might mean, also, that how others interact with a content plays a part, as suggested in the first part 
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of her account (“when a lot of people share the same things, I think it appears [in her news feed]”). 
The latter idea was made even more explicit to me by Adão, the high-school teacher: 
 
[6.14] I’m not sure what comes first, the chicken or the egg. But the higher the number of 
‘likes’, the higher the number of people that will ‘like’ it. If a text has a small number 
of ‘likes’, people might think: ‘Um, why is that nobody is ‘liking’ it?’. They, like, go with 
the flow in this sense. 
 
Antonio, the real estate agent, provided a similar example: 
 
[6.15] When everybody starts to ‘like’ [a content], it becomes a snowball. The ‘like’ is 
everything. I believe the ‘like’ rules – if somebody ‘liked’ something, then other people 
will get curious and might ‘like’ it as well. 
 
Adão and Antonio seem to believe that, by privileging quantity of interactions in its 
government of the sight vector, Facebook’s visibility regime commonly creates what Antonio calls a 
“snowball” effect: the more interactions a content has, the more people will see this content, which 
might, in turn, create more interactions, and so on. This assumption about how Facebook places 
content applies not only to others’ contents but also to content produced by the participant herself, 
it seems. In conjunction with Amanda’s narrative, their descriptions exemplified an aspect that all 
participants appear to share: governing of the sight vector by “the algorithm” (or “Facebook”, “thing”, 
“system” etc.) is not a “sledgehammer” that creates “blunt” binaries: yes/not, in/out, as indicated by 
Gael in the first part of this chapter. Rather, she seemed to suggest that it is driven by categorical and 
measurement variables: both the “what” and the “how many” are taken into account. In principle, 
any content that achieves a certain combination of these variables might end up being shown to her 
by “the algorithm”. The process of deciding what is seen by whom seems, then, to be taken as rather 
malleable, produced by a complex dynamics of computer calculations and the social calculations of 
end user (Gillespie, 2017), who might “go with the flow” in Adão’s words. 
 
This is not to say that interviewees did not identify patterns in the decisions of the platform. 
In fact, many participants told me that these automated decisions ultimately give rise to audiences 
organized by Facebook. Again, they frequently used the “bubble” image to designate these audiences. 
As Victor, a clerk in a cultural centre who spoke at length about “algorithms”, said: 
 
[6.16] This bubble would be, like ... you use the social network, you are posting and sharing 
things that you think are right. Other people start to think these things are okay too, 
they start to ‘like’ these things as well. The points of view start to get closer. Whatever 
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you post will appear more often for them; as the ‘friends’ of this person will see that 
she always ‘likes’ your stuff, they begin to get closer to you too. 
 
His depiction of a “bubble” is illustrative of two understandings expressed by other 
participants. For Victor, “the algorithm” brings end users together regardless of their desire to actually 
see each other. All he did was interact with certain posts. In his description, “the bubble” is like a 
network, a shapeshifting set of connections not only between individuals who are already linked to 
each other but also between strangers ( “friends” of “friends”). This “bubble” is assumed to be created 
by the platform, and not by him – as it would be in the controllable visibility imaginary. However, 
instead of a fixed assumption of sameness, for Victor “the algorithm” appears to a follow a temporal 
and interactional logic: definitions about what to place where in the news feed are driven by the 
assumption that what users “liked” in the past is what users might “like” in the future. Artur, the 
documentarist, told me something similar: 
 
[6.17] There’s a lot of people who believe in conspiracy theories behind this algorithm, that 
there are even political issues involved. I tend to think this is not the case. I believe it 
is a much more sophisticated mechanism: its greater goal is to please me, I think so. 
The objective is not to manipulate information, or censor something, I don’t think so. 
So, like, if I post a cat pic, I’ll get a cat pic. If I post conservative news, I’ll get 
conservative news. So, it tries to guess what I like. 
 
For Artur, the behaviour of the algorithm has nothing to do with politics, manipulation or 
censoring and, thus, is not explainable by “conspiracy theories” – a point to which the third part of 
this chapter returns. Its intentions are both simpler and “more sophisticate”: it merely wants to 
“please” him. 
 
Other participants said that Facebook does not only want to please people but also get them 
hooked – articulating a view that resembled Seaver’s (2018) theorization of algorithmic 
recommendation system as “traps”. As Fernanda, the engineer, said: 
 
[6.18] The algorithm is… I believe that it works in a way that… it wants to get you addicted. 
 
This view seems to imply that the sight vector may be taken as being guided by concerns 
common to other private companies when creating their products. This was made explicit by 
Benjamin, a junior consultant: 
 
[6.19] The algorithm, I think, is like a mechanism that social networks have and Facebook 




Not all participants talked openly about “pleasing” clients so as to get “money” – Benjamin, 
Fernanda and Artur looked like particularly attuned to the political economy of the platform. However, 
no participant seemed to ignore the fact that Facebook was a for-profit company; for many of them, 
this appeared to go without saying. This understanding was able to co-exist, at least for some 
interviewees, with the assumption that Facebook may also be guided explicitly by political goals in the 
definition of what appears or not in the news feed – as Section 6.4.2 will propose. 
 
Underlying these descriptions and explanations, I suggest, is the understanding of the sight 
vector of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime as a form of automated placement. If, in the first 
imaginary, this vector refers to the definition of the possibility of seeing, in this second one, it is 
understood as defining the facticity of seeing, of what will indeed appear in one’s news feed by the 
platform itself. Automated placement does not necessarily contradict end users’ will. Interviewees 
appear to think that Facebook tries to interpret their datafied actions to offer them what it is they 
want. The nature of this assumed interpretation is made clearer in the next section. 
 
6.3.3. The Entanglement of Visibility Vectors as Wish Prediction 
If both the reading and sight vectors are conceived of differently by users compared to the 
first social imaginary, it is no surprise that how they are intertwined is also quite distinctly imagined, 
as described below. This distinction can be intuited from the accounts analysed in the previous 
section, but is illustrated even more clearly by what Bernardo, the public employee, told me: 
 
[6.20] I believe Facebook has an…um, how do you say it? An intelligence area that verifies 
what you like or don’t like. I believe these reactions, ‘like’, ‘love’, ‘wow’, are totally 
related [to this verification]. I believe Facebook sees what people… Facebook is the 
largest base of personal data in the planet, so I believe they have the means to verify 
what people want and do not want to see. 
 
Bernardo does not use the term “algorithm”, but does think of Facebook as having an 
“intelligence area”, an expression that is illustrative of this second imaginary. This “area”, he believes, 
examines some “means” (“data” about “reactions”, like “love” and “wow”) to “verify” what end users 
“want” to see. Thus, the relationship between the readability (eavesdropping) and the sight 
(automated placement) vectors seems to be the consequence of a kind of knowledge that Facebook 
produces from end users’ behavioural data. While the compliance I described in Section 6.2.3 
presumes end users’ capacity to command the platform to construct certain visual boundaries, here, 
the platform is described as having interpretive latitude. This knowledge might be described as 
objective – something that might be “verified” simply, as Bernardo says. However, its objectivity is not 
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self-evident: it demands some form of “intelligence” to be revealed. At the same time, Facebook does 
not seem to be imagined as imposing what people will see. It seems that this intertwining is not 
conceived as arbitrary, but as lending to this imagined algorithmic visibility regime some legitimacy 
from the interviewees’ standpoint. By “legitimacy”, I do not mean an ethical judgment, but rather a 
sense that Facebook has the technically-grounded capacity to know “what people want” to see (as 
Bernardo described it). This process of discovery could be understood as erroneous – Section 5.2.2 
presented some examples of algorithmic decisions which were understood by interviewees as 
mistakes. Nonetheless, it is understood as the consequence of an “intelligent”, scientific procedure. 
 
This second social imaginary seems to share with the first the understanding that the 
dimensions of seeing and reading are intertwined. However, if, in the controllable visibility imaginary, 
this entanglement is taken to be a function of users’ intentions, in this second imaginary it seems to 
be assumed to be a function of users’ predicted wishes. That is, the eavesdropping on various kinds of 
actions by the platform is conceived as allowing Facebook to predict (correctly or not) what users 
would wish to see in their news feeds were they able to decide for themselves. If, in the controllable 
visibility imaginary, “compliance” appeared to be understood as influenced not only by the design of 
interface buttons but also by the interviewees’ own subjective understandings, in this second 
imaginary, the intertwining of how actions are read so as to construct the news feeds seems to be 
imagined as affected by an external social reality of computationally mineable interactions. 
 
6.3.4. Predictive Visibility Imaginary: A Data-centred Normative Order 
To sum up, this social imaginary’s key assumption can be characterized as the idea that 
Facebook is designed incessantly to eavesdrop (quantitively and qualitatively) on a plethora of users’ 
actions, with the aim of predicting end users’ wishes about what they want to see. This prediction, 
then, is acted upon to place, in an automated manner, certain contents in a certain order in the news 
feed. 
 
The second imaginary seems to hinge on what might be called a data-centred normative order. 
The regime, I propose, is not assumed as driven by any particular axiological understanding or 
presumption about what end users ought or not to see. What is best for people to see, it seems, is 
what people’s previous datafied actions suggest that they would like to see again. That this social 
imaginary seems to be understood as devoid of explicit normative judgment by the platform does not 
mean that it is devoid of normative significance. It does imply an assumption about end users’ abilities 
to decide how they are made visible, I suggest. In this imaginary, end users do not seem to be 
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understood as having certain and definite control over the reading and sight vectors or how they 
become entangled. Sections 7.3 and 8.3 discuss how this assumption often leads participants to 
transform how they act to attempt to influence the visibility regime, a highly consequential decision 
for the exercise of civic voice on Facebook. 
 
The next set of sections examines the third – and last – set of implicit assumptions about how 
visibility is governed on Facebook which emerged from the analysis of my interviews. 
 
6.4.1. ‘You Have no Control’: The Readability Vector as Exploitation 
In the two social imaginaries discussed above, the readability vector appears to be understood 
as somehow limited, either to interface buttons (controllable visibility imaginary) or by Facebook and 
its various connections with other platforms and software (predictive visibility imaginary). This section 
analyses interview excerpts that suggest that this vector may be assumed, also, as seemingly 
boundless. 
 
Laura, a freelance journalist, said: 
 
[6.21] Companies have an intelligence system that has access to everything that is shared 
about them [on Facebook]. You have no control. And [there’s always] someone who 
knows someone, who knows someone. The world is very small. Like the trainee who 
shared [on Facebook] what he was doing [in the company] – something, like, really 
internal [to the company] – and he was fired. 
 
Laura’s quote illustrates imaginations about being read on Facebook which differ from those 
examined above. She believes that the end users are susceptible to external organizations 
(“companies”) able to visibilize various users’ actions (“everything”) using their own “intelligence 
system[s]”. Given the context of our conversation, Laura was probably referring to “social media 
measurement”, a practice that monitors mentions to brands which has become a basic service offered 
by public relations companies for about ten years.54 In Laura’s comment, the meaning of “intelligence” 
has less to do with algorithmic prediction (cf. Bernardo’s – Excerpt 6.20) than with dataveillance. Her 
description does not single out any particular “company”. It seems that, for her, any end user is 
potentially dataveillable to any “company” that can afford to pay for the service or with the technical 
skills to execute similar operations. As she put it: “you have no control”. While dataveillance processes 
are an integral part of the controllable and predictive imaginaries discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, 
the assumption that the platform’s data are somehow accessible to third-parties suggests an 
 
54 See, e.g. Bekkers, Edwards, & de Kool (2013). 
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increased degree of exposure, which, I suggest, is typical of this third social imaginary of the Facebook 
visibility regime. 
 
Imaginations about third-parties were not limited to private companies concerned about their 
particular brands. Other participants cited other actors which, they appeared to think, extract data 
from Facebook in order to monitor end users. Some examples: Alex, an IT professional, told me that 
progressive political parties use what he described as “big data” to “probe the environment”; Maria, 
the events organizer, told me that Google “without a doubt” uses Facebook data; the IT professional 
Jair said that the group of alleged “hackers” Anonymous “certainly is monitoring”. More generally, 
interviewees referred to agents of the Brazilian state. This category of actor was often described in 
somewhat vague terms (“the government”), but when probed, some participants identified particular 
agents, such as marketers under contract to governments (e.g. Joaquim, the script writer) and, in 
particular, the police. According to Vicente, the theatre teacher, for instance, the police had sent him 
a suspicious email after his participation on a protest organized through Facebook.55 
 
Other participants appear to believe that multiple state actors observe their actions, through 
different reading practices. Take what I was told by Davi, the English teacher: 
 
[6.22] Oh, that is for sure, the [political] parties of the left, the ABIN [the Brazilian federal 
intelligence agency] are monitoring this [Facebook], our chats, they see everything. 
But we [conservative people] do not offer any danger, we are not talking about 
planting bombs or anything, we are not violent. But we are monitored, all the time. 
There are undercover agents in our [Facebook] groups. And it is possible to monitor 
someone stealthily. Suppose I worked at an intelligence agency or for dominant 
groups, what do I’d do? I’d find out if I have a relative that is in one of our groups and 
this relative tells me everything, I don’t even need to be added to this group. Some 
people get into the groups with a different identity. It’s easy. 
 
Davi’s narrative is not about dataveillance. In his description, more important than 
computational methods are the “undercover agents”, who seem to be like human spies operating in 
Facebook groups and chats. These agents, Davi appears to believe, plant and cultivate human sources 
of information (e.g. a “relative”) that can tell them “everything” that is discussed in those seemingly 
private spaces. While this supposed strategy is reminiscent of pre-digital surveillance, the digital 
environment seems essential in the excerpt, since it facilitates adoption of fake identities (“it’s easy”). 
Similar understandings were narrated by other participants. In this view, Facebook’s design, 
ultimately, is unable to allow users to differentiate real from fake profiles. This creates a loophole, 
 
55 I discuss further how the police or police officers were described by some interviewees as able to visibilize 
their actions on Facebook in Sections 8.2.3 and 8.3.5. 
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which can be utilized by actors with contestable purposes – including one of my interviewees as I show 
in Section 7.2.3. 
 
Imaginaries about this form of manual digital surveillance were common to most of the 
interviews. When specified by interviewees, they often involved not “undercover agents”, as in Davi’s 
description, but more mundane usages of digital technologies. In particular, the taking of screenshots 
(prints, in Brazilian Internet slang) to register and circulate the instantiation of an interface. When 
explaining who can visibilize what she writes about politics on Facebook, the nurse Patricia told me: 
 
[6.23] Let’s say, if I discuss a topic with someone, someone else might take a screenshot of 
that story, this can happen. 
 
Another example is Lorena, the dancer. She said that she “know[s]” that police officers use 
“prints” to monitor and single-out certain protesters. 
 
[6.24] There are WhatsApp groups, in which they [police officers] exchange [‘prints’]. If the 
police officer finds the Facebook [profile] of a girl who did something in a 
demonstration against him [the police officer], he will ‘print’ [the Facebook profile] 
and he will fetch her. 
 
The ability to take screenshots might be understood as inherently digital. However, they do 
not involve computational analysis of any data and do not require sophisticated skills – anyone can do 
it or can learn quickly how to do it. 
 
Although only a few interviewees seem to believe that they are both dataveilled by third-
parties and manually read through end users’ practices such as screen-shooting (printing), all 
participants described at least one of these two forms of reading. I suggest that these described 
understandings share a similar implicit assumption: that Facebook is designed in such a way that it 
can be exploited by a multitude of non-Facebook actors willing to advance their own, often malicious 
agendas. I next examine a third imagination of the sight vector. 
 
6.4.2. ‘Facebook is Communist’: The Sight Vector as Political Censorship 
Consider what Luis, the politically conservative pensioner who had become heavily involved 
in online political discussions about the crisis, told me: 
 
[6.25] Their algorithms, they [Facebook] have the secrets of what to put into them. In 
determinate moments, immediately before the impeachment [of Brazil’s former 
president, Dilma Rousseff in 2016], for instance, amid that high tension, it was clear 
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that you could not criticize PT [Workers’ Party] and Lula [da Silva, Brazil’s former 
President and Dilma’s ally]. Some posts disappeared; fan pages were blocked. So, 
there is this possibility, João, that Mr. Zuckerberg is aligned with globalist policies, the 
same of policies of people like [George] Soros. [Facebook might even change the 
algorithm] at the request of the Brazilian government. They have the contacts of the 
government, don’t they? It got clear at that moment, in which there was this huge 
tension, [that Facebook helped the PT]. They change the algorithm, but how exactly 
this relationship happens, this perverse relationship between globalists and the 
government, this is hard [to know]… So, this algorithm is like the Coke’s formula, they 
change it all the time. If you post something from YouTube on Facebook, it is not 
always that [other people will see]. There is this algorithm that says: ‘Hey, you’re 
posting too much from YouTube and taking [away users] from here [Facebook]’. […] 
And keywords. If you say ‘PT’, or, ‘Out With PT’, ‘Dilma’, it [the algorithm] will make it 
harder for you. The algorithm seeks them [these words]. It monitors you. [But] until a 
certain moment, when things are normal, it shows you what you like. 
 
Luis’s characterization of how “the algorithm” constructs the news feed is markedly different 
from what was suggested in the first two sections of this chapter. Instead of a compliant mechanism 
which obeys end users’ pre-defined wishes (controllable visibility imaginary), or an intelligent system 
able to predict people’s unspoken wishes about what they want to see (predictive visibility imaginary), 
“the algorithm” was presented by Luis as a mysterious tool (“the Coke’s formula”), which is changed 
“all the time” to arbitrarily delete posts, block pages and fetch keywords (“Dilma”), with the goal of 
hampering the range of right-wing messages (it “will make it harder for you”). The reason for this is 
less commercial than ideological. In Luis’s words, Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of the platform, 
might be aligned to “globalists” as (in his view) the billionaire and philanthropist George Soros and the 
Brazilian government. It seems that, for Luis, end users are prevented from seeing some posts. Not 
because these posts were being blocked from view by other users (as in the first imaginary), and less 
because they did not attract a sufficient number of interactions (as in the second imaginary), but 
because they contradicted the political plans of a set of “globalist” actors. At the same time, Luis 
believes that this sort of strategy is employed only at politically fraught moments – for example, 
“immediately before the impeachment”. Otherwise, “when things are normal, it shows you what you 
like”. 
 
Although most of Luis’s quote relates to the news feed algorithms, there is a hint that similar 
actions are applied to the platform’s content moderation system (“fanpages were blocked”). This was 
commented on by other participants. Fabricio, the telemarketer, said: 
 
[6.26] When you publish something criticizing gays, you’re blocked, 30 days minimum on 
Facebook. But if they [‘lefties’] publish the image of a homosexual violating a crucifix, 
it stays there, you see? As if it were a normal thing. 
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[JCM] How do you think this blocking system works? 
 
They [Facebook] got a meeting with Jean Willys [a progressive and gay Brazilian 
politician], and Jean Willys posted on Facebook. ‘I met today with the administrators 
of Facebook’. Eduardo Bolsonaro [one of the sons of Jair Bolsonaro] tried to contact 
them [Facebook], but never heard back. Jean Willys has a verified page. [Once,] they 
managed to take down Jean Willys's page, but he was able to recover it within one 
hour. Then he posted: ‘Do not worry, fascists may try to overthrow me, but we've all 
set up’, something like that. And you realize that Facebook has this characteristic of 
the left, politically correct, communist, that curtails the freedom of the people who 
are conservative. 
 
Consider also what Maria, the politically conservative event organizer I mentioned earlier in 
the chapter, said: 
 
[6.27] Facebook has its own rules, and we complain about it. If it’s up to the Foicebook [to 
define how visibility is managed], then it is tough. If a leftie curses at us, smear us, the 
motherfucker remains there [in Facebook], alive and kicking. Now, if I curse back, if I 
say ‘faggot’, then I’m taken down. This is what everybody complains about these 
punishments. We say that this is censorship by Facebook. 
 
Maria’s and Fabricio’s descriptions reinforce and add other elements to Luis’s comments. The 
described plot to undermine the messages of conservative end users on the platform appears to 
involve not only ideological tweaking of the algorithm but also real-life secret contacts between 
Facebook executives and certain progressive Brazilian politicians (e.g. Jean Willys), which, thus, 
benefit from stronger protection (“verified page”, quick page recovery). Underlying Maria’s and 
Fabricio’s descriptions is a sense of unfairness. As Maria said, a “leftie” had a free pass to spread hate 
speech and “smear” conservatives, but conservatives are punished for the slightest transgression of 
Facebook “rules” – that is, the so-called “Community Standards” which guide the platform’s content 
moderation. For Maria, content moderation is less an attempt to enforce these rules, than a 
straightforward kind of political “censorship”. This presumed censorship seems to be understood as 
so widespread that Maria and her conservative friends (“we”) have created the nickname, 
“Foicebook”, to describe the platform’s political bias. The word “foice”, Portuguese for “sickle”, is an 
allusion to the Bolshevik Hammer and Sickle symbol. This sort of description was particularly common 
amongst conservative interviewees. It seems that, during my fieldwork, I captured the exposition of 




56 A version of the same idea was articulated later by American President Donald Trump (Stewart, 2018a). 
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However, progressive participants expressed similar concerns. Telma, the musician, suggested 
that “the American government” may have a say in how Facebook “censors” certain information via 
the same system of content moderation – which she referred to as “censorship”. I then asked: 
 
[6.28] [JCM] Do you think Facebook has a political stance on this ‘censorship’? 
 
Facebook itself I’m not sure. It must have some connection with the American 
government. Somehow the CIA, the FBI, they have access to everything. 
 
Octavio, the cultural producer, indicated that content moderation might be informed by a 
“conspiracy” to undermine shirtless transgender men. 
 
[6.29] It censors the photos, it blocks people. Or those who did mastectomy. I hate these 
conspiracy theories. I think it's counterproductive. But on the other hand, we cannot 
be totally innocent. They are companies, they have interests. Everything fits, that's it. 
We start to realize that there is a control. 
 
Why would the CIA and the FBI be interested in “censoring” Facebook content produced by 
Brazilian end users? What “conspiracy theory” (see also Section 5.3.1) explains Facebook’s “censoring” 
of pictures of transgender men – including those who have undergone mastectomy? This was unclear, 
although throughout the interviews I probed these ideas. Octavio referred to other, shadowy 
“interests” at play in the definition of what appears on Facebook’s news feed. The fact that neither of 
these individuals could explain completely what they meant is, I propose, less a product of the 
individual inability to explain their thoughts and more a defining aspect of this apparently common 
imagination. Many participants were suspicious, but no-one seemed certain about what they were 
suspicious of. It seems that it is not that the platform represents a specific ideology, as the descriptions 
of right-wing participants above would contend, but rather that Facebook is assumed to be somehow 
associated to other powerful entities. As Telma put it, there “must” be a connection between the 
platform and archetypical conspiratorial organizations such as the CIA. Her choice of the CIA is not 
completely odd. As in other Latin American countries that endured Cold War military dictatorships, 
Brazilian progressives are educated to believe that the 1964 military coup d’état was orchestrated by 
the CIA.57 Octavio’s ambivalence about what he terms “conspiracies theories” suggests a similar 
apprehension; he does not want to believe in them, but is not certain that not believing is an option. 
 
The implicit assumption that might be said to underpin the quotes examined in this section is 
that Facebook operates a form political censorship when constructing end users’ news feed – at least 
 
57 See Arão Reis (2014). 
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in regard to certain content and at certain moments. Some interviewees associated this presumed 
willingness to censor content to conspiracies with other powerful actors. In some cases, these 
conspiracies seemed quite specific (e.g. with a particular politician); in others, they seem to be based 
on a revealing vagueness and older conspiratorial imaginaries. Importantly, while all participants 
appeared to assume that Facebook is a space that might be exploited by third-parties (readability 
vector, see previous section), not everyone described ideas, actions or events that suggested political 
censorship (sight vector, this section). However, since this third imaginary does not seem to be defined 
by the entanglement of these two vectors (next section), one needs not hold assumptions about both 
of vectors to be understood as holding this imaginary. 
 
6.4.3. A Missing Entanglement 
 In Section 3.6.2, I defined Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime as characterized by the 
intertwining of two vectors (readability and sight). In the imaginaries explored in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 
in this chapter, this intertwining seems to be considered either as a form of compliance (controllable 
visibility imaginary) or what I call wish prediction (predictive visibility imaginary). The accounts 
examined in this third part indicate that this link was not necessarily imagined by interviewees. Being 
read by third-parties and other end users does not appear to directly influence the configuration of 
interviewees’ news feeds. Likewise, the idea that Facebook allegedly censors certain content based 
on its political preferences, is informed (but not determined) by how end users are read. That is, a 
post must be datafied before Facebook can decide whether or not to “censor” it, according to the 
interviewees. However, this decision seems to be the consequence of political ideologies and 
conspiracies, not of end users’ wishes or the data themselves (as in controllable and predictive 
imaginaries, respectively). Therefore, there appears to be an unspoken assumption of a lack of 
entanglement between readability and sight. 
 
This separation has important consequences for this third social imaginary of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime. The regime seems to be conceived as comprising episodic exploitations 
and idiosyncratic acts of censorships. In this sense, what defines this other imaginary is not only the 
seeming impossibility for end users to influence how visibility is governed but also the assumption 
about the apparent non-existence of a single power centre in the regime. Not even Facebook seems 
to occupy this position. Its visibility regime emerges, from the descriptions analysed in the two 
previous sections, as porous to other logics not defined by the platform: the goals of third-parties 
when extracting data from the platform, people’s willingness to take screenshots of posts or to 
pretend to be somebody else on Facebook, political ideologies and conspiracies. In this view, Facebook 
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might be running the space, but is not fully in command of it. Therefore, it could be said that there is 
an imagined visibility regime – assumed patterns of readability (exploitation) and sight (political 
censorship). However, this imagined regime hardly fits my theorization of algorithmic visibility regime 
(Section 3.6.2). Let me now propose a definition for this third imaginary. 
 
6.4.6. Uncontrollable Visibility Imaginary: A User-Excluding Normative Order 
Drawing on the examples explored in this third part, it could be suggested that, while the two 
vectors do not appear to be imagined by the interviewees as entangled, they share a common 
imagined trait: the lack of the possibility of control over them by the interviewees. In this 
uncontrollable visibility imaginary, as I call it, end users do not appear able to conceive ways to 
influence how they are read or seen/see on Facebook. 
 
As such, this social imaginary implies a sense of normative order from which end users, as 
agents, essentially are excluded. More than being only unable to determine how Facebook eavesdrops 
on their actions, as seen in the predictive visibility imaginary, end users appear to picture themselves, 
also, as ultimately unable to know who may read them on the platform. As control over their visibility 
is unimaginable from within the platform, various interviewees realized that leaving Facebook, that 
is, not engaging at all with its visibility regime, was the only way to have some kind of say about how 
the platform visibilizes them – this will become clearer in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter presents the empirical findings with regard to which social imaginaries of 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime the interviewees appeared to hold. My findings indicate that 
the regime is imagined from three distinct perspectives, whose cardinal features seem to be shared 
by all participants. I call them controllable, predictive and uncontrollable visibility imaginaries. 
Following the conceptual framework, these labels refer to how individuals understand the platform’s 
capacity to control how they are read and seen/see. I suggest that the first imaginary is marked by a 
user-centred sense of normative order (Section 6.2.4). Users are assumed to be able to decide 
whether and when they are read by the platform (Section 6.2.1) and to use this reading to make visual 
boundaries, and choose who is outside and within their visual field (Section 6.2.2). In the second 
imagined regime, this kind of automatic compliance with end users’ wishes (Section 6.2.3) is replaced 
by what I term a data-centred sense of normative order (Section 6.3.4). Facebook is assumed to be 
incessantly eavesdropping users’ actions (Section 6.3.1) to predict what they want to see (Section 
6.3.3) and to construct their news feeds accordingly (Section 6.3.2). Finally, in the last imaginary, no 
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possibility of control seems conceivable for end users (Section 6.4.3), either with regard to how they 
are read by a multitude of actors (not only the platform – Section 6.4.1) or to how Facebook engages 
in presumed political censorship (Section 6.4.2). The normative order of this uncontrollable visibility 
imaginary seems, thus, to be defined by the exclusion from it of end users (Section 6.4.4). 
 
This chapter underlines the differences between these social imaginaries, which are not 
mutually exclusive. They seem to be associated with particular forms of visibility operations and, thus, 
with different forms of visibility control. Mostly, they coexist. In Chapters 7 and 8, I illustrate this in 
greater depth. The controllable visibility imaginary establishes only some basic regime boundaries, 
which partially constrain the predictive visibility imaginary and both coexist with the full-blown 
uncertainty of the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. This is because this latter is operated either by 
non-Facebook actors (in the case of its readability vector) or tends only to affect the functioning of 
the regime in specific moments (in the case of its sight vector). Indeed, the three imaginaries seem to 
share some basic assumptions: that Facebook’s news feed is a malleable space; that an invisible 
computational infrastructure (often called “the algorithm”) informs such malleability (even when not 
determining it); and that such reading is (at the least partially) designed to advance Facebook’s own 
goals. Conceptually, the most important shared aspect of these three imaginaries is their 
sociomateriality.  
 
Before describing in in Section 9.3 what I mean by this, I analyse the relative role played by 
the three social imaginaries examined in this Chapter in interviewees’ attempt to control the visibility 
of their civic voice expressions on Facebook. Chapter 7 begins this work by considering attempts to 














Visibility Expansion Projects 
  
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 analysed the three non-mutually exclusive social imaginaries of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime that interviewees seemed to share. I called them controllable, predictive 
and uncontrollable visibility imaginaries. 
 
The present chapter begins the empirical analysis of how these social imaginaries shape 
participants’ civic voice expressions on Facebook – an investigation that continues in Chapter 8. In so 
doing, this chapter starts to consider the civic ramifications of Facebook’s datafication power more 
closely. Section 3.6.3 proposed that these civic implications could be studied through what I defined 
as visibility control projects. Based on Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) notion of agency and on the 
concept of civic voice, I theorized visibility control projects as attempts by end users to achieve two 
goals: define how their civic voice expressions are visibilized (seen/read), and ensure that these civic 
voice expressions are heard (recognized/not misrecognized) on Facebook. Also in Section 3.6.3, I 
formulated two basic kinds of visibility control projects – visibility reduction projects (which are 
examined in Chapter 8) and visibility expansion projects (which are examined in this chapter). Thus, I 
address here SRQ 3.1: Do ordinary end users’ attempt to expand the visibility of their civic voice 
expressions on Facebook? If so, is this attempt associated with how they articulate these 
expressions? 
 
In line with the strategies explained in Section 4.4.5, the empirical findings examined in this 
chapter arose from patterns found in interviewees’ answers to my questions on whether and how 
they acted to enhance their visibility when expressing themselves politically on Facebook. I 
interpreted interviewees’ descriptions to allow consideration of the relative role of the three social 
imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime vis-à-vis interviewees’ civic self-
understandings. This allowed me to explore the continuations and tensions between the two goals of 
visibility control projects – being visibilized and being heard. 
 
Most interviewees reported having used visibility expansion projects, but in two markedly 
different ways. In the first part of the chapter, I examine projects that did not entail changing 
interviewees’ civic voice expressions. In the second part, I go on to analyse key examples of the 
multiple visibility expansion projects that did entail some form of transformation of these expressions. 
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Then, in the third and last part of the chapter, I consider accounts on why interviewees decided not 
to implement this sort of project. This and the next chapter (8) do not engage with the theoretical 
details of the notion of “project”, as defined by Emirbayer and Mische (1998). This is done in Section 
9.4, where I also consider to what extent the descriptions analysed in this and in the next chapter may 
be said to regard assumptions about the sight or the readability vector of Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility regime. 
 
7.2. Visibility Expansion Through the Control of Non-Civic Voice Elements 
This first part of the chapter considers descriptions about visibility expansion projects that do 
not depend on altering civic voice expressions. My examination of interviewees’ descriptions indicates 
five forms of projects, which I call piggybacking, network expansion, voice multiplication, tactical self-
interactions and temporal control. 
 
7.2.1. ‘When I Want Views, I Publish in the Page’: Visibility Expansion Through Piggybacking 
Consider what I was told by Olivia, the editor: 
[7.1] Only when there’s something important. Like the zika case [she is referring to the 
epidemic of zika virus in Brazil between 2016 and 2017]. It was in the media, but no-
one was talking about it, because it was happening mostly in the Northeast [region of 
Brazil], [affecting] poor women. You feel kind of responsible. Then, I said, ‘no, people 
have to know about this’. This is when I want something to get widely visualised. Then 
I publish in that page. The reach and the number of shares, it’s enormous, I didn’t 
understand this power, this force they [the page] have. And I started to like it, ‘wow, 
I can write, people will listen to me’. [But] I rarely do it. Because, I’ve never been 
concerned with attracting ‘likes’. I speak about the things I find interesting for other 
people to know. [But] this page has many followers, and then the haters come, people 
who attack you, send you aggressive messages. Mostly young folks, usually sexist 
boys, and it’s like a persecution. Especially when it’s a controversial theme, like 
abortion. They curse at me – ‘whore’, ‘you mom should have aborted you’, ‘scum’. 
And they ‘print’ my stuff and put it on conservative Facebook pages. It’s very tiring. I 
don’t really respond, but it’s no fun, logically. 
 
If something is happening that people “have to know” about, Olivia will publish her post not 
on her own profile (which has “only” some thousands of “friends”), but on a Facebook page that has 
millions of followers, she said. In another part of our conversation, Olivia told me she is able to do this 
because its administrator invited her to write about woman’s health and feminism. This could increase 
her visibility without needing her to expand her own network. In other words, she piggybacked on the 
page’s “enormous” audience. Underlying this action is what I described in Chapter 6 as the 
controllable visibility imaginary, in which users assume that they can directly define how they see and 
are seen by others by using an interface functionality – here, not a button, but the very space of a 
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“page”. By publishing on this page, Olivia expects to expand dramatically who is “in” the boundaries 
of her voice, creating the possibility of being seen and heard by millions of people (“And I started to 
like it, ‘wow, I can write, people will listen to me’”). According to her description, she did not always 
try to increase her reach: it was only if she needed a post to achieve “a lot of views”. From her example 
of the zika virus, which hit poorer parts of the Brazilian population disproportionately, it seems that 
the impetus to expand her visibility derives from her own political stance towards such social 
inequality (“You feel kind of responsible”). Thus, this project seems, at least initially, conducive to her 
civic self-understanding: by increasing her visibility, she feels she can be recognized as the citizen she 
wants to be. 
 
However, the second part of her narrative nuances the first. Some “boys” or “haters”, people 
to whom she would not normally be exposed in her “bubble” (a term she used at various moments of 
our conversation), harass her: “it’s like a persecution”. In addition to being abusive towards her, these 
“haters” will take screenshots (prints) of her “stuff” (most likely pictures and texts) and post them in 
conservative spaces on Facebook – probably to mock and insult her. This is why, Olivia suggests, that 
she “only rarely” will use the page that attracts millions of followers. This inaction is linked to Olivia’s 
apparent assumption that, in trying to be seen, she may lose control over who can see her on 
Facebook, which is the central tenet of the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. An echo of this 
ambiguity can be identified in her response to my question about whether she thinks her civic voice 
is heard on the platform: 
 
[7.2] It's hard ... Sometimes, yes. But I question – isn’t this just a massive annoyance? I see 
that some people read the post [on the page] to either agree or disagree, they come 
with a skewed understanding. Did what I said make any difference to them? Or those 
who agree with me already know all this, and those who disagree don’t care? I’ve had 
some positive feedbacks, though. 
 
The ambivalence engendered by her augmented reach seemed to have led her not only to 
question whether she should expand the exposure of her voice, but also to consider whether her civic 
voice was heard: was she respected as a citizen? Or was expressing herself politically “just a massive 
annoyance”? “Haters” seem beyond the possibility of dialogue; those who apparently listen to her did 
not appear to need her opinion. A definitive answer to my question is “hard”, she said. The best 
approximation is ambiguity – “sometimes”. This sort of ambivalence in regard to one’s own civic worth 




7.2.2. ‘I Will Accept Everyone’: Visibility Expansion Through Network Expansion 
Artur told me about how his political usage of Facebook had changed over time: 
 
[7.3] In the beginning, my Facebook was, like, for those people I already knew. [But] when 
Facebook became a political business [for him, around 2014], I said, you know what? 
I will accept everyone. I think I deleted the personal pictures, maybe the picture 
albums as well. Then, I accepted everyone. I said, ‘damn it, I’m not going to expose 
my personal life anyway, damn it if I don’t know the person’. Then, with the political 
worsening [due to the crisis] I got pissed off because they [strangers] would come and 
bug me and then I stopped accepting everyone. 
 
As the Brazilian political crisis progressed, Artur’s Facebook profile, which once was mainly 
about personal and family topics, essentially became a “political business” – that is, a springboard for 
the expression of his civic voice. At this moment, Artur, who used to be selective about friendship 
requests, came up with a project based on a more banal functionality than posting in a page with 
millions of followers, as Olivia reported doing (see previous section). He simply started accepting 
strangers as “friends” even if they disagreed with him. He assumed that the broader his network, the 
more likely his voice would be heard. This project hinges on assumptions about the platform’s 
algorithmic visibility regime that are typical of the controllable visibility imaginary. 
 
However, similar to Olivia, this project triggered experiences and reflections that modulated 
his expectations of being recognized. Apparently afraid of having non-political elements of his profile 
maliciously exploited by strangers he accepted as “friends”, Artur deleted some albums of family 
pictures so as not to expose his “personal life”. However, these actions did not stop these strangers 
from bugging him and making him “pissed off”, which led to Artur abandoning the project. Such 
change relates, of course, to a different imaginary of the platform’s visibility regime – that of 
uncontrollable visibility. While the emotional charge in his narrative is less intense than in Olivia’s, 
Artur appears to have experienced a similar contradiction: his attempt to expand his reach 
engendered some lack of control over his voice. In view of the risks, he intentionally withdrew from 
the project (“I stopped accepting everyone”). This decision was part of a larger process of rethinking 
what it meant to be heard on Facebook, he told me: 
 
[7.4] After the impeachment [of former president Dilma Rousseff in 2016], [he realized 
that,] more than convincing people who don’t agree with me, expressing yourself on 
Facebook is important to reinforce your own convictions and the people who already 
agree with you. Because in these moments of fragmentation, you feel you are losing 
comrades. I think people who don’t agree with me may not have heard [my voice], 
but people who agree, they said ‘oh, how good that Artur thinks like me, I'm not 
alone’. And then I decided to be part of this group of people who is not Petista 
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[supporters of the Workers’ Party] but which sees positive things in the Workers’ 
Party governments. 
  
It seems that, for Artur, engaging with strangers ceased to make sense. To be heard on 
Facebook came to mean not convincing those strangers who “do not agree with” him, but supporting 
and being supported by his leftist “comrades”. It is difficult to dissociate this shift in his civic self-
understanding from the negative experience of enacting his project. At the same time, this turn was 
likely also influenced by his diagnosis that leftists, like him, were in a moment of “fragmentation” after 
the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff – and, thus, in need of cohesion. It seems that, largely due to this 
recognition from peers on Facebook, he was able to rediscover himself as a moderate Petista, one of 
a “group of people” who are critical of, but not against, the Worker’s Party. 
 
The examples of Olivia and Artur suggest that trying to be seen by more people can lead to 
loss of control over aspects of civic voice. This association between controllability and uncontrollability 
was fairly common in the descriptions I collected during my fieldwork. However, as the next section 
indicates, this sort of project might include robbing others of control over their voices. 
 
7.2.3. ‘I Create Fake Profiles’: Visibility Expansion Through Voice Multiplication 
Fabricio is a Black man who lives in one of São Paulo’s poorest shanty towns. Aged 23 years, 
he supports himself by taking phone calls in a telemarketing centre. However, this job is peripheral 
to his life: he told me that most of his time and thoughts are dedicated to engagement in 
conservative politics on Facebook. He intends to achieve sufficient influence to “break Brazil’s 
establishment”, he said. Fabricio seemed to believe that the kind of influence needed for this 
destruction relied on increasing the number of end users who were exposed to his civic voice 
expressions. To achieve this, he told me that he had concocted an array of visibility expansion 
projects. One was aimed at increasing his capacity to send invitations to Facebook “events” that he 
creates, aimed at generating actual street protests against “the left”: 
 
[7.5] As Facebook limits the amount of invites you can send out, I create fake profiles. For 
each profile I had 300 friendship requests.58 I would not stop until seeing at least 
20,000 invites sent. 
 
I was surprised by his naturalness when discussing these “fake profiles” and asked him to 
explain how he constructed them: 
 
58 At the time of writing this limit was 500 invitations per profile (Facebook, 2019). 
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[7.6] Like, I invent this ‘Jair Souza’ [the alias of the fake profile]. To avoid having the real 
‘Jair Souza’ knowing about it, because it is obvious that this [real] person eventually 
will find his picture, you can go and search for someone who lives abroad. Someone 
who lives in Belgium, Switzerland, and I get the picture of whoever I found, someone 
who is not well known. Each profile demands a different email address, so I created 
an email to each one of them. It takes like one hour to make 5 profiles. [Then] I go to 
the pages of [Brazil’s far-right guru] Olavo de Carvalho, and then it depends on which 
kind of public you want. If I want to crowd out the event, I go to Olavo de Carvalho’s 
page and see a post that has the largest number of ‘likes,’, and I click in the reactions, 
and mostly in those little hearts, of ‘love,’ and I add [as a ‘friend’] everyone that clicked 
on ‘love’ in that post, and I start doing it in other publications. Until I reach the 
maximum of 300 friendship requests. Then, what’s my goal? One thousand invites, 
say? Alright, I have these five profiles tailored to Olavo de Carvalho[‘s public], to talk 
about the event. Logically it’s a topic that they [other end users] are fond of, and they 
start to share [the event’s page]. But Facebook is a smart tool. It blocks, it excludes 
[the fake profiles], it knows what you’re doing. I think I’ve created a total of 40 [fake 
profiles], and like 5 of them are still working. It [Facebook] excludes, there’s no way 
[to avoid]. Unless you interact, but, man, can you image the amount of work that 
would entail? it’s impossible. You’d have to create an artificial life to 30 [fake] profiles, 
it’s insane, no way. I keep creating, I know Facebook will exclude afterwards, but I 
keep creating them. 
 
In this example, Fabricio’s civic voice is exerted not through a text or a picture, but by creating 
a Facebook event. His project did not include changing the events – their themes, place, tone – but 
multiplying the profiles able to “voice” them. To circumvent the Facebook invites limit, he constructs 
what he calls “fake profiles”, which involves using an array of functionalities, enabled or not by 
Facebook. First, he creates an “event” in the platform. He then searches the profiles of real end users 
(preferably from “abroad”), copying their pictures and providing Facebook with an email address that 
he has no intention of using, and uses these to create the fake profile. He concludes by “adding” 
strangers from conservative pages who seem to be as conservative as he is (a form of manual 
microtargeting) as “friends” and, finally, sends them the invites. While Facebook cannot stop him from 
creating fake profiles and sending out invites, Fabricio describes it as a “very smart tool” that will 
“delete” his forgeries over time. This seems to create a cat-and-mouse game: in response to the 
deletion of his fake profiles, Fabricio keeps “creating [new profiles]”. His description differs from 
Olivia’s and Artur’s. First, this kind of visibility expansion project appears to depend on the assumption 
that Facebook is, potentially, exploitable, which is a core implicit understanding of the uncontrollable 
visibility imaginary. However, unlike Olivia and Artur (Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 above), he portrays 
himself as the exploiter, not the victim. Second, his project engendered little ambivalence about his 
civic voice. When asked if he felt heard when talking about politics on the platform, Fabricio said that: 
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[7.7] When I talk about politics I am quite heard. And people usually defend me. I do not 
even need to... They listen to me – they listen to me a lot. 
 
No other interviewee described creating false Facebook accounts – but others told me they 
may intentionally manufacture interactions, which encompasses a different sort of imaginary about 
the platform’s algorithmic visibility regime. 
 
7.2.4. ‘Come on! Let’s ‘Like’ It!’: Visibility Expansion Through Tactical Self-Interactions 
Octavio, the cultural producer, administered multiple Facebook pages where he published 
pro-LGBT texts and videos. These pages, he said, were crucial for his attempts to be seen by more 
people. 
 
[7.8] There are some strategies. The amount of ‘likes’ you give to it. With three pages, in 
addition to my profile, you ‘like’ with each one of them and that [post] starts to appear 
more [to others]. And there’s this other possibility: commenting. Posts that are more 
frequently ‘commented’ and ‘liked’ may appear more frequently. So, I go and 
comment with my own profile, then with one of my pages, then with another page, 
and another, and it will start to appear to my ‘friends’, so they can ‘like’ it as well. 
These strategies are not inevitable, infallible. They make it easier [to be seen] but have 
their limits. 
 
A similar visibility expansion project was described by the accountant Vigo, who administers 
a politically conservative Facebook page with other friends. He described their actions as crucial to 
increase the “reach” of the content produced by the page. 
 
[7.9] I always ask other administrators to engage [with the page’s content] so that the page 
does not lose relevance. I say: ‘Fuck, 1,500 people saw this and [only] 100 people 
‘liked’ it? That's absurd’. I go there and say, ‘Damn, we're losing reach, and that's 
because folks are not engaging’. I say, really, ‘come on! let's ‘like’ it, let's do it!’. 
 
Rather than changing how they talk about politics, Octavio’s and Vigo’s projects involved the 
production of datafied self-interactions. In Octavio’s case, he produced the interactions himself; Vigo’s 
project involved requests to other administrators to “like” these posts (“come on, let's ‘like’ it”). 
Underlying their projects seems to be the assumption that these comments and “likes” will be read 
by “the algorithm” (an expression both interviewees used in our conversations) as signals that posts 
on their pages are relevant and, thus, as Octavio said, will “appear more frequently” in others’ news 
feeds. This assumption is consistent with the predictive visibility imaginary, according to which 
Facebook analyses interactional data to predict what end users wish to see. This sort of project was 
not “infallible”, but could “make it easier” to be seen, Octavio said. If a post was seen by 1,500 people, 
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it appeared to Vigo to have the potential to be seen by even more people. Not fulfilling this potential, 
he said, would be “absurd”. It seems that all efforts, even single “likes”, count on Facebook. 
Furthermore, given that both Octavio and Vigo viewed themselves as minorities whose visibility 
needed to be increased in order to be heard (Octavio as a supporter of the LGBT cause, and Vigo as a 
conservative citizen), it is possible to associate their drive to be seen with their social context.” 
 
These interactions did not appear to be “fake” like Fabricio’s profiles. After all, the “likes” and 
“comments” were produced by Octavio and Vigo, and there is no evidence to suggest that they were 
merely pretending to be interested in these posts. Instead, their projects appear to be tactical 
instantiations of their civic self-understandings. 
 
7.2.5. ‘The Best Time to Post’: Visibility Expansion Through Temporal Control 
For other participants, another visibility expansion project involved managing the timing of 
their civic voice expression. Consider four examples: 
 
[7.10] The time you post is important. I believe some things are boosted by these algorithms. 
So, for instance, when something happens, and I think I have to talk about it, I’ll wait 
for these times of the day. My public, of my social network, is more [present] in the 
evening, 6pm to 5pm, that when [Facebook] is teeming. When people are leaving 
their jobs, they are in the bus or in the train, looking at their mobiles. If I post at 6pm, 
that will reverberate for some minutes, 40 or 50 minutes. And maybe if I post at 6pm, 
the person is leaving his job, so in 10 or 20 minutes he will be in the public 
transportation, idle and in the social media, so it’s more likely he will see it. [Benjamin, 
junior consultant] 
 
[7.11] Sometimes I want an audience; I want to reach the greatest number of people at that 
moment. Then you say, what is the best time to post? Then, like, at least for me, in 
my network of ‘friends’, I’ve observed that it is from 6pm onwards, until 8pm, 9.30pm, 
there is a bigger public. [Lorenzo, retail clerk] 
 
[7.12] After Thursday, after the work shift, it starts to peak. Thursday, then Friday, Saturday, 
and Sunday – end of Sunday, after supper, then it peaks. [Luis, pensioner] 
 
These projects did not seem to affect what the interviewees said about politics, but when they 
did so. They described different ideas about which moment is appropriate to post. For Benjamin, peak 
time began at 5pm or 6pm and might generate 40 to 50 minutes of increased visibility, when potential 
readers “are leaving their jobs, they are in the bus or in the train”; Lorenzo also thought peak time 
began at 6pm, but saw it lasting until 9.30pm. Meanwhile, days were more important for Luis, who 
viewed the weekend as a particularly good time. From their depictions, it is not clear why they have 
different assumptions about what is peak time on Facebook. There might be several influencing 
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factors, such as readers’ presumed ages and occupations (see the allusions to work by Luis) and 
income (Benjamin’s references to public transportation, which, in Brazil, is rarely used by high and 
upper middle classes). However, these assumed peak times stemmed from the previous interactions 
my interviewees were able to “observe”, as Lorenzo put it. That is, participants seemed to view certain 
times as more likely to generate interactions, based on which timings had generated more (or less) 
interactions on previous posts – an orientation that is consistent with the predictive visibility 
imaginary. 
 
So far, I have discussed visibility expansion projects that did not involve any change to civic 
voice expressions. However, no interviewee reported enacting only this first kind of project, as the 
second part of this chapter shows. 
 
7.3. Visibility Expansion Through the Control of Civic Voice Elements 
For all participants who described trying to expand the visibility of their civic voice, doing so 
also involved acting upon their civic voice expressions. My analysis revealed four kinds of this second 
sort of project. I call them: tactical aggressions, simplification, visual provocations and news 
association. 
 
7.3.1. “It’s a Form of Offending, Really’: Visibility Expansion Through Tactical Aggressions 
I return to Fabricio, the conservative telemarketer. In addition to creating fake profiles to 
expand his capacity to send invites to Facebook “events”, his projects involved what he termed 
“zoeira”: 
 
[7.13] [Zoeira] is when you offend leftists, but in a funny way. I create a lot of zoeira content. 
Recently I made a meme of some leftists who were protesting in a beach, together 
with the Marcha das Vadias [Brazilian version of the SlutWalk movement] people. 
And they painted something in their breasts, like circles and stuff, and had their 
trousers unbuttoned. Then, I got their image, put it in the upper side [of the meme] 
and in the lower side I put the image of [Jair] Bolsonaro surrounded by other guys 
with machine guns. This went viral. It’s a form of offending, really. Conservative pages 
on Facebook, they grow with zoeira. I select the words very carefully; they have to be 
the words that [conservative] folks will want to hear. Instead of calling a feminist a 
‘feminist’, I’ll call her Chewbacca, because she doesn’t shave her armpit. We have this 
work method. 
 
The actions Fabricio narrated do not require the exploitation of any functionality of the 
platform, but rather the expression of his political views as zoeira, his “work method”. This term could 
be understood in English as a derogatory joke. However, as Fabricio’s excerpt indicates, in Brazilian 
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Internet slang, it is commonly used to designate ironic hate speech – which I define as a form of 
discourse which conveys hatred towards certain social groups and, in particular, minorities. He offered 
several examples of this kind of voice expression. The one described in the above excerpt is a meme 
in which conservative politicians seem to be about to or willing to machine-gun naked feminists. The 
other is a text comparing feminists to the Star Wars “Chewbacca”, the bipedal hairy ape and dog mix, 
whose language is a form of howling. In his reported voice expression, there was no discussion of 
ideas, visions or actions, but rather eulogies to physical violence and de-humanization of rivals – but 
“in a funny way”. Fabricio’s reported belief that this kind of content might go “viral” seems to be 
rooted in the understanding that the platform grants more reach to content that receives more 
interactions, which might be explained by the predictive visibility imaginary. He seems to assume that 
the more “offensive” the message, the more interactions it generates, and the more visible the 
message becomes. However, on its own, this social imaginary of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime falls short of explaining why Fabricio seemed to think that offences – and not other expressions 
– could generate more interactions. Consider a second excerpt of our conversation: 
 
[7.14] You’re like, ‘I can say what I want’, that’s it. [Leftists] call me homophobic, fascist, 
racist, when I’m nothing like this, so I have to get it back to them somehow and the 
only way that I can do it is offending them. A video [celebrating] the [Brazilian] military 
dictatorship goes viral because there’s this guy who can’t say what he thinks in his 
classroom, because inside his college there’s a lot of people who are against him. If 
conservative people try to speak out, they are… God knows what can happen. They 
might even get hurt, you know? So, the freedom of expression that is lacking in 
colleges, in the institutions, they find on Facebook. This [zoeira] ends up creating 
some... not fans, but people who admire you, who respect you, believe in what you 
say. Like, you don’t have to present proofs, you simply say and people listen to you. I 
have influence over people, a lot of influence.[...] People won’t believe me. Like, ‘what 
do you work with?,’ then I say, ‘Oh, I live in a shantytown, I’m a telemarketer’. [People 
say]: ‘But, man, you are leading the movement!’ When I post something and realize it 
hasn’t gone viral as in the way it should have gone, if it does not get at least 50 likes, 
I delete it. [In this case], I believe that what I have published, it might not be exactly 
what I think. The Brazilian Right is not so consolidated, you know? There’s a series of 
questions, of values, norms, precepts, that I’m not so sure about yet. So, if it doesn’t 
reach this amount of ‘likes’, this is not what should have been posted. 
 
One might initially interpret this excerpt as laying bare the constitutive ties between Fabricio’s 
offensive civic voice expressions and how he comprehends himself as a citizen. Doing so would suggest 
that Fabricio created and enacted this kind of project because it is largely consistent with how he 
understands himself and his peers – those who, according to the predictive visibility imaginary, were 
more likely to “like” and, thus, be exposed to his messages. According to his description, the real 
oppressors are minorities such as “feminists”, and this sort of aggression, more than being a way of 
 150 
making a message go “viral”, is a genuine and justified expression of his civic self-understanding (“‘I 
can say what I want’”). 
 
However, the second part of the excerpt suggests that his civic self-understanding is less 
clearly defined. The “respect” zoeira generates appears to help him comprehend what he wants to 
say in the first place – to identify which civic voice is his civic voice. If a post did not achieve a certain 
number of “likes” (a form of recognition marker for him, apparently), he deletes it. “It might not be 
exactly” what he thinks: he is still learning the “norms, precepts” that guide the “Brazilian Right”, and 
this learning appears to mainly occur through communications that will be assessed as right or wrong 
according to the number of reactions it receives on Facebook. It is not that he necessarily wants to 
exert a hateful civic voice, but rather that attacking rivals seems necessary if he wants to be recognized 
through datafied interactions. This social stance seems important: as he states, “people will not 
believe” that a poor young Black living in a shantytown can lead “the movement”. His history of 
voicelessness appears to render him particularly eager to be heard – at any cost. 
 
Fabricio was the only interviewee who demonstrated no ethical doubt in relation to this kind 
of project. Compare his narrative with that of Helena, the law student: 
 
[7.15] Let me exemplify. Society is tired of feminists; they crossed all the lines. [Then] I made 
a video, and said, really angry: ‘Let me tell you something, you motherfuckers, if all 
men are a rapist in potential, you’re all whores in potential. Why? If everything is 
socially constructed, and you are in the Marcha das Vadias [SlutWalk], just accept the 
label!’. I don’t think that all feminist as motherfuckers, but I say, ‘you motherfuckers’, 
it’s just zoeira. I don’t really think all feminists are potential whores, it’s just a futility, 
who cares. In the end, to whose life does it make any difference to call feminists 
‘whores in potential’? But that’s what goes viral. It’s just a gratuitous aggression. 
Why? If there’s an anti-left feeling, leftists are to blame. They put labels on people, 
and people find a way of reacting. [But] it’s the kind of post that, if you look at my 
Facebook, I rarely do this kind of posting, it’s the one I least enjoy posting. I make it 
when I need to get something to go viral, when there’s something that is going on and 
people are not realizing, [when this ‘thing’] starts to make me uncomfortable. [But] 
there is an enormous demand on you when you start to get visibility. And it comes in 
all aspects of his life. There’s a lot of [people] in the Internet that thinks that to be 
conservative is to be fundamentalist, and I’m born and raised in a samba school. I do 
not want to have some imbeciles saying I’m not a conservative because I go and see 
my friends in the samba school. I do not want to be held accountable about my life. 
That’s when I polarized [myself] even more. The more I get polarized, the more I find 
these folks so I can block them, you see?  
 
Helena’s description both resonates with and contradicts Fabricio’s. Her project is a form of 
zoeira which, albeit not mentioning murder or de-humanization, is also constructed as a form of hate 
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speech against “feminists” (“you are all potential whores”). Likewise, her project seems to be linked 
to the predictive visibility imaginary, in as much as it relies on eliciting interactions from others that 
will make the video “go viral”. Yet she did not seem to be fully certain about the ethics of her actions 
and makes sure to distance herself from her own message. To say that “all feminists are whores” is 
just a “gratuitous aggression”, she said. Helena appears to know that her message is ethically 
contestable. In fact, as Helena told me after our interview, one of her good friends is a moderate 
feminist. She describes using hate to express herself as akin to a necessary evil, something to be done 
only when there is a pressing issue that “people are not realizing”.  
 
In addition to the ethical frictions between her civic self-understanding and this project, there 
were concerns about the consequences of “visibility”. She appears to assume that being seen by more 
end users may cause her to lose control over who can see and, thus, interact with her – which is typical 
of the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. These criticisms, she said, come not from the “feminists” she 
attacks, but from her own ideological group, and seemed to be as much linked to her imaginary of 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime as to conservatives’ prejudices about Helena’s gender. Her 
links to a samba school that parades at the Carnival street party seem to bother her conservative 
critics. In her words, they “demand” ideological coherence of her voice, as if she could not be both a 
conservative and attend a samba school. Helena disagrees and decides to protect herself – by 
attacking. Her description suggests that the more “polarized” she is, the more she is seen, and the 
easier it is to spot these critics and “block” them to prevent future criticisms. Her narrative is similar 
to those of Olivia and Artur examined in the first part of this chapter. In her attempt to be heard, she 
discovers she must cope with threats of (unfair) attacks – ironically, based on sexist views on what 
women can or cannot be. Yet, instead of retreating, as Olivia and Artur reported doing in a similar 
situation (Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, respectively), she became even more aggressive. 
 
The same sort of projects were described in less violent tones by progressive interviewees. 
One example is Manuela, a Black architect. During the political crisis, she had become a staunch critic 
of racism and sexism. When I asked what she did to be seen by more end users, she told me: 
 
[7.16] The posts that really go viral, they have to have a certain radicality, because people 
‘like’ something that is more, like… [radical]. What they understand as aggressive I 
understand as a necessary radicalism. The radical thought is, like, we do not want to 
watch Globeleza, I don’t want to watch it. But, of course, in the real world Globeleza 
will not cease existing: it will only get a proper outfit. I understand that our proposal 
may be radical so as to achieve a minimal transformation. 
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Contrary to the suggestions of murderer, de-humanization and misogyny depicted so far in 
this section, Manuela’s attempt to increase the visibility of her voice is not described as involving hate 
speech. However, it seems to encompass a transformation of her civic voice expression. Her example 
concerns a post about a famous Brazilian TV programme, which shows a naked Black woman (the so-
called mulata Globeleza) dancing samba to announce the beginning of the Carnival season. In mixing 
Brazil’s historic sexism and racism, Manuela states that the character (and its naturalization as a 
traditional TV programme) represents some of the worst problems of Brazilian society. In order to 
increase the possibility of having more people see her criticism of the programme, she not only 
criticized the TV programme, but also added “some radicality” to the post: Globeleza should be totally 
banned. The goal is to attract readers, elicit more reactions and, in consequence, increase the number 
of people who could see her posts (“people ‘like’ something that is more radical]”). Like the other 
examples in this section, it seems that the predictive visibility imaginary is implied in her project: it 
allows Manuela to think that boosting the number of people who could see her post involved receiving 
interactions, which in turn involved provoking her readers with some “radicality”. 
 
While aware of the ethical issues that her visibility expansion project may raise (“other people 
say that it is aggressive”), Manuela did not try to distance herself from it. She justified her “radical” 
position as “necessary” in view of Brazil’s equally radical racist and sexist social order – of which she 
sees herself a victim, as she repeatedly told me. Instead of artificially adjusting her voice expression 
to meet Facebook’s assumed visibility requirements (as Helena apparently did), Manuela seemed to 
allow herself to express her already existing “radicality”. 
 
The examples presented by Helena and Manuela seem to illustrate how end users’ critical 
self-reflexivity may shape in different ways, but do not stop offensive civic voice expressions. Joaquim, 
the script writer, presented a different perspective: 
 
[7.17] I quit using these tools. It’s not always that a post goes viral now. But I do not have 
this intention anymore. I observed that visibility opens some doors. Before, I had to 
beg for people to pay attention to my [film] scripts. Today, the crowdfunding websites 
are the ones who approach me, asking ‘hey, let’s launch a campaign…’. I started to 
see some things that were a bit worrying. This consumption [of information], I don’t 
know, maybe it is harmful. Not to me, but to the [political] discussion, broadly. When 
you write a text, and in this text I’m hitting politicians, bum! It’s like 20 or 30 
thousands ‘likes’. Then, you write a text about, like, my affective relationship with my 
dog, and it’s fewer than that. Then you write again about politicians, and [the ‘likes’] 
come back. Then you start to think, ‘I have to start talking about politicians so people 
will see me‘. And you understand that, every time you trash a politician, you have 
more visualizations, there’s more repercussion. And then you start hitting first and 
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asking and thinking later. I started to ask myself: how does this influence people’s 
minds? This distrust in politics, generally? What are we really problematizing? I have 
eight thousands followers [in his page]. It’s OK. But there are people who have 50, 60 
thousands. Getting at these numbers would demand much more marketing, it’s not 
so… true. It’s not really honest. I think I’m at a point that, you know? Is it ethical? 
What are the limits? I’ve opted for a more moderate discourse. You ask yourself: I’m 
going to go viral, but go viral for what? What is the point? I’m not sure if I want to be 
in this second phase, in which you become a professional ‘influencer’. I’m not 
interested, I see no point in doing it. 
 
Joaquim is a Black young man who grew up in a poor family. He had a rather ordinary political 
presence on Facebook until some months before our conversation. When one of his posts on politics 
unexpectedly went viral and achieved more than a million users (in his estimation), he decided to seize 
what he saw as a professional opportunity. He created a page and invested considerable effort in 
attracting readers. One of the techniques he utilized to generate more interactions (or 
“repercussions”, in his words) and “be more visible” was a form of offensive voice expression: “trash 
politicians”, or “hitting first and asking and thinking later”. That is, personal attacks that were intended 
to attack individuals, not discuss ideas. As in the other cases examined in this section, his visibility 
expansion project sought interactions from his algorithmic “bubble” – typical of the predictive visibility 
imaginary. 
 
Similar to Helena and Manuela, Joaquim’s conscious usage of aggression to increase the 
number of users who would see his Facebook posts led to him to question: “is this ethical?”. However, 
unlike these other participants, this questioning eventually caused Joaquim to “quit using these tools”. 
What appears to have happened is some reconsideration of how he understands himself as a citizen, 
a process triggered by the enactment of his project. Initially, Joaquim apparently thought his civic 
voice amenable to instrumentalization – something that could be shaped to achieve maximum 
visibility and increase the odds of being listened to at no substantive cost. Over time, he began to feel 
recognized. He received invites to write film scripts and, at the time of the interview, was about to 
have a book of essays published. This prompted him to reconsider the costs of what he termed 
“marketing”. In part, this subjective process was framed, he suggested, by his view of the Brazil’s 
political crisis. Joaquim seemingly saw himself as contributing to the “distrust in politics”. Moreover, 
by contemplating the possibility of becoming an “influencer”, he apparently realized that this is not 
how he wanted to be recognized as a citizen, that those aggressive posts were not his “true” self-
representation. As he said: “I’m going to go viral, but go viral for what?”. What initially appeared to 
be an acceptable pathway to being heard in a society that rarely sees and hears people like him, 
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eventually proved to contradict his civic self-understanding. He then opted for a “moderate 
discourse”. 
 
Interviewees also reported less contentious projects, as discussed in the succeeding sections. 
 
7.3.2. ‘I Seek to Use a Simple Language’: Visibility Expansion Through Simplification 
 Among my interviewees, the businessman Daniel was the most popular – at least according 
to Facebook metrics. His political posts often received over a thousand “likes”, and hundreds of 
“shares” and comments. However, he was not an “influencer”. Daniel told me that he made no money 
out of his Facebook presence – and he did not seem to need to do so. From his spacious office in one 
of the most expensive areas of São Paulo, where we met, he commanded a multi-million dollar 
company. 
 
When I asked how he enhances the visibility of a post, he said: 
 
[7.18] If you think of my timeline [his ‘friends’], considering this algorithm, it’s made of 
people who are really irate with what is going on. So, any post that you make that 
reinforces this idea [ire] gets a lot of visibility. So, like, things are very predictable in a 
universe that I know that the public will identify with what I write. Do you wanna see? 
 
He got up from his armchair, turned on his computer, accessed a news media website and 
clicked on a link about bankers’ profits in Brazil. “I’ll make a post about this piece, let’s see what 
happens”. After logging into his Facebook account, he typed a text which, according to his description, 
was intended to “criticize bankers, criticize profits”. At the end of the interview, the post “should get 
1,500 ‘likes’”, he said, as the red notifications started to pop up on the screen almost immediately 
after he clicked on the “post” button. (The text had received 800 “likes” when I left his office and had 
over 2,000 reactions some hours later.) When we resumed our conversation, he said: 
 
[7.19] It’s a simple recipe, ‘criticize banks, criticize bankers’. The grey zone – this is where it 
gets hard to know what will happen. The hard is not this black and white, the hard 
thing is this middle ground in which you talk about something slightly more 
elaborated. Then it is hard to know what the reaction will be. When no post goes viral 
for more than two days in a row, then I post something criticizing banks and then I’m 
back in the radar, you understand? […] [But] if you’re in a debate with someone who 
is politicized, who has a strongly held position, [he] won’t change.  
 
The post I witnessed Daniel writing did not convey offence. It was an outcry against bankers’ 
immense wealth at a moment when Brazil was engulfed in the deepest recession in its history. 
According to Daniel, the text would have hundreds of visualizations because its “black and white” 
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message would reinforce the existing beliefs of those who see his posts – at least when he considers 
the “bubble” created by “the algorithm”, as he told me at another moment of the interview. Again, 
behind this project is the assumption, linked to the predictive visibility imaginary, that Facebook’s 
visibility regime privileges interactions. First, it orients his understanding of who will see his posts (the 
post-crisis “irate”, “politicized people” who rarely change their opinion) and, second, it generates an 
understanding that “black and white” posts will commonly have more “reactions”, and thus visibility. 
The detachment with which he describes the post (“it’s a simple recipe, ‘criticize bankers’”, something 
that he does when he wants to come back “to the radar”), suggests that such voice expression might 
not necessarily represent his civic self-understanding. Nevertheless, at no point did he demonstrate 
any discomfort with this post, nor did he report having changed or halted this kind of visibility 
expansion project because of ethical concerns. For him, it seemed, having his civic voice heard is not 
directed to changing the minds of people who, in the end, “won’t change” anyway. Rather, he 
appeared to be satisfied just with receiving approval, in the form of “likes”, “shares” and comments – 
or at least accepted that this was what talking about politics on Facebook could offer him. 
 
Daniel’s project of visibility expansion appeared to involve simplifying his civic voice 
expressions. That is, making his posts easier to consume, understand and accept by other end users. 
However, his seeming utilization of simplified voice expressions to experience the satisfaction 
associated to reactions did not echo what other participants told me. Consider what Luis, the 
pensioner, said about his ploys to make his videos seen by more people: 
 
[7.20] I try to convey [a message] in a way that it does not look like I’m pressuring. We were 
talking of radicalism, but without looking like it’s radical. I seek to use a simple 
language. It makes no sense to put in an intellectualized language, because people 
get lost in the middle. One example: corporativism in the private sector. This is how I 
put it: corporativism started this way, one had to be part of a guild, then it evolved, 
and we have arrived at labour unions, which jam the economic activity in Brazil. Why 
is there a compulsory union tax? That is jamming [the economy]. 
 
Both Daniel and Luis assume that “simple” messages could increase the visibility of their civic 
voice by generating more reactions. However, they seemed to disagree about whether those who 
would see these messages were willing to change and, consequently, about what it meant to be heard 
by these others. Luis was not (just) seeking approval. Rather, he appears to imagine that being heard 
translates into convincing people of his conservative beliefs – not through some form of open 
discussion, but through “subtle” messages, which allow him to communicate his “radical” 
conservative ideas without sounding too radical. The way his video unproblematically links mediaeval 
guilds and contemporary unions, or the idea that unions necessarily “jam” the economy, highlights 
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some of the simplifications that he considered were needed for other end users not to “get lost” 
during his videos. Again, while this simplified message did not seem to completely correspond to Luis’s 
civic self-understanding, there was no sign of unease about such simplification. It seems to be a small 
concession to the possibility of convincing others of his point of view. 
 
“Being heard” through simplified expressions of civic voice might have yet other meanings, as 
exemplified by Benjamin, the junior consultant. 
 
[7.21] I’m really into textão [in Brazilian Internet slang, long, serious posts on datafied 
platforms]. I have written [long] posts saying all that I thought, and I wanted people 
to go there and comment, to argue, to think. But they wouldn’t. People are not fond 
of reading. You make two texts [on the same topic]. One is short, you can read without 
clicking on the ‘See More’ button. The other is more profound. The shortest one will 
get many more reactions, because people sometimes they just want to read [it 
quickly], to see your opinion. [...] Sometimes I share something, and if two people 
‘like’ it, that’s fine. Usually, [my posts] appear to people who think like me. I feel it’s 
like a bubble. But there are some things that I want people to talk about, to discuss. 
Like when the police go to my neighbourhood and kill some kid. Then the police say, 
‘he was a thug’, and then I see folks saying, ‘yeah, but he was a thug’. [In these 
situations] I get really pissed, and then I try to have a more strategic vision, to reach 
more people. I try my best. Sometimes I don’t manage to do it, but I try my best to be 
concise. 
 
A young Black man living in an impoverished area of São Paulo, what Benjamin seems to want 
from trying to increase the visibility of his civic voice is not necessarily approval (like Daniel) or to 
convince people of his ideas (like Luis), but rather to inspire debate about police violence (“I want 
people to… discuss”). To generate any discussion, though, his text has first to be read. This might not 
necessarily mean posting “black and white” messages (as Daniel describes) or persuasive half-lies (as 
Luis suggests), but instead texts that are as short as possible (“I try my best to be concise”). It seems 
that this different understanding of what it means to be heard springs, at least partially, from 
Benjamin’s different assumptions about who can see his posts. “Usually”, he said, his posts appear to 
“people who think like him”, that is, those who are already critical of the police. However, when 
something revolting occurs (such as the criminal murder of a young man by police officers), he wants 
to make this message extend beyond his “bubble”. The background to these understandings and, thus, 
his actions, is arguably (yet again) the predictive visibility imaginary. Interestingly, conciseness is 
something that he “sometimes [doesn’t] manage” to achieve, since he is “really into textão”. This 
difficulty in doing what he imagines should be done to increase the number of users who would see 
his posts, indicates the existence of a certain friction between his civic self-understanding (which 
would like to post longer posts, “saying all” he wants to say) and the voice he knows will attract greater 
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visibility (“concise”). During the interview, however, Benjamin demonstrated little preoccupation with 
this adjustment. As with Luis, simplification appeared to be a small compromise. 
 
This also seems to apply to the use of images, as I show next. 
 
7.3.3. ‘I Know What People Like to See’: Visibility Expansion Through Visual Provocations 
In the descriptions analysed above, there were allusions to the deployment of images to 
enhance the reach of civic voice expressions on Facebook – for example, Fabricio talking about memes 
in Section 7.3.1. Some interviewees explicitly stated and justified this usage. For instance, Miguel, a 
public policy student, told me that: 
 
[7.22] I usually post it with an image. 
 
[JCM] Does it need to be a flashy image? 
 
I believe that only an image already generates more views. The person is scrolling 
down [her news feed] in his mobile and he will stop to see the image, and then he 
starts to read [the post], you know? 
 
Davi, the English teacher, described a similar project: 
 
[7.23] I have some training [in how to attract people’s attention], I did a course on neuro-
linguistic. If you post something with lots of text, this will not invite people to read. 
Sometimes, a simple sentence and a picture, like: ‘Enough!’, works best. Take gender 
ideology, if I want to post a criticism to gender ideology. You have to post something 
that will stir people up, sensitize people. Not manipulate them but make them think. 
I don’t say: ‘I think this, I think that’. I say: ‘This is this! What you think?’. For instance, 
I saw that kids these days will undergo gender change surgery at 1-year-old. How am 
I going to protest this? Instead of fighting, I’ll post a boy wearing girl’s clothes sitting 
in the lap of a transvestite. And I said: is that what you want for your child? Done, 
that’s my protest. 
 
To make others “stop” at their posts, as Miguel put it, and “invite” them to read what they 
have to say, as Davi said, plain text is not enough. It should be accompanied by some form of visual 
attraction to make the message stand out among the continuous flow of their news feeds. These 
images seem to work like provocations: other end users will stop because of the picture and end up 
being exposed to ideas – even, presumably, if they were not initially interested in them. Both 
descriptions seem to depend on the assumption that human beings, or as Davi describes it, our brains, 
are naturally predisposed to look at pictures – even if they are not flashy, according to Miguel. The 
visual element might generate more reactions, which, likely, will increase the chances of others seeing 
the same post – which, in turn, is consistent with the predictive visibility imaginary. 
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In Miguel’s case, using pictures did not appear to affect how he understands himself as a 
citizen; however, Davi is different. Enacting this project generated a consideration about his voice: 
was he manipulating others? The question makes sense since the example he gave could be 
understood as an attempt to induce people to refute LGBT rights (“gender ideology”) by the 
association with paedophile-like figures who intend to force toddlers to “undergo” sex reassignment 
surgery (“I’ll post a boy wearing girl’s clothes sitting in the lap of a transvestite”). However, for Davi, 
this prejudiced caricature is just a way to make users “think”. He realizes – but then apparently rejects 
– ethical issues. 
 
A comparable example, but from someone at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, 
was described by the Black dancer Lorena. We were discussing what she does to be seen by others 
when she said: 
 
[7.24] My work in the network is like a ladder, a slow process. I know what people like to 
see: people like seeing butts, they like seeing people dancing, I know exactly what 
folks like seeing on the Internet. I post what people like seeing on the Internet, and 
then, immediately after, I post a textão. It’s a strategy. 
 
She also appears to describe a form of visual provocation. Lorena first grabs her readers’ 
attention with images of her body to provoke their interaction. The more others react to her images, 
the more likely they will see her future posts – consistent with the predictive visibility imaginary. Then, 
benefiting from the expected algorithmic closeness generated by these interactions, she posts 
explicitly political voice expressions (“textão”). Her visibility expansion project resembles a “ladder”, 
in which attention is conquered step by step, as Lorena said. 
 
Some might interpret this as a self-demeaning project, involving a Black woman living in a 
racist and sexist society who sees herself forced to expose her body in order to be heard as a citizen. 
This interpretation is valid, but does not correspond to Lorena’s description: 
 
[7.25] When you represent yourself aesthetically, I think this is a political act. Because you’re 
influencing people who are watching this video to think that this is positive, beautiful. 
And this is precisely our intention, because the TV won’t do it. TV ridicules the fat 
woman, ridicules the Black gay guy. So, the idea is precisely to turn it upside down. 
We use videos to express the freedom of our bodies through dancing in a rather 
explicit way. And this has a political response because it’s a strong confrontation, 
people feel uneasy. 
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For Lorena, showing off her non-White body, the kind of body which she said commonly is 
ridiculed in mainstream Brazilian media, is a way of challenging Brazil’s racism and sexism. She said 
that giving her funk dancing job exposure on Facebook is explicitly and intentionally constructed as a 
“political answer”. In essence, she assumes that the picture of her body is an expression of her civic 
voice. The actions she describes, as those of Miguel and Davi in this section, did not seem to contradict 
her civic self-understanding. However, as Section 9.4 suggests, this sort of visibility expansion projects 
might be interpreted as having implications for the recognition of other end users. 
 
In addition to presenting images, news was also described as capable of expanding the 
visibility of interviewees’ civic voice expressions on Facebook. 
 
7.3.4. ‘I Can Make it Explode’: Visibility Expansion Through News Association 
When the video-maker Amanda began expressing herself politically on Facebook, most of 
her material was about the difficulties of cycling in São Paulo. As a cyclist herself, this choice 
reflected her preoccupations and interests. However, at the time of our interview, what had been 
only a hobby had since become a potential way to make money – or at least strengthen her 
portfolio. That was when she started to consider what she could do to have her political posts seen 
by more end users: 
 
[7.26] I record lots of things that I shelve. I say: ‘This is interesting, but I can tie this with 
something else to make it really interesting’. So, you don’t want to waste an interview 
that is great, but about a topic that is not hot at the moment. It can wait and 
eventually I can tie it with something that will make it explode. So, my work usually 
comes down to this. And I think that thanks to these subjects I ended up migrating [as 
a video-maker] to the [topic of the] city, not only cycling, but the city’s social and 
cultural movements. 
 
Amanda’s visibility expansion project does not entail tweaking her voice to make it more 
aggressive, simple or visually provocative, but instead associating it to a “hot” topic. This might involve 
her shelving and re-editing a “great” interview in order to “tie it” to something else that might become 
important, thus making it “really interesting” and eventually seeing it “explode” in terms of views. This 
project seems to assume that Facebook’s visibility regime is oriented by interactions – which is 
consistent with the predictive visibility imaginary. I suggest there is an intuitive understanding of 
“agenda-setting” (see Feezel, 2018, for a recent discussion) underlying her description, for she appears 
to understand that a few topics dominate debate on platforms, while most others are marginalized. 
This was echoed by another interviewee, the copywriter Humberto, who used the term “social media 
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waves” to describe those events that draw public attention to a few discussions and influence how 
end users express themselves on platforms such as Facebook. 
 
In the case of Amanda, her depiction suggests that enacting this project neither contradicted 
nor matched her civic self-understanding. Instead, it seems to have led her to construct a different 
comprehension of which voice she should articulate as a citizen. In her example, she started to post 
videos about the city of São Paulo and its “social and cultural movements”, rather than of cycling, in 
an effort to explore other topics that could help her posts to become more visible.  
 
7.4. Rejecting Visibility Expansion Projects 
So far, I have examined the descriptions of participants who reported acting intentionally to 
expand the visibility of their civic voice expressions on Facebook. In this last part of the chapter, I 
analyse the reasons offered by interviewees to not enact this sort of visibility control project. My 
interpretation of their descriptions coalesced around three main justifications: the understanding that 
trying to be seen by more end users might be useless, unethical or dangerous. 
 
7.4.1. ‘I Don’t Feel I Can Reach People’: Visibility Expansion as a Useless Project 
 Consider two excerpts: the first is from my interview with Pedro, who works in a publishing 
company: 
[7.27] It [his posts] stays in a niche of thoughts that are very similar to mine. It doesn’t really 
trespass [the limits of his ‘niche’]. I seek to understand the facts, to find a solution, to 
find a way to change [others], to participate. Only, I don’t know, I do not feel that I 
can reach the people who should reflect [about their own views]. I have no idea how 
to do it. I resent not being able to reach these folks. I’m kind of giving up. 
 
The second excerpt is from my conversation with Cristian, the geography student. 
 
[7.28] But I have a question, João, um ... the discussion I'm making, who should be exposed 
to it? [The goal] would be to reach the one who already knows or to reach that other? 
The quality of the reach you can’t measure. I see the charts and I see the abstraction 
of the numbers, but, like, did it [his page’s post] arrive at who they had to [see his 
message]? To the teachers who have never attended a university course? So, these 
numbers, for me, are, like, cool – but what about the quality? That's why I send emails 
and if I do not send [physical] letters is because of the price. 
 
I suggest that both descriptions convey a similar sense of disappointment. An important 
theme in my conversation with Pedro was his idea that Facebook’s “algorithms” create “bubbles” – 
described by him as “niches”. His posts, he said, were usually seen by end users whose “thoughts” 
were similar to his – a notion that chimes with the predictive visibility imaginary. For him, the “bubble” 
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seems to be not merely an idea on how the platform governs who can see whom, but is also an 
assumption, which informs his decision on what not to do. Cristian’s description refers to a Facebook 
page he administers, aimed at communicating academic information about geography – his 
undergraduate degree discipline. While he did not use the term “bubble”, his rhetorical question 
(“[The goal] would be to reach… that other?") suggests a similar assumption: he cannot “reach” the 
“others” who were outside his online circle of interaction. However, in his example, the “other” is not 
the person who disagreed with him ideologically, as in Pedro’s case, but rather people who were 
socially distant from him – the school teachers who did not study at a university, but who could benefit 
from the posts on his Facebook page. 
 
The disappointment demonstrated by Pedro and Cristian appears to stem from the 
assumption that trying to expand their visibility on Facebook would not guarantee that their civic 
voices would be heard by those who would indeed benefit from hearing them. As Cristian said, he 
could see the “number” of views in the engagement analytics provided by his page, but these numbers 
did not tell him much about the individuals who saw the posts – were they the “right” ones? He said 
that the “abstraction” of the figures lacks “quality”. The apparent uselessness of trying to control their 
visibility in a way that is conducive to their civic recognition prompts somewhat different responses. 
At the time of our conversation, Pedro was less excited by the idea of exerting his civic voice on 
Facebook – and, thus, was less active (“I’m kind of giving up”). Cristian, on the other hand, appeared 
to be more interested in communicating with people through other means. He told me that emails 
and physical letters were better options to allow him to spread his ideas. 
 
In the next section, I analyse descriptions that involve another reason not to increase the 
visibility of civic voice. 
 
7.4.2. ‘I’m not Going to Play Social Games’: Visibility Expansion as an Unethical Project 
 When I asked Theo, the lawyer, if he tried to increase the number of people who see his 
Facebook posts, he replied: “Um, wrong person to ask that” and then elaborated: 
 
 [7.29] I never wanted to post anything that is radical just to generate discussion. What I have 
to ‘share’ I will ‘share’. My Facebook is what I think. I’m not going to defend someone 
who I think should not be defended, I'm not going to play these social games in social 
media, post something to please someone. 
 
Later in the interview, when I asked if he thought his voice was heard, he said: 
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[7.30] No, when its Theo’s voice, never. If you look at my Facebook… [Gets his phone, opens 
the Facebook app, scroll down his posts]. Of my last seven posts, the last one had two 
‘likes’. The rest, no ‘like’ at all. But to be heard I would have to rebut the comments, 
sometimes nasty comments. Not sure if this is what makes me happy.  
 
Theo’s narrative is typical of what other interviewees told me: trying to expand the reach of 
civic voice expressions may entail certain ethical dispositions which these interviewees did not appear 
to possess – and did not want to possess, it seems. The real-estate agent, Antonio, told me that trying 
to be seen by more users is something for “professionals’”, not “ordinary people”, and suggested that 
any such effort would be dishonest. Emilia, another real-estate agent, said that talking about politics 
on Facebook is not about the “maths” (numbers of “likes”, “shares” etc) and compared this sort of 
project with commercial (not political) activity. In all cases, the assumption is that increasing one’s 
visibility depends on generating interactions – which can again be explained by the predictive visibility 
imaginary. 
 
What often seems to be behind these justifications is an ethical trade off, similar to those 
elicited by the projects I named tactical aggressions (Section 7.3.1): should ordinary end users like my 
interviewees sacrifice their civic self-understanding in order to be seen by more people on Facebook? 
For some participants, the ethical questions emerged after they had enacted their project; for others, 
including Theo, the very possibility of having to compromise their civic voices seemed to fully 
contradict how they appeared to see themselves as citizens. I suggest that this is not just an issue of 
authenticity versus artificiality – although this seems to underlie Antonio’s reference to ordinariness. 
Essentially, it is about what they saw as the right way of doing democratic politics, a politics that ought 
not involve becoming “radical” simply to provoke “discussion”, as Theo put it. Their choice does not 
seem to be associated with the social consequences of visibility expansion projects, but with a 
rejection of the sort of civic recognition that accompanies these projects – a recognition that they 
appeared to see as, itself, unsatisfactory. In Theo’s example, his posts could indeed receive more 
“likes” – but this would also require him to “rebut… nasty” comments, which simply did not make him 
“happy” as a citizen. The next section discusses concerns about a distinct negative consequence of 
visibility expansion projects. 
 
7.4.3. ‘A Guard Flashed Me a Gun’: Visibility Expansion as a Dangerous Project 
 The following excerpt of my interview with Vicente, the theatre teacher, is a good illustration 




[7.31] I never thought of a strategy to reach [more people]. Who read, read, who didn’t read, 
too bad. At the time of the protests against the bus fares [June 2013], I was quite in 
the front line, I had a lot of reach [on Facebook]. We had some demonstrations where 
I grabbed the mic and criticized a big shot [of the transportation section in his city]. 
That day, a security guard flashed me a gun. One day, I went to the [bus] station and 
the same guard was there. He looked at me as if saying, ‘I remember you’. 
 
Similar to other excerpts examined in this chapter, Vicente’s resembles a trajectory. At the 
beginning of the Brazilian crisis, when there were numerous protests against the rising bus fares in 
São Paulo and nearby cities, he was “in the front line”, both on Facebook, as he told me, and in the 
streets. During one of the protests, Vicente decided to assume, although briefly, a leadership position: 
he “grabbed the mic” and attacked a powerful businessman. This attracted a subtle but unmistakeable 
death threat from a security guard who, he was to learn later, had not forgotten him. The way he 
presented his story implies that becoming more visible on Facebook might be comparable to leading 
a street protest. In a country such as Brazil, and for someone who defends the same progressive 
causes Vicente defends, both forms of leadership can lead to physical violence. Similar to Olivia and 
Artur, Vicente appeared to believe that the possibility of being unable to control who can see him on 
Facebook overshadows the attempt to become more visible – which is consistent with the 
uncontrollable visibility imaginary.  
 
While the previous section describes an ethical trade off, the stakes were higher in Vicente’s 
story. He appears to be more concerned with his physical integrity, rather than with having his civic 
self-understanding recognized or not by others. In his depiction, being heard – on Facebook or in the 
streets – potentially appears to be associated to the risk of being murdered. Interestingly, this 
apparent belief seems to have resulted from a brief moment when he was “heard”. But he was not 
willing to gamble with his life for politics. Later in our conversation, he said that one of the reasons he 
decided to “stop a bit” doing politics on Facebook was the realization of how real this threat was. The 




This chapter presented the findings related to SRQ 3.1, which asked whether end users 
attempted to expand their visibility on Facebook, and the nature of the eventual relationship between 
these attempts and the expression of their civic voice on the platform. The analysis of interviewees’ 
descriptions suggests that various kinds of visibility control projects might be conceived and enacted 
to achieve this goal. The first part of the chapter showed that these projects can involve piggybacking 
(Section 7.2.1) on others’ visibility; using “friendship” requests to increase the number of people who 
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can see posts (network expansion, Section 7.2.2); engendering voice multiplication (Section 7.2.3) 
through the use of fake profiles; using tactical self-interactions (Section 7.2.4) via interface buttons; 
and posting at certain times, which I call temporal control (Section 7.2.5). While none of these projects 
included altering what the individual wanted to say, it does not follow that they do not act on the 
expression of their civic voice. The second part of the chapter discussed how interviewees reported 
transforming how they express themselves politically on Facebook in the expectation of increased 
visibility. My fieldwork identified at least four kinds of projects: engagement in tactical aggressions 
(Section 7.3.1) towards others, which usually includes hate speech; a more concise and easier-to-
understand voice (simplification, Section 7.3.2); the inclusion of visual provocations (Section 7.3.3) 
such as pictures, as part of their civic voice expression; and altering their self-representation to allow 
links to more newsworthy events, which I call news association (Section 7.3.4). In the final part of the 
chapter, I discussed the reasons interviewees gave for not increasing their visibility, that is, their 
assumptions that these projects were useless, unethical or dangerous (Sections 7.4.1, 7.4.2 and 7.4.3, 
respectively). 
 
In Chapter 8, I consider a different sort of project, which is aimed at reducing the visibility of 



















Visibility Reduction Projects 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In examining interviewees’ descriptions of how they attempted (or not) to expand the visibility 
of their civic voice expressions on Facebook, Chapter 7 moved the thesis to the empirical investigation 
of the civic consequences of Facebook’s datafication power. 
 
This chapter continues to explore these ramifications. It does so through an analysis of what 
Section 3.6.3 defined as visibility reduction projects, that is, the actions devised by participants to hide 
their civic self-representations on the platform. Therefore, this chapter tackles SRQ 3.2: Do ordinary 
end users’ attempt to reduce the visibility of their civic voice expressions on Facebook? If so, is this 
attempt associated with how they articulate these expressions? 
 
Given their theoretical and empirical parallels, the approaches and organization adopted in 
Chapter 7 and in this one are similar (see Section 7.1). Data analysis involved interrogating each 
reported action to reduce the visibility of one’s civic voice expressions to unpack the relative roles of 
the social imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime (see Chapter 6) and individuals’ civic 
self-understandings. Whereas interviewees’ accounts about their projects varied substantially, they 
mirror the categories identified in Chapter 7. The first part of this chapter considers those few projects 
that did not include controlling civic voice expressions themselves. The second part explores the large 
number of reported projects in which participants’ intervened in their civic expressions. Lastly, the 
third part examines why some interviewees seemed to be unwilling to try to reduce the visibility of 
their civic voices. 
 
8.2. Visibility Reduction by Controlling Non-Civic Voice Elements 
Some participants told me they reduced their visibility on Facebook by acting upon elements 
other than their civic voice expression. My analysis of their descriptions identified three examples of 
this sort of visibility reduction project, which I characterize as: (re)categorization of others, space 
shifting and tactical delays. 
 
8.2.1. ‘Sometimes I Use the ‘Except’’: Visibility Reduction Through (Re)categorization of Others 
Benjamin, the junior consultant, told me that a common issue related to his political usage of 
Facebook was understanding which of his Facebook “friends” would be able to see his posts. He said: 
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[8.1] On Facebook, you have many publics. College teacher, a girl you’re hanging out with, 
your boss, you mom, grandma. If you’re unemployed, for instance, you have to show 
yourself as intelligent to those people who can help you to find a job. But to your 
neighbour you can’t show yourself as very intelligent, because the kid never went to 
school, he will see this [post] and say, ‘oh, what a jerk’, he will see you on the street 
and say, ‘you’ve been kind of an idiot, saying stuff no-one understands – your think 
you’re an intellectual?’. So, with whom do you wanna talk to? So, sometimes I use the 
‘Except’, you know? 
 
Benjamin’s project was a frequent one: he uses the platform’s “Privacy Settings” functionality 
to prevent some of the people in his network from seeing some of his messages. This appears to be a 
straightforward example of the controllable visibility imaginary within Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime, where the platform gives end users unilateral capacity to make visual boundaries and decide 
who can see their civic voice expressions. However, this visibility reduction project, and the imaginary 
that enables it, also appear to be a response to Benjamin’s assumption that, “on Facebook, you have 
many publics”. While this might suggest an inability to define who is going to see what he posts, I 
would suggest that it is not related to the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. Rather, this description 
seems to allude to the notion of a “bubble”, which is linked to both the controllable and predictive 
visibility imaginaries, as seen in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.2. 
 
Benjamin seems to assume that his “bubble” is ideologically, but not socially homogenous. 
That is, he conceives it as composed of people from discrepant dimensions of his social life. This might 
include someone who could offer him a job, to whom it is important to “show yourself as intelligent”, 
while also including a friend from his impoverished neighbourhood, who may ridicule the 
“intellectual” tone of his posts. Such a socially diverse “bubble” is linked to Benjamin’s own shifting 
social context, I suggest. Although he is Black and was raised by a blue-collar worker family, Benjamin 
now had a college degree, a white-collar job and worked in the rich central area of São Paulo. At the 
same time – like many other 23-year-olds – he still lived with his parents in his old neighbourhood. 
This transitional moment seems to give rise to ambivalences about his civic self-understanding. He 
might want to be heard by some as an “intellectual”, but not everyone will recognize this civic voice. 
Therefore, his project could be understood as an attempt to recategorize some end users as relating 
to his “old” self, and others to his “new” self. In doing so, he maintains the possibility of being 
recognized by some (e.g. someone who might help him find a job) and avoid misrecognitions by others 




Benjamin’s account is representative of what many participants told me about how they 
utilize Facebook’s “Privacy Settings” to reduce their visibility. However, there were other aspects of 
the interface that participants resorted to in their attempts to limit who could see their civic voice 
expressions, as can be seen in the next section. 
 
8.2.2. ‘I Always Send It via ‘Inbox’’: Visibility Reduction Through Space Shifting 
Antonio, the conservative real estate agent, described having a very active political life on 
Facebook. However, he told me that he restricts these activities to what he understands were spaces 
of controllable visibility: 
 
[8.2] Usually, [he talks about politics] within the groups. In the open, it’s for work. I do real 
estate, so [Facebook ‘friends’] have access to my phone number and then I don’t want 
to mix things. [Since] they are mostly clients. Even doing this, some of them [group 
users] still find me, get in [his profile]. At my workplace, I don’t log in [his Facebook 
account]. Things are separate. [And] the left is radical. They shout, curse, are unable 
to debate, call you a ‘racist’, ‘homophobic’. 
 
The nurse, Rosa, told a somewhat similar story, but in relation to a different functionality. 
 
[8.3] If it’s something very personal or will generate a controversy I’m not willing to deal 
with, I generally send it in the inbox. For instance, I wanted to show him [her 
boyfriend] that I’d found out that if Dilma were impeached, she could appeal to the 
Superior Court of Justice [one of Brazil’s superior courts], and I always send it via 
[Inbox] message. 
 
Antonio’s and Rosa’s projects involve moving across different spaces within Facebook’s 
interface, with the expectation that they will be seen by specific others within these spaces. When 
Antonio talks about politics, he talks within specific Facebook groups, not “in the open” space of his 
profile. Even if groups do not render his civic voice expressions as completely hidden (“some of them 
[group users] still find me”), they provide the boundaries he needs to separate his civic voice from his 
professional life. In these spaces, he assumes that no one knows or cares about his life as a real estate 
agent. Rosa also chooses a different space – Facebook Messenger – which she assumes is strictly 
confidential. In this other space, she appears to imagine that only she and her boyfriend can see what 
she says. She moves into it whenever a topic might “generate a controversy”, implying that that 
people other than her boyfriend may contest her civic voice expression. These projects and their 
implementations depend on the controllable and uncontrollable visibility imaginaries. It appears that 
the latter leads them to assume that there is the constant risk of losing the ability to decide who can 
view what they say about politics “in the open” spaces of the platform. Meanwhile, the controllable 
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visibility imaginary provides them with the means to at least try to retake command over how they 
are seen by others.  
 
Antonio’s and Rosa’s descriptions suggest attempts to preserve their ability to continue to 
speak as themselves – and to be heard as themselves, even if only by certain individuals. In Antonio’s 
case, it is possible to discern a different, non-algorithmic context shaping his civic self-understanding 
– ideology. Similar to many other conservative individuals I spoke to, he seemed to feel part of a frail 
minority. If he spoke in the “open”, a person from the “radical left” could label him a “fascist” and 
potentially damage what he conceived of as a non-political element of his life (his career). 
 
Other participants described projects that involved not space, but time, as I show next.  
 
8.2.3. ‘I Waited Three Months to Publish It’: Visibility Reduction Through Tactical Delays 
Section 7.2.5 discussed how Facebook users attempt to increase the visibility of their civic 
voice expressions by posting at moments when they assumed more people would see their posts. One 
of these was Benjamin, the junior consultant discussed in Section 8.2.1. Unsurprisingly, he told me 
that the same strategy might work in reverse. His example concerned a post about a distressing 
personal experience: 
 
[8.4]  I was stopped by two policemen, close to here [the Paulista Avenue, in central São 
Paulo]. They were like, ‘where is the drug?’, ‘where are you from?’. In an area that is 
mostly White, that people’s social class is not mine, it clearly was: ‘This is not your 
place’. Then I talked to people, [who told him], ‘write something about it, it’s 
unacceptable!’. I wrote it. [But] I waited three months to publish it. Because I was 
afraid it could generate a huge repercussion, that the police could get word, that 
something could happen. 
  
  [JCM] What were you afraid of? 
 
Being murdered, really. I can die, ‘just another junkie’. [Mimics policemen’s voice]: 
‘Black, with this hair, of course you’re [a criminal]’. So, when it’s about the police, I’m 
very, very afraid, because I know that if something happens, it will be just another 
number. It won’t change society. I have the profile of those who are murdered [Black, 
young, male]. I see myself in them. The police might kill me and make me into a ‘drug 
user’, you know? Who will have more voice – my mom, who says her son is innocent, 
or the police? 
 
Benjamin wrote a text that, while apparently saying what he wanted it to say, was tactically 
delayed with the explicit goal of not generating a “huge repercussion”. If the police officers who had 
harassed him read his post, he might “be murdered”, he said. To be able to exert his civic voice, he 
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altered not the content of his post, but its timing. He seemed to assume that, after some time had 
passed, the policemen would have forgotten what they did to him – perhaps because this sort of 
everyday abuse was common, or so Benjamin appeared to think. I propose that behind his visibility 
reduction project is the assumption that end users may end up losing control over who can see a 
Facebook post (“the police could get word”) when it goes viral (when it generates “a huge 
repercussion”). This assumption, and the notion of “virality” by interaction in general, seem to suggest 
a point of contact between two social imaginaries of Facebook’s visibility regime. The vectors of sight 
and readability appear to be imagined by Benjamin as intertwined, as they are in the predictive 
visibility imaginary – but also as generating an exposure beyond his control, as in the uncontrollable 
visibility imaginary. 
 
It seems that the social dimension of Benjamin’s civic self-understanding is crucial to his 
project. He was not involved in any sort of crime and, in principle, should not be fearful of the police. 
However, he seemed to assume that being innocent meant very little against the authoritarianism of 
the police in Brazil. In being Black, young and living in a poor neighbourhood, he had “the profile of 
those who are murdered”. “Just another junkie”, they could lie after killing him. Benjamin’s apparent 
understanding of himself as a part of a second-class citizenry (“Who will have more voice – my mom... 
or the police?) apparently forced him to try to balance the urge to seek accountability and the fear 
that, were his expressions heard, he could be murdered. 
 
Similar to what I described in Chapter 7, none of the interviewees appeared satisfied with only 
intervening through non-civic voice elements. In their attempts to control the visibility of their civic 
self-representations on Facebook, more direct interventions seemed necessary, as exemplified in the 
next few sections. 
 
8.3. Visibility Reduction Through the Control of Civic Voice Expressions 
The second part of this chapter analyses descriptions of visibility reduction projects that seem 
to involve transformations to civic voice expressions. I describe them as misleading profiles, voice 
disguising, correction, voice deletion, voice suppression and voice disappearance. 
 
8.3.1. ‘I Changed my Name to Arabic’: Visibility Reduction Through Misleading Profiles 
 Fernanda, the engineer, described herself as passionate about progressive politics. She has 
used Facebook to disseminate news pieces, examine official documents and organize small gatherings 
to discuss topics such as elections and feminism. While she has been doing this for some years, the 
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political crisis rendered her expressions more intense – and riskier, she told me. During the 2014 
elections, she was in a public square watching the transmission of a presidential debate, when she 
agreed to be interviewed by a journalist. Her progressive opinions became part of a video that was 
published on the Facebook page of a major Brazilian newspaper. She told me that her appearance in 
the video was “very short”, but was enough to create an “enormous revolt” among some conservative 
end users: 
 
[8.5] A friend of mine wrote [tagging her], ‘Fernanda, is that you?’, right in the [comment 
section of the] link to the video [posted in the newspaper’s Facebook page]. When I 
saw it, I told her to delete it. But my ‘message requests’ inbox was already like ‘you 
will die,’ this kind of stuff. 
 
Underlying her description of this abuse is her apparent assumption that she has no control 
over her own visibility on Facebook: she had no say in her friend’s action of “tagging” her in a comment 
of the post, which, also against her will, allowed strangers to identify her as the person in the video, 
visit her profile and send abusive messages via her inbox. “Tagging” seems to be associated with the 
idea that, on Facebook, end users’ readability might be exploited by third parties – typical of the 
uncontrollable visibility imaginary. Usually associated with physical surveillance of prisoners and 
medical patients (Nellis, Beyens, & Kaminski, 2013), the term, in this context, means the ability to 
create a clickable link to someone’s profile by typing the person’s name on Facebook in e.g. a comment 
(Facebook, 2019b); this relies on the fact that the platform creates and maintains end-user databases. 
In the aforementioned scenario, “tagging” allowed Fernanda’s friend to exert manual control over 
Fernanda’s visibility, allowing others to also see her against her volition. Her description indicates that 
by lacking the ability to control who reads her, she also has no control over who can interact with her 
on Facebook – or so she seemingly assumed. 
 
Fernanda’s experience of harassment led her to adopt a project that goes beyond interface 
functionalities or talking only within certain spaces: 
 
[8.6] I had to start a different profile from the scratch, [with] my name in Arabic. This one 
is harder to find, folks can’t tag me anymore. And that is the idea, because of this 
[harassment] story. I kept the [older] profile with my name, surname, my pic, but 
nothing since 2013. [Others say]: ‘Fernanda, can I add you?’. [She says] ‘sure, of 
course’, and then I add them in the older profile. These [users] won’t see any post, 
because I never post anything [in the older profile], I only rarely log onto it. Oh, there’s 
this picture of that event, [people] tagged me? I go and ‘like’ the tagged picture. In 
the other, which has my very own name, but in Arabic, I have now many friends, most 
from my [original] city. Someone might even threaten me, but he can’t disturb me in 
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my workplace. They don’t know who my boss is, can’t come and bad-mouth me to my 
boss. They can’t harm me. 
 
In an attempt to regain control over who could see and interact with her, Fernanda told me 
she decided to construct a second profile. The original one was described as a form of professional 
front, a digital dummy that can be exploited by others (e.g. tagged) without causing her harm; she 
constructed it as strictly apolitical and mostly void of interactions. Her new profile was described as 
her civic persona, and it seemed to be crafted to maximize her control how she is seen and read. 
However, to achieve invisibility, she believed that a second profile was not enough, and decided to 
change her name using the Arabic alphabet. (This choice was not random: she is of Arabic descent.) 
Fernanda seems to assume that this renders her effectively invisible to any Brazilian user that tries to 
search for or tag her on Facebook. In her Arabic profile, she had “many friends”, but they were from 
another city and they do not know any of her work colleagues and, thus, were unlikely to create 
professional problems. While the new profile did not render misrecognition impossible (“someone 
might… threaten me”), she said it was less likely to damage her professional life. This kind of visibility 
reduction project seems to be facilitated by an ensemble of social imaginaries within Facebook’s 
visibility regime. If her assumptions about the need to reduce her visibility stemmed from the 
uncontrollable visibility imaginary, doing so would depend on there being ways to unilaterally counter 
such uncontrollability (consistent with the controllable visibility imaginary). Yet, her project did not 
depend on the tools explicitly provided by Facebook for such control (such as “Privacy Settings”), but 
was instead based on a functionality that was hardly designed to give end users greater control over 
their visibility (“Language Settings”). 
 
Fernanda might conceive of Facebook as both allowing others to see her against her will and 
supporting her ability to counter such arbitrary government. However, these possibilities only lead to 
a project vis-à-vis her understanding that, as a citizen, she is at risk. Fernanda appears to think that 
both strangers and work colleagues would be keen to punish her for her ideological stance. In a 
moment of backlash against the left in Brazil, she seemed to assume that her civic voice was not only 
part of a minority of progressives – thus, amenable to this kind of oversimplification – but also unable 
to resist this kind of professional risk. At a particular moment in our conversation, she told me that 
these imagined dispositions were part of Brazil’s post-crisis climate: “[People have become] alienated. 
They don’t understand the political position of different parties. They think I’m a Petista, they don’t 
understand me – I’m not Petista”. 
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The idea of risk can encompass darker scenarios, as I was told by other interviewees. First, 
take the case of Fabio, the tattoo shop manager. During my initial observation of his profile, I noticed 
that his picture showed a man with his head completely hooded. It looked like an original picture – 
that is, one taken by him, but it was impossible to discern his facial features. In our interview, I asked 
why he posted that particular photo. He replied: 
 
[8.7] To post my picture, or of my daughters, it’s almost dangerous. We are now in a regime 
[the post-impeachment government of Michel Temer] that is not only conservative, 
[but also] with people who are on the side of the hatred, who say that is cool to 
slaughter others. This is dangerous, really. I’m afraid, like, if someone says, ‘this one 
here [Fabio] is bothering’. Then, in a state of exception, in which people want to 
restrict all rights, it seems obvious to me that expose yourself like this is dangerous. A 
military coup might be coming. Then, you don’t have any freedom anymore, people 
can get into your house, find you there, and God knows what can happen. 
 
His imaginary of Facebook’s visibility regime is similar to those in other accounts examined in 
this section. Assumptions of uncontrollability (anyone can see his profile picture) invoke assumptions 
of control (Facebook allows him to post a picture without his face). However, for Fabio, the danger to 
be avoided is not being fired, but getting arrested or something worse. Not much different from what 
happened during the military dictatorship, he seems to believe that, in post-crisis Brazil, dissenting 
voices such as his might be violently repressed – “God knows what can happen”. To avoid this 
possibility, Fabio said that the safer course of action is making himself physically unidentifiable. This 
limited anonymity gives him some leeway to remain politically “active”. Framing his reasoning were 
also assumptions about Brazil’s authoritarian history. In our conversation, Bruno demonstrated to be 
well aware of what happened during the military dictatorship to dissenters like him, and seemed to 
envision a return to those conditions – facilitated by Facebook. 
 
Maria, the conservative event organizer, also told me a disturbing story. She was unemployed 
at the time of our interview and reported spending large parts of her time engaging in intense disputes 
and interactions with a relatively small, but highly active group of other conservative end users on 
Facebook and other platforms. When I asked if I could interview her, I noticed that her Facebook 
profile stated that she lived in another Brazilian city, not São Paulo. She agreed to be interviewed and, 
somewhat interestingly, arranged to meet in a café in São Paulo and not in the city that appeared on 
her profile. When I asked her about this, she told me that the city information on her profile was false, 
a response to threats she had received: 
 
[8.9] They started to send threatening emails, saying they are coming for my mom, my 
sister. They send personal information, like where you live. They said they are going 
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to kill me, to rape me. I joke about it, but I really got worried when they said they 
would plant a bomb in my car. It’s better [to change her city on Facebook]. You put 
together ‘Rambos’ and Internet wankers… they can actually do it. 
 
Maria told me she has no concrete clues as to why she has been harassed, but believes that 
the threats were triggered by a dispute with an opponent group of conservative users. She found out 
about the threats after receiving screenshots of conversations about how to rape and kill her. “Do you 
wanna see it?”, she asked me, pulling her phone and showing a screenshot of what seemed a Brazilian 
version of 4Chan, the anonymous imageboard website. The screenshot showed a picture of a scruffy-
looking man. “This is the one who wants to rape me. Then he does these photo montages with my 
pictures, as if he were raping me”. 
 
What is at play in her account, it seems, is control over her image, which can be seen, and may 
be copied and manipulated into violent montages. She assumed that there is little that she can do 
about these already circulating visual composites, but Facebook’s configuration cannot stop her from 
lying, which might mislead harassers about her whereabouts, a project that is consistent with the 
controllable visibility imaginary. As in the other cases explored above, Maria’s assumptions of 
controllability seem to be invoked only in response to assumptions of lack of control. In conjunction 
with these unbalanced imagined regimes, there were different assumptions about others – not 
recruiters, clients, work colleagues or an authoritarian government, but ideologically like-minded 
strangers who appeared to be assumed by Maria as willing to physically harm her due to a dispute 
that even she did not fully comprehend. Given the rape threats, it is difficult not to see the links 
between her assumed vulnerability and a much older political issue – Brazil’s deeply rooted sexism 
(Section 2.2). 
 
In Fabio’s and Maria’s descriptions, there seems to be a mismatch between their assumed 
risks and the capacity of their visibility reduction projects to tackle these risks. Fabio knew that an 
authoritarian government can find his picture through other ways – thus, why not show his face?; 
Maria has even received an email containing all her “personal information” – thus, why lie about her 
city? I suggest that their apparently ineffective projects point to how much they care about their 
visibility: any small amount of control is worth grabbing. 
 
While Maria’s, Fabio’s and Fernanda’s projects do not involve the transformation of their 
posts, I suggest that they imply a transformation of their voices inasmuch as they involve changing 
elements of who is speaking on Facebook – in minor (Maria, Fabio) or major (Fernanda) ways. The 
next section starts to consider examples of changes to participants’ civic voice expressions. 
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8.3.2. ‘It Was a Political Post, But Between the Lines’: Visibility Reduction Through Voice Disguising 
Consider first what Gael, the graphic artist, told me. He was talking about how Facebook’s 
“bubble” “induces narcissism” when he said: 
 
[8.10] Facebook incentivises me to be more like myself, more and more radicalised and 
selecting people who applaud my radicality. 
 
  [JCM] Do you feel this yourself?   
 
Oh yeah, all the time. That’s when the irony comes in. When the Supreme Court guy’s 
plane crashed, I was like posting conspiracy theories. I was like, ‘It was the Russians!’. 
Some folks believed, others didn’t, like ‘But is this true? What is your source?’, and I 
was like, ‘The source is the Internet! Embrace the post-truth’ [laughter]. Irony 
provides a kind of relief. Sometimes there is this discomfort. You kind of get bored. 
When everybody starts to say the same shit. Example: the [then São Paulo’s former 
mayor João] Dória x graffiti controversy59. In the first days I posted a lot. In the third 
day, I got bored. Then I begin to get oblique, ironic. Like, I’m [saying]: ‘Dória is 
ridiculous, a hick’. But then it comes a moment that you get fed up and say: ‘No, let’s 
just post [pictures] of beautiful graffities in other cities without any comment’. Just 
leave it there, don’t get into [the discussion]. As if there was this group of people 
talking excitedly and you’re like seeing them from a distance. 
 
At a different moment in the interview, Gael told me that his personal “bubble” is composed 
of a “minority of the minority of artists who live in Pinheiros [a bohemian middle-class neighbourhood 
in São Paulo], graffiti people, alternative folks”. Living within this bubble, especially in moments of 
acute political turmoil, can be an uncomfortable and boring experience, Gael said. “When everybody 
starts to say the same shit”, it apparently becomes difficult to have an original voice; his civic self-
understanding is destabilized. That is when “irony comes in”, he said. In practice, this could mean 
engaging jokingly in conspiracy theories about the death of Teori Zavaski, the Supreme Court Judge 
who presided over the Car Wash Operation and died in a plane crash in 2017; eulogizing “post-truth”; 
or merely posting enigmatic pictures, instead of declaring his position in the controversy. Gael prefers 
to be “oblique” and to disguise what he truly thinks. 
 
Irony can be employed for other, more familiar reasons – and lead to distinct actions. Take 
the case of Alex, the IT professional, who told me that: 
 
[8.11] You can’t do conspiracy theories [on Facebook] because you won’t be able to defend 
yourself. Like, I think something is true, but how can I prove it? The death of this 
 
59 He is referring to a public controversy in 2017 over the erasing of the graffiti in one of São Paulo’s main 
avenues, by the then conservative mayor, João Dória. 
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[Supreme Court] Justice, [for instance]. When it happened I posted on Facebook: 
‘These folks [leftist politicians investigated in the Car Wash Operation] have luck, 
everyone dies in the most fitting moments, these fellows are lucky’. What was that, 
man? Way too much of a coincidence. But we are in their hands [the investigated 
politicians]. It’s no use, sometimes there is no use in lashing out. 
 
Like Gael, Alex is also suspicious of the sudden death of Justice Zavaski. However, suggesting 
that the judge was murdered, and that this was organized by the politicians harmed by the 
investigations he presided over, might put him at risk, he seems to assume. Thus, Alex prefers to 
position himself in irony, underlining the coincidence (“lucky people”/“people of luck”) to highlight 
the absurdity of the idea that Zavaski’s death was a coincidence. Here, irony, arguably, plays the 
political role of “protective cover of indirection” (Hutcheon, 2003, p. 15): he said something without 
saying it. Behind Alex’s actions there appears to be the assumption that what he writes on his private 
Facebook timeline could potentially be seen by anyone, regardless of his wishes, which is consistent 
with the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. This sort of regime, Alex appears to imagine, benefits the 
“left” – the group that might hunt him down were he to say exactly what he believes about the death 
of Zavaski (recall his quote on leftists using “big data” to monitor platforms in Section 6.41). 
 
Others seem to believe that even irony is too risky and prefer to resort to a different kind of 
rhetorical disguise – subtlety. The politically progressive nurse Patricia was one of the interviewees 
most concerned about the possibility of being observed by others on Facebook. However, being 
monitored by politicians was the least of her worries: 
 
[8.12] Mostly my boss, I know she sees. The girls who are friends with her [the boss], they 
have everyone on Facebook precisely to keep an eye on us. They had never ‘liked’ 
anything I published. [But one day] when I posted about a restaurant, [one of the 
friends commented]: ‘Look at this, boss’. Then I said… wow! I mean… In the same way 
that I see things I don’t like, I know they might be seeing. I know that there is a lot of 
people who see what I post. Everyone is watching. 
 
Even when end users do not “like” her posts, Patricia “knows” that “everyone is”, at least 
potentially, “watching”. This might be interpreted as another facet of the uncontrollable visibility 
imaginary, according to which end users can systematically exploit Facebook’s end user interface or, 
in Patricia’s words, “keep an eye on” her. This possibility is crucial to understanding how she has 
constructed her civic voice on Facebook since the beginning of the crisis: 
 
[8.13] My voice itself, I don’t put it [on Facebook]. I’m afraid of losing my job. People are 
mostly super conservative. People are conflating things. What if my boss sees it and 
says, ‘Patricia might be a Petista, unionised, may sue the hospital, organize a strike’. 
I’m afraid. But they don’t know much about politics, so if I post one thing or another, 
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they don’t realize. [It was] Christmas season, and I wrote: ‘So many kids asking for lots 
of gifts, and my son only asked for a coloured pencils set’. More than 100 people 
‘liked’. You see, it was a political post, but very much between the lines. Those who 
understood it, understood. Those who didn’t found it cute. You have to find an 
opening. We do politics all the time. It’s not about hoisting a flag but showing who we 
are. 
 
Instead of being “explicit”, Patricia may post “one thing or another” in a way that her work 
colleagues will not “realize” is political. In her example, when she talked about not buying expensive 
gifts for her son, she managed to position herself as critical of consumerism, thus, of capitalism and 
somewhere on the left of the political spectrum. However, it generated no controversy because this 
positioning was constructed as subtle – to be read “between the lines”. 
 
In addition to her conception of the platform’s visibility regime as uncontrollable, is, again, an 
understanding of her civic voice as relatively precarious. She suggested that, since 2014, when the 
political crisis deepened, people had begun to conflate the professional and the political. As a leftist, 
she appears to consider herself part of an ideological minority, unable to effectively challenge the 
actions of those others. Work colleagues were conceived of “mostly” as conservatives, a little ignorant 
of politics and willing to punish her professionally solely because they disagree with her political 
leanings. Subtlety seems to be employed to try to strike a balance between protecting her job 
(particularly at a moment of economic crisis) and maintaining the possibility of expressing her civic 
voice in minimal accordance with her civic self-understanding (“it’s about… showing who we are”). 
 
Misleading others about who they are or exerting a disguised voice were arguably forms of 
obfuscation, whereby interviewees concealed their voices by representing themselves in particular 
ways (and not, for instance, by using technology – see e.g. Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2015); however, 
they also described more literal forms of invisibilization, as discussed in the next four sections. 
 
8.3.3. ‘Don’t be Sexist, Homophobic, Patriarchalist’: Visibility Reduction Through Voice Correction 
Artur, the documentarist, told me that he talks differently about politics because of who, in 
his mind, observes him on the platform. He said, in an ironic tone: 
 
[8.14] Facebook has become an amazing bubble of liberal progressive left people... So I’m 
mega careful, in particular in relation to things I agree with. I’m a defender of the gay 
movement, LGBT, women, human rights. [But] folks are vigilant. If you make a joke 
that might be considered sexist, folks will attack you, and rightly so. They won’t spare 
you just because you’re their friend. I try to be careful because I think that these 
movements are sometimes radical. But I’m in favour of their radicality. So I think our 
role as White, highly-educated, middle-class men is to police ourselves and be very 
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careful with what we say. Don’t be sexist, don’t be homophobic, don’t be 
patriarchalist, don’t exclude anyone in any way. Because sometimes, unintentionally, 
you might exclude someone, some group… Like, if I’m posting something defending 
the MST [Movimento Rural Sem-Terra, a social movement that advocates for access 
to land in Brazil], is this comment defending the MST in detriment to another 
population? Who doesn’t do this, is at risk [of being attacked by fellow leftists]. 
 
Artur reported being “mega careful”, avoiding being “sexist”, “homophobic”, “patriarchal” 
and – more generally – excluding. As if ticking off a mental check list of possible problems, he makes 
sure to “police” himself. That is, under other visibility conditions, he could say “things” 
“unintentionally” that he, in fact, disagrees with. But not on Facebook. Artur seems to believe that his 
posts will appear to those within his “amazing bubble of liberal leftists”. As he explained at another 
moment in our interview (see Excerpt 6.17), this “bubble” is related to an “algorithm” that is designed 
to “please him” by presenting him with what he has previously interacted with, an assumption that 
seems consistent with the predictive visibility imaginary. This imaginary orients him to imagine a well-
defined group of observers of his posts: friends who are part of “the gay movement, LGBT, women, 
human rights”. In conjunction with this imaginary is the implicit understanding that these others were 
willing to criticize him. As he said, “folks are vigilant”. This seems to indicate a different consequence 
of a polarized political climate: one might be attacked not only by opponents for being on the opposite 
side, but also by allies for not expressing a sufficiently progressive civic voice. Similar to Helena in the 
context of her “fundamentalist” conservative readers (Excerpt 7.15), any deviation in the coherence 
of Artur’s civic voice may become a reason for criticism, he assumes. However, if these criticisms were 
threatening, it was because of his ambivalence in relation to how he conceives his own voice. Despite 
a desire to be a hard-core progressive, Artur saw himself as “at risk” of contradicting his own values – 
by being sexist, for instance. The shadow of an unforgiving ideological “bubble” seems to remind him 
to hone his impure edges, destabilizing and reconstructing the meaning of what being a good citizen 
means for him. 
 
Self-invisibilization may also take the form of protective deletion. 
 
8.3.4. ‘This One I Deleted’: Visibility Reduction Through Voice Deletion 
In addition to carefully considering whether he should expose his face on Facebook, as 
discussed above, Fabio sometimes deletes political posts from the platform: 
 
[8.15] The other day I posted something about the husband of my wife’s boss. They are of a 
different [ideological] bunch, voted for Dória [the then conservative Mayor of São 
Paulo]. Then I thought, ‘oh, no, fuck, no, I spoke about him without saying his name, 
but [clearly] was about him’. This one I deleted. But it’s rare. 
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Fabio deleted his post because he feared the conservative husband of his wife’s boss could 
see a post in which Fabio had made an indirect political joke about him. There was no clear reason for 
him to think that this would happen (he was not Fabio’s “friend” on Facebook”), or that his wife’s boss 
or her husband would understand the joke as being about him. Yet Fabio seemed to assume that, on 
Facebook, it is virtually impossible to know who sees or does not see a post. And he had a lot to lose, 
he said. When we spoke, Fabio had just been fired from a company whose revenue had nosedived 
due to the Brazilian recession. His wife had become the sole earner in the household. Consequently, 
the mere chance of upsetting his wife’s boss became too risky.  
 
Other physical dangers were also discussed. I met Telma, the musician, in the squat where she 
was living with her partner and an 18-month-old baby boy. Telma was politically progressive and, 
some time earlier, had embarked on a bitter inbox discussion with a former boss who, since Dilma 
Rousseff’s impeachment, had “freaked out” and “became a far-rightist". During the course of this 
acrimonious discussion, the former boss had copied Telma’s profile picture, which showed her with 
her son, and “edited it to add a “#Bolsonaro2018 frame” 60 on it and then “shared it”. “It was a 
persecution!”, she said. 
 
[8.16] I’ve done it [deleted a post]. But it was more because I was afraid of exposing my son. 
[The post] was about feminism. These anti-feminist guys are really aggressive. I think 
they might come and get me in my house. I do my best to not publish my location and 
stuff. But there’s always that dumb relative who goes [and posts in her timeline]: ‘Hey, 
Telma, when are you coming to visit us in the city X’? I’m not afraid of them [the 
government], I’m afraid of people who can strike me more directly. 
 
Like Benjamin (Excerpt 8.4) and Maria (Excerpt 8.9), Telma feared physical harm for expressing 
her civic voice (“they might get me in my house”). She considers opponents of feminism to be 
particularly “aggressive” – an assumption likely informed by Brazil’s sexism (Section 2.2). Apparently 
based on the uncontrollable visibility imaginary, Telma believes that users have no say over how 
others talk about them on the platform, as even a well-intentioned “relative” can inadvertently reveal 
someone’s geographical location. Implicit in her description is an understanding of how motherhood 
might put her at further risk – in particular, when talking about feminism. It seems that, had she been 
the only person at risk, she would not have deleted the post. However, as a mother, she had much 
more to lose. 
 
 
60 A Facebook picture frame used by supporters of the then far-right candidate for the 2018 presidential 
elections, Jair Bolsonaro. 
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Next, I analyse cases in where the invisibilization comes before the voice is expressed. 
 
8.3.5. ‘Maybe Now I’ll Be More Careful’: Visibility Reduction Through Voice Suppression 
From the accounts described above, the deletion of a political post appears to be a costly 
action, only taken if negative consequences are otherwise expected. The suppression of civic voice 
expressions, on the other hand, seems to respond to multiple presumptions. Take, for example, 
Octavio, the cultural producer. At the time of my fieldwork, a conservative mayor had just been 
elected to govern the small city where he lives, one hour from São Paulo. Octavio, who is gay, wanted 
to continue to be a member of a municipal council where citizens discuss LGBT issues. When we met, 
he was wondering whether he should criticize the mayor: 
 
[8.17] Maybe now, the way I’ll talk about the city, I’ll be more careful. Until I have more 
contact with the people of this new municipal administration, so I can know my limits. 
I want to be in this role [in the municipal council]… It could be that much of this fear 
is just me thinking I’m more important [than he actually is]. But it can be the opposite. 
We are walking in the wire – to what extent we are observed or [if] it’s an arrogance 
to think that we are been observed. But the [new] mayor recently greeted a leftist 
and called her by her name. And he had never had any contact with her, he was not 
in her Facebook. And he greeted her by the name, he knew who she was. 
Governments create these [fake] profiles, they do monitor. It’s so simple. 
 
In the above excerpt, the uncontrollable visibility imaginary takes the form of a government’s 
ability to create fake profiles to “monitor” certain individuals. Implied in this description is not only 
how Facebook’s visibility regime works, but also the idea that politicians could be actively spying on 
citizens. This suggests that this kind of activity could also be a part of local level politicians’ repertoires; 
after all, it is so “simple” to do, he said. 
 
For Octavio, it seems, this sort of monitoring is easy, but not necessarily employed. He 
reflected that considering himself as being monitored is perhaps a self-centred fantasy, an “arrogant” 
understanding of his own voice. At the same time, Octavio appeared to wonder why the mayor 
greeted someone whom he had never met before by name. Due to the assumed possibility of 
monitoring, people like him have to live with this ambivalence, deciding for themselves when to 
attend to the possibility of dataveillance and the harms it might entail – to “walk on the wire”, as he 
put it. In his description, what seems to trigger his doubts is the possibility that, as an aspiring member 
of the new LGBT municipal council, he might well be one of the new mayor’s targets for monitoring. 
It is precisely this prospect of developing an “important” civic voice that reminds him of the risks 
involved in his attempt to develop an “important” civic voice, I suggest. 
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Rafael, the conservative undergraduate law student, also thinks that “surely, political 
monitoring is a very common thing”. However, he had even darker notions about politicians: 
 
[8.18] I avoid posting about drugs. PT [Workers’ Party] for instance, is a party with strong 
connections with Comando Vermelho61 [Red Command, one of the largest criminal 
organizations in Brazil]. I fear [leftists parties will see], I fear what might happen. This 
is heavy stuff, drugs, drug trafficking. And over time, I would deepen [his posts on it]. 
Because I’m like this: when I start to talk about something, I go deep. 
 
Crucial to his reported decision not to discuss the alleged relation of leftist parties to organized 
crime, is his assumption that these parties are violent and, arguably, willing to harm him physically. 
While this might not happen to everyone, but could happen to him. He understands himself to be the 
kind of citizen who, when he starts to talk about this kind of “heavy” topic, will “go deep” and 
eventually become “someone” who is targeted by “political monitoring”. Similar to Octavio’s example, 
there is the understanding of how the importance of his civic voice might render it risky. By not saying 
everything that he wants to say, he may at least be able to continue saying some things without fear. 
 
If political parties were understood by some as able to be physically violent, it is not surprising 
that fear of police violence is related to civic voice suppression. Consider what Miguel, the public policy 
student, told me: 
 
[8.19] Once I witnessed a situation of police abuse against some young men. We were in the 
same bus stop. The cops first searched [the men], then they hit them and ended up 
breaking the arm of one of the kids. Then I made a post about it. [But] I thought that 
if the policemen saw [Miguel’s post] they could retaliate against me, but I didn’t want 
to stay silent either. So, I didn’t say where it happened, I just said that I witnessed a 
case like this and that and published. I think I was able to convey the message, but 
these people [the policemen] will never be punished. 
 
I then asked how he thought the police could see his post: 
[8.20] Someone could have a common friend, and this person could end up seeing [the post], 
or someone could see and show it to the police. Not to harm me, but to demand some 
explanation. 
 
Miguel’s depicted project is similar to Benjamin’s (Excerpt 8.4 above) in that both attempted 
to reduce the reach of a text about police abuse. However, instead of intentionally trying to reduce 
the chances of being seen, as Benjamin did, Miguel suppressed geographical details that could lead to 
the identification of the perpetrators of the abuse. Like Benjamin, Miguel appeared to try to retain 
 
61 There are no evidences to support this allegation. 
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the ability of expressing his voice (“I didn’t want to be silent”) while avoiding the possibility of suffering 
“retaliations”. While the post might not lead the policemen to be “punished” (i.e. Miguel will not be 
fully heard), it might manage to “convey” a “message” of how gratuitous police violence can be in 
Brazil, particularly towards certain people. However, it is not that the police necessarily monitor him 
on the platform: visibility might occur through an accidental link between his and others’ networks, 
or a dynamic that has little to do with Facebook. This is exemplified in his fear that one of his own 
friends might read his post and contact the police to “demand an explanation” – similar to the idea of 
“someone who knows someone” explored in Section 6.4.1. The idea of policemen as willing to 
“retaliate” against a critical citizen is, in turn, linked, at least partially, to Miguel’s civic self-
understanding. While not Black, he comes from a poor area of greater São Paulo. Like Benjamin, he 
takes believes that police violence against people like him in Brazil often is gratuitous and goes 
unchallenged. 
 
So far, these projects of visibility reduction through self-invisibilization refer to human 
observers. Consider, however, what the real estate agent Antonio told me: 
 
[8.21] If you heavily criticize politicians, it [Facebook] deletes [the post]. If I was to say what 
I really think, what I think of Brazil’s politics… [he would be blocked]. That [Supreme 
Court Justice] Gilmar Mendes had to be in jail [for instance]. 
 
Most of my conversation with Antonio was devoted to his debasing of all major Brazilian 
politicians – except Jair Bolsonaro, whom he supported. Not all criticisms could be voiced on Facebook, 
though, he said: the platform would “delete” them, “block” his profile and prevent him from saying 
anything at all. Thus, he prefers to just supress some of his thoughts. However, his description implies 
that the expected act of external invisibilization that prompted his own invisibilization is governed by 
a kind of political censorship that is typical of the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. Antonio appeared 
to assume that “Facebook” is somehow able to discern the tone and topic of the post and take down 
only those which express “heavy” political criticism. 
  
The descriptions about civic voice suppression analysed in this section relate to actions 
enabled by the implicit understanding that, on Facebook, one has ultimately no control over how one 
is read or seen. However, there may be other social imaginaries at play. For instance, Ava, a junior 
marketer who fiercely defended feminism on her Facebook profile and had led in-person workshops 
on the topic, told me: 
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[8.22] I take into consideration my security. Some things I don’t feel comfortable talking 
about [on Facebook]. Feminism – it can be really dangerous. We get death threats, 
pictures of women being murdered with a note: ‘This can happen to you’. Topics that 
are more impactful I don’t talk about on social media. I talk about them during my 
workshops, which is a safer situation for me. To talk about rape [for instance], which 
I think is very basic, it needs to be talked about, by everyone. But it’s too big a taboo. 
It’s dangerous to talk about [rape]. I would not like to have to wear to so many 
armours, to need so many armours. It’s unfair. But I have to go in baby steps, so as to 
not cause more holes than I already cause. Because any small comma that you say, it 
might go viral, and it might [create a] backlash against you. 
 
Ava’s project is costly to her. Although convinced that “impactful” topics such as rape “need 
to be talked about, by everyone”, she feels compelled to wear “armours” and supress these themes. 
This project might be “unfair”, she surmises, but at least it avoids her being exposed to misogynist 
hatred and receiving death threats. Underlying this project is the assumption that, on Facebook, a 
civic voice expression can go “viral” even if its author does not want it to. As seen in Section 8.2.3, 
virality seems situated at the limits of the predictive and uncontrollable visibility imaginaries. 
Combined with these assumptions on how the platform governs visibility is, yet again, an assumption 
that some end users might be eager to harass and, possibly, physically harm her. There is also a civic 
self-understanding of being socially vulnerable, incapable of avoiding these menaces without being 
supressed. 
 
A second example of how the predictive visibility imaginary might inform the suppression of 
civic voice was given by Adão, the high-school teacher. According to him, his professional life 
influenced his decision to “omit” certain ideas: 
 
[8.23] In 2014, I used to write things that were a little angrier. Then, some colleagues, former 
teachers, began to say: ‘Gosh, why are you so angry at Dilma [Rousseff, the impeached 
president]?’ People would tell me: ‘Adão, don’t you think that your criticisms weaken 
the government and help the enemy [conservatives]?’ I realized: this is going to taint 
me. So, what did I do? I omitted myself. It’s not that I wrote things I didn’t agree with, 
I just didn’t write at all. 
 
At different moments in our conversation, Adão talked about how “bubbles” are created by 
both the frequency of his interactions with others and his boundary making actions (“block”, 
“unfollow”, “unfriend” – see Excerpt 5.13). This understanding, consistent with both the predictive 
and controllable visibility imaginaries, seems to underlie his voice suppression. Those who could 
“taint” Adão were not violent policemen, authoritarian politicians or aggressive misogynists, but 
“former teachers” who were on the same ideological side and interacted with his posts, but did not 
necessarily agree with all the expressions of his civic voice. At the same time, given that these same 
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people could potentially be helpful for his career in the future, it was not advisable to cut them off 
(e.g. “block” them). That is, they were, at least in 2014, a dissonant part of what Adão thought of as 
his “bubble”. The presumption that these individuals could, indeed, undermine his professional goals 
is at least partially related to a political climate where dissent within the same ideological camp seems 
understood as favouring “the enemy”. In addition, there is his standing before these “former 
teachers”: the vulnerability of his civic voice seems to derive from a professional inequality. At the 
time of the visibility reduction project he narrated, Adão was a young doctoral student who wanted 
to be an academic. Those “teachers” were already within academia, people who could decide whether 
he would be able to find a job.  
 
Next, I analyse accounts about how end users may at times try to make their civic voices 
disappear completely from Facebook. 
 
8.3.6. ‘I’m Cutting Myself Out of It’: Visibility Reduction Through Voice Disappearance  
 Above, I discussed how Gael employed irony to try to the reconstruct his civic individuality 
within the assumed sameness of his “bubble”. However, later in our conversation, Gael said he was 
increasingly sceptical of Facebook as a space to talk about politics: 
 
[8.24] I’m cutting myself out of it. I kind of accepted that fascism is coming. People’s level of 
hatred is so high that is has become like a sewer that must spill over. I believe 
Facebook doesn’t cause it, but it amplifies it, you know? The bubble exacerbates it. 
 
I then asked if he felt that he was heard on the platform, to which he replied: 
 
[8.25] Oh, no, no damn way. There are so many [voices], one more voice is very little. People 
hear me, you know, but because it’s fun. I don’t think it causes any real change. In my 
personal profile it’s 60 ‘likes’, five ‘shares,’ max. [And] those who hear me are the 
people who already agree with me. It’s kind of impossible, when you think about it. 
It’s easier to be heard in-person. In those neighbourhood meetings, as it’s a 
geographic community, there’re people from all sides, and you’re like sitting at the 
square’s benches, and then you have some cool discussions. Over there, people will 
say, ‘I’m in favour of the death penalty,’ and, ‘oh, OK, let’s discuss’. You can talk to 
people, look at their eyeball. Now, if I say that death penalty is an absurd [on 
Facebook], I’ll be heard by those who already think like this. The revengeful folks [who 
approve of death penalty], they won’t’ [listen]. 
 
Gael’s visibility reduction project is one of inaction. What apparently drives his plan to “cut” 
himself “out” is an informed fatalism: the “wave” of “fascism is coming” and there is nothing he can 
do about it. Of interest to me is the role played by Facebook’s imagined visibility regime in his project. 
Gael is talking again about “bubbles” – an element, which, as described above, brings together the 
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predictive and the controllable visibility imaginaries. For him, his “bubble” might “hear” him, as 
evidenced by some dozens of “likes” and “shares” his posts usually receive. However, this did not 
translate into his feeling heard. These people, he said, “already agree” with him. Being recognized as 
a citizen would involve bringing about some kind of political change, which would require his 
modifying the opinion of those outside his “bubble” – “the revengeful folks” who disagree with him. 
 
The importance of his imaginary of Facebook’s visibility regime was demonstrated in his 
comparison between the platform and a different political space – a group of people he meets 
frequently to discuss neighbourhood issues. In these in-person interactions, guided by a 
“geographical”, as he said, not algorithmic logic, it is much easier to see and be seen and, thus, to 
convince others of his point of view – as he said, to “be heard”. It seems, then, that Gael’s wanting to 
stop talking about politics on Facebook is not because he imagines the platform’s regime as allowing 
a bunch of “revengeful” others to uncontrollably see and interact with him. Instead, the regime 
creates an unsurmountable distance from these others. In creating “bubbles”, Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility regime renders civic voices useless – at least according to Gael’s understanding of what it 
means to be heard. 
 
Consider, also, the case of the copywriter Humberto. He is a transgender man who became 
involved in politics in 2013, at the onset of the Brazilian political crisis. At the time, Humberto 
identified as a gay woman, but, over time, he came to understand himself as a man. Then, the two 
processes – the Brazilian crisis and his individual identity transformation – became fused in his online 
activities. When I asked him how he participated politically on Facebook, he said: “My biggest political 
participation was that I transitioned online, in the social network, publicly”. This involved posting texts 
about his own experience, about transgender politics, communicating with other transgender men 
and, crucially, exposing his new physical self in pictures. Being a transgender person was one of 
Humberto’s most important expressions of civic voice. When we spoke, though, he had “stopped using 
social media just for the sake of using it”: 
 
[8.26] I’m learning how to deal more intelligently with social media, [with] more autonomy 
in relation to how I expose myself. Be smarter with my image, my security. I’m very 
vulnerable on social media, because there’re these people, these right-wingers. 
Today, I’m marked on social media. Anything I publish gets me blocked for 30 days. 
One of my posts, it had no image, but I was blocked for ‘nudity’. I’m quite persecuted. 
My page was taken down because of hackers’ attacks. Since my pictures have 
circulated many times, in the same day Facebook finds it and blocks [he]. It’s not 
about me [original emphasis], but somehow I feel much more monitored. Social 
media are very hostile to me. I can’t show myself as I like, as I see myself, as I want to 
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show myself to friends. Facebook is not an egalitarian experience, in particular to 
transgender bodies. Going to the beach, to the swimming pool – it’s hard work for 
me. And then, when I do go I want to take a picture, I want to post it on Face[book], 
and I can’t. Any small thing attracts lots of haters, so it’s a hostile place. I can’t, my 
identity is not complete. It’s a halved experience.  
 
Like Gael’s, Humberto’s project is one of inaction. At the time of our conversation, he was 
“learning” how use the platform only as a tool to organize in-person events. On the one hand, he 
assumes that “haters” constantly flag up his pictures, leading the moderation system to take these 
photos down – what, given the idea of an interactional link between past and present, is consistent 
with the predictive visibility imaginary. On the other hand, Facebook has learned to “find” and read 
his naked torso as a necessary breach of community standards. Consequently, it will unilaterally and 
automatically take down his posts – consistent with the uncontrollable visibility imaginary. By being 
incapable of controlling how he is seen and read in the platform, Humberto appeared to had lost the 
ability to be heard on the platform in a way that is minimally respectful of the intertwining between 
his civic voice and gender (“I can’t show myself… it’s a hostile place”). This reported sense of 
inadequacy between his civic self-understanding and imagined visibility regime can be understood as 
an example of the platform’s well-known failure to accept transgender people’s specificities (see e.g. 
Koebler & Cox), a failure that cannot be disentangled from the acute level of prejudice transgender 
individuals suffer in all instances of their lives, particularly in Brazil (Section 2.2). 
 
Whether Gael and Humberto will be able to stay away from political posts on Facebook is a 
reasonable question since, as other interviewees told me, doing politics on Facebook can be 
understood as “addictive”. In fact, having a break from this “addiction” is the reason why the video-
maker Amanda sometimes tried to stop expressing her civic voice on Facebook completely: 
 
[8.27] You log in to see one thing, suddenly you are seeing something else. It’s a bit... I think 
that this what the algorithm is for. Because you see something, and below there’s 
something else about the same topic, and then you start to click in lots of links. When 
you realize, you’ve lost half-hour in it. On Facebook I can’t stop talking about politics, 
it’s like an addiction. It’s insane. If you’re on it, it seems as if you want to remain there, 
more and more, like an endless thing. It’s because I can’t help but feel outraged by 
things, so I want to fight. Sometimes I feel intoxicated on Facebook, then I get out of 
São Paulo, to disconnect. To disconnect I need to either be outside of my house or out 
of São Paulo. My mobile phone is prepaid, so I rarely have credits, [her data plan] ends 
up rather quickly, then I have to do something else, go to the beach, have a real life. 
 
For Amanda, it is not enough (or possible) to merely filter out politics from her Facebook 
activities: she feels obliged to “disconnect” totally. This might entail purposefully leaving São Paulo or, 
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at the very least, her home. On these occasions, the limited connectivity of her pre-paid mobile phone 
prevents her from accessing Facebook. 
 
The drastic nature of these measures is described by her as proportional response to the 
platform’s attempts to prod her into exerting her civic voice (“I can’t stop talking about politics… it 
seems you want more and more”). In her account, this sort of perceptible nudging operates through 
an “algorithm” designed to offer a never-ending stream of pleasant content and keep her glued to the 
platform – which is consistent with the predictive visibility imaginary. However, the “algorithm” can 
produce this “kind of addiction” because it is described as coupled with Amanda’s reported inability 
not to feel “outraged” by the “things” she sees on the platform – not to want to “fight for [what is 
right]”. This, in her case, is linked to Brazil’s inequalities. 
 
Either ex-ante (voice suppression and disappearance) or ex-post (deletion), the self-
invisibilizations described in the last three sections are characterized by the withholding of civic voice 
expressions that participants would like to convey were it not for probability that such communication 
could be harmful to them. The last part of the chapter explores descriptions about why users reported 
not wanting to engage in visibility reduction projects. 
 
8.4. Rejecting Visibility Reduction Projects 
 Many participants talked about not enacting at least certain visibility reduction projects. This 
section identifies two main reported reasons behind these decisions: the idea that reducing the 
visibility of one’s civic voice expressions is unnecessary and/or unacceptable. 
 
8.4.1. ‘I’m Not Instigating Any Revolution’: Visibility Reduction as an Unnecessary Project 
 For some interviewees, the fact that malicious state agents could be able to read and see their 
civic voice expressions on Facebook did not appear as a deterrent. Julia, the freelance journalist, said: 
 
[8.28] I’m not instigating any revolution, any protest, directly. So, I’m not really worried. 
 
As it became clear at multiple moments of our conversation, Julia seemed to assume that, on 
Facebook, as in the Internet more generally, “everything” she does is observed by “someone” (see 
Excerpt 6.10). This implicit understanding – consistent with the uncontrollable visibility imaginary – 
did not, however, change her civic voice expressions. In her mind, these expressions do not instigate 




Other participants declared they had very little to gain from enacting this sort of project. For 
instance, Maria, the event organizer, said: 
 
[8.29] It never happened [a job interview]. Have a look at the stuff I say on my videos and 
tell me – who is going to give me a job? If it’s very hard for anyone, imagine how hard 
it’s for me. Any HR [department] sees it, logically. I’m screwed. [But won’t censor her 
actions because] even if I delete [her posts and videos], there will be something 
somewhere [in the Internet]. So, I won’t [delete or stop talking about politics]. Once 
you’re in [politics], you can’t go back. 
 
Maria said that her videos on politics, in which she curses and mocks both progressives and 
moderate conservatives, cannot simply be deleted by her, even if she wanted to do so. Coupled with 
the assumption that recruiters not only “logically” do online searches about job candidates but also 
are unwilling to hire individuals from her ideological leaning, this other instantiation of the 
uncontrollable visibility imaginary (similar to concerns addressed by debates on the “right to be 
forgotten”62) has rendered Maria unemployable (“who is going to give me a job?”) – or so she seems 
to believe. The damage has already been done – so why bother to curb her voice?, she seems to ask 
herself. The dancer Lorena provided a similar, but gloomier description. 
 
[8.30] Oh yeah [the police monitor her]. So far nothing has happened – but I know one day 
it may happen. Of course, I would be pissed if the police arrested me arbitrarily and 
killed me. It’s possible, but I won’t stop talking. Because this [police violence] can 
happen if I’m in a street protest, or if I’m just sitting over there and they don’t like my 
guts and decide to arrest me. So, like, I’m not afraid of the state because the state can 
murder me in many ways. 
 
Lorena’s disinterest in limiting the visibility of her voice is not related to her inability to truly 
erase her online presence (like Maria) or to her apparent irrelevance of her civic voice (like Julia). The 
point for her is that she would be at risk even if she never spoke on Facebook. As a Black woman who 
dares to talk about politics, Lorena might be violently repressed “in many ways” – monitoring 
Facebook is just one and, arguably, a minor gateway to this risk. The police might kill her “in a protest… 
just sitting over there”, she said, pointing to a public square next to the bar where we were talking. 
There is nothing to be gained from reducing her visibility on Facebook because she cannot imagine 
herself a proper citizen. 
 
 
62 See Jones (2018) for an ample discussion on this topic. 
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Other interviewees seemed to believe that, while Facebook’s visibility regime allows for 
dataveillance, those who would want to engage in such practice are technically incapable of doing so. 
Pedro, the publishing company employee, provided an example of this assumption. He told me that 
he is sure that Facebook data is exploited by state agents – but not Brazilian state agents. 
 
[8.31] No, not in Brazil. I can’t see the expertise for this. For instance, they haven’t managed 
to decrypt those WhatsApp chats for the Car Wash [Operation]. And it’s a national 
issue, everyone is paying attention to it. I also think that Facebook would not do it 
[cooperate]. About this, I’m not that paranoid. I won’t lie – it can happen. But I don’t 
see Brazil[’s state agents] as having the expertise to do it.  
 
If Pedro is not “that paranoid” about being monitored by state agents it is because “Brazil” 
did not have the “expertise” to exploit Facebook data – unless Facebook cooperates, which it “would 
not”, he said. Pedro compares this possibility to federal prosecutors’ inability to decrypt some crucial 
WhatsApp data in the course of the Car Wash Operation. If digital data could not be retrieved in that 
“national” situation, to which “everyone is paying attention”, it is unlikely that something similar could 
be done with Facebook data, Pedro appears to assume. Therefore, trying to invisibilise himself is 
unnecessary. For other interviewees, restraining their civic voice expressions seems to be too costly, 
as I show next. 
 
8.4.2. ‘I Have to Make this Comment’: Visibility Reduction as an Unacceptable Project 
When I asked Octavio if his political participation on Facebook was influenced by his 
assumption that he is observed, the cultural producer said: 
 
[8.32] I can’t really understand the scale of this control but I wouldn’t be able to leave this 
space. Because these contacts, these accesses don’t exist in this other, nonvirtual 
world. Talking like this I may sound fearless. But I’m not fearless. The thing is – some 
things you can choose. Others are not choices. I’m read as Black – no choice. I’m read 
as gay. So, I can’t say: ‘Oh, I won’t engage in this struggle, I won’t make this post, 
won’t make this comment’. I have to make this comment [original emphasis]. 
 
His description is one in which dataveillance is as uncontrollable as it is hard to “understand”. 
He suggests that the only way to avoid this “control” would be to leave Facebook, but that this is not 
an option. Through the platform, he has established political “contacts” and “accesses” that exist only 
on the platform. Without these “contacts” and “accesses”, it would become harder for him to resist 
others’ “reading” of him as of an inferior race and holding a deviant sexual orientation. These assumed 
prejudices, which did not originate from the platform’s visibility regime, leave him with “no choice” 
but to “engage in this struggle” by posting and commenting. 
 189 
 
Other participants provided similar descriptions. When asked if he tried to reduce the visibility 
of his posts, undergraduate law student Rafael told me: 
 
[8.33] Before, yes, I’d avoid talking harshly about feminism because I was hanging out with 
a girl who is a feminist. I knew she would get sad. But in the last months [when he got 
more involved in politics], I’ve changed. That [his Facebook profile] is my 
environment, and if it bothers someone, this person can ‘unfollow’ me. 
 
Rafael seems to have a nuanced story of self-invisibilization. He did it once for affective 
reasons. However, as he became more involved in politics, he stopped doing so. It seems that his civic 
self-understanding, due likely to the context of the crisis, has become too important to be restricted. 
Unlike Octavio, Rafael – who is a White middle-class man – did not relate the need to exert critical 
voice uncompromisingly to fight an injustice. His account denotes a need to affirm his values such as 
honesty and gender conservatism, I propose. 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
 This chapter addressed SRQ 3.2, which asks whether participants try to reduce their visibility 
on Facebook and whether/how these attempts affect their civic voice expressions. The first part of 
the chapter discussed descriptions of projects whose actions did not interfere with the expression of 
their civic voice. I described (re)categorization of others (Section 8.2.1) as using “Privacy Settings” 
functionalities to stop some individuals from seeing some posts; space shifting (Section 8.2.2) as 
moving across different locations on the platform’s interface to effectuate the same kind of control; 
and tactical delays (Section 8.2.3) as timing posts to avoid their going unexpectedly viral. More 
frequent were depictions of projects that did involve some form of transformation of civic voice 
expressions. These transformations, examined in the second part of the chapter, included changes to 
who is speaking by creating misleading profiles (Section 8.3.1), constructions of ironic and subtle 
messages to conceal one’s real opinions (voice disguising, Section 8.3.2) or literal invisibilizations of 
one’s civic voice expressions. In some cases, interviewees described being vigilant about not 
expressing views that they thought could offend likeminded end users (voice correction, Section 8.3.3) 
and erasing (voice deletion, Section 8.3.4) or concealing (voice suppression, (Section 8.3.5) posts that 
could potentially be harmful to themselves. Others talked about voice disappearance (Section 8.3.6) 
projects, that is, when they seemingly tried to stop speaking about politics completely on Facebook. 
In the third and last part of the chapter, I examined two main reasons why participants reported not 
trying to reduce the visibility of their civic voice expressions on Facebook: that doing so is unnecessary 
(Section 8.4.1) and/or unacceptable (Section 8.4.2). 
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 In Chapter 9, the empirical findings examined in this and in the previous three chapters inform 
my attempt to conceptualize how Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime shapes civic voice as not 
only a civic action but as a form of civic self-understanding. In regard to the descriptions of visibility 
control projects specifically examined here and in Chapter 7, Section 9.4 returns to the concept of civic 
voice and prefiguration to propose a more general systematization of how imaginaries of Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime seem to lead interviewees to qualify (prefigure) certain kinds of civic 
expressions – and, ultimately, themselves – in certain ways. Or, put another way, how these 
imaginaries shape their process of civic becoming. This systematization (which I call prefiguration cycle 
of civic voice) allows me to cast light on the normative implications of these processes, conceptualized 

























Voice Through Silence 
 
9.1. Introduction 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 examined descriptions about how ordinary Brazilian citizens schematize 
Facebook’s visibility regime (Chapter 5), the social imaginaries they hold about this regime (Chapter 
6), and the ways in which these imaginaries allow them to try to control how their civic voices are 
heard on Facebook through projects that aimed at expanding (Chapter 7) or reducing (Chapter 8) their 
visibility. 
 
Here, I revisit the empirical findings from those chapters to further develop conceptual 
insights to advance current discussions on datafication power and its consequences for democracy. 
My argument is developed in four main parts. The first three follow, roughly, the sequencing and 
structure of the empirical chapters. Each begins with a brief overview of the theory that guided my 
data collection and analysis, summarizes the empirical findings and compares them to the literature 
on similar topics. I formulate my conceptual insights through iteration with the conceptual framework 
(and other theories), to address the sub research questions. The fourth and fifth parts build on these 
insights to consider the analytical and normative aspects that have emerged from my research. I begin 
by examining the findings in Chapter 5. 
 
9.2. The Conspicuous Invisibility of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regime 
My conceptual framework suggests that Facebook’s datafication power is exerted through a 
structure that I describe as an algorithmic visibility regime, composed of a combination of the vectors 
of sight (the patterns in what end users see on the news feed) and readability (the patterns related to 
how end users are read by the platform). This structure, I proposed, is employed to try to control end 
users’ actions toward itself by directing how they qualify (or prefigure) these actions with the aim of 
furthering the platform’s business model. This involves, primarily, the attempt to direct how end 
users’ make sense of the algorithmic visibility regime by materializing this regime in certain ways (see 
Table 3.1 in Section 3.6.2). In relation to the regime’s sight vector, it could be argued that Facebook 
tries to materialize a personalized news feed so as to attract end users’ attention; in the case of the 
readability vector, the platform apparently intends to materialize its infrastructure as inscrutable so 
as to deflect end users’ attention (and possible interference) from its inner workings, its infrastructure. 
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In the conceptual framework (Section 3.6.3), I suggested that understanding the ways in which 
end users reflect on these attempted materializations is the first step to investigate how the platform’s 
visibility regime is imagined and, thus, might shape civic voices. This refers to SRQ 1: How do ordinary 
end users schematize Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime? and was addressed in Chapter 5 (“The 
Schematization of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regime”). The notion of schematization (Section 
3.3.2) draws on the phenomenological perspective synthesized by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) which 
suggests that individuals construct schemas about the world by consciously and (often) socially 
experiencing that world. These experiences result in attention to certain areas of reality. Over time, 
individuals may identify patterns in these areas and develop certain “types”, that is, simplified models 
of aspects of the world. 
 
The findings examined in Chapter 5 (see Table 9.1 below and Appendix 7) suggest that the 
study participants seemed to describe three macro areas (composed of several micro areas) through 
which they developed schemas about Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime, which I labelled 
responses, information, and probing actions. 
 
Macro Areas  Micro Areas 
Responses 
 




• Changes in elements of news feeds 
• Own actions (on and off platform) 
• Other end users’ reactions (on and off 
platform) 
Information 




• Social Interaction 
 
• News feed visual elements 
• Books, movies, journalistic pieces, rumours 
• Work, pedagogical and private interactions 
• Page’s statistics about other end users 
Probing Actions 
 




• Changes in timelines 
• Other end users’ actions (on platform) 
• Results of surveys executed with the aid of 
an external software 
Table 9.1. Summary of empirical findings of Chapter 5. Source: Author. 
 
How do these empirical findings compare to the findings in the literature on similar processes? 
The evidence in Chapter 5 offers some interesting answers. The way individuals described making 
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sense of Facebook’s visibility regime through information that was not about Facebook itself (one 
example of the consumption of traditional media information) and the use of survey software by an 
interviewee to make sense of other end users (improvised survey), have not, to my knowledge, been 
investigated in the literature. At the same time, although they may not use the same theoretical 
vocabulary, several authors suggest that it is by making inferences about algorithmically curated news 
feeds, consuming some information and, less often, probing elements of datafied platforms, that end 
users tend to construct understandings about the functioning of Facebook (see Section 3.5.2). 
However, the conceptual framework proposed in this study allows these conjectures to be advanced 
by examining these findings vis-à-vis the platform’s datafication power. 
 
This study provides evidence to argue that, in designing a system whose pervasive datafication 
and machine learning algorithms seek to adapt to every datafied action, in order to predict what end 
users would like to see, Facebook does manage to materialize a highly personalized news feed. This is 
particularly evident in the case of observation of responses. Interviewees told me, multiple times, that 
they could see their news feeds adjusting in response to their actions – the accurate responses 
referred to in Table 9.1 and Section 5.2.2. They assumed that some of these shifts were responses to 
clicks on interface buttons, such as the “Block” button (e.g. Nicolas, Excerpt 5.23). More often, news 
feed adjustments were understood as consequences of actions that were not explicitly about visibility. 
Lorena’s observation of the shifts she could see in her newsfeed shifting appropriately to show her 
more content about Rio de Janeiro’s dancing scene, after she added dancers from that city as “friends” 
(Excerpt 5.4). Likewise, the identification of inaccurate responses seemed to emerge as contrasts to 
participants’ expectations of accuracy – and not as ruptures to a natural, unbiased order. For instance, 
initially, Vigo thought that Facebook’s algorithm “was about interaction”, but then concluded that, 
commonly, it was aimed at dividing ideologically opposed users (Excerpt 5.20). For Fernanda, the 
“change” in the “algorithm” became perceptible due to her default assumption that profile pictures 
would show up in her news feed only if they were changed, that is, interacted with by users (Excerpt 
5.21). 
 
Although obliquely, the findings regarding the consumption of information also suggest the 
success of this component of Facebook’s datafication power. Personalization is not an end in itself, as 
I pointed out in Section 3.6.2. Its goal is to lead end users to imagine that Facebook’s news feed is 
organized by a natural logic of “relevance”, which could make them qualify any action towards the 
news feed as “enticing”. I suggest that the multiplicity and pervasiveness of the information circulating 
about Facebook, attests to how deeply infiltrated into interviewees’ lives the platform has become – 
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a strong signal of how relevant Facebook appears to be understood by its end users. Multiple kinds of 
media content (books, news media pieces) and social interactions (affective, professional, pedagogic) 
were described as being about Facebook. Participants employed informational fragments, such as 
what an “algorithm” is (Nicolas, Excerpt 5.23), to make sense of the whole of the regime; they saw 
echoes of Facebook on narratives that were not about or were not directly linked to Facebook itself 
(Section 5.3.1); information provided by the platform’s built-in analytics (Section 5.3.2); and felt the 
need to read, circulate and believe in rumours (Excerpts 5.32 - 5.35) and conspiracy theories about 
the platform (Rafael, Excerpt 5.36) in order to make sense of it. It seems reasonable to claim that, had 
the platform not become so relevant, there would be much less interest in understanding its 
functioning. Of course, the importance of Facebook is not self-evident or unidirectional. As I observed 
in Section 5.3.1, the fieldwork was conducted less than a year after the Brexit referendum in the UK 
and only a few months after the election of Donald Trump as US President. As a result, there was 
frantic public discussion on how the platform, supposedly, might overturn democracy. Terms, such as 
“algorithm”, were escaping from the academic and technical realms and becoming popular “dirty 
words” (Reynolds, 2019). That is, experiences of information consumption, arguably, can be 
understood as both an outcome of the relevance of Facebook for billions of users and indicative of 
the importance assigned to it by other actors – politicians, journalists, researchers. Moreover, this 
relevance was linked to a myriad factors, such as network effects and regulation (or lack thereof), 
other than the nature of its main end user product (the news feed). 
 
The reported probing actions further illustrate the point about relevance. Daniel’s willingness 
to carry out an improvised survey of his readers to construct his own information (Excerpt 5.40) and 
Fabio’s and Rafael’s improvised algorithm audits (Excerpts 5.41 and 5.42, respectively) demanded a 
considerable amount of interest, some time and some labour. They had not only consumed 
information about Facebook and observed patterns of responses – they also cared enough about what 
was going on the platform to invent ways of testing its visibility regime, despite the possible problems 
associated to these tests. Fabio likely knew that posting images of nudity would lead the platform to 
block his account (he had faced a similar punishment in the past, he told me); in Rafael’s case, there 
was, arguably, a social cost to exposing his apparent lack of “likes”, by asking “friends” to react to his 
post. 
 
It might seem banal to conclude that Facebook’s news feed is materialized as personalized – 
an assumption that is not challenged in the literature. Nevertheless, in the light of my 
conceptualization of datafication power, this conclusion matters. On closer inspection, it is clear that 
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it is the very personalization of the news feed – and its likely consequences for assumptions about 
relevance – that undermine Facebook’s second control technique (which intends to render its 
infrastructure inscrutable). Again, this is clear in the reported experiences of observing responses. The 
sort of constantly updated personalization engendered by the platform’s algorithmic visibility regime 
appears to multiply the shifts in the patterns of content flowing through interviewees’ news feeds. In 
turn, these shifts increase the number of times they may establish connections between what they 
see on the news feed and their own actions. As these fleeting responses proliferate, it becomes less 
likely that they are mere flukes, or not noticeable. When asked how they had concluded that Facebook 
was reading their actions before deciding what to place in their news feed, almost all the interviewees 
pointed to these connections. As Theo (Excerpt 5.7) said: “We can’t think that everything works by 
chance”. The plasticity of the news feed – how the forms and content that appear on it constantly 
change over time – serves as perceivable seams in the hidden decisions made by the platform’s 
algorithmic infrastructure. Indeed, the more accurate the personalization, the easier it became for 
participants to realize that these responses could not be a “fluke”. Recall Artur’s idea that Facebook 
had tapped his smart phone to offer him a solar panel ad which left him “absurdly scared” (Excerpt 
5.9.). He seems to be asking, if Facebook knows about such an intimate wish, what might it not know? 
That is, the platform’s algorithmic visibility regime does appear to work as “‘a self-deforming cast that 
will continuously change from one moment to the other”, as much of the critical scholarship on 
datafication argues (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4, cited in Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 169; see also Yeung, 2017, 
and Zuboff, 2019, for similar arguments). However, instead of rendering its hidden mechanics 
imperceptible, this self-deforming cast makes them too evident to go unnoticed.  
 
Similarly, in becoming highly relevant, but not offering an official and all-encompassing 
explanation about its government of visibility,63 the platform likely incentivized (or facilitated) the 
consumption of conspiratorial, baseless and incomplete information about its inner workings – the 
origin of much of what I have termed uncontrollable visibility imaginary (to which I return in the next 
section). Unsurprisingly, none of the interviewees reported having schematized the regime due to 
information produced by Facebook itself – say, through an advertisement, message on the interface, 
or a press release. The silence about its regime is a fundamental part of the platform’s strategy to 
render its inner workings inscrutable. However, in doing this, Facebook relinquishes its ability to try 
to define how people talk about one of its core elements, I suggest. Probing actions, again, indicate a 
 
63 At least, this was the case at the time of my fieldwork. Section 10.4 discusses the potential temporal limitations 
of my conclusions. 
 196 
confluence of these unintended consequences – for instance, Fabio and Rafael had both consumed 
conspiratorial information about Facebook. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that Facebook’s datafication power exhibits an internal 
contradiction. On the one hand, the regime does manage to materialize the platform news feed as 
minutely personalized. On the other, largely because of the efficiency of this first materialization, the 
infrastructure of the regime becomes, unintentionally, imaginable, compromising Facebook’s attempt 
to render it inscrutable. Put another way, the success of one prefiguration ordering attempt 
undermines the other. Nevertheless, if the algorithmic efficiency of the sight vector makes the regime 
imaginable, it does not render it fully comprehensible. None of the interviewees was completely sure 
about their own reflections and conclusions. Many participants were hesitant in their answers, which 
were framed by expressions such as “I think”, “not sure, but…”, “I don’t know well”, etc. Shifts in the 
visual flows of the news feeds, information and probes seem, largely, to fill in the void of meaning that 
stemmed from the gap between the certainty that there is something behind the interface making 
decisions about who becomes visible to whom, and the uncertainty about what, exactly, this 
something is. 
I argue, therefore, that Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime is schematized through its 
materialization as conspicuously invisible. That is, this regime produces or gives rise to conspicuous 
evidence about its own existence and logics. However, this evidence does not reveal the reasons 
behind these mutations, deepening suspicions about what, really, is going on. Constantly thought of 
and discussed, the particulars of Facebook’s government of visibility surfaced in my interviewees’ 
descriptions as a public, open and largely obvious mystery, whose solution, participants seemed to 
assume, is unknown to almost everyone. However, conspicuous invisibility is not a feature of the 
platform. Rather, it is produced by interviewees’ practical engagement with the platform and how this 
engagement leads them to reflect and communicate, publicly and privately, about Facebook. That is, 
this aspect is not observable on either the platform or to the end users, but in the relations between 
platform and users, as described by the latter (see also Bucher, 2017). 
This insight diverges from some arguments about the epistemology of infrastructures. Despite 
Bucher’s (2018) suggestion that datafication processes may appear to be “known unknows”, critical 
data studies research tends to assume, in line with Starr (1999, p. 380), that computational 
infrastructures are “by definition invisible” and only become discoverable “on breakdown”. This 
insight is echoed in the idea that end users find out about behind-the-screen algorithmic operations 
when they are surprised by what appears in their news feeds (e.g. Eslami et al., 2015; Hamilton, 
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Sandvig, Karahalios, & Eslami, 2014; Rader, 2017). However, as my analysis indicates, Facebook’s 
computational infrastructure (and the regime as a whole) appears to become imaginable because it 
works remarkably well – sometimes too well. This insight echoes the work of anthropologists of non-
computational infrastructures (Larkin, 2013). These scholars have demonstrated how authoritarian 
regimes, for instance, have used electrical grids (Sneath, 2009) and satellites (Barker, 2005) as explicit 
displays of power and sources of legitimacy, and that supposedly ignorant users can become “experts” 
in infrastructural systems (Winther, 2008). In Nigeria in the 1930s, for instance, the “sense of wonder” 
produced by electricity has been described as key in the construction of what Larkin (2008, p. 19) 
names the “colonial sublime”. Yet, these theses on the explicit political usage of infrastructure do not 
seem to apply to conspicuous invisibility as evidenced in this study. Facebook’s infrastructural 
elements were not exhibited intentionally as part of a top-down plan to sustain a certain order, or a 
product of ordinary expertise. Their liminal knowability, in theory, was unwanted, somewhat 
detrimental to the platform’s attempts to control users’ actions and not dependent on – even amateur 
– know-how. 
More than rendering Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime knowable, conspicuous 
invisibility informs the contours of the social imaginaries that result from the schematizations analysed 
in Chapter 5 and in this section, I suggest. My conceptual framework proposed that Facebook intended 
to lead end users to assume the platform was a mere news feed of relevant content, thus, obscuring 
not only its infrastructural components but also the very idea that such an infrastructure is entangled 
with the interface (Section 3.6.2). This attempt seems to have backfired, but in a generative manner. 
Whereas the experiences through which participants imagined the regime produced some sort of 
assumption of control over how this regime works (at the very least, a sense that it can be controlled, 
even if not by interviewees themselves), the conflicting signs made available by these experiences and 
the lingering unknowns appeared to indicate that this control can never be fully trusted. Hence, I 
suggest that conspicuous invisibility allows for the co-existence of contradictory imaginaries about 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime, as explained in Chapter 6 and explored further in the next 
section. 
In addition, the experiences allowing the regime to become imaginable involved more than 
simply occurrences on the platform. Participants did not describe an isolated unfolding, as if observing 
a black box opening at a distance. Precisely because the platform’s infrastructure was visually 
invisibilised, its visibility regime seemed to depend on social interactions to become imaginable. In 
fact, all the interviewees’ reported schematizations involved relationships between various elements: 
Facebook (e.g. “the algorithm”, its “globalist” controllers), themselves, other end users, state actors 
 198 
(real or not), politicians, other companies, etc. This seems to be at the origins of the sociomaterial 
nature of the interviewees’ imaginaries of the algorithmic visibility regime, as I argue next. 
9.3. Sociomaterial Imaginaries, Imagined Others 
Chapter 6 (“Three Social Imaginaries of Facebook’s Algorithmic Visibility Regime”) addressed 
SRQ 2: Which social imaginaries do ordinary end users hold of the platform’s algorithmic visibility 
regime? As was explained, all the interviewees reported actions or understandings that implied or 
made explicit assumptions about Facebook’s government of visibility. Chapter 6 was organized around 
a combination of Taylor’s (2004) understanding of social imaginary and the concept of algorithmic 
visibility regime. If interviewees are able to imagine the regime, their imaginaries could a priori be 
theorized as involving the regime’s two visibility vectors, how these vectors relate to each other and 
the broader moral order to which assumptions about them are anchored (see Section 3.6.3). 
 
Chapter 6 identified three imaginaries (see Table 9.2 below and Appendix 7). Working 
inductively with these concepts, I suggested that the first imaginary, which I labelled as controllable 
visibility imaginary, implies an end user-centred normative order: who ought to visibilize whom on 
Facebook is a function of end users’ discretion. In the second imaginary (predictive visibility 
imaginary), end users are displaced from this centre by the data on their actions, collected by 
Facebook, based on which it makes automated decisions on content allocation. In the third 
(uncontrollable visibility imaginary), end users have no say about how the regime works: the 
exploitative reading of their actions by various kinds of actors (not just the platform) appears 
disconnected from the seeming political censorship that ruled the configuration of their news feed. 
 
 Controllable Visibility Predictive Visibility Uncontrollable Visibility 
Readability Vector Control Tool Eavesdropping Exploitation 
Sight Vector Visual Boundary-Making Automated Placement Political Censorship 
Vectors Entanglement Compliance Wish Prediction No Entanglement 
Normative Order End Users-Centred Data-Centred End User-Excluding 
Table 9.2. Summary of empirical findings of Chapter 6. Source: Author. 
 
These findings depart, in some ways, from those in the research on lay understandings of 
platforms’ datafication operations. Conceptualizations of ordinary users’ “theories”, “notions” and 
“imaginaries” of platforms’ algorithmic systems do not usually focus on broader issues of power and 
control or on visibility per se, as in this study. Their emphasis tends to be on ideas “about what 
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algorithms are, what they should be, how they function and what these imaginations in turn make 
possible [emphases added]” (Bucher, 2017, p. 40; see Section 3.5.2). Works that do consider other 
imagined elements, such as “audience”, tend to pay less attention to the role of datafication 
operations (e.g. Duffy and Chan, 2018). However, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the interviewees did 
not appear to emphasize either “algorithms” or “audiences”. Perhaps, expectedly, given my interest 
in patterns of interactions (i.e. a regime), I was able to identify how they seemed to imagine multiple 
artefacts and human actors as engaged in relationships. 
 
Returning to Table 9.2, in the controllable visibility imaginary, the readability vector seemed 
to be conceived of as a control tool, not because of any intrinsic characteristic of “the algorithm”, the 
term used, for example, by Joaquim (Excerpt 6.1), but because end users like Joaquim decided to use 
this imagined artefact, in this way. Similarly, its sight vector might be understood as a form of visual 
boundary-making, since end users such as Gael (Excerpt 6.4). felt the need to construct such 
boundaries: they do not emerge necessarily or by themselves, Logically, the first vector complies with 
the second due to the interviewees’ willingness to instantiate this entanglement in the first place. 
Imaginations about the digital artefacts used by Facebook to govern visibility would make no sense 
without imaginations about the interviewees’ themselves (their intentions, emotions, expectations), 
others (and what they can do in relation to interviewees) and, more distantly, some form of implicit 
assumption that Facebook wanted to design such a controllable regime.  
 
In the predictive visibility imaginary, assumptions about the platform as a company, seem to 
be crucial. If the various artefacts that compose the readability and sight vectors are understood as 
forms of eavesdropping and automated placement, whose entanglement is aimed at predicting end 
users’ wishes, this is because Facebook is imagined as a company, willing to profit out of its end users’ 
desire to see more of the same – maybe to make them “addicted”, as Fernanda told me (Excerpt 6.18). 
Second, this imaginary depends on the presumption that the interviewees or other users are 
somehow susceptible to these imagined operations, acting not only within and outside of Facebook 
but also generally wanting to see more of the same. 
 
In the third imaginary, uncontrollable visibility, there is a greater fragmentation of actors – 
without which, however, imagined visibility vectors make little sense. That the readability vector can 
be assumed to be a form of exploitation is because the interviewees assumed that there are 
organizations (states, companies) and other end users who might want to exploit Facebook’s data, or 
the loopholes in its built-in tools of visibility control. This is captured in Laura’s excerpt (6.21) on 
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companies which “have an intelligence system” to monitor users on Facebook, and on “someone who 
knows someone” and might want to leak, copy or communicate a post whose visibility appeared 
restricted by “Privacy Settings”. Likewise, the idea that the sight vector works as political censorship, 
seems to hinge on ideological presumptions of, for example, Facebook as a “globalist” company (Luis 
in Excerpt 6.25), and almost certainly involved in conspiracies with politicians (Telma, Excerpt 6.28; 
Fabricio, Excerpt 6.26). 
 
These insights suggest an extension to my initial conceptual framework (Section 3.6). The 
framework assumed the idea that the symbolic/human and the material/non-human are interwoven 
(Taylor, 2004; Sewell, 1992), a kind of co-constitutive duality that is reflected in my analysis. As I 
explored in the previous section, interviewees’ concrete experiences did seem to constitute 
imaginaries; and, as I show in the next section, imaginaries do seem to constitute certain concrete 
actions toward non-human resources. However, these three imaginaries seem, also, to point to a 
different kind of co-constitution. For, standing between the inferences to generate schemas from 
concrete experiences and the actualization of these schemas into actions, there appears to be an 
internal generativity to the social imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime. That is, these 
imaginaries are themselves composed of imaginations of human and non-human elements and these 
imaginations seem to shape one another in non-linear ways. In trying to make sense of interviewees’ 
descriptions, I found it nearly impossible to find explicit or implicit articulations of Facebook’s interface 
functionalities, algorithms and software which were not entangled with the imaginations of the 
interviewees, other end users, Facebook’s controllers, other platforms and companies, politicians, 
broader ideologies, economic interests, etc. Participants’ assumptions about these digital artefacts’ 
material mechanisms and attributes seemed deeply infused with affective, political and economic 
meanings. 
 
This ontology might best be defined as sociomaterial.64 In my conceptual framework, I did not 
anticipate the kind of entanglement between imaginations of human and of non-human elements. On 
the basis of my analysis it now seems appropriate to extend my conceptual framework by 
incorporating insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). The concept of 
sociomateriality has been used by a variety of STS scholars to describe the “constitutive 
entanglement” of human and non-human entities during social practices. While there are multiple 
formulations (for a discussion, see Leonardi, 2012), I follow Orlikowski (2007). She describes 
 
64 Sewell’s (1992) theory accounts for the constitutive relationship between artefacts and schemas. However, it 
does not emphasize the inseparability of these two dimensions, which are clear in my interviewees’ explicit and 
implicit descriptions of what goes on in Facebook. 
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sociomateriality as entailing that “any distinction of humans and artifacts… is analytical only; these 
entities relationally entail or enact each other in practice” (Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1438). This formulation 
resonates with the discussion in Chapter 6.65 Surely, interviewees do not exhibit quasi-theoretical 
ideas about how non-human and human actors are not “independently existing entities with inherent 
characteristics” (Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1438). However, couched in ordinary terms, their descriptions 
seemed to depend on implicit understandings, according to which what goes on in Facebook is the 
result of a form of “constitutive entanglement” between multiple imagined elements. There are not 
just an “algorithm”, “Facebook”, a physical database, other users, etc., but rather an indefinite 
number of relations between imagined artefacts and imagined human actors (individuals, groups, 
organizations) which seem to depend on each other to be imagined in the way they are. Since I refer 
here to relations between imaginaries and not to the “real” entities with which these imaginaries are 
associated (as proponents of sociomateriality usually do), my adoption of the term is heterodox. On 
the basis of my research, it is not possible to suggest that any imaginary of any technology can or 
should be defined as sociomaterial. Likewise, I do not argue that all social imaginaries are 
sociomaterial. However, my findings do provide a basis for proposing that algorithmic systems and, in 
particular, machine learning systems, seem prone to elicit this kind imaginary. Given their inherent 
role as connectors of various kinds of inputs, and their computational capacity to produce outputs 
that might be highly consequential, but are not easily explainable to ordinary people (Burrell, 2016), 
these systems invite the application of various frames of meaning which are not necessarily those 
understood as typical of “technology”. 
 
In sum, to say that interviewees appeared to hold not social imaginaries, as proposed in the 
conceptual framework and in Chapter 6, but sociomaterial imaginaries entails arguing that they 
encompass two forms of constitutive relationships between human and non-human elements. One 
(already alluded to by, for example, Sewell and Taylor) comprises the dynamic relationship between 
imaginaries and individuals’ concrete experiences. Another may be said to regard the way individuals 
combine imaginations of both people (their selves, collectivities, ideas) and things (their forms, 
functions) to create the mental constructs that tend to structure their everyday practices – at least, in 
regard to Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime. 
 
This reconceptualization has important consequences for this study. From a sociomaterial 
perspective, it is not only imaginations about human elements that shaped interviewee’s assumptions 
 
65 This is not to say that these imagined elements do not exist as real independent entities, which, of course, is 
the general point of sociomateriality. My point is that their imaginations can be understood as being engaged 
in a relationship of co-constitution. 
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about Facebook datafication operations, as Chapter 6 and this section (thus far) emphasize. The 
opposite seems also to be true: interviewees assumptions of human elements were partially 
constituted by their imaginations about Facebook’s visibility regime. 
 
This becomes clear when we consider how others appeared in my interviews. During my 
fieldwork, I heard numerous descriptions about imagined individuals, groups, organizations, and how 
they would react to an interviewee’s civic voice expressions – a critical factor in the prefiguration of 
such expressions, as discussed in the next section. These representations are akin to the notion of 
“imagined audience”, referred to in Section 3.5.2 but which was not originally part of my conceptual 
framework. It has been argued that “imagined audiences” are concocted through end users’ attempts 
symbolically to recreate their communication boundaries in view of the understanding that online 
spaces like Facebook collapse communicational contexts (e.g. Marwick & boyd, 2011). Typical of 
studies on the relations between “self-presentations” and interface functionalities (Marwick & boyd, 
2014), this concept does not appear to have been reconsidered vis-à-vis recent developments of 
datafication, despite authors noting the need to do so (Litt, 2016, p. 112). 
 
My findings might offer an interesting entry point to addressing this lacuna by allowing for the 
development of the concept of imagined other, as formulated below. The evidence examined in 
Chapters 7 and 8 (and see next section of this chapter) indicates that imagined others fall in this study 
into three categories: 
 
(a) Controllable Others. On many occasions, the interviewees seemed to believe that, through 
the platform’s functionalities, they could expose themselves to/ conceal themselves from 
some social actors regardless of whether these actors wanted to visibilize them or not. In 
Antonio’s narrative, these are potential clients who might not be happy to see that he is a 
Bolsonarista (Excerpt 8.2); in Fabricio’s (Excerpt 7.6), they appear as likeminded conservatives 
who must be informed about his “events”; in Artur’s, they are “addable” conservative 
strangers who must be convinced of his progressive ideas (Excerpt 7.3). These imagined others 
might be called controllable others. As indicated by these examples, different controllable 
others might be conceived as controllable in contrasting ways and on different levels. In most 
of my interviews, these others were associated to the controllable visibility imaginary. 
However, in at least one case (Fabricio, Excerpt 7.6) they became imaginable due to the 
uncontrollable visibility imaginary. 
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(b) Imagined Bubble. Participants also often described a second kind of other: those who likely 
would see their actions on Facebook because they had previously interacted with them– the 
“bubble” that many participants referred to. In their descriptions, the definition of who is 
inside the “bubble” appears as subject to their own willing interactions with the interface 
functionalities (consistent with the controllable visibility imaginary) or by the automated 
decisions assumed to occur under the predictive visibility imaginary (executed by “the 
algorithm” or any cognate term such as “filter”). But this general form hardly describes the 
bubble’s content: different participants imagined radically different bubbles. Some are 
assumed to be ideologically pure (Artur’s, Excerpt 8.14); others see them as ideologically 
mixed, containing both friends and conservative “clients” or defined not by their ideology, but 
by how they repel complexity and nuance (Daniel’s, Excerpt 7.18). That is, people’s imagined 
bubbles may be but need not be as homogenous as suggested by the “filter bubble” 
metaphor. Their assumed homogeneity is related less to the political inclinations of the 
components of a “bubble” than to an assumed stable (but not fixed) visibility pattern. 
 
(c) Imagined Surveillant. End users within an imagined bubble often are understood as secret 
watchers of one’s actions. However, their gaze, while often influencing the interviewee’s 
actions, is avoidable – they are not “surveillants” according to my understanding the term. By 
imagined surveillant I mean, first, those end users or categories of end users who, despite 
being outside one’s imagined bubble and regardless of one’s wishes, can see and/or read 
one’s civic voice. Thanks to the uncontrollable visibility imaginary, participants seemed to 
assume that multiple actors outside their bubble could, by and large, see or read them. Yet, 
my interviewees rarely talked about a generic surveillant. Their descriptions about how to 
navigate the assumption of uncontrollability invariably invoked “others” who, even when not 
concrete individuals and groups (like Patricia’s work colleagues, Excerpt 8.12), were somehow 
specific (“the police”, in Lorena’s description, Excerpt 8.30) or Facebook itself (according to 
almost all the interviewees). 
 
These insights seem well-aligned to those in the literature on imagined audiences. Litt and 
Hargittai (2016, p. 6), for instance, also found that these imaginations are multiple, originating from 
various kinds of ties, including those stemming from “imagined surveillance” (Duffy & Chan, 2018). As 
in Eden Litt’s (2016) work (perhaps the most complete exploration of the notion of imagined 
audience), in my study participants described that certain posts led them to imagine certain others. 
For example, a post about police violence invoked the possibility that police officers would will see 
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the message (e.g. Miguel, Excerpt 8.19). Also, similar to Litt (2016), I argue that the kind of imagined 
other may be fluid: the same social actor might be, in distinct situations, “controllable” and an element 
of an “imagined bubble” (as many other end users seem to be assumed by participants to be). 
 
 Despite these general similarities, the concept of imagined others differs from that of 
imagined audience in three ways. As my generic language suggests, imagined other encompasses a 
much broader array of social actors and relations. The literature on imagined audiences typically 
refers, explicitly or implicitly, to end users who might see – and potentially respond to – their 
messages. The idea of “audience” might apply to components of “imagined bubbles” – since it implies 
the understanding of a performance that is knowingly undertaken for the consumption of others (Litt, 
2012). It is, however, difficult to see how “controllable others” and “imagined surveillants” would fit 
this characterization. The former seems to be imagined as individuals whose very position as potential 
“audience” is defined by the interviewees themselves – and, it is in this capacity that these others 
were invoked during the interviews. The latter refers to social actors who, in addition to monitoring 
performances, regardless of interviewees’ intentions, rarely see such performances – they usually 
dataveil them. That is, relationships with imagined others appear, commonly, to be conceived as 
involving a one-way connection or communication. 
 
There appears, also, to be a distinct relationship between the functioning of the platform and 
imaginations about social actors. Litt (2016) proposes that different “features” (feedback mechanisms, 
kinds of privacy settings) might differently inform the construction of imagined audiences. In 
investigations of imagined audiences, the central feature is arguably the lack of a clear rule defining 
who can visibilize whom, which engenders the collapse of contexts and the need to imagine an 
audience. In contrast, I suggest that imagined others hinge on the existence of understandings of rules 
underlying Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime. These rules seemed to be assumed as enacting 
relationships and, hence, the production of relative positions in the assumed diagram of the 
algorithmic visibility regime, as described by Brighenti (2010; see Section 3.6). Put another way, these 
assumed rules partially re-construct participants’ contexts of communication. Under the presumption 
that the regime is a function of interviewees’ wishes (typical of the controllable visibility imaginary), 
these rules seemed to allow the interviewees to unilaterally create boundaries and interactions 
(controllable others). These boundaries, merged with those automatically created by Facebook 
(according to the predictive visibility imaginary), give rise to imagined bubbles. In the case of the 
uncontrollable visibility imaginaries, and surveillant others, this reconstruction is more nuanced. It is 
not that the interviewees had no idea about what caused them to be susceptible to be seen or read 
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by virtually any social actor on Facebook, but that these rules were not organized under a broader 
logic of visibility government as in the other two imaginaries. For example, if governments and 
companies are assumed to be able to pull end users’ data from Facebook this is because such data are 
deemed to be produced and stored in a particular way; screenshots can be captured by anyone, but 
are not a random occurrence – assumptions about their usage are made possible by ideas regarding 
how images can be produced through digital technologies. It is not that contexts simply collapse – 
they collapse for different reasons which obey particular logics. 
 
However, such assumptions about how Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime functions do 
not necessarily define who these others are. Based on my study, it is possible to suggest that the 
particular imagined others described by my interviewees either are or echo real-life actors, about 
whom participants hold expectations of a normative order. These others were described as believing 
that some civic voice expressions are ethically unacceptable or compulsory, conventional or abnormal, 
dangerous or safe. Usually, it is their anticipated reaction (or recognition or misrecognition) that 
inform interviewees’ decisions on how to control the visibility of their voices. Therefore, if 
sociomaterial imaginaries are kinds of “deep schemas”, imagined others might be theorized as 
embodying “surface” schemas, in Sewell’s (1992; see Section 3.3.1) sense of rules that immediately 
inform everyday practices. 
 
A third difference, largely implied in the discussion above, is that imagined others, as defined 
here, are conjured in the context of relations of power – an aspect that is usually explicitly theorized 
in the literature on imagined audiences. By this I mean that these imaginations are, on the one hand, 
offshoots of the dynamics engendered by Facebook’s datafication power. On the other, inequalities 
that have little to do with datafication also play a constitutive role in their constitution – a point that 
is unpacked in Section 9.4.2 below, when I discuss the importance of interviewees’ social contexts for 
the enactment of these imagined others. 
 
The phenomena and the concepts discussed in this section may play a role in the structuring 
of various kinds of Facebook practices. Publishing a family picture, a post about sports, a comment 
offering emotional support – it seems reasonable to claim that these other kinds of Facebook practices 
probably involve sociomaterial imaginaries and imagined others, as developed above. In other words, 
while necessary to civic voice expression, the conceptual insights developed so far in this chapter are 
not necessarily about civic voices. They retain some analytic independence from the kinds of practices 
that are the main focus in this thesis. (I return to this point when considering the contributions made 
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by this study – Section 10.3.) However, I suggest that, when instantiated to orient people’s civic voices 
expressions, sociomaterial imaginaries merge with another kind of imaginary that is particular to civic 
voices – civic imaginaries (Section 3.6.1). This point, crucial to my argument about bottom-up 
authoritarianism, is developed after a re-examination, in the next section, of my findings about the 
visibility control projects of civic voice expressions. 
 
9.4. The Prefiguration Cycle of Civic Voice 
 Let me recap my argument in this chapter so far. The first part contended that, in successfully 
materializing a personalized and enticing news feed, Facebook’s prefiguration ordering attempts 
render its algorithmic visibility regime conspicuously invisible. In the second part, I argued that the 
schematization processes that originate in this materialization are what permits the development of 
sociomaterial imaginaries and imagined others. Building on these insights, I next consider in which 
ways sociomaterial imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime seem to order the 
prefiguration of interviewees’ civic expressions, prompting experiences of (mis)recognition and 
constituting their civic self-understanding. That is to say, this section examines the role of these 
imaginaries (and, indirectly, of Facebook’s visibility regime datafication operations) in the peculiar 
processes of civic becoming the thesis set out to understand. 
 
Chapters 7 (Visibility Expansion Projects) and 8 (Visibility Reduction Projects) considered 
whether and how interviewees’ attempts to control the visibility of their civic voice expressions 
transformed how they expressed themselves as citizens. As proposed in the conceptual framework, 
end users may try to become more visible to increase the possibility of their voice being heard (which 
I describe as visibility expansion projects), a possibility explored in Chapter 7, which addresses SRQ 
3.1: Do ordinary end users’ attempt to expand the visibility of their civic voice expressions on 
Facebook? If so, is this attempt associated with how they articulate these expressions? They may 
try, also, to reduce their visibility to avoid experiencing misrecognitions (visibility reduction projects), 
which I explored in Chapter 8 by addressing SRQ 3.2: Do ordinary end users’ attempt to reduce the 
visibility of their civic voice expressions on Facebook? If so, is this attempt associated with how they 
articulate these expressions? Given their similar conceptual and methodological bases, the findings 
in Chapters 7 and 8 fall in three parallel directions: (1) projects that did not involve adjustments to 
civic voice; (2) projects that did involve adjustments to civic voice; and (3) the rejection of these 
projects (see Table 9.3 below and Appendix 7). 
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The empirical findings in these two chapters are both familiar and new. How end users try to 
increase or decrease their visibility in online participatory spaces has been documented, discussed 
and theorized in-depth (Section 3.5.2). It is not a new observation that individuals will use interface 
functionalities to define their readers (which I call (re)categorization of others) or to change some 
details in their profiles (misleading profiles) and online communications (voice disguising). Whereas 
my analysis reveals multiple facets of what is usually subsumed under the umbrella term “self-
censorship” (see Section 3.5.2) (correction, deletion, suppression and disappearance), it also finds, 
generally, that end users do refrain from expressing their voices, which is in line with most of the 
empirical literature. Projects aimed at visibility expansion, on the other hand, have been much less 
studied. It might be said that tactical aggression (according to which hateful and belligerent speech 
may be used to achieve more interactions and, thus, visibility), temporal control (the practice of 
posting at certain moments in the expectation that more people will be online and, thus, able to read 
the post), and simplification (how users abridge their voice so as to be seen by a larger amount of 
people) have been examined, under different names and from different theoretical angles, in the 
context of far-right activists (Marwick and Lewis, 2018) and communities of professional “influencers” 
(Coettler, 2019; Bishop, 2019). However, unlike my research, these ideas have not been developed 
based on the study of ordinary people. 
 



















































  Table 9.3. Summary of empirical findings of Chapters 7 and 8. Source: Author. 
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I suggest that my formulations of civic voice (Section 3.6.1), agency as project (Section 3.3.2) 
and power as the ordering of prefiguration (Section 3.3.3) allow for an interesting re-interpretation of 
the empirical findings summarized in Table 9.3 above. Imaginaries of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime seem to influence the prefiguration of civic voice expressions in ways that are more complex 
than Facebook arguably expects (see Table 3.1). Instead of leading end users to think of all actions 
toward the platform’s interface (and in particular the news feed) as “enticing”, and of those toward 
the platform’s infrastructure as “impossible”, this study found that these imaginaries are associated 
with multiple prefigurations, occurring at interrelated moments. They seem to compose a kind of 
cycle, wherein the division between interface and infrastructure (and, thus, sight and readability 
vectors) is often blurred. Certainly, most interviewees did not describe this cycle in full. I use Emirbayer 
and Mische’s (1998) work to piece together an abstract model from my participants’ dispersed, but 
collectively coherent accounts, as explained in the succeeding sections. 
 
9.4.1. The Problematization of Civic Voice Expressions 
The interviewees’ descriptions suggest that they prefigure civic voice expressions on Facebook 
as problematic. None of the interviewees used this term or explained specifically to what extent 
talking about politics on Facebook is or not “problematic”. However, the very fact that all the 
interviewees described constructing at least one form of visibility control project, suggests that they 
often realize that the platform “is in some degree resistant” to the “immediate and effortless 
realization” of whichever civic self-representation they wanted to realize (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998, p. 998). This is not because these expressions were necessarily troubling, but because they 
would be vocalized under assumed uncertain visibility conditions. This is precisely the starting point 
of the three sociomaterial imaginaries. Even in the controllable visibility imaginary, my interviewees 
seem to take for granted that whether one’s civic voice expression will be seen/read is not a given. 
This initial “problematization” seemed to elicit reflexivity, thus, informing the very need to consider 
whether and how to control the visibility of their civic voice expressions. 
 
Problematization did not mean that the participants necessarily conceived visibility control 
projects, nor did it define which projects would be enacted. These decisions were preceded, first, by 
a specification of the problem – its “characterization” (Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 998). More 
than a general sense of visibility uncertainty generated by all sociomaterial imaginaries, it involved 
interviewees’ imagined others. That is to say, when planning whether and how to represent 
themselves politically on the platform, interviewees anticipated who would be exposed to such self-
representations, and how this imagined figure would react.. 
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9.4.2. Deliberation on the Importance/Potential Damage of a Civic Voice Expression 
The “characterization” of which imagined other might visibilize their civic voice expression 
does not, in itself, amount to a prefiguration moment. However, in embodying normative 
understandings about what can/cannot, ought/ought not be done and said, imagined others appeared 
to engender a second moment in the prefiguration cycle. At this moment, the initially problematic 
civic voice expression was further prefigured in relation to two relational qualifications, both of which, 
I suggest, hinge on expectations of civic recognition and misrecognition. These prefigurations involved 
definition of the importance for participants’ civic self-understanding of having certain expressions 
articulated so as, possibly, to be heard by certain imagined others; and how such expression, 
potentially, can be damaging for their self-understanding, given the risk that, once articulated, certain 
others can denigrate their voices. Following Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 998-999), this second 
prefiguration is likely to encompass deliberation on the relative weight of these qualifications. In 
contrast to rationalist perspectives, what seemed to be at play was not self-interested, objective and 
detailed calculation of costs and benefits, but subjective and likely fleeting considerations of their own 
civic self-understanding, permeable to both pondered reasoning and abrupt and ambiguous feelings 
of what is right, perilous, expected, gratifying, etc. 
 
Precisely why participants imagined that particular imagined others would react in any 
particular manner to a particular voice expression, which, thus, led them to qualify a civic voice 
expression as more or less important/damaging, remains largely unclear. However, in addition to 
immediate factors (e.g. the nature of the message, its timing, default “Privacy Settings”), the 
constitution of and expectations regarding imagined others do seem to be influenced by an unequally 
distributed sense of precarity, marked, largely, by Brazil’s troubled democratic history and the 
contingencies of the tumultuous moment when the fieldwork was conducted (see Sections 2.2 and 
2.3). In almost all the interviews, participants reported and commented on a bellicose political climate, 
in which friends, work colleagues, family and strangers alike, were imagined as thirsty for action in 
relation to even minor political disputes, with hatred and vengefulness, or, alternatively, as pardoning 
misconduct by ideological allies. Examples include Patricia’s imagined surveillants (her boss and 
colleagues), who were conceived by her as politically conservative and aggressive, which implies that 
she ought to avoid expressing her progressive civic voice (Excerpt 8.12); Artur’s imagined bubble was 
thought by him to be intolerant to all expressions that were not purely progressive, meaning that he 
ought to avoid all actions that eventually could be understood as “sexist”, for instance (Excerpt 8.14); 
Daniel assumed that his bubble rejected complexity and, thus, ought to be served with “black or 
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white” content (Excerpt 7.18). The growing influence of far-right beliefs could be felt, also, as many 
conservative interviewees seemed to believe that Facebook’s content moderation is, in fact, a piece 
of a “communist” global conspiracy, as Luis (Excerpt 6.25) told me, or is designed to spread rumours 
about its alleged leftist manipulation (Excerpts 5.32 - 5-35). The economic crisis – which, at the time 
of the fieldwork, was in one of its worst moments – likely increased this sense of civic vulnerability. 
Most interviewees told me that they feared that their civic voice might lead to harm caused by work 
colleagues, as exemplified by the description of the real estate agent Antonio (Excerpt 8.2).  
 
Other factors influencing participants’ sense of fragility appeared to originate from the 
insecurity of social minorities. Many interviewees imagined that the police could see their posts, but 
only those who were Black and/or from the violent outskirts of São Paulo told me that they feared 
being killed or harmed by the police because of their Facebook posts and comments (e.g. Benjamin, 
Excerpt 8.4, and Miguel, Excerpt 8.19). Gender inequalities seemed, also, to play a role in how 
participants understood the risks involved in representing themselves as citizens on Facebook. The 
only interviewees who reported suffering sustained harassment and abuse or having their images 
violated by “haters”, were either women (e.g. Maria, Excerpt 8.9., Fernanda, Excerpt 8.5, Telma, 
Excerpt 8.16) or transgender (Humberto, Excerpt 8.26). My point is not about numerical prevalence, 
but the alleged reasons behind the denigrations of their voices. Maria and Fernanda received rape 
threats; Telma’s post that led to her abuse was about feminism; Humberto was persecuted explicitly 
because of his gender. Lastly, some participants linked their will to engage in ethically contestable 
visibility control projects to their class and race. As Fabricio (Excerpt 8.14) told me, proudly, his 
conservative friends “won’t believe” that a telemarketer living in a shantytown is “leading the 
movement”; Joaquim (Excerpt 7.17) said that being seen on Facebook could “open doors” that would 
otherwise be closed to a Black man from a poor neighbourhood. I do not claim that there is a linear 
or mandatory relationship between these contextual assumptions and the prefiguration of their civic 
voice expressions. Even within my sample of interviewees this was not the case. However, at least in 
the instances in which this connection was explicit, they seem to help to explain why people who 
shared the same three imaginaries of the platform’s visibility regime acted upon these imaginaries 
differently. 
 
Once participants decided about the relative worth of an intended civic voice expression in 
relation to (an) imagined other(s), the first question to consider was whether to control the visibility 
of their voice on Facebook completely. While all they described conceiving and enacting at least one 
kind of visibility control project, most reported doing so only on specific occasions: for example, in 
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Helena’s words (Excerpt 7.15), if they wanted an urgent public issue “to go viral”, or if they feared 
retaliations that they could not cope with, as Fabio’s deletion of a post about his wife’s boss implies 
(Excerpt 8.15). Likewise, interviewees’ decisions not to control their visibility appeared, also, to 
originate from whether they qualified their voices as too important (see Sections 7.4.2 and 8.4.2) or 
too irrelevant (see Sections 7.4.1 and 8.4.1), and the consequences of becoming too visible as 
unacceptably damaging (see Section 7.4.3). 
 
9.4.3. Project Conception 
If participants did make the “decision” to try to control the visibility of a civic voice expression 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 999), I suggest that they were entering a third stage of the prefiguration 
cycle: project conception. A necessary and initial definition involved the goal of such visibility project, 
what Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 989) call “anticipatory identification”. Projects that aimed at 
expanding interviewees’ visibility appeared to assume that some civic voice expressions were too 
important to be invisibilised to certain imagined others. Visibility reduction projects, in contrast, 
arguably assumed that certain civic voice expressions, or elements of them, were too potentially 
damaging to be visibilized by certain imagined others. 
 
After defining the general objective of the project, it can be suggested that they inserted 
“themselves into a variety of possible trajectories and spin out alternative means-ends sequences” 
(“symbolic resolutions”) so as to construct a “hypothetical resolution”, that is, decide on which actions 
are needed to achieve that goal (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, pp. 989-990). At this stage, it could be 
argued that Facebook’s imagined visibility rules oriented my interviewees to understand not only with 
whom they were interacting but how to interact with these imagined others. As emphasized in 
Chapters 7 and 8, there appear to be two macro kinds of projects to control the visibility of civic voice 
expressions: those supported by elements extrinsic to civic voice and those realized through 
modification of civic voice expressions. Their different nature, I suggest, gives rise to distinct 
prefigurations of these expressions. 
 
I begin by discussing those supported by non-civic voice elements, usually underpinned by the 
controllable visibility imaginary: ((Re)categorization of others, space shifts, and tactical delays (see 
Table 9.3 and Section 8.3). It is possible, in these cases, to talk about an enabling prefiguration: these 
projects seemed to lead the interviewees to qualify certain civic voice expressions as possible. Take 
the example of Olivia, who, by piggybacking on the reach of someone else’s Facebook page, could 
communicate to millions of end users the social dimension of the Zika virus epidemic – something that 
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would have been impossible using only her personal profile (Excerpt 8.1). Importantly, these projects 
did not prevent civic voice expressions from being shaped by Facebook’s visibility regime. Just the 
opposite, I suggest: their enabling role played a primary role in the constitution of participants’ civic 
self-representations. 
 
However, the importance of this kind of project is relative. Even those who reported employing it 
appeared, also, to transform their own civic voice to govern their visibility. This other macro kind of 
visibility control project has a distinct nature and appears to engender a different sort of prefiguration. 
Underpinned by the predictive and the uncontrollable visibility imaginaries, its starting point seems 
to be that, if Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime is moved by social life itself, it is social life that 
must be moulded to control the functioning of the regime. Thus, most of the visibility control projects 
examined in chapters 7 and 8 did not address one or another visibility vector of the visibility regime. 
In trying to be more/less seen, interviewees commonly understood that it was necessary to change 
how they were read, and vice versa. Civic voice expressions become overdetermined by distinct goals: 
controlling their own visibility and representing interviewees’ as citizens. The resolution to this 
problem seemed to involve the qualification of two kinds of civic voice expressions as necessary: 
 
(a) Controlling oneself to control the others to control the regime. In the projects I labelled tactical 
aggressions, simplification, visual provocations, and news association (Section 7.3; see Table 
9.3.), participants seemed to control their actions of civic self-representation so as to elicit (or 
preclude) datafied reactions, with the goal of controlling Facebook’s algorithmic decision-
making and increasing the likelihood of being heard. The predictive visibility imaginary not 
only helped to orient participants’ definition of who could see their actions (the imagined 
bubble I defined above) but also provided guidance about how they should relate to these 
others. If they wanted their voice to go beyond such a bubble, the articulation of their civic 
voice had to be such that would lead the components of the bubble to interact with 
participants’ actions – through “likes”, “shares”, “comments”, “views”. In this kind of project, 
participants appear to be reproducing Facebook’s datafication power logic: any sort of action 
that could be qualified as enticing by other end users, was qualified as enticing by them as 
well. 
 
(b) Controlling oneself to control the regime to control others. In the projects labelled as 
misleading profiles, voice disguising, voice correction, voice deletion, voice suppression and 
voice disappearance (Section 8.3; see Table 9.3.), participants seemed to control their civic 
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voice expressions so as to control dataveillance operations (even if not explicitly described as 
such) and to prevent others from denigrating them. This sort of project, typically, was 
structured by the uncontrollable visibility imaginary which oriented participants to both 
construct imagined others (surveillants) and showed how to interact with these others. The 
assumption here seemed to be that, since everything that occurred within (and eventually 
outside) the platform would be read/seen, the only sure way to prevent imagined surveillants 
from being able to read/see their actions was not acting at all, not producing any data (or 
deleting previous actions). This kind of project could be understood as an attempt to blind the 
algorithmic visibility regime. In some cases, the “others” that my interviewees imagined as 
able to read their messages were, in fact, people within their imagined bubble (e.g. Adão, 
Excerpt 8.23). In these cases, the predictive and the uncontrollable imaginaries were 
combined: the former orients the construction of others; the latter, shows how to interact 
with these others. However, this combination did not alter the general contours of this second 
kind of project. In contrast to the first, this seemed to configure a sort of formal resistance to 
Facebook’s prefiguration ordering: any sort of action or component of an action, that might 
elicit interactions from other end users was qualified as undesirable. 
 
In my research, these visibility control projects were executed – or were intentionally not 
executed (e.g. Joaquim’s refusal to continue to use tactical aggression, Excerpt 7.17). Even a “judicious 
execution” of a project may entail “loss, as when the fulfilment of a duty or realization of a particular 
vision of the good requires the sacrifice of an equally compelling duty or good” (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998, p. 1000). Indeed, interviewees seemed to realize that, despite their (sometimes meticulous) 
projects, they rarely could make themselves heard as the citizens they understood themselves to be 
or wished to become, as I propose in the next section. 
 
9.4.4. Self-Evaluation 
The first three stages – “problematization”, “deliberation” and “conception” – involve 
prefigurations of concrete civic voice expressions. However, during the interviews, participants, at 
some point, would tell me or suggest how they qualify their civic voice in more abstract terms, as if 
referring not to a specific action, but to an action that was typical of themselves. In these moments, I 
suggest, qualification of actions becomes, metonymically, a form of broad qualification of their own 
civic voice on Facebook. This fourth stage might be called “self-evaluation” – an element that 
Emirbayer and Mische do not theorize about since they are not interested in processes of self-
formation. These understandings apparently emerged cumulatively. In expressing their civic voice (or 
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pondering the consequences of these expressions), interviewees experienced (or anticipated) 
recognitions and misrecognitions, which, in turn, led them to reconsider their voices on the platform. 
The self-evaluations that emerged during my analysis can be grouped into distinct kinds: 
 
Inadequate. Some interviewees reported that, on Facebook, their civic voices appear 
inadequate, that is, hopelessly unable to bring about the form of civic recognition they desired to 
achieve. Interviewees’ conclusions originate from the three different forms of misrecognition: 
invisibilization, denigration and distortion (Section 3.4.2). Pedro’s description (Excerpt 7.27) illustrates 
a form of invisibilization. As he said, he does not know how to make his voice “really trespass”, that 
is, cross the divide (“the bubble”) imposed by “the algorithm” between him and the conservative 
individuals he expected to “change”. Theo, in turn, rejected the idea of distorting his voice so as to be 
seen on Facebook by more people (Excerpt 7.29). This helped him to understand why his posts were 
rarely interacted with, making him the “wrong person” to be asked about visibility expansion. Another 
example is Humberto (Excerpt 8.26), the copywriter who made his gender transition on Facebook, but 
then was harassed and blocked (i.e. denigrated) by “haters” and the platform’s image recognition 
algorithms. As he said multiple times in our conversation “the networks are a hostile place” for him, 
suggesting that people like him, who do not conform to gender binaries are worthless on the platform. 
In qualifying their voices as inadequate, these participants began to see the very idea of civic self-
representation as uninviting – hence, their reported increasing disinterest in talking about politics on 
Facebook. If they wanted to preserve their self-respect, self-silencing seemed necessary. 
 
Expendable. Most participants suggested that, by acting to control their visibility, they 
managed, eventually, to be heard on Facebook. However, this recognition entailed accepting that at 
least some elements of their or others’ civic voices needed to be misrecognized – that is, were 
expendable. Regarding visibility reduction projects, this prefiguration was commonly described as an 
almost inescapable invisibilization. Recall Ava (Excerpt 8.22), for instance, who reported having no 
choice except to supress his “very basic” ideas about rape to avoid death threats. This sense of 
inescapability may also affect those who try to increase their visibility through the denigration of 
others’ voices, like Helena (Excerpt 7.15), who used tactical hate speech to promote her conservative 
agenda. Other projects seem to engender the potential distortion of their own civic voice. What I call 
simplification projects, are one example: Benjamin, who forced himself to write short texts – despite 
his will to post long, serious posts (textão) (Excerpt 7.21). While simplification and other similar 
visibility expansion projects (visual provocations and tactical self-Interactions) do not necessarily lead 
to distortions, they might depend on the assumption that other end users can be manipulated and 
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misled (i.e. denigrated). Luis’s (Excerpt 7.2) description about how he tried to convince readers of a 
radical idea “without looking like it’s radical” illustrates my point. Finally, there are projects that carry 
the potential to either invisibilise their creators (e.g. Antonio, Excerpt 8.2, who by talking in closed 
groups might have missed out on the possibility of having his voice properly heard by a wider 
readership) or unintentionally led to the denigration of their voices (e.g. Olivia, Excerpt 7.1, who 
managed to be heard by a wide readership, but ended up suffering attacks from “haters”). In 
promoting some recognition, civic voice expressions that hinge on these sorts of compromises seemed 
to leave most of participants in an ambivalent position: willing to keep talking about politics on 
Facebook, but suspicious of whether these expressions are worthwhile (Olivia, Excerpt 7.2). In other 
situations, the realization that the compromise was far too costly, led the interviewees to, for 
example, try to become a “more responsible” citizen (Joaquim, Excerpt 7.17) and schedule moments 
of full disconnection (Amanda, Excerpt 8.27). 
 
Rewarding. In a few cases, the adjusted civic voice expressions were described as truly 
conducive to civic recognition – that is, as rewarding to participants civic self-understandings. A case 
in point is Fabricio, who described both the usage of fake profiles (Excerpt 7.7) and tactical aggressions 
(7.14). Fake profiles, he said, were essential to the establishment of his self-esteem. He told me that, 
“I know that, if people see the invites, they will come”. As to his hate speech, he came to understand 
that what he wanted to say was anything that could entice reactions from his conservative bubble. In 
his words, “When I post something and realize it has not gone viral as in the way it should go, if it does 
not get at least 50 likes, I delete it. [In this case], I believe that what I have published… might not be 
exactly what I think [emphasis added]” (Excerpt 7.14). It is necessary to note, though, that his 
recognition came at the expense of the denigration of others – both those who had their identities 
stolen for the production of fake profiles and those targeted by his hate speech. Another form of 
rewarding civic voice was exemplified by Artur (Excerpt 8.14). After invisibilising elements of himself 
that, he feared, could be attacked by the “vigilant folks” in his progressive “bubble” (e.g. his eventual 
sexism), he realized that he did not want to express the voice he was trying to conceal. As a “White, 
highly-educated middle-class man”, he should “be very careful” with what he says. That is, in 
concealing unwanted aspects of his civic voice, he seemed to have found out which voice he wanted 
to have. At the same time, his “correction” was triggered by the prospect of attacks. His process of 
self-discovery appears, thus, to be entangled with self-disciplining. One might wonder, what would 
happen if his “bubble” was composed of individuals who praise violence – would he act aggressively? 
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These self-evaluations might inform which voice expressions interviewees might want to 
construct on Facebook, restarting the prefiguration cycle (see Figure 9.1 below). This constantly 
possible restarting is suggestive of the instability and volatility of these processes of civic becoming. I 
do not claim that all civic voice expressions undergo every one of these prefigurations, nor that this 
cycle is completed in a linear manner. With the exception of the first stage, participants most likely 
experience these prefigurations at distinct moments and in relation to distinct civic voice expressions. 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Simplified diagram of the prefiguration cycle of civic voice on Facebook. Source: Author. 
 
9.5. Bottom-up Authoritarianism 
So far, this chapter has conceptualized the dynamics underlying the empirical findings of this 
thesis. As the prefiguration cycle of civic voice suggests in the previous section, these dynamics have 
a significant normative dimension. That is, my analysis of how civic voice is constituted under the 
algorithmic visibility regime engendered by Facebook’s datafication operations points to a widespread 
sense of civic misrecognition. Interviewees often described how they felt that they had to silence 
themselves when talking about politics on Facebook, or how their voice expressions sometimes 
entailed the denigration of other end users. 
 
P b e a i a i
C c ce a  b e a c
Se f-E a a i
C c V ce a  I ade a e,
E e dab e, Re a d g
P jec  C ce i
C c ce e e  a  b e /
ece a  (e c g/  e c g)
De ibe a i
C c ce e e  a  a
/ e a  da ag g
I e e a i Deci i
Cha ac e i a i
 217 
This last set of sections tries to explain these misrecognitions. I propose that Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime, largely based on the processes that I have explored in the preceding 
sections, engender what I term bottom-up authoritarianism.66 In Section 3.4.2, authoritarianism was 
conceptualized as a structural form of misrecognition. Therefore, when I argue that the stories I heard 
during my interviews seem to reveal a form of authoritarianism, I mean that the civic misrecognitions 
identified in the prefiguration cycle of civic voice do not seem to be the result of participants’ 
individual idiosyncrasies or chance events. They are much more likely to be associated to a structural 
element. In the next section, I propose that this element is a paradoxical form of civic imaginary. After 
explaining the relationship between this imaginary and the sociomaterial understandings of 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime (Section 9.3), the last analytical section of this chapter defines 
bottom-up authoritarianism in greater detail. 
 
9.5.1 A Paradoxical Civic Imaginary 
The conceptual framework (see Section 3.6.1) proposed that civic voice is shaped by at least 
two structural elements – visibility conditions and individuals’ “set of implicit assumptions in relation 
to what civic worth is and to whom it is granted”, that is, civic imaginaries. However, that initial 
conceptualization assumed that these structural elements work separately. This section explores their 
relationship moving beyond the initial concepts and arguments that initially informed this study. It 
seems not to be the case that different prefigurations of civic voice were influenced separately by 
either assumptions of visibility or assumptions of citizenship. I argue that, largely because of the 
double porosity of the sociomateriality described in Section 9.3, these two kinds of imaginaries appear 
fused into a hybrid civic imaginary in which rules of visibility and norms of civic worth are entangled 
and, as such, orient interviewees prefiguration of their civic voice expressions. 
 
Let me unpack the two interrelated processes which seem to comprise this composite 
schema. On the one hand, interviewees’ assumptions of civic worth seem to have absorbed elements 
of their assumptions about Facebook’s visibility rules. It seems that, on the platform, definitions of 
what civic worth is and how it is attained are often preceded – and, thus, transformed – by imaginaries 
of the algorithmic visibility regime. 
 
This is mostly evident in the third stage of the prefiguration cycle (“project conception”, see 
Figure 9.1 above). If civic voice expression is transformed into the very matter through which visibility 
 
66 Writing from a different theoretical and empirical perspective, Hintz and Milan (2018) also employ the term 
“bottom-up” to discuss authoritarianism in platforms. 
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can be controlled, and if visibility must be controlled to enhance the odds that voice can be heard, 
interviewees have few choices except to adjust their voices to try to expand and reduce their visibility. 
In implying that being seen/read by some others (or not) is the immediate goal shaping a practice that 
is unavoidably ethical (civic voice), imaginaries of Facebook’s visibility regime67 were actualized in a 
way that converted a practice that is not inherently ethical (visibility control) into an immanent 
normative ideal. Something similar can be seen in the first stage of the prefiguration cycle 
(problematization). As already noted, the interviewees apparently problematized any civic voice 
expressions, not because of their content (whether or not they comply with some notion of civic 
worth), but because of their uncertain visibility. It is this status that seems to have produced concerns 
of invisibilization or denigration, rather than any framework of civic worth itself. Therefore, expressing 
a civic voice that complies with Facebook’s visibility rules becomes the primary condition to become, 
at least, eligible for civic recognition. The control of visibility seems less an “an end in itself [emphasis 
added]” (Banet-Weiser, 2019, p. 22; Herman, 2013) than a necessary stage. Without being able and 
willing to elicit, avoid and accept datafied reactions from imagined others, it could be argued that 
interviewees were effectively non-existent as citizens on the platform. This is either because they 
were invisibilised or because they had (or felt pressured) to abandon the attempt to represent 
themselves. This dynamic seems to have been present even when participants acted according to the 
controllable visibility imaginary – which, in theory, separates visibility control and civic voice. Evidence 
examined in Sections 7.2 and 8.2 shows that this other imaginary was often invoked as a response to 
assumptions of uncontrollability. 
 
 On the other hand, a contextualization of interviewees’ assumptions about Facebook’s 
government of visibility seems to occur. In interweaving human and non-human elements, from 
within and outside the platform, sociomaterial imaginaries can be understood to have worked as 
blueprints for the participants projection of their own definitions of what is a worthy civic voice, and 
how and to whom civic worth should be granted and denied. 
 
This is made evident in the second stage of the prefiguration cycle (deliberation, see Figure 
9.1 above). The imagined others who populated interviewees’ descriptions were marked by the 
chronic and violent iniquities of Brazilian society in regard to race, gender, income and (thanks to the 
crisis) ideology. Contextualization is noticeable, too, in the descriptions of those who reported not 
trying to control the visibility of their civic voices on Facebook. Some considered themselves the 
subject of prior misrecognitions regarding their economic and racial positions; therefore, any attempt 
 
67 In particular, the predictive and uncontrollable imaginaries. 
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to protect their online voice would be superfluous (e.g. the Black female dancer, Lorena, for whom 
“the state can murder” her “in many ways”, Excerpt 8.30); others apparently understood themselves 
as already proper citizens – hence, any form of sacrifice would be unacceptable (e.g. the White lawyer 
Theo, Excerpt 7.29). 
 
Taken together, these co-constitutive processes engender a hybrid and paradoxical civic 
imaginary, I argue. In this imaginary, the control of visibility seems not a mere condition for the 
possibility of attaining civic recognition, but a cost of such recognition. Since these imagined others 
are expected to denigrate dissonant voices and cheer (or accept) the denigration of others’ voices, 
interviewees appeared to assume that misrecognizing themselves and others to control their own 
visibility and increase the likelihood of being recognized as citizens, are necessary courses of action. 
They misrecognize themselves through the various forms of self-silencing (misleading profiles, voice 
disguising, voice correction, voice deletion, voice suppression, voice disappearance and, to a lesser 
extent, news association); they misrecognize others through projects such as tactical aggression; and, 
to some extent, they misrecognize both when resorting to simplification and visual provocations, 
which implies that the interviewees often had to supress their legitimate voices and lie, patronize and 
manipulate their peers. On Facebook, it seems that the possibility of voice passes through the silencing 
– of oneself or of others, or both. 
 
The formation of civic self-understandings analysed in the fourth stage of the prefiguration 
cycle (self-evaluation, see Figure 9.1 above) could be interpreted as the consequence of how the 
different participants in this study located themselves in this paradoxical civic imaginary. Those 
interviewees who described their voices as inadequate and, frequently, felt excluded from this order, 
were, as expected, those who were less willing to accept the need to silence themselves and others; 
those who classified their self-representations as expendable should be able to deal with some form 
of misrecognition, but not unproblematically. The owners of rewarding voices appeared to accept and 
embrace this imaginary. 
 
This argument does not sit easily with the insights in the literature on similar phenomena. 
First, this paradoxical imaginary seems to change not the emotional experience of disrespect, but the 
dynamics that bring it about – how civic worth is granted and denied. In Honneth’s (1992) theory, 
misrecognition stems from a framework of social worth that demeans certain voices as inferior; post-
structuralists have for long argued that these frameworks might conflate recognition into 
misrecognition, becoming apparatuses of control that lead individuals to distort their voices so as to 
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be recognized (McNay, 2008). Others point to the pervasive but silent invisibilization of citizens 
through the configuration of spaces and norms of participation (Fraser, 2007). However, my analysis 
suggests that, in the context of the present study, spaces and norms are, generally, inclusive, and it 
demonstrates that recognition remains separate – but subjugated – to misrecognition. Furthermore, 
while distortion of voice seems to lead to, at least, some level of recognition-like interactions, based 
on the experiences analysed in this thesis, being heard as a proper citizen remains only a possibility. 
An individual might wholly transform her civic voice expressions so as to control her visibility, but 
there is no guarantee that any recognition will follow, or that denigration would be avoided, for 
instance.  
 
Second, in contrast to theories of self-optimization or self-branding (Section 3.5.2), civic voice 
expressions appear not to be adjusted with the aim of building an improved citizen or maintaining a 
stable public persona. Transformations were pragmatic and encompassed hateful and controversial 
self-representations. They were also unstable – several interviewees reported having to interrupt 
certain civic voice expressions or to alter them so as to avoid denigration. 
 
Third, arguments about how users direct themselves toward “the algorithm” when trying to 
influence the functioning of a datafied platform (see Section 3.2) might also be nuanced, based on my 
analysis. In fact, it seems that interviewees oriented themselves toward imagined others, whose 
constitution and relationship were oriented by the assumed rules of Facebook’s algorithmic visibility 
regime, but whose normative subjects originated from a constellation of other structures. 
 
There is another body of research that is more closely linked to my analysis – the work on 
datafication and authoritarianism, as discussed in the next section. 
 
9.5.2. Authoritarianism without Authorities? 
Much of the literature on datafication and authoritarianism tends to adopt a top-down 
perspective, involving two broad approaches (see Section 3.5.1). One posits that organized 
authoritarian actors – governments, politicians, parties, social movements, far-right “influencers” – 
may exploit datafied platforms to bypass accountability, persecute opponents and sow hate, 
falsehoods and distrust in democratic institutions, with the aim of radicalizing and alienating the sort 
of ordinary citizen in which this thesis is interested. From this perspective, summarized by Deibert 
(2019), platforms are not, themselves, authoritarian. Rather, they enable authoritarians. The second 
approach tends to focus on the kind of non-ideological authoritarian power that these platforms 
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themselves exert on end users. In this view, the deployment of datafication is premised upon the 
notion that end users’ autonomy has no moral meaning: it amounts to a kind of a commodity that 
should be analysed scientifically so as to be more efficiently manipulated (e.g. Zuboff, 2019). Although 
these two views differ in relation to how they characterize the political nature of platforms, neither 
gives in-depth attention to end user’s agency, largely assuming, arguably in neo-Frankfurtian fashion, 
that platforms, akin to older forms of industrial media, engender and depend upon manipulable 
individuals, prone to accept authoritarian leaders (Adorno, 2004). 
 
This thesis’ conclusions complicate these claims. The authoritarianism engendered by the 
paradoxical civic imaginary described above does not appear to be limited to the controllers or 
beneficiaries of datafied platforms. It can be exerted by the billions of end users of these companies’ 
products; this can happen even if these individuals are not “radicalized” by activists, organizations and 
politicians. Indeed, it was not necessary for anyone to tell, force or convince the interviewees in this 
study to misrecognize their civic voice expressions or to denigrate others. They seemed to have done 
so because they understood that these were the necessary (if sometimes contestable and distressing) 
courses of action to take if they wanted to be respected (or at least not disrespected) as citizens. If 
they wanted to be heard when they talked on Facebook. Of course, authorities frequently appeared 
in my interviews (the state, the police, a security guard, arguably relatives and friends). However, 
these imagined others did not architect the experiences of civic misrecognitions I was told about – at 
least not willingly. 
 
Likewise, I found no signs of coercion or Manichean attempts by Facebook to seduce 
individuals into any authoritarian ethos. The insight on conspicuous invisibility (Section 9.2) suggests 
the opposite – these consequences appeared to be largely contrary to the platform’s goals. Thus, it is 
not only that this authoritarianism appears to flourish even in the absence of directives from overtly 
authoritarian actors who use Facebook’s datafication operations. It also, on the basis of this study, 
can be understood to flourish precisely because the platform does not seem to be able to manipulate 
users as it might aim to. This unpremeditated, diffuse and unforced self-authoritarianization 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding datafied power’s radically novel operations, its consequences for 
the constitution of civic subjects (citizens) are, conceivably, not ontologically different from other 
contemporary kinds of power – which, as Foucault (2002) theorized decades ago, unfolded through a 
relation of the self to the self, often producing consequences not initially predicted by controllers and 
designers of social structures (Brown, 2006). 
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I suggest that the complex of structural conditions and patterned practices that realize the 
sorts of misrecognitions examined in Section 9.4, is a form of bottom-up authoritarianism: an 
authoritarianism that involves but is not created by any single “authority”. Based on this study, this 
bottom up authoritarianism can be said to emerge out of ordinary end users’ voluntary (but not 
autonomous) disposition to adopt civic voice expressions that, at different levels and with distinct 
consequences, imply misrecognition of themselves and others. To be sure, this authoritarianism is not 
ideological and overt. In this study, it seems to affect individuals from the right to the left, and seldom 
appeared in the interviewees’ discourse as linked to open intolerance and violence. It might seem odd 
to say that banal actions, such as using one’s own Facebook page to “like” one’s own posts, are 
authoritarian. This apparent innocuousness is, I argue, typical of the phenomenon I am describing. 
Turned into means for a noble end, authoritarian actions might appear as trivialized, ordinary, good, 
and ironically fun, almost relieved from the symbolic darkness that usually envelops the term (recall 
descriptions about “zoeira” – Section 7.3.1). 
 
However, bottom-up authoritarianism is, I suggest, far from harmless. For most interviewees, 
the price for trying to be who they want to be seemed fairly high. Their descriptions display 
widespread unease with having to abide by the recognition costs dynamic that is at the centre of the 
civic imaginary depicted in the previous section. This unease seemed likely to constitute silent, distant, 
frustrated and, perhaps above all, fearful citizens. For others, this game has allowed unprecedented 
feelings of “empowerment”, a form of civic recognition they rarely if ever had experienced before. 
Some seemed to thrive, others to retreat. However, those who thrived were not particularly troubled 
by that paradoxical civic imaginary (Fabricio, Helena, Luis), while individuals who appeared to be most 
committed to the idea of mutual recognition (e.g. Gael, Humberto, Olivia, Joaquim) were those who 
told me they were actively trying to limit their civic voice on Facebook. From the perspective adopted 
in this thesis, both groups can be characterized as having authoritarian characteristics, at least on 
Facebook. While this was more evident in the case of Fabricio, for example, who is proud about his 
hate speech, the hurtful self-imposed silence of individuals such as Humberto implicates a self-denial 
of recognition. This is not to say they are equally responsible for their authoritarian practices and 
resulting self-understandings (Humberto clearly is not), or that self-misrecognition equates, in ethical 
terms, with misrecognition of others (it does not). These are intricate issues that are worthy of more 
exploration. 
 
My overall point is that the voices that resulted from the prefiguration cycle described in 
Section 9.4 are hardly conducive to a “democratic ethical life” based on “social freedom” (Honneth, 
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2014, p. 63). At the individual level, this means that individuals such as the participants in this study, 
are not developing their political capacities as they could be expected to. Their autonomy seems 
harmed: they are not able to be the citizens that they could be, want to be or ought to be. 
Interestingly, though, the restraints are self-imposed, even if not self-created. At the societal level, 
without proper democratic citizens, it is unlikely that proper democracy can exist. To say that 
Facebook, at least when contextualized by troubling democracies such as Brazil’s, appears to 
undermine end users’ ability to constitute themselves as free citizens is tantamount to saying that this 
combination also erodes the possibility of a democratic culture. I return briefly to this in Section 10.3, 
when discussing the Brazilian context. 
 
Judging from my interviews, it is unclear how this complex kind of authoritarianism might be 
resisted. Since Facebook’s visibility regime is not necessarily understood as denying civic worth itself,68 
it appears to become particularly difficult for interviewees to envisage a way of struggling for their 
civic voice on the platform. Recall that, in Honneth’s theory, the struggle for recognition (i.e. the 
attempt to change how social worth is defined and granted), depends on both experiencing the 
demeaning emotions of misrecognition and the realization that these emotions are produced by 
structural conditions – that they are shared. Most of participants in this study did seem to feel this 
“moral injury”, to use Honneth’s term, associated with their inability to be themselves on Facebook 
(e.g. Humberto, Excerpt 8.26). However, they experienced more difficulty visualizing how to challenge 
this condition, due, possibly, to the hybrid origin of the civic imaginary I described in the previous 
section, which are composed of assumptions about Facebook and a plethora of non-Facebook 
structures. No-one, in my sample, appeared to describe any project that could be interpreted as a 
struggle for voice. Even practices that originated from interviewees’ creative and informed attempts 
to influence the algorithmic visibility regime seemed, ultimately, to be another way of playing the 
algorithmic game (echoing Bucher, 2012).  
 
I suggest that my participants’ actions toward Facebook’s infrastructure might be unwanted 
by the platform, but these actions cannot be deemed resistance, in the ethical sense of the word. They 
merely produce more data. Bottom-up authoritarianism, therefore, can be understood as being driven 
not by individuals’ gullibility or ignorance. On this basis, it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
projects of visibility control that give rise to misrecognized or misrecognizing voices are underpinned 
 
68 An exception is perhaps how some interviewees conceived of Facebook’s content moderation system, which 
was imagined by them as being based on a clear definition of civic worth (e.g. Luis, Fabio, Rafael). However, 
none of them knew how to oppose to this perceived problem. 
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by some form of critical reflection on the platform’s inner workings and may be enhanced by some 
knowledge about others and the regime itself (e.g. Fabricio, Excerpt 7.6), what casts doubt on the 
efficacy of propositions overly focussed on enhancing the literacy about the platform’s inner workings, 
or even those who call for transparency measures. 
 
From the point of view of this study’s participants, it seems that the only form of resistance 
to the algorithmic visibility regime is to abdicate from any form of datafied interaction, as Pedro 
(Excerpt 7.27), for instance, tried to do (and even this attempt’s success was uncertain, as Amanda 
told me – Excerpt 8.27). Disconnection becomes understood – in a non-programmatic manner – as an 
act of political defiance (see Mejías, 2013). Put another way, civic disengagement, which for decades 
was assumed to be one of democracy’s most crippling trends (Dahlgren, 2014; Norris, 2011), appears, 
in this context, as arguably the most autonomous approach to citizenship. Or, rather, the action that 
might at least allow for the possibility of autonomy. 
 
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to highlight how bottom-up authoritarianism is, 
ultimately, indissociable from the other concepts I have advanced above. Without conspicuous 
invisibility, there would be no sociomaterial imaginaries; without sociomaterial imaginaries, there 
would be no imagined others; and without these imaginaries and others, there would be no 
paradoxical civic imaginary, the structural element that engenders bottom-up authoritarianism.  
 
9.7. Conclusion 
This chapter develops the main conceptual insights of this thesis. Through the re-examination 
of the empirical findings discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, three sets of interrelated concepts were 
formulated (see Appendix 7). I drew on my analysis of interviewees’ schematizations to argue that 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime can be understood as becoming imaginable by being 
materialized as conspicuously invisible (Section 9.2). The uncertainty that marks this condition, 
coupled with the profoundly social dimension of these schematizations, engender imaginaries that 
are not only multiple and contradicting, but also sociomaterial; that is, composed of combinations of 
human and non-human imagined elements, giving rise to what, in the second section, I call imagined 
others (Section 9.3). I then conceptualized how these imaginaries appear to support a series of 
prefigurations of participants’ civic voice expressions, triggering various civic 
recognitions/misrecognitions and transforming their civic self-understandings. This prefiguration 
cycle, I contended, corresponds to the processes of civic becoming which this thesis set out to explore 
(Section 9.4). In the last set of sections (9.5), I tried to explain and conceptualize the normative 
 225 
dimension of these processes. I proposed that, in making possible a paradoxical civic imaginary 
(Section 9.5.1), Facebook’ algorithmic visibility regime seems to gives rise to a structural form of civic 
misrecognition, which entails a kind of bottom-up authoritarianism (Section 9.5.2). End users may not 
need to hold authoritarian ideologies, to be radicalized or coerced by others to develop and engage 
in authoritarian practices. It suffices to establish misrecognition as the cost of the possibility of civic 
recognition.  
 






























This thesis began with my description of a scene I witnessed in 2013. I would like to finish with 
another – much more recent – memory. It is of an event that took place in September 2018 and 
occurred in London, not Brasília. Instead of the Congresso Nacional’s curious modernist shapes, I could 
see the monuments in Trafalgar Square, reminiscent of the British Empire – Nelson’s Column, gigantic 
lions, equestrian statues. Similar to the scene in Brasília, there was a group of strangers – mostly 
Brazilian expats. But this time, I was no longer a journalist, but a doctoral student. Rather than 
observing them, I felt free to join them. “Ele não! Ele não!” [not him! not him!], we chanted. A tourist 
asked me who the pronoun “him” referred to. It was not difficult to figure out: the name and picture 
of Jair Bolsonaro, the extremist conservative candidate who appeared poised to be elected Brazil’s 
president, were prominent on nearly all of the posters and stickers being displayed – with some 
images sporting a Hitler moustache. Our message could not have been clearer: anyone but him (and 
his acolytes) would be acceptable. Somewhat similar to 2013, anti-Bolsonaro protests were taking 
place in hundreds of cities, in Brazil and abroad. However, the electrifying climate in that long night in 
June 2013 had little to do with our sobriety that afternoon in London. It was unclear to me whether 
the other expats truly believed that an electoral turnaround was possible, that any demonstration 
would be able to stop Bolsonaro. I was deeply sceptical. After the ascension of Donald Trump and the 
Brexit referendum, what would have been an unbelievable shock seemed to be an almost unavoidable 
outcome. Nonetheless, I spent most of my waking hours those days on Facebook, publishing 
desperate posts, responding to strangers’ comments, beginning interminable discussions and quarrels 
with random people, trying to convince whomever could read me that Bolsonaro was a virulent lunatic 
who talked, repeatedly, about killing, torturing and raping political rivals. Most of my interlocutors did 
not appear to care. Within weeks, Bolsonaro won the election in a far-right landslide. His rise seemed 
to me at the time diffusely associated with the conclusions of the thesis I was writing. 
 
This final chapter revisits these conclusions. It first distils the empirical findings and conceptual 
insights to offer a synthetic answer to the main research question – How does Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility regime shape the civic voice of ordinary end users on the platform? Then, it summarizes my 
key contributions to, mainly, debates about the civic ramifications of datafication and about 
datafication power itself. Before concluding, this chapter discusses the Brazilian context, explores the 
limitations of this study and points to some future research directions. 
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10.2. Points of Departure, Points of Arrival 
This section recaps the empirical, conceptual and epistemological points of departure of the 
thesis and recapitulates where my analysis led – the points of arrival of the study.  
 
Empirically, my chief premise is set out in Chapter 2. I suggested that the Brazilian crisis 
engendered (and was largely engendered by) a wave of ordinary processes of civic becoming. In a 
democracy historically marked by the low presence of the “people”, these processes appeared to 
represent a turning point. What distinguished this turmoil from previous turbulences was not just the 
centrality of these newly engaged ordinary individuals, but the fact that their political involvement 
unfolded mainly in a new sort of space – datafied platforms. If we are to understand which citizens 
emerged from the Brazilian crisis, it is important to understand the role played by Facebook (Brazil’s 
most popular platform) in these processes. This is the focus of this study. 
 
Using elements of social practices theory to bridge recognition theory, critical data studies 
and sociology of visibility, Chapter 3 constructed a non-naturalist conceptual framework to investigate 
these particularly located processes of civic becoming. This framework is supported by two main 
pillars. The concept of civic voice was examined to flesh out the notion of citizenship as a self-
constitutive practice with a normative horizon. In this view, political self-representations seek (and 
often ought) to be recognized by others. Based on these responses (or lack of them), individuals come 
to understand who they are (or are not) as citizens. The nexus of civic actions and self-understandings 
that compose civic voice is, thus, both structured by and evaluated against shared assumptions of 
what citizens ought to do and be – which I termed civic imaginary. Practices imbued with the values 
of mutual recognition were depicted as crucial to the constitution of autonomous citizens and, thus, 
of democratic life – or, alternatively, to the flourishing of authoritarianism. The notion of algorithmic 
visibility regime was advanced as a way of explaining the kinds of structures datafied platforms, such 
as Facebook, are, and how their intertwined visibility vectors (sight and readability) are used to try to 
control end users. This form of power, I suggested, is best theorized as neither the deployment of 
resources (datafication operations) nor only as schemas (“notions”, “imaginaries”, “folk theories”), 
but rather as the materialization of the former to direct the construction of the latter and, in this way, 
order the prefiguration of end users’ actions towards the platform. The main conceptual point of 
departure in this study is that the shaping of civic voices by Facebook’s datafication operations is best 
theorized as an indirect process. It begins with end users making sense of the platform’s government 
of visibility (schematization), which might give rise to social imaginaries of the algorithmic visibility 
regime. Then, these imaginaries may prompt end users to transform their civic voice expressions to 
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control how they are visibilized so as to be heard on Facebook, creating new experiences of 
(mis)recognition and transforming their civic self-understanding. 
 
Underlying much of the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 is the main epistemological 
position in this study – that end users may be able to reflect on physically invisible datafication 
operations, act in relation to their reflections and, when asked, talk about these actions and 
reflections. Hence, my choice of in-depth interviews with ordinary Brazilians as my method (Chapter 
4). After the examination in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, of the descriptions collected from interviews with 
47 of those newly engaged ordinary Brazilians, Chapter 9 revisited my findings to elaborate on the 
conceptual insights in relation to the sub-questions guiding this study. 
 
Building on those insights, now I propose a synthetic answer to my main research question. 
In brief, I argue that, at least in Brazil, Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime seems to shape civic 
voices by making possible the construction of a new understanding of how civic worth can be socially 
recognized, enacting a civic imaginary that is particular to the platform (Section 9.5.1). This imaginary 
does not explicitly denigrate or invisibilise any category of end user (as recognition scholars tend to 
argue), nor does it offer them recognition in exchange for compliance with unjust norms (as the critics 
of recognition scholars tend to retort). Rather, it implies that enhancing the odds of being heard 
depends on controlling one’s visibility on Facebook, which, in turn, hinges on misrecognizing oneself 
and others. At the core of this civic imaginary there is, thus, a paradox. 
 
This paradox seemed to be crucial to how interviewees represented themselves as citizens on 
Facebook. Its consequences can be seen throughout what I designated as the prefiguration cycle of 
civic voice (Section 9.4). It systematizes the empirical findings that emerged from the investigation of 
SRQs 3.1 and 3.2 and, in this way, conceptualizes the processes of civic becoming that the thesis set 
out to investigate. To be seen (and likely heard) by their peers, many interviewees considered hateful, 
simplified and manipulative civic voice expressions to be necessary. They seemed to infer that if 
Facebook’s news feed privileges posts and comments that receive large amounts of datafied 
reactions, any expression that can entice others into reacting is understood as itself enticing. 
Disrespect for others appeared as an unavoidable consequence of the interviewee’s own attempts to 
be respected. The paradox emerged, also, in the multiple sorts of self-imposed silences – deletions, 
omissions, lies – whereby participants demeaned themselves to avoid being demeaned (or fired or 
murdered) by others. Since they imagined, ultimately, having no control over how their online actions 
would be read and seen, it was found that they appeared to believe that the only way to prevent 
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having their voices denigrated was a sort of preventive self-invisibilization. Surely, many voice 
expressions were enabled or tweaked without significant harm – but these visibility control projects 
seemed not to be deemed sufficient to secure real control. 
 
Participants’ sense of civic self was not shielded from these adjustments. By engendering 
intersubjective (mis)recognitions, these particularly shaped voice expressions were shown to 
indirectly constitute interviewees’ civic self-understandings on the platform. For many, the prospect 
of having to misrecognize others and themselves seemed unbearable. They tended to see themselves 
as inadequate citizens on Facebook, unable or unwilling to even try to be heard. Others came to 
comprehend their voices as expendable: certain self-representations would have to be sacrificed so 
other expressions could at least become eligible for recognition. Even when adjustments were 
described as rewarding, more or less immediate forms of silencing of others and selves were involved. 
In sum, I found that my participants could rarely be the citizens they expected to be on Facebook. In 
eroding the possibility of legitimate recognition, that paradoxical civic imaginary seems to undermine 
the initial condition for individual autonomy, engendering a specific form of bottom-up 
authoritarianism, as I describe this structural dynamic of misrecognition. This is the main conceptual 
development proposed in this study. It also the culmination of other processes formulated in Chapter 
9, which suggest how Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime seem to have enabled this seeming state 
of affairs. 
 
The enabling role played by the regime originates from what seems to be an unintended 
consequence of Facebook’s datafication power, as suggested in Section 9.2. The analysis of the 
interviews indicates that the platform’s attempt to direct how end users imagine and act towards its 
algorithmic visibility regime backfires, but in a generative manner. Facebook controllers might want 
to obscure this regime, rendering its government of visibility as a natural function of what end users 
imagine as “relevant”. Nevertheless, in being minutely personalized, Facebook’s news feed not only 
becomes a central element in participants’ everyday lives, about which an abundant amount of 
information is consumed (individually and socially). It is also transformed into a heuristic artefact. 
Through it, interviewees can apparently observe the proliferation of responses (real or not) to their 
offline and online actions (on or off Facebook). These responses and information (and the improvised 
probes their combination allows for) seemed to lead the interviewees to assume that something (“the 
filter”, “the algorithm”, “Facebook”), is ostensibly defining who can visibilize whom on the platform. 
Yet, as the infrastructure remains physically invisible, what this “something” is cannot be fully known, 
it seems. Therefore, instead of being concealed, the regime appears to be materialized as 
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conspicuously invisible. It is such materialization that permits Facebook’s government of visibility to 
be schematized as it is, I proposed, in response to SRQ 1. 
 
Conspicuous invisibility – and the fact that to surface it depends on interactions with other 
human actors – seems to give rise to three contradictory, but concomitant imaginaries about the 
algorithmic visibility regime (controllable, predictive and uncontrollable visibility imaginaries). More 
than sets of taken-for-granted assumptions about social relations structured by datafication 
operations (as initially proposed in my conceptual framework), these imaginaries seem to be 
populated by imaginations that are co-constituted by human and non-human elements. Invoking the 
notion of sociomateriality, I advanced the idea of sociomaterial imaginaries to describe these schemas 
and reconceptualize the empirical findings related to SRQ 2. In this study, the idea of sociomaterial 
imaginary is particularly helpful to understand what I describe as imagined others, which are 
composed of a combination of participants’ assumptions about the platform’s visibility regime and 
their assumptions about real-life individuals, organizations and institutions. Three categories of these 
others were found to dominate the descriptions of interviewees: controllable others, algorithmic 
bubble and imagined surveillants. 
 
This sociomateriality helps to explain the paradoxical civic imaginary which is behind bottom-
up authoritarianism. Sociomateriality entails that assumptions about the rules governing who 
visibilizes whom on Facebook are hybridized by interviewees’ broader relational understandings of 
which civic voice is deemed worthy in a country marked by long-standing inequalities, state 
authoritarianism and elitism. The result is particular imagined others who seem to be assumed to hold 
particular ideas about which voice ought to be recognized or misrecognized. In the descriptions 
offered by my Brazilian interviewees, what makes Facebook’s civic imaginary paradoxical is not only 
the assumption that they must elicit reactions from others to be seen or that they have no control 
over how they are seen/read. Rather, the paradox appears to emerge from the combination of these 
assumptions with the understanding that their imagined bubble is awaiting disrespectful voice 
expressions, that their imagined surveillants might act on to demean or harm them; that the societal 
barriers to their personal development justify the costs of being heard on Facebook (Section 9.5.1). 
Their imaginations seemed to be linked to their social positions. Being a woman, transgender, Black, 
a man, White, affluent appeared in the descriptions of some of the interviewees as a critical factor to 
how they imagined specific others and, thus, to their expected recognitions and misrecognitions 
within Facebook. Therefore, in this research, bottom-up authoritarianism emerges out of the 
contextualization of sociomaterial imaginaries of the platform’s algorithmic visibility regime within 
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Brazil’s political conditions and history. It should be noted that, based on this study, it is not possible 
to claim that this kind of authoritarianism is intrinsic to the platform itself, or to expect that it occurs 
everywhere with the same intensity (see Section 10.4 below).  
 
Each of the conceptual insights in this study paves the way to the next one, albeit in an 
indeterminate manner: bottom-up authoritarianism hinges on sociomaterial imaginaries (but is not 
determined by them). In turn, these imaginaries depend upon the conspicuous invisibility of the 
algorithmic visibility regime (but this materialization of the algorithmic visibility regime does not 
define which sociomaterial imaginaries will be constructed). 
 
10.3. Conceptual and Empirical Contributions 
This study’s conclusions have implications for how the relationship between datafication and 
democracy might be conceptualized. Bottom-up authoritarianism indicates that civic unfreedom 
might be produced by end users from across the ideological spectrum as a result of their rightful and 
often well-informed attempts to satisfy an emotional and ethical need, and not only by malicious state 
agents, far-right activists or platforms. While Facebook’s business model is indissociable from the 
misrecognitions this thesis has examined, the platform’s controllers cannot be said to have wished to 
engender this sort of political outcome. The authoritarian civic voice expressions I examined seem, 
ultimately, to originate from an unintended consequence of Facebook’s contradictory datafication 
power (to which the platform seems to have turned a blind eye). (This is not to say, of course, that 
Facebook is exonerated from its extraordinary irresponsibility over the years, epitomized in the “move 
fast and break things” motto.) 
 
Furthermore, my conclusions invite consideration of the contextual dimension of 
authoritarianism in datafied platforms. How end users imagine themselves in relation to certain others 
seems strongly associated to structures that are not intrinsically datafied such as race, gender and 
income. In this study, minorities appeared to be particularly affected by this dynamic precisely 
because of their minority status. In this sense, my conceptual insight establishes a link with broader 
debates on how automated systems seem to disproportionately penalize the most vulnerable, and 
reinforces suggestions of decentring purely technological solutions for the social consequences of 
datafication (Gangadharan & Niklas, 2019; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; see also Franklin, 2013). From 
a broader view, bottom-up authoritarianism may be understood as a new construct to understand the 
relative role played by datafied platforms in the erosion of the very possibility of mutual recognition 
and, thus, of an “ethical democratic life” (Honneth, 2014). 
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In seeking to understand the relationship between democracy and datafication, this thesis 
contributes to the general debate on the nature of Facebook’s datafication power as well. The notion 
of an algorithmic visibility regime has proven a fruitful framing for this study. The usage of 
prefiguration allowed me to break down the algorithmic visibility regime’s control technique into 
three interdependent components (resource materialization, schemas and prefigured action), 
increasing the level of detailed insight into the processes that constitute the shaping of a complex 
social practice such as civic voice. Yet, the interview data analysis allowed me to suggest 
improvements to the framework initially proposed and led to an understanding that perhaps comes 
closer to representing how such a regime actually works. Table 10.1 below updates Table 3.1. It 
provides a summary of my initial theorization approach and how it can be enhanced drawing upon 
the conceptual insights formulated in Chapter 9. Rather than being materialized as a mere 
personalized news feed, there is the ambiguity presented by conspicuous invisibility; instead of 
restricting end users’ assumptions about the platforms’ visibility rules (schemas) to the idea that the 
news feed is made up of “relevant” content, there is the messy complexity of the three sociomaterial 
imaginaries and their offshoot, the concept of imagined others. Finally, instead of only one form of 
































Prefiguration Cycle (See Figure 9.1) 
       Table 10.1. Summary and comparison between two conceptualizations of Facebook’s algorithmic  
       visibility regime. Source: Author.  
  
This post-analysis extension of the conceptual framework contradicts expectations (common 
for example in some accounts of political micro-targeting) that the platform might possess some kind 
of (deterministic) control over its end users. Its datafication operations have been shown to play some 
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role in the constitution of imaginaries, actions and self-understandings, but which role is difficult to 
define a priori. If my first formulation, arguably, was over reliant on assumptions about the platform’s 
intentions, this reformulation seems closer to late-Foucauldian theory which inspired much of my 
thinking. Datafication power works in ways that are often uncertain and faceless – and yet, it might 
be highly productive. 
 
Some of the conceptual insights that contribute to this revamped version of the concept of 
algorithmic visibility regime might be considered, in their own right, relevant to specific problems 
within the field of critical data studies. The notion of conspicuous invisibility provides insight into how 
ordinary end users make sense of platforms’ inner workings by suggesting that their infrastructures 
might become imaginable, not due merely to a “break down”, but thanks to the good performance of 
datafication power. Imagined other was advanced as a way of developing the concept of imagined 
audience in the context of datafied platforms. The algorithmic government of visibility by Facebook 
might inform not only the collapse but also the mental reconstruction of contexts of communication, 
engendering types of “others” that are defined by their relative positions to end users, and allowing 
for the incorporation of contextual elements. Also, in decentring “algorithms” or other computational 
procedures, and underscoring constitutional relationships between a plethora of components, the 
idea of sociomaterial imaginaries enlightens discussions about the understandings end users hold of 
platforms’ datafication operations.  
 
This thesis did not aim to contribute to the debate on the transformation of Brazilian 
democracy since 2013, but some provisional ideas might be offered. As signalled in the introduction 
to this chapter, while no linear connection can be established, I find it hard to dissociate bottom-up 
authoritarianism from the ascendency in Brazil of authoritarians like Bolsonaro. Given the importance 
of Facebook to Brazilian ordinary end users, who either actively produced or passively allowed this to 
happen, it seems reasonable to suppose that the likely self-authoritarianization of their civic voices on 
the platform had some kind of influence on this change of direction. In my fieldwork, I learnt how 
expressing one’s civic voice on Facebook can be a frustrating, frightening and cowardly practice. Many 
of the stories that I heard were told by citizens who had become disillusioned with the possibility of 
representing themselves freely, who were fearful of the consequences of doing so, and who were 
convinced that demeaning others was a necessary, justifiable or satisfying way of expressing their 
voice. Some of the ordinary people I met in São Paulo in 2017 had learned to enjoy speaking like 
Bolsonaro; others seemed to feel incapable of standing up to figures like him; some few appeared to 
had given up. The consequences of bottom-up authoritarianism might go beyond what happens on 
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Facebook. It is fair to assume that these processes of civic becoming on the platform might have some 
influence on how individuals voted, whether they attended street protest and made political decisions 
in spheres that are not overtly political (e.g. workplace, household). As it is obvious, the citizens 
constituted through bottom-up authoritarianism are not digital citizens, as sometimes they are called, 
but simply citizens, acting within and outside of platforms like Facebook. 
 
Moreover, these citizens need not be only ordinary citizens. It might be that authoritarian 
leaders have not only electorally benefited from, but have been themselves constituted by bottom-
up authoritarianism as well. This is not to say that they were necessarily “radicalized” by their usage 
of the platform. However, it is reasonable to infer that, on Facebook and similar platforms, this sort 
of politician has found a place where their authoritarian selves are accepted, cherished and 
incentivized, becoming, thus, liberated and empowered. 
 
For decades, Brazil’s democracy was marked by a low level of non-electoral participation, 
which allowed social change, most of the time, to be the business of a tiny elite, as explained in Section 
2.3. The arrival of datafied platforms, along with broader and long-term changes, does seem to have 
transformed this aspect. There have never been more chances for Brazilians to exert their civic voices 
and never have so many indeed exerted their voices. However, I have pointed out that the kind of 
citizen that seems to be constituted by these experiences is not necessarily conducive to democracy. 
Put another way, an inversion of Brazil’s democratic paradox, to use Mouffe’s (2000) expression again 
(see Section 1.2), might be underway. Instead of a society in which people’s sovereignty is ignored or 
repressed, as before, the country seems to have an increasingly powerful demos and a more or less 
threatened political elite. Yet, this might entail not further democratization, but the opposite. At the 
time of writing, it was difficult to envisage which citizens, in which spaces, could reorient the country’s 
fortunes – despite the considerable discontentment with Bolsonaro . 
 
10.4. Limitations, Future Research and Alternatives Interpretations 
Given the relatively small size of my sample, the extent to which the insights from this study 
can be generalized needs consideration. In this section, I highlight limitations of this thesis, avenues 
for future research and several potential alternative interpretations of my results which might have 
emerged if I employed a different conceptual framework. 
 
Further research is needed to establish whether the patterns of practices and imaginaries 
described by the interviewees in this study are likely to be repeated by other individuals. It seems 
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probable that my insights into how Facebook’s visibility regime is schematized and imagined might be 
shared by many other people, Brazilians or not. This is because these insights refer, primarily, to how 
the platform functions and, despite eventual tweaks and localized testing of alternative interface 
configurations, this functioning is essentially the same for all, or most, of its end users. Much more 
care is needed with regard to the generalizability of my insights about imagined others, the 
prefigurations of civic voice and bottom-up authoritarianism. These insights encompass multiple 
factors – not just how Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime functions, but also individuals’ many 
assumptions about themselves and others. It might be, for instance, that individuals living in more 
functional democracies, where civic recognition is more widely and equitably protected and 
guaranteed, imagine other social actors as being more willing to listen, discuss and be respectful. It 
might be that there are variations within Brazil, due to the country’s significant 
geographical/economic disparities (see Section 2.2), or differences between politically engaged and 
non-engaged end users (see Section 4.4.2). These possibilities invite future research to compare 
specific populations or countries – some of which might be experiencing, as Brazil, widespread 
processes of civic becoming on datafied platforms. These projects might, but need not, be qualitative. 
My results could inform statistically representative surveys designed to tackle similar problems. 
Furthermore, future research could investigate the role of bottom-up authoritarianism for political 
actors such as politicians, parties and social movements, as suggested in the previous section. This 
issue is particularly intriguing in relation to actors whose current prominence is strongly associated 
with the dominance of datafied platforms as public spaces, in Brazil or elsewhere. 
 
Another limitation regards the temporality of my findings and insights – to what extent are 
they time limited? Research on digital media often runs the risk of quickly becoming dated. The period 
between my fieldwork, at the beginning of 2017, and the conclusion of this study, in mid-2019, was 
particularly turbulent. The series of scandals in which Facebook was embroiled forced it to repeatedly 
change the design of its products. The logic of the news feed was altered several times in attempts to 
reduce “low-quality” content and to enhance engagement; ad hoc content moderation to prevent 
abusive speech, falsehoods and illegal content became much more common; and initiatives to 
enhance end users’ awareness of the platform’s inner workings were enacted (Dreyfuss & Lapowsky, 
2019). Furthermore, the platform responded with transparency measures such as publishing its 
content moderation guidelines (Bickert, 2018), allowing users to check who paid for a political ad 
(Cellan-Jones, 2018) and the launch of a media campaign on various issues such as “fake news” (Tiku, 
2018). Mark Zuckerberg (2019) even promised to effectively end Facebook as we know it, saying that 
“the future is private”. These changes and pledges are related, precisely, to how the platform’s 
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algorithmic visibility regime works. As such, they may have impacted on how end users, including my 
interviewees, schematize, imagine and try to control the visibility of their civic voices. Nevertheless, I 
suggest that my conceptual insights offer an interesting framework to apply to other datafied 
platforms that appear to operate under similar logics. The modified version of the concept of an 
algorithmic visibility regime (see Table 10.1 above) could be used to study political videos on Google’s 
YouTube, for example, where, it is claimed that over 80% of end users click on algorithmically 
recommended videos (Pew Research Centre, 2018a). This sort of future research might but need not 
refer to politics. Algorithmic visibility regimes (and how they are imagined) likely influence many other 
kinds of communicative practices on datafied platforms – in relation to end users’ personal and 
professional lives, for instance. 
 
Additionally, the normative insights in this study cannot be generalized to encompass all of 
the consequences of datafied platforms for civic voice. It is possible, for example, that, on many 
occasions, civic voice expressions on Facebook are not or are only marginally affected by end users’ 
imaginaries of the regime – indeed, some interviewees pointed to precisely this (see Sections 7.4 and 
8.4). My theoretical assumption that individuals are constantly interpreting reality may have skewed 
the analysis in this study away from actions that are only marginally influenced by people’s explicit 
intentions or not affected at all by them. It might also be, for instance, that during our conversations, 
the interviewees remembered only those experiences that were emotionally engaging.69 An 
interesting future research direction that could mitigate this issue might involve the use of the 
platform’s “Activity Log” (which lists all end users’ actions) as an interview prompt. Participants could 
be asked to login in to their accounts and to go through their logs, explaining their actions in relation 
to their assumptions about the algorithmic visibility regime and their expectations of 
recognition/misrecognition. Furthermore, possibly positive aspects of datafication for democracy 
were not addressed in this study because this project was located, largely, in a troubled empirical 
context – the Brazilian crisis – and motivated by my curiosity regarding Facebook’s role in it. However, 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility regime might be strategically used, for example, to better inform or 
organize citizens to stand up to authoritarian actors. Thus, I do not claim that Facebook’s inner 
workings are solely, or even necessarily, involved in authoritarian dynamics. As Robin Mansell (2017, 
p. 46) suggests, “[i]t is misleading to argue that digitally mediated communication in the digital era is 
wholly exploitative or that it is fundamentally liberating”. It should also be noted that my aim was not 
to elucidate how interviewees see themselves as citizens overall, if, by “citizen”, one means a 
 
69 At the same time, these rarely reflected upon and thus scarcely recalled actions might be less important for 
the construction of civic self-understandings. 
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complete civic self-understanding which is likely influenced by many experiences that have not been 
studied here. While important (even central) to most of my interviewees, Facebook is not the sole 
space where they might exert their civic voices and become citizens. 
 
Lastly, alternative theoretical framings might have been drawn upon to interpret the corpus 
of data in this study and this might have yielded interesting interpretations. First, a focus on critical 
accounts of neoliberal rationality might have informed an examination of the relations between 
datafication, citizenship and the socioeconomic system in which platforms such as Facebook have 
flourished (Brown, 2015). This might have allowed me to situate my analysis in wider historical trends 
and to discuss the function of neoliberal logics of commodification in the authoritarian voices 
documented in this study. I also considered developing my conceptual framework around theories of 
mediatization, in particular, its culturalist variances (e.g. Hepp, 2013), what might have helped to 
conceptualize the relations between Facebook’s government of visibility and interviewees’ individual 
and social contexts in greater depth. Similarly, the notion of “mediation opportunity structure” 
(Cammaerts, 2012) might have been applied to elicit understanding of how lay people relate to media 
technologies for political ends. A final concept that was considered (and employed in Magalhães, 
2018) was Foucault’s (1984) treatment of subjectivation. While his thinking would have enabled a 
stronger focus on ethical subjectivity, I judged that it would not be sufficiently informative regarding 
how, precisely, subjects are (and ought to be) formed – thus, my choice of recognition as a core 
construct. Generally, these alternative theoretical framings would have made it difficult to develop 
the notion of imaginaries as a key element of my conceptual framework and, arguably, to articulate 
the concepts of materiality, action and self-understanding in the way I have found helpful in my study. 
 
10.5. Conclusion 
The research for this thesis intended to understand the role of datafication power in a kind of 
process that, between 2013 and 2018, contributed to upend Brazil’s political order – the 
unprecedented civic involvement of previously disengaged ordinary people, largely through datafied 
platforms, and specifically through Facebook. More than informing the series of collective events that 
came to be known as “the crisis” (protests, impeachment, corruption scandal), these processes of civic 
becoming called into question the very nature of Brazil’s democratic life. 
 
Inspired by non-naturalist accounts of citizenship, I suggested that my study would demand 
the development of two principal concepts: one to account for the constitutive (and normative) 
relationship between acting politically and becoming a citizen in a democracy (which I defined as civic 
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voice); the other to theorize the power techniques enacted by the datafied spaces where this acting 
and becoming unfold (which I defined as an algorithmic visibility regime). The ways in which 
Facebook’s algorithmic visibility may shape the civic voice of its ordinary end users during the Brazilian 
crisis (this thesis’ overall problem), however, are not straightforward, I suggested. The computational 
operations used by the platform to read end users’ actions – which define how they see (and are seen 
by) others on its interface – may not directly produce civic voice expressions. These operations, I 
proposed initially, might be materialized by Facebook to direct how they are made sense of by end 
users – a process that might be political but is not necessarily about citizenship. Thus, I argued that 
their understandings of these operations – how they imagine them – might be the immediate 
structural elements shaping civic voice expressions. I expected that they would do so by transforming 
end users’ expectations of visibility, and, thus, their assumptions about the possibility of being 
recognized (or misrecognized) as a citizen on Facebook. 
 
The thematic analysis of in-depth interviews with 47 of those ordinary Brazilian end users 
suggested that this theorization provided a productive – although not definitive – conceptual 
framework to tackle this study’s overall research question. I concluded that Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility seems to be materialized, at least in the eyes of the end users examined in this study, as 
conspicuously invisible. This seemed to give rise to imaginaries about the algorithmic visibility regime 
that were considerably more complex than I anticipated. Essentially, they do not only refer to social 
relations between individuals, but to co-constitutive relations between imaginations of both human 
and non-human elements. The original conceptual framework was therefore extended to introduce 
the concept of sociomateriality, proposing that my participants’ implicit understandings about who 
can visibilize whom on Facebook may be best understood as sociomaterial imaginaries. My analysis 
also revealed that interviewees did not seem to make decisions about their civic voice expressions 
based solely on their assumptions on how Facebook governs its algorithmic visibility regime. Instead, 
their descriptions repeatedly pointed to what I conceptualized as imagined others – which invited the 
assimilation of another concept that was not part of my initial conceptual framework: imagined 
audiences. These imagined others consisted of hybrid assumptions about Brazil’s troubled democracy 
and Facebook’s rules of visibility government. In conjunction with the platform’s assumed rules of 
visibility, these imagined others were found to give rise to paradoxical norms about how to be heard 
as citizens on Facebook (a paradoxical civic imaginary), engendering what I depicted as a form of 
bottom-up authoritarianism. This was characterized as a structural misrecognition dynamic through 
which the interviewees seemed to both distort and invisibilise their own civic voices and denigrate 
those of others – the apparent cost of controlling their visibility so as to increase the likelihood of 
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being recognized on the platform. On this basis, I have suggested that authoritarianism on Facebook 
need not be produced by an external authority. It may emerge from the bottom up and for a reason 
that is, in principle, legitimate: to be heard. 
 
As noted in the previous section, more research is needed to understand the generalizability 
of the insights arising from this thesis. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that the consequences of 
datafication for democratic citizenship (particularly in Brazil) may be more subtle, but are not 
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Initial Interview Protocol. 
 
 
“RQ1: In which terms, and to what extent, are civic practices adjusted by users to enact, resist and manipulate 
algorithmic visibility? 
 
1) What do you think is needed to be more visible on social media when people are talking or doing things 
about this political crisis? 
 
2) And you? What do you do when you want your posts or comments about this crisis to become more visible? 
Can you give me examples? 
 
3) Are there some moments in whih you actually want to become less visible on social media? What do you do 
to hide? Can you show me examples? 
 
4) Have you ever changed what you do or say about politics on social media during the crisis because you 
thought someone, some company or a government would see what you doing or saying? Can you show me 
examples?  
 
5) Do you feel that there are things that you would like to do or say on social media, but cannot because the 
interface/system does not allow you? 
 
6) Do you ever talk, read or interact with people that you disagree about the crisis on Facebook/Twitter? If so, 
how? Can you show me examples?  
7) How did all this political participation during the crisis impacted on your offline relation to politics? 
 
RQ2: How users develop perceptions about algorithmic visibility? 
 
8) Thinking a bit about what we were talking about… how did discover that those are the ways to become 
more or less visible on social media? Can you tell me how did you learn these techniques? 
 
9) How do you know who and what can see you? Can you tell me how did you learn this information? 
 
10) Do you think that using social media is the best way to learn about how social media works, in the sense 
we have been talking about so far?  
 
11) When you think about these things that you have to do to be more visible, or how you cannot do all the 
actions that you want on social media…. Is this way of doing or talking about politics close to what, in you 
opinion, politics should be like? 
 
12) Based on what we have seen on your activity log, do you remember a moment during the crisis in which 
you felt that people were really respecting or disrespecting what you were saying or doing about this political 
crisis? How do you know people respected what you said/done? Can you show them to me? 
 
13) Do you think that sometimes you are talking about politics, but no-one is listening? Why you think that 
happens? What do you feel about it?  
 
14) Now, after all we talked about, and thinking about what we saw on you activity log…. I would like you to 
compare the person that you were before the crisis and after. Do you feel that using social media to talk about 
or do things about this crisis made you more or less capable to exert or claim you rights as a citizen? Can you 
explain me why? 
 





Final Interview Protocol. 
 
 
“(INITIAL NARRATIVE QUESTION) 
 
Could you explain how you participate politically on social media? 
 
HOW USERS SEE 
 
1- What does determine what you see on your social media news feed about politics? 
 
2 - How did you discover this? 
 





HOW USERS ARE SEEN (STRUGGLE FOR VISIBILITY) 
4 – What does it make a post or a comment on politics on social media more visible? 
5 - How did you discover this? 
 




HOW USERS ARE SEEN (SURVEILLANCE) 
7 - Who can see your posts/comments on politics on social media? 
 
8 - How did you discover this? 
9 - Do you change your political activities on social media because these activities might be seen? Could you 






10 – When you talk about politics on social media, do you feel you are heard? 
11 – Do you think people would hear you more if your posts/comments were more visible? 








Cross tabulation of components of the conceptual framework and research/interview 
questions. 
 
   COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
   
The schematization of the 
algorithmic visibility regime 
Social Imaginaries of 
algorithmic visibility regimes 
The adjustment of civic voice to exert control over the 
algorithmic visibility regime 
   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 




SRQ 1: How do ordinary 
end users schematize 
Facebook’s algorithmic 
visibility regime? 
SRQ 2: Which social 
imaginaries do ordinary end 
users hold of the Facebook’s 
algorithmic visibility regime? 
SRQ 3.1: Do ordinary end 
users’ attempt to expand the 
visibility of their civic voice 
expressions on Facebook? If 
so, is this attempt associated 
with how they articulate 
these expressions? 
SRQ 3.2: Do ordinary 
end users’ attempt to 
reduce the visibility of 
their civic voice 
expressions on 
Facebook? If so, is this 
attempt associated 





























How did you discover this 
[What does define what you 
see on your social media 
news feed about politics?] 
*What does define what you 
see on your social media 
news feed about politics? 
*What, if anything, do you 
do to change what you see in 
your newsfeed about politics? 
What, if anything, do you 
do to change what you see in 
your newsfeed about politics? 
What, if anything, do 
you do to change what 











How did you discover this 
[Who can see your 
posts/comments on politics 
on social media?]? 
*Who can see your political 
activities on politics on social 
media? 
*Have you changed your 
political activities on social 
media because these 
activities might be seen? 
N/A 
Have you changed your 
political activities on 
social media because 
these activities might be 
seen? 
How did you discover this 
[what makes your post/ 
comment on politics on 
social media more visible)? 
*What does it make your 
political activities on social 
media more visible? 
*What, if anything, do you 
do to increase the visibility of 
your political activities on 
social media? 
What, if anything, do you 
do to increase the visibility of 
your political activities on 
social media? 
N/A 
Being Heard N/A N/A 
* When you act politically on 
social media, do you feel you 
are heard? 
* Do you think people would 
hear you more if your political 
activities were more visible? 
* When you act 
politically on social 
media, do you feel you 
are heard? 
*Do you think people 
would hear you more if 
your political activities 












List of interviewees, with basic demographic information. 
 
Pseudonym Gender Age Race Ideology Occupation 
Daniel Male 55 White Centre Businessman 
Lorenzo Male 23 White Centre Retail clerk (unemployed) 
Eneas Male 36 White Conservative Small businessman 
Rafael Male 32 White Conservative Undergraduate student (law) 
Vigo Male 26 White Conservative Accountant (unemployed) 
Alex Male 51 White Conservative IT professional (unemployed) 
Davi Male 45 White Conservative English teacher 
Luis Male 62 White Conservative Pensioner 
Fabricio Male 21 Non-White Conservative Telemarketer 
Antonio Male 48 Non-White Conservative Real estate agent 




Artur Male 40 White Progressive Documentarist 
Fabio Male 40 White Progressive Manager in a tattoo shop 
Theo Male 25 White Progressive Lawyer 
Vicente Male 36 White Progressive Theatre teacher 
Bernardo Male 26 White Progressive Public employee 
Adão Male 35 White Progressive High-school teacher 
Pedro Male 33 White Progressive Publishing company employee 
Gael Male 37 White Progressive Graphic artist 
Ulises Male 52 White Conservative (did not say) 
Humberto Male 29 White Progressive Copy Editor 
Alvaro Male 27 White Progressive Private tutor 
 267 
Victor Male 35 White Progressive Clerk in cultural centre 
Octavio Male 38 Non-White Progressive Cultural producer 
Cristian Male 22 Non-White Progressive Undergraduate student (geography) 
Nicolas Male 34 Non-White Progressive Telemarketer 
Benjamin Male 23 Non-White Progressive Junior consultant 
Laura Female 24 White Centre Freelancing journalist 
Kate Female 24 Non-White Centre Freelancing journalist 
Rosa Female 22 Non-White Centre Nurse 
Maria Female 34 White Conservative Event organizer (unemployed) 
Helena Female 36 White Conservative Undergraduate student (law) 
Ireni Female 49 White Progressive Lawyer 
Lucia Female 27 White Progressive Actress 
Fernanda Female 36 White Progressive Engineer 
Leticia Female 40 White Progressive Psychologist 
Olivia Female 43 White Progressive Editor 
Emilia Female 40 White Progressive Real estate agent 
Amanda Female 41 White Progressive Video-maker 
Telma Female 28 White Progressive Musician (maternity leave) 
Patricia Female 42 Non-White Progressive Nurse 
Manuela Female 21 Non-White Progressive Architect 
Ava Female 32 Non-White Progressive Junior Marketer 
Lorena Female 30 Non-White Progressive Funk dancer 
Joaquim Female 32 Non-White Progressive Script writer 













Translation of the basic text enclosed in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
“Do you talk about politics in social networks? Not affiliated with any party or social movements? 
Send a message to this page and get interviewed! 
 
My name is João Carlos Magalhães, I am a journalist and researcher at The London School of 
Economics and Political Science - LSE. I look for people to be interviewed for about an hour about 
how they use social media to do and talk about politics. The result of the interviews will be used for 
my doctorate. 
 
Interested? Send a * message * to this page (it only takes a few seconds) or an email to j.c.vieira-
magalhaes@lse.ac.uk. 
 























Table summarizing the empirical findings and conceptual insights of the thesis, linking them 






Empirical Findings Conceptual 
Insights 
 
(Chapter 9) Chapter Section 
Main Themes (correspond to 
main sections of the chapters) 
 
Specific Themes 



































































End User-Excluding Order 
Visibility 
Expansion 
Projects / Civic 
Voice 
(Sections 3.3, 


















































Projects / Civic 
Voice 
(Sections 3.3, 




8.2 Control of Non-Civic Voice 
Elements 

















8.4 Reasons for no project 
Unnecessary 
 
Unacceptable 
 
